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Abstract of Thesis 
 
The endeavour to prove the existence of God through reason and rational 
argumentation formed a key element of medieval Islamic theological and 
philosophical discourses - this is an assumption frequently articulated in the 
secondary academic literature devoted to the subject. But is this really the case? 
The discourse these theologians and philosophers are said to have participated 
in is commonly compared to the discourse on arguments for the existence of 
God formulated in western philosophy: both traditions, as it were, it is argued 
are concerned with proving that God exists. This thesis, however, argues that 
proofs for God’s existence are actually absent from the theological and 
philosophical works of the classical Islamic era (3rd/9th – 7th/13th centuries). 
This is not to say that the arguments we encounter there are flawed or 
unconvincing arguments and do not succeed in proving what they set out to 
establish: that is, God’s existence. Reviewing the constellation of arguments and 
discussion germane to this subject, this thesis argues that medieval Islamic 
theologians and philosophers did not seek to prove that God exists, but that 
there existed an entirely different purpose which informed their 
endeavours. Various indications can be found that suggest the need for a re-
appraisal of the discussions in question, and this thesis shall identify them. 
Since we seek not only to identify what it is the participants of this discourse 
sought to prove, but also to examine its development with regards to the use of 
arguments, concepts and terminology – the former would, obviously, not be 
possible without the latter –, we shall approach our sources in a chronological 
order with eight chapters being dedicated to a number of the most important 
classical Islamic theologians and philosophers.  
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Introduction 
The endeavour to prove the existence of God through reason and rational 
argumentation was an integral part of medieval Islamic theology as well as 
philosophy, it has often been argued in secondary literature1 – but is this really 
the case? 
It has been said that Islamic theologians and philosophers formulated their 
arguments taking their inspiration from the philosophical thinking of Aristotle 
and Plato, with whom they had in common the intention of poving that God 
exists.2 Some scholars have argued that these medieval Islamic arguments can 
also be linked to the attempts to prove that God exists to be found among 
western thinkers, who were infact inspired by the former. Herbert Davidson, for 
instance, traces the origins of the ‘cosmological and ontological proofs for the 
existence of God’, appearing from the time of the philosopher René Descartes 
(1596-1650), to the Islamic ‘cosmological proofs, initiated by Avicenna’.3 
William Lane Craig, to name but one more scholar, has likewise stated that his 
so-called kalām cosmological argument for the existence of God ‘originated in 
the minds of medieval Arabic theologians, who bequeathed it to the West’.4  
It is certainly important to bear in mind that – what we could call – the western 
discourse on arguments for God’s existence is not a homogenous one: thinkers 
such as Descartes and Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), but also Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and many others, whom Craig had in mind when 
he spoke of ‘the West’, might have had different reasons for formulating their 
proofs of God’s existence and might also have written for different audiences.5 
                                                          
1 This shall become evident from our engagement with the secondary literature in the following 
chapters.  
2 In particular with regards to the cosmological and the teleological argument for God’s 
existence, it is said that their roots lie in Greek philosophy (Evans and Manis 2009, p. 68 and p. 
77; Kvanvig 2008, p. 106; J. L. Mackie in Taliaferro and Griffiths 2002, p. 242; Davidson 1987, p. 
2).  
3 Davidson 1987, p. 388. 
4 Craig 1979, p. ix 
5 Nancy Kendrik (2011) has pointed out that Anselm of Canterbury, for instance, formulated his 
argument in the Proslogion, which has often been referred to as an argument for God’s 
existence, not with an atheistic audience in mind, notwithstanding the fact that Anselm 
addresses himself to ‘the fool who hath said in his heart, There is no God’. His argument is 
addressed at ‘fellow monks, to understand through reason what they already accept through 
faith’ (p. 74). Robert J. Fogelin (1990) has noted that Thomas Aquinas’ Five Ways to 
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The same, it could be argued, is true for the audiences different Islamic 
theologians and philosophers had mind when they formulated their proofs.6 Yet, 
besides these details, it is nevertheless the case that, generally speaking, the 
discourse western thinkers engaged in has often been likened to the Islamic 
discourse on arguments for God’s existence: in both traditions,7 it has been 
suggested, we encounter various attempts to prove that God exists. Further 
parallels have been drawn by scholars of the Islamic discourse where they 
classify the arguments put forward by Muslim theologians and philosophers 
following Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) categorisation of arguments for God’s 
existence as cosmological, teleological or ontological8 – categories which are 
                                                                                                                                                                    
demonstrate ‘that God exists’, as Aquinas himself has it, are addresses at those who uphold that 
‘appeals to natural principles and appeals to human reason and human will do not wholly 
explain natural phenomena. Thus for a complete explanation of natural phenomena, these 
natural principles must be supplemented by an appeal beyond the natural realm’ (p. 306). In 
recent years, William Lane Craig (1949-), a Christian apologist, has employed his own so-called 
kalam cosmological argument for God’s existence in debates with atheists (see, for instance, his 
chapter “Five Reasons God Existst” in his and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s God? A Debate 
Between A Christians and An Atheist (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004)). 
6 Much of al-Māturīdī’s Kitāb al-Tawḥīd, for example, is written in response to certain dualistic 
beliefs held by Zoroastrians and Manichaens who lived, like him, in Samarqand, as well as to 
theologians of the Muʿtazilite school. The implications of this, in particular with a view to his 
role in formulating arguments for God’s existence, will be discussed in Chapter 2. Al-Ghazālī, on 
the other hand, in his Tahāfut al-falāsifa addresses himself first and foremost to the 
philosophers and attempts to defend certain propositions accepted among, as he states, all 
proponents of kalām. He, too, is said to have discussed the question of the proof and provability 
of God’s existence in this work, which we shall discuss in Chapter 6. 
7 When speaking in the following of the Islamic and the western ‘tradition’, then this is not done 
without acknowledging the difficulty of ‘lumping together’, as it were, many varying thought 
systems, forms of argument and intentions behind them in one single ‘tradition’. Maybe 
speaking of Islamic and western ‘traditions’, respectively, would do more justice. Yet, in order to 
distinguish one discourse (namely the one Islamic theologians and philosophers engaged in and 
where they responded to each other) from another (namely the one associated with the ‘West’), 
this broad classification makes sense. Compare Jan-Peter Hartung’s “Schulen, Netze, Traditionen: 
Zur Institutionalisierung von Wissen in der persophonen Welt der Frühen Neuzeit” on the 
question of what constitutes, and when we speak of, a ‘school of thought’.    
8 See Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Herausgegeben von Wilhelm Weischedel, Band 4, 
Zweiter Teil, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983), p. 526. By a cosmological 
argument for God’s existence we mean the following: ‘cosmological arguments are, as the name 
implies, attempts to infer the existence of God from the existence of the cosmos or universe. 
Such arguments may take as their starting point the existence of the universe as a whole, the 
existence of particular objects or the existence of even the individual object. These arguments 
are sometimes called first-cause arguments because they attempt to infer that God must exist as 
the first cause or ultimate cause of the universe’ (Evans and Manis 2009, p. 67). A teleological 
argument, which is a subcategory of the cosmological argument, is defined in the following way: 
‘it too begins with the existence of the cosmos. It begins, however, not merely with its existence 
but with its character as a cosmos, an orderly universe. It is often referred to as the argument 
from design’ (Evans and Manis 2009, p. 77). By an ontological argument, we mean one which 
‘takes its departure from a given concept of the nature of God. Through nothing more than an 
analysis of the concept, it undertakes…to deduce the actual existence of the corresponding 
object’ (Davidson 1987, p. 390). Cosmological and teleological arguments are a posteriori 
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likewise used to refer to the proofs by the aforementioned western 
philosophers.     
This thesis proposes that a re-evaluation of what has been referred to as 
medieval Islamic arguments for God’s existence is necessary. Contrary to the 
widely held view, described above, that Islamic theologians and philosophers 
sought to prove that God exists, this thesis argues that proofs for the existence 
of God are absent from their works. By this, we do not mean that their 
arguments are bad arguments for the existence of God or that they do not 
succeed in what they aspire to accomplish. This thesis is not concerned with 
evaluating the strengths or weaknesses of their proofs. Rather, what we are 
referring to is the purpose and objective of these arguments: what are they 
meant to prove? We argue that medieval Islamic theologians and philosophers 
did not attempt or seek to prove that God exists. The identification of certain 
passages in their works with arguments for God’s existence, as has been argued 
by numerous scholars, seems to pose a misunderstanding and 
misrepresentation of what these proofs are meant to establish. This thesis is 
dedicated to a re-evaluation of the medieval Islamic philosophico-theological 
discourse which, in the scholarly meta-discourse, has been regarded as a 
discourse on the proof of God’s existence. It shall examine and explain what the 
participants in this discourse sought to prove, if it is not the existence of God. In 
doing so, this thesis does not attempt a comparison of the discourse in question 
between the western philosophical tradition and the Islamic tradition either. It 
is rather trying to show that it seems to be mistaken to assume that Islamic 
scholars were concerned with the proof and provability of God, from which it 
follows that it would likewise be mistaken to assume – as has been done – that 
one and the same discourse can be found in both the Islamic and the western 
tradition.9  
                                                                                                                                                                    
arguments which are based on experience and certain observations about the world, while 
ontological arguments are a priori arguments which conclude that God exists before 
considering this world (Jackson 2011, p. 18). 
9 While the discourse on arguments for God’s existence is therefore absent from medieval 
Islamic works of theology and philosophy, as this thesis argues, it can of course be maintained 
that other discourses do appear in both traditions: such as the problem of evil or theodicy, to 
mention but one. See, for instance, Eric L. Ormsby’s Theodicy in Islamic Thought: The Dispute 
over al-Ghazālī’s ‘Best of all Possible Worlds’ (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) and 
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A number of reasons emerge why past research has seemingly misunderstood 
the nature of the discourse in question, and this thesis shall identify where 
these misconceptions lie. In some cases, a more exact understanding of the 
meaning and use of certain terminology is required in order to appreciate the 
concerns of the aforementioned discourse participants. It shall be seen that the 
phrase ‘argument for God’s existence’, for instance, can denote entirely different 
things, depending on the context in which the discussion takes place and on 
what the argument is meant to prove. To avoid confusion, we will speak of 
‘classical’ or ‘traditonal’ arguments for God’s existence when intending a 
cosmological, teleological or ontological argument seeking to show that God 
exists, as discussed before. Other meanings associated with the phrase (that is, 
arguments or proofs of God’s existence), which we will encounter throughout 
this thesis, will be indicated and explained where necessary. In other cases, 
important indications as to what these theologians and philosophers sought to 
prove have been overlooked because only those passages which are usually 
associated with the discourse on proofs of God’s existence were taken into 
consideration while neglecting other relevant evidence dispersed throughout 
the philosophico-theological works.  
In addition to this, we also need to bear in mind another consideration: all 
arguments for the existence of God cannot do without defining what they mean 
by ‘God’ in order to succeed at all.10 It is known that in the history of these 
arguments in western philosophy, for instance, different concepts of God have 
been put forward. Anselm of Canterbury (c. 1033-1109) famously proposed a 
                                                                                                                                                                    
McBrayer, Justin P., Howard-Snyder, Daniel (eds), The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of 
Evil (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).   
10 Nicholas Everitt (2004, p. 15) has pointed out that, in arguments for God’s existence, ‘God’ 
does not so much stand for a proper name as for a description. They must therefore answer the 
question: ‘for which description in particular is it a shorthand?’ In many instances of such 
arguments it is actually the case that the entity proven to exist is rather different from common 
descriptions of God. With regards to the conclusion reached by Leibniz in his proof, Everitt 
highlights ‘how very ungodlike Leibniz’s necessary being is. Although Leibniz refers to this 
being as ‘God’…there is no ground in this argument for thinking that the being possesses such 
traditional attributes as omnipotence, omniscience or moral perfection.’ (ibid., p. 75) With 
regards to what he perceives as Islamic arguments for God’s existence, Davidson has pointed 
out the same difficulty: ‘the Kalam thinkers unfortunately do not state what, precisely, a 
complete proof must comprise. After arriving at a cause of the universe, adherents of the Kalam 
proceed to argue that the ultimate cause of the universe is eternal, one, and incorporeal... – but 
they do not tell us precisely which of these attributes are being established as part of their 
proofs of the existence of God and which are ancillary attributes’ (1987, p. 214).      
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concept of God which entailed that He was ‘a being than which none greater can 
be conceived’11 and argued for God’s existence on the basis that existence is a 
‘great-making property’ which must, therefore, be affirmed for God.12 Thomas 
Aquinas (1225-1274), in the fifth of his Five Ways to prove God’s existence, 
presents God as the cause of the workings of natural bodies, while conceding 
that it is only God’s existence which can be inferred from these effects, not, 
however, His comprehensive nature. 13  Yet, no matter what the concept 
proposed is and whether we are dealing with a cosmological, a teleological or 
an ontological argument, what they all have – and must have – in common is 
that they want to establish that there is a certain entity, that is, to refute the 
non-existence of this entity. Since this is the case, it is doubtable whether 
certain instances in the works of Islamic theologians and philosophers, which 
secondary literature has identified as arguments seeking to prove God’s 
existence, fit this description; it rather seems to be the case that all their proofs 
are concerned with is a debate and dispute about the nature of God where the 
mere existence of the entity which we refer to as God is already accepted. To 
label such proofs as arguments for God’s existence, rather than arguments for a 
certain nature of God, seems to confuse two separate and distinct points of 
enquiry and hence leads to a misrepresentation of the discourse these scholars 
engaged in.14 Yet, someone could object to this important point we just made by 
asking: does it still make sense to speak of a dispute about the nature of God, 
rather than His existence if two people disagree to such an extent about what 
they mean by ‘God’ that the concepts they defend have not much, or nothing, in 
common? Would then not the attempt on the part of a theologian, for instance, 
to prove his conception of God and thereby to disprove that held by a 
philosopher constitute an argument for God’s existence? Something similar has 
                                                          
11 Quoted from Anselm’s Proslogion in Evans and Manis 2009, p. 63. 
12 Evans and Manis 2009, p. 63 and p. 65. 
13 Fogelin 1990, pp. 306-307. 
14 This point has already been hinted at by Nancy Kendrik with reference to Saint Anselm’s 
proof in the Proslogion, yet she does not go so far as to reject labelling it an argument for God’s 
existence. She writes: ‘Anselm’s argument in the Proslogion is often said to be an attempt to 
prove that God exists. This is true, but one must be careful in asserting it. … He is not trying to 
convince atheists that there really is a God. Instead, Anselm is arguing for a particular 
conception of God’ (2011, p. 73). Graham Oppy has, more fittingly, phrased Saint Anselm’s 
argument as a ‘proof for the existence and nature ,my emphasis- of God’ (Oppy in Jordan 2010, 
p. 22).      
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indeed been argued by Craig in a different context.15 Here we need to bear in 
mind two things: firstly, it will be seen that the theologians and philosophers 
engaged in this kind of dispute always concede to their opponents belief in the 
godhead even where fundamentally different conceptions are involved. 
Secondly, while the above point may be valid in itself, it might not be the case 
that this is how medieval Islamic theologians and philosophers perceived their 
own endeavours. It can be shown, this thesis argues, that these scholars did not 
conceive of their disputes about God’s nature as tantamount to disputes about 
God’s existence (that is, their particular ‘God’ and His existence), and it is their 
understanding of this discourse this thesis enquires into.  
The misrepresentation of the medieval Islamic discourse in question we spoke 
of above, as well as the causes leading to this confusion, becomes most apparent 
when it comes to arguments which have been identified as cosmological proofs. 
We need to bear in mind that the inference of the cause from a given effect, 
which is what all cosmological arguments attempt to do, can mean two distinct 
things: in the case of an argument for God’s existence it means that the effect 
points to the existence of a cause, having certain qualities, which is then 
identified as ‘God’. A cosmological argument for God’s existence therefore seeks 
to show that an instance of what we mean by ‘God’ really exists, rather than that 
it does not. Yet, the inference of a cause from an effect can also refer to 
something entirely different, and it is this what classical Islamic theologians and 
philosophers had in mind, as this thesis argues. It can be the answer to the 
question, ‘What or who is the cause of a given effect?’ or put differently, ‘Who 
did this?’ In this case, the intention is to identify who the agent of a given action 
is, based on the action. The explanations of the great philosopher Ibn Sīnā (d. 
427/1037) shall serve us as an example to clarify this point: when writing 
                                                          
15 In response to Francis J. Beckwith’s article “Do Muslims and Christians Worship the Same 
God?” (17 December 2015, www.thecatholicthing.org). Beckwith argued that Christians and 
Muslims indeed do worship the same God as ‘the fact that Christians may call God “Yahweh” and 
Muslims call God “Allah” makes no difference if both “Gods” have identical properties. … The 
fact that one may have incomplete knowledge or hold a false belief about another person…does 
not mean that someone who has better or truer knowledge about that person is not thinking 
about the same person.’ Craig (“Do Christians and Muslims Worship the Same God”, 7 February 
2016, www.reasonablefaith.org) objected to this view, arguing, ‘I think we can argue that the 
conceptions of God in Christianity and Islam are so fundamentally different that they are not the 
same God.’ Based on Craig’s view, one could argue that a Christian and Muslim’s dispute about 
God’s nature is tantamount to a dispute about the very existence of (their respective) God.   
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about a type of syllogism called dalīl, he states that it ‘clarifies the cause from 
the effect’.16 The example Ibn Sīnā gives to illustrate its working is the following: 
this tree is burnt; everything burnt came into contact with fire; hence, this tree 
came into contact with fire.17 What this example clarifies is how the inference of 
the cause from the effect can, and indeed is, used to answer the question of what 
has to be indentified as the cause belonging to a given effect. A burnt tree, the 
effect before us, allows the inference that it is nothing but fire which has to be 
identified as its cause. Importantly, this inference of the cause from the effect 
does not seek what the inference of the cause from the effect seeks in all 
cosmological arguments for God’s existence. Yet, it is the objective discussed 
last, we will argue, medieval Islamic theologians and philosophers pursued 
when they presented arguments along the lines of, or following a similar 
structure as, what we mean by cosmological proofs for God’s existence.  
It was the philosopher Karl Popper (1902-1994) who pointed out that all truly 
scientific theories must be fasifiable; a theory that cannot, in principle, be 
fasified cannot claim to be scientific and is not a good theory at all: ‘wir fordern, 
daß es die logische Form des Systems ermöglicht, dieses auf dem Wege der 
methodischen Nachprüfung negativ auszuzeichnen: Ein empirisch-
wissenschaftliches System muß an der Erfahrung scheitern können.’18 This 
must hold true as well for the claim this thesis makes. We shall therefore stress 
the following: it will be seen that the strongest argument in favour of our thesis 
has to do with the meaning of certain phrases, as indicated above, which allow 
us to establish what particular arguments associated with the discourse in 
question are meant to prove. If our thesis, therefor, to a great extent hinges on 
the meaning of these phrases (among other indications!), it follows that they, at 
the same time, guarantee the falsifiability of our thesis. These phrases, for 
instance, are not used to ‘fit’ our thesis, rather they are evidence to strengthen it 
since, in principle, they could falsify it. We must therefore also conclude that 
what lends support to one thesis, falsifies the claims of a contrary thesis. It is 
                                                          
16 Ibn Sīnā, al-Shifāʾ, al-Burhān, p. 33.   
17 Ibn Sīnā, al-Najāt, al-Burhān, p. 103. 
18 Popper, Karl, Logik der Forschung: Zur Erkenntnistheorie der modernen Naturwissenschaft. 
Wien: Springer-Verlag, 1935, pp. 12-13. 
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based on this reasoning that we speak of a misrepresentation of the discourse in 
question and its concerns in academic literature.    
Certain indications can be found in the writings of medieval Islamic theologians 
and philosophers that allow us an answer to the question of why they were not 
concerned with the proof of God’s existence. The answer to this question has to 
do with audiences and the origins of certain theologico-philosophical debates in 
the Qurʾān, to name but two examples. This thesis will attempt to identify them. 
At the same time, we need to be aware of the difficulties in answering the 
question of why something does not appear in these works: when a certain 
question is not discussed, we are generally not told why it is not discussed, 
which would otherwise allow us to infer that the discourse participants were 
aware of the question, but chose, for whatever reasons, not to expound upon it. 
When it comes to proofs for God’s existence, which are, as this thesis argues, 
absent from medieval Islamic works of theology and philosophy, it seems to be 
the case that a positive answer as to why they are absent poses a difficulty and 
would lead us into the realm of speculation, as will become clear.       
As indicated, the discourse we are concerned with properly belongs to the two 
disciplines of speculative theology (ʿilm al-kalām) and the metaphysical branch 
of philosophy (falsafa) respectively.19 Our analysis of it shall therefore rest on 
an examination of works of kalām and falsafa, to the exclusion of works 
belonging to other Islamic disciplines, such as Qurʾānic exegesis, which might in 
places contain certain references to the discourse in question. Only in one 
instance, we shall take into consideration a Tafsīr work, for reasons that will be 
explained. This thesis will cover a time period of five centuries, from the 
beginnings of our discourse in the 3rd century Hijri/9th century CE to its 
advancements and finally what can be described as its culminating point in 
terms of intellectual and argumentative rigour in the 7th/13th century. Since we 
seek not only to establish what it is these theologians and philosophers sought 
to prove, but also to examine the development of the discourse with regards to 
                                                          
19 Kalām discourses are characterised by their resort to dialectical methods and rational 
frameworks in order to explain theological doctrine. The term kalām seems, initially, to have 
been used to refer to the method of employing dialogues to flesh out theological propositions, 
identifying through a sequence of questions and corresponding answers certain logical 
contradictions in the doctrines held by an opponent. See Shah 2014. 
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the use of arguments, concepts and terminology – the former would, obviously, 
not be possible without the latter –, we shall approach our sources in a 
chronological order. Eight chapters will be dedicated to some of the most 
influential proponents of kalām and falsafa who shaped the discourse in 
question. We shall begin our investigation with one of the earliest mutakallimūn, 
al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm (d. 225/860), and with the – arguably – first Arabic 
philosopher, al-Kindī (d. 256/873). We shall then turn to the eponym of the 
Maturidite school of thought, the theologian al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944). The 
subsequent chapter will be dedicated to al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/936), whose name 
would come to designate another school of thought, and to al-Bāqillānī (d. 
402/1013), an adherent of it. This shall be followed by a chapter on Ibn Sīnā (d. 
427/1037), conceivably the greatest philosopher in the Islamic tradition, as 
well as on al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), one of Ashʿarism’s leading figures. We 
shall then turn to one of the greatest defenders of the theological tradition and 
harshest critic of philosophy, al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), followed by a chapter on 
Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198) who for his part took up the defence of philosophy 
after al-Ghazālī’s attack. We shall conclude our investigation with one of the 
most significant theologians of the later Ashʿarite tradition, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī 
(d. 606/1209). Besides these scholars, we will also take into consideration, in 
different chapters, the works of a number of theologians belonging to the 
Muʿtazilite school of thought, such as al-Fuwatī (d. 209/825), al-Naẓẓām (d. 
230/845), Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī (d. 321/933), ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025) 
and al-Malāḥimī (d. 536/1141). The works of the Maturidite Abū al-Muʿīn al-
Nasafī (d. 507/1114) and of Abū al-Qāsim al-Anṣārī (d. 511/1118), one of al-
Juwaynī’s disciples, shall also be adduced in our quest. Our selection of scholars 
is not meant to convey the idea that other thinkers, contemporary with the ones 
selected or coming after them, did not also contribute to developing the 
discourse in question; rather, we have chosen these individuals primarily on the 
basis that most of them are the ones who have been identified by previous 
research as participants of the medieval discourse which has the proof of God’s 
existence as its subject-matter. Since this thesis argues that the discourse these 
scholars were engaged in was not concerned with the proof of God’s existence, 
it makes sense to focus primarily on the abovementioned thinkers so as to show 
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where a different reading of their arguments allows different conclusions about 
their objectives. A more comprehensive study of arguments for God’s existence 
in Isamic theological and philosophical thought would surely benefit from 
taking into consideration also less studied scholars as well as those coming after 
al-Rāzī, with whom our study ends, but this would be beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  
Even if this thesis argues that the discourse in question has been mistaken as 
being concerned with the proof that God exists, it is undisputed that the 
discourse itself has rightly been identified as a significant aspect of the 
intellectual history of medieval Islamic theology and philosophy. This is evident 
from the important position it assumes and the depth of argumentation in these 
works. The theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, for example, points out how this 
particular aspect of theology – that is, the proof of the creator, usually inferred 
from creation – forms the basis of other major Islamic disciplines, such as 
Qurʾānic exegesis (Tafsīr), the study of the Ḥadīth literature as well as 
jurisprudence (Fiqh).20 It is due to the significance belonging to this particular 
discourse that the indications to be found in the relevant philosophico-
theological works should be further investigated – indications which suggest 
that their authors might have sought to prove something different than God’s 
existence.  
  
                                                          
20 Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr, vol. 2, p. 95. 
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Chapter One: al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm (d. 225/860) and al-Kindī (d. 
256/873) 
 
Al-Qāsim  
‘The main subject of our epistle is the argument from design,’ Binyamin 
Abrahamov writes in the introduction to his translation and edition of al-
Qāsim’s Kitāb al-Dalīl al-kabīr. ‘This argument,’ he continues, stating its purpose, 
‘proves the existence of God through the wonderful design observed all over the 
universe.’21 This class of argument, which is based on the notion of design and 
which can occur with different foci,22 can be found, according to Abrahamov, in 
the writings of the earliest as well as later mutakallimūn,23 and primarily of 
those belonging to the Muʿtazilite school of thought as the other schools mostly 
gave preference to different sorts of arguments.24 Generally speaking, the 
argument from design in al-Qāsim’s al-Dalīl al-kabīr consists, in Abrahamov’s 
eyes, in his pointing to the existence of a plenitude of signs in this world which 
reveal its being made and created. Wilferd Madelung, too, identifies al-Qāsim’s 
arguments as proofs for God’s existence on the basis of the order observed in 
this world.25 Creation requires a creator, and the perfection, order and wisdom 
behind the signs point to God whose existence is consequentially proven.26 Al-
Qāsim also makes use of a number of other concepts to make his point, such as 
the notions of change and particularisation (takhṣīṣ).27 We shall see that these 
are early instances of concepts which should later come to play an important 
                                                          
21 Abrahamov’s introduction to al-Qāsim, al-Dalīl, p. 1. See also p. 7: ‘K. al-dalīl al-kabīr...deal[s] 
with the argument for the existence of God and the creation of the world.’ See also Daiber 1975 
who briefly mentions al-Qāsim among those who prove ‘Gott aus der Weltordnung’ (p. 160). See 
Horten 1912, p. 13 et seqq. (‘Das Gottesproblem’) for a general outlook on – what he identifies 
as – the theological arguments for God’s existence (‘Gottesbeweise’). 
22 Abrahamov states for instance with reference to al-Maqdisī that his ‘argument from chance 
,and- argument from composition…are in effect arguments from design in other terms’ (ibid., p. 
3). 
23 Besides the Muʿtazilites al-Fuwatī and al-Naẓẓām, Abrahamov mentions such scholars as al-
Bāqillānī, Ibn Ḥazm, al-Ghazālī and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī whom he believes to have made 
recourse to this argument (ibid., pp. 2-6). 
24 Ibid., pp. 1-2. Madelung (1965, p. 106) believes that the argument from design is not the 
‘traditional argument’ employed by Muʿtazilite theologians, giving preference to the argument 
from the createdness of the world instead.  
25 Madelung 1965, p. 106. 
26 Abrahamov’s introduction to al-Qāsim, al-Dalīl, pp. 7-8. 
27 Ibid., p. 10. 
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role in the arguments theologians employed to ‘affirm the creator,’ as it often 
appears, and this is particularly true for the concept of particularisation. 
Contrary to Abrahamov and Madelung’s view that the proofs in al-Qāsim’s al-
Dalīl al-kabīr are arguments from designs with the purpose of proving that God 
exists, we shall argue that the proof of God’s existence is in fact absent from al-
Qāsim’s work. As opposed to Abrahamov’s view that the argument from design 
for God’s existence constitutes the ‘main theme’ of the Dalīl kabīr, it shall be 
seen that the main theme running through the entire book is the following: 
Creation insofar as it contains the signs of making and arrangement allows us to 
infer that it must be ascribed to none other than God as His work. Furthermore, 
the characteristics of created things allow us to gain knowledge about God’s 
nature. The purpose these signs serve in al-Qāsim’s reasoning is, hence, 
different from the purpose they serve in the traditional argument from design 
for God’s existence, as we shall clarify in more detail.  
The ‘Proof of God’ and al-Qāsim’s Concern in the Kitāb al-Dalīl al-
kabīr 
Al-Qāsim himself indicates at the very beginning of his work that it will be 
concerned with giving an answer to the question posed by those he refers to as 
zanādiqa and mulḥidūn28 who ‘ask about the proof for God (al-dalīl ʿan Allāh) 
the Lord of the worlds.’29 It is certainly the case that such expressions as ‘the 
proof for God’ do not immediately intimidate their ultimate objective or aim, 
and Abrahamov and Madelung in fact believe that it refers to ‘the proof of the 
existence of God,’ as we have pointed out above. The same difficulty exists when 
al-Qāsim speaks of ‘God’s proofs (ḥujaj) for the people to gain knowledge about 
Him (fī’l-ʿilm bihi)...and pieces of evidence to attain knowledge of Him 
                                                          
28 Note that both terms were usually used for individuals who were considered to deviate from 
the orthodox tenets of Islam, be they adherents of dualistic beliefs, Sufis, Shiʿites, philosophers 
or even other mutakallimūn (Abrahamov in al-Qāsim, al-Dalīl, pp. 180-182, f. 1 and 2). Al-Kindī 
labels those who uphold the reality of the divine attributes as mulḥidūn (al-Kindī (1950), Risāla 
fī waḥdāniyya Allāh wa-tanāhī jirm al-ʿālam, p. 207). For Abrahamov’s remark that ‘,a-l-Ghazālī 
regards as zanādiqa the philosophers who…deny the existence of a creator,’ (Abrahamov in al-
Qāsim, al-Dalīl, p. 181, f. 1) which implies atheism on their part, see our Chapter Six on al-
Ghazālī.    
29 Al-Qāsim, al-Dalīl, p. 62. All translations from al-Qāsim’s al-Dalīl are mine, unless indicated 
otherwise. 
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(maʿrifatihi)’30 which are clear and established or when he introduces ‘the 
clearest traces of (His) wisdom in the things’ as the method which ‘brings about 
knowledge of Him (al-ʿilm bihi).’31  
It is nevertheless possible to gain an idea of what such expressions as ‘the proof 
for God’ and attaining ‘knowledge of Him’ refer to when we consider the 
following: After a discussion of different ways of perceiving God where al-Qāsim 
singles out the one based on the manifold signs contained in creation as the one 
prepared by God Himself, he adduces a great number of Qurʾānic verses which 
are seen to exemplify this approach. God Himself, al-Qāsim states, tells us 
‘through the established signs (aʿlām)…which are always present in the heavens 
and the earth and what is in between them’ how we can know Him (annahu 
yuʿraf).32 One such instance al-Qāsim refers to is Q. 10.31-32. In these two 
verses God poses the rhetorical question who provides for humans, who brings 
forth life from death and in general who directs all affairs. The answer is given 
immediately: It is God, and a further question is posed: ‘{So why do you not take 
heed for Him?}’33 Al-Qāsim comments on these verses that everything God 
mentions points to its being ‘created (makhlūq) and not a creator itself,’34 its 
being ‘arranged (mudabbar) and not an arranger’35 and in general contains 
‘evidence of influence from one who exerts influence (muʾaththir).’36 Al-Qāsim’s 
train of thought is at the outset, admittedly, reminiscent of the traditional 
arguments from design, yet his statement at the end of it that ‘there must hence 
be one who arranges (mudabbir) all affairs, and there exists none such other 
than God (wa-lan yūjad illā’llāh)’37 indicates a different reading: Bringing 
together the Qurʾānic reasoning with terminology and concepts characteristic of 
dialectical discourses, al-Qāsim seeks to identify God as the one who brings 
about everything. ‘God is the creator,’38 al-Qāsim concludes his discussion of the 
                                                          
30 Ibid., p. 62. 
31 Ibid., pp. 62/64.  
32 Ibid., p. 76. 
33 Ibid., p. 80. All translations of the Qurʾān are taken from Abdel Haleem 2004.   
34 Ibid., p. 80. 
35 Ibid., p. 80. 
36 Ibid., pp. 80/82. 
37 Ibid., p. 82. 
38 Ibid., p. 82. 
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above verses. In this endeavour, it is not God’s existence which al-Qāsim seeks 
to prove on the basis of the need of design for some designer.  
All Qurʾānic verses adduced by al-Qāsim indeed serve the purpose of proving 
this very point. With reference to Q. 57.17 which reminds humans that {God 
revives the earth after it dies}, al-Qāsim reasons that everyone has to admit that 
there is no human being ‘who exerts influence (and) arranges’ and that the 
‘trace of...arrangement’ is ‘from God, not from humans.’39 Even Jesus, who 
according to the Qurʾān revived the dead, did so, al-Qāsim emphasises, only by a 
capacity given to him by God.40 This reasoning, which establishes God alone as 
creator and director of all affairs following certain Qurʾānic verses, reappears in 
later Muʿtazilite works with the same function. In his Kitāb al-Majmūʿ fī’l-muḥīṭ 
bi’l-taklīf, ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025), for instance, clearly states his objective 
of showing that ‘there is no originator for the bodies except for God’41 and that 
‘the Eternal (Most-High!) is the originator of the bodies.’42 To achieve this, he 
explains that ‘originated things (ḥawādith) must be affirmed which do not come 
from us in order that we are led to God through them.’43 As a Muʿtazilite, ʿAbd 
al-Jabbār of course affirms human causal efficacy besides God’s authorship.44 In 
order to prove God as the being who brought about the world, he therefore 
makes recourse to events ‘the servants (al-ʿibād) are not able to bring 
about…such as an earth quake.’45  
Al-Qasim for his part follows certain Qurʾānic dicta. Q. 75.36-40, which refer to 
God’s creation of humans from a drop of sperm as well as of His ability to bring 
the dead back to life, is made the foundation of the proof that God alone is 
creator. ‘This does not occur, unless due to God,’46 al-Qāsim states, pointing to 
God’s exclusive role in prolonging or shortening the span of human life. In the 
same vein, Q. 6.97 states: {It is He who made the stars, so that they can guide 
you when land and sea are dark}. Al-Qāsim eagerly emphasises that the 
                                                          
39 Ibid., p. 84. 
40 Ibid., pp. 84/86. 
41 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Majmūʿ, p. 88. 
42 Ibid., p. 90. 
43 Ibid., p. 79. 
44 See De Cillis 2014, pp. 10-16 on the Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite positions on causality. 
45 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Majmūʿ, p. 28. 
46 Al-Qāsim, al-Dalīl, p. 92. 
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alternation of night and day is from God alone.47 ‘To God (Praised!) belongs 
dominion (li’llāh subḥānahu min mulk) over every star and celestial body,’48 he 
explains, and ‘from Him is the wondrous arrangement (minhu ʿajīb al-tadbīr).’49 
Following the Qurʾān’s mention of the purposeful and wise creation of the camel, 
the mountains, the heavens and the earth in Q. 88.17-22, al-Qāsim stresses that 
‘the creation (ṣanʿ) of all these things has been established…through the signs 
(dalāʾil) in creation and its arrangement (tadbīrihi).’50 Asking about the creator 
of all these things, he remarks: ‘That is God, the Lord (rabb) of the worlds and 
creator (ṣāniʿ) of creators.’51 Then al-Qāsim refers to the reminder in Q. 26.77-
82 that God is the one {who created me [and it] is He who guides me; He who 
gives me food and drink…+ and explains it in the same way: ‘It is God, the 
creator besides whom there is no creator.’52 To ‘the signs for Him,’53 al-Qāsim 
explains, also belongs God’s ‘enlightening proof (ḥujja)’54 given in Q. 14.32-34. 
These verses declare: {It is God who created the heavens and the earth, who has 
sent down water from the sky…+. Al-Qāsim’s comment on this passage clarifies 
his understanding of what the Qurʾān seeks to establish: ‘Thus speaks God who 
created (khalaqa) all this and made it (ṣanaʿa); there is no creator in it [i.e., the 
world] other than Him and no creator for it together with Him. This is the case 
even if they deny it.’55 Likewise, Q. 31.11 admonishes humans, stating that the 
creation of the heavens and the bringing forth of plants from rain is ‘*God’s 
creation+’56 only and demands: ‘{Now, show Me what these others have 
created.}’57 Al-Qāsim weaves into the fabric of his argument the intention of this 
verse, arguing it shows that ‘all this is making and creation from Him’ and 
characterises ignorance of this fact as ‘the most evident aberrance (abyan al-
ḍalāl).’58 He furthermore expresses his disbelief how humans can have doubts 
                                                          
47 Ibid., p. 94. 
48 Ibid., p. 96. 
49 Ibid., p. 98. 
50 Ibid., p. 110. 
51 Ibid., p. 110. 
52 Ibid., p. 118. 
53 Ibid., p. 130. 
54 Ibid., p. 130. 
55 Ibid., p. 130. 
56 Ibid., p. 132. 
57 Ibid., p. 132. 
58 Ibid., p. 132. 
 
 
23 
 
concerning God or associate partners with God (shirk) when He made clear that 
‘*It is God who created the heavens and the earth}.’59 
All these passages, which are only a selection of the many references al-Qāsim 
makes to the Qurʾān, but which all follow the same train of thought, have made 
it abundantly clear that the signs in creation are not understood by al-Qāsim to 
point to the existence of another entity – God – in addition to the world; rather, 
his endeavour is to establish on the basis of wise arrangement in this world that 
it is, firstly, created, and, secondly, comes from God who is the sole creator.  
There is a number of other passages in al-Qāsim’s work which are of twofold 
importance for us: These passages not only shed further light on the question of 
what it is that al-Qāsim is seeking to establish, but support our contention that 
it is not the proof of God’s existence in the traditional sense; they also give an 
indication of the reason why to prove God’s being sole creator is a matter of 
such significance in al-Qāsim’s thought. ‘Among the signs for Him (al-dalāʾil 
ʿalayhi) is Abraham’s speech,’60 al-Qāsim writes with reference to the Qurʾānic 
account in Q. 21.52-56. The prophet was sent by God with a clear mission: ‘A 
dispute and quarrel took place between him [i.e., Abraham] and his people 
about God (fī’llāh),’ al-Qāsim explains, because he found them worshipping 
idols (al-tamāthīl)61 as well as the stars alongside their worship of God (kānū 
yaʿbudūna min al-nujūm maʿahu).62 Al-Qāsim states that Abraham admonished 
his people that ‘{Your true Lord is the Lord of the heavens and the earth, He 
who created them}’63 and he ‘reasoned on the basis of God’s signs in His 
heavens and His earth that God is the creator of all this (fa-istadalla...bi-dalāʾil 
Allāh min samawātihi wa-arḍihi ʿalā anna Allāh ṣāniʿ li-dhālika kullihi).’64 As 
opposed to Abrahamov’s suggestion – and translation – that Abraham’s dispute 
with his people was ‘about the ,existence- [sic] of God,’65 al-Qāsim’s own 
remarks make clear that Abraham sought to dissuade them from shirk when 
                                                          
59 Ibid., p. 132. This is from Q. 32.4. 
60 Ibid., p. 112. 
61 Ibid., p. 112. 
62 Ibid., p. 114. 
63 Ibid., p. 114. This is Q. 21.56. 
64 Ibid., p. 116. 
65 Ibid., p. 113. 
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they worshipped other things alongside God (maʿahu) ‘even though they are 
God’s creation, made by Him.’66 It is evident that Abraham’s pointing to signs in 
creation does not, in al-Qāsim’s understanding of his mission, serve the purpose 
of proving to his people that God exists, as they believed in God’s existence 
anyway. Rather, he uses the signs as evidence that God alone is creator and 
everything else is His creation. It is ultimately on the basis of God’s role as 
creator that His right to worship is explained, while worship of other things is 
rejected due to their being part of what is created. The numerous instances in 
Abrahamov’s translation which suggest that Abraham’s mission entailed that he 
‘brought proof of the existence of God,’67 while al-Qāsim speaks of ‘dalla...ʿalā 
rabb al-ʿālamīn,’68 as it appears in one instance, hence misunderstand the wider 
context and intend of the discussion.69  
Al-Qāsim adduces the story of yet another prophet, and it proves the same point. 
‘To the signs (dalāʾil) of those messengers and prophets who came after 
Abraham...belongs the speech of Joseph,’70 he states. When in prison, Joseph 
addressed his two fellow inmates and ‘presented proof to them that God is 
alone in terms of al-rubūbiyya (mā tafarrada Allāh bihi min al-rubūbiyya).’71 So 
what does the term al-rubūbiyya denote? Abrahamov suggests its translation as 
‘divinity.’72 Al-Qāsim’s own words, however, scattered over a few passages, 
indicate something different. In one passage, for instance, al-Qāsim mentions Q. 
23.86 which orders the Prophet to pose the question: ‘{Say, ‘Who is the Lord 
                                                          
66 Ibid., p. 114. 
67 Al-Qāsim, al-Dalīl, p. 119. 
68 Ibid., p. 118. 
69 Compare the following passages: ibid., pp. 112/113 Abrahamov’s ‘Among the proofs [of the 
existence- ,sic- of God is the statement of Abraham’ and Arabic ‘wa-min al-dalāʾil ʿalayhi qawl 
Ibrāhīm’; pp. 116/117 Abrahamov’s ‘As to the proof (dalāla) of God,‘s existence- ,sic- by His 
indications’ and Arabic ‘wa-fī’l-dalāla ʿalā’llāh bi-dalāʾilihi’; pp. 118/119 Abrahamov’s ‘Then he 
began to argue against them on behalf of God about knowing that God ,exists- ,sic-’ and Arabic 
‘thumma ibtadaʾ iḥtijājan ʿalayhim li-llāh fī-maʿrifatihi’ as well as Abrahamov’s 
‘,Abraham-...brought proof of the existence of God and proved the existence of the Lord’ and 
Arabic ‘fa-istadalla ṣalawāt Allāh ʿalayhi wa-dalla bi-mā ʿaddada min hādhā kullihi ʿalā rabb al-
ʿālamīn’; pp. 120/121 Abrahamov’s ‘Every piece of evidence...that Abraham brought, only 
proves the existence of God’ and Arabic ‘wa-laysa mimmā dalla bihi...yadullu abadan 
mustadillan illā ʿalā’llāh’ as well as Abrahamov’s ‘Praise be to God for the argument for His 
,existence- ,sic- which He manifested to Abraham’ and Arabic ‘wa’l-ḥamd li’llāh ʿalā mā abāna 
min ḥujjatihi li-Ibrāhīm’.   
70 Ibid., pp. 122/124. 
71 Ibid., p. 124. 
72 Ibid., p. 125. 
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[rabb] of the seven heavens? Who is the Lord [rabb] of the Mighty Throne?’}’73 
Al-Qāsim explains this verse as pointing to the fact that the things God mentions 
are clearly subjected to His control (marbūb), and that what is evidence for 
their being creation is evidence for God’s rubūbiyya.74 It can therefore be 
inferred from this passage that the term al-rubūbiyya refers to God’s role as the 
one who brought creation into existence. The same is confirmed when al-Qāsim 
states, referring to Q. 35.11 which talks about God’s creation of humans, that 
‘God proved through it ,i.e., this verse- on the basis of the clearest sign (dalīl) 
His rubūbiyya and that He is alone with regards to the creation of the things 
(wa-mā tafarrada bihi min ṣanʿ al-badāʾiʿ).’75 Closely related to the concept and 
term al-rubūbiyya is, in al-Qāsim’s reasoning, the term rabb. This is the case in 
the aforementioned Qurʾānic verse Q. 23.86 where God is identified as rabb on 
the basis that He is creator and has al-rubūbiyya. It also becomes apparent 
when al-Qāsim mentions the terms rabb and khāliq in one breath, stating that 
‘God is their rabb and their creator.’76 Referring to Q. 45.7-13 which culminates 
in God saying ‘{It is God who subjected the sea for you…He has subjected all that 
is in the heavens and the earth for your benefit, as a gift from Him. There truly 
are signs in this for those who reflect},’ al-Qāsim explains the following: No 
human being ever claimed that he, not God, is the one who subjugated the 
things mentioned. This would have been an evident lie, and not even Pharaoh 
maintained this despite his utter ignorance when he said: ‘{I am your supreme 
lord [rabb]}.’77 Pharaoh, of course, did not intend to say ‘I am rabb and creator 
(khalāq) for you’78 and he did not mean by it ‘I am god and provider (ilāh 
razāq)’79 either. Al-Qāsim’s explanation makes clear that God’s being called rabb 
denotes His role as creator. It is unthinkable, al-Qāsim stresses elsewhere, that 
God should share the title of rabb with another entity: ‘The rubūbiyya of one 
rabb is more excellent...than of two...since, if it belonged to two, each rabb 
                                                          
73 Ibid., p. 86. 
74 Ibid., p. 86: wa-shahada lahu bi’l-rubūbiyya mā shahada bi’l-ṣanʿ ʿalayhā min shuhūdihā.  
75 Ibid., p. 86. 
76 Ibid., p. 154. 
77 Ibid., p. 174. This is Q. 79.24. 
78 Ibid., p. 174. 
79 Ibid., pp.174/176. Rather, what Pharaoh meant is: ‘I am your sayyid and malīk...because in the 
language of the Arabs every rabb is sayyid and malīk.’ It is interesting that al-Qāsim maintains 
that Pharaoh did not claim to be ilāh considering that he does so in Q. 28.38. 
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would be lacking (manqūṣ)...but how should the one who lacks be a god (ilāh) 
or be affirmed as rabb?’80 God who is perfect is hence the only rabb and the only 
one who can claim al-rubūbiyya for Himself – ‘the proof for His oneness (al-
tawḥīd) has been established’81 – which entitles Him, in His perfection, to 
demand obedience and be honoured.82    
Our consideration of these passages allows us to conclude the following: The 
main theme running through the whole of the Kitāb al-Dalīl al-kabīr is the 
endeavour to ascribe the whole of creation to God alone and to deny any other 
entity’s sharing in the creative act. This is particularly evident where al-Qāsim 
speaks of ‘the proof that God is alone in terms of al-rubūbiyya,’ a term which 
stands for God’s role as creator. The stories of the various prophets al-Qāsim 
adduces further support this point and show that the proof that God exists does 
not constitute part of how al-Qāsim understands their missions. Yet, their 
stories also illustrate that the significance of establishing God’s being sole 
creator lies in the fact that it is made the basis for justifying and explaining 
God’s worthiness of worship alone and the repudiation of shirk. It follows that 
al-Qāsim’s allusion to the manifold signs in creation does not serve the purpose 
they serve in the traditional design arguments. Such things as the heavens and 
earth and their arrangement are pointed to in order to prove that their creation 
must be ascribed to God alone; in the design argument, however, the 
arrangement perceived in the world serves to show that there must be a divine 
entity.83  
This is one aspect of the ‘knowledge of God’ attained through signs in creation 
al-Qāsim spoke of at the very beginning of the Kitāb al-Dalīl al-kabīr. Another 
aspect concerns what we could term God’s nature as well as His otherness from 
creation, which al-Qāsim emphasises adducing the Qurʾānic pronouncement: 
                                                          
80 Ibid., p. 124. 
81 Ibid., p. 124. 
82 Ibid., p. 124. 
83 Compare ibid., p. 120: ‘The creation and arrangement we see can only be due to the rabb, just 
as the creation of the earth and the heavens and what is between them...is not from any maker 
(ṣāniʿ) or creator (khāliq), (but) only from God. Likewise, what Abraham mentioned is only 
from God. ... Abraham referred to His making (ṣanʿihi) and His creation (khalqihi)...when he 
called (his people) to God, (the same things) which God’s prophets before and after him did not 
cease to refer to.’  
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‘{There is nothing like Him (laysa ka-mithlihi shayʾ)}’84 We recall that at the 
beginning of the Kitāb al-Dalīl al-kabīr al-Qāsim spoke about different ways in 
which humans attempt to conceive of God, and he singled out conception of God 
insofar as He is completely different from everything else as the right way. All 
existent things, al-Qāsim explains, are different from each other in certain 
respects, but will be similar in others. God’s difference (khilāfuhu) from created 
things, however, is something that describes, and appertains to, Him only and 
solely exists between Him and creation.85 After having shown that God is sole 
creator, al-Qāsim then goes on to discuss ‘God’s signs (dalāʾil) for us that He is 
different (khilāf) from the (other) things.’86 God’s otherness from everything 
lies in His being the most exalted, solely worshipped being; He is beyond time, 
without before and after; and in general, ‘His names are infinite..., united in Him, 
not separated.’87 The right perception of God, based on His otherness from 
creation and the signs in creation, also entails not imagining (tawahhama) Him 
as a body (jism) – a sin committed by the scholars of the masses (khashw al-
ʿāmma) who lack ‘certain knowledge (al-yaqīn)’ of God and who ‘did not believe 
in Him (lam yuʾminū bihi).’88 The common people (al-ʿāmma) themselves are 
likewise ignorant of God (jahl bi’llāh) and of the signs God brought forth for 
them to know Him (jahalat mā qulnā mimmā kathura Allāh ʿalā maʿrifatihi al-
adlāʾ). They hold contradictory, reprehensible beliefs about God (qawluhā 
ʿalā’llāh), but believe them to be right.89 These remarks made by al-Qāsim show 
clearly that the common people and their scholars’ lack of ‘knowledge about 
God’ or their ‘ignorance of Him’ concern God’s nature, but not God’s existence. 
Even the failure to ‘believe in Him’ on the part of the aforementioned scholars is 
not the same as the absence of belief that He actually exists.90  
                                                          
84 Ibid., p. 139. This is Q. 42.11. 
85 Ibid., p. 66. 
86 Ibid., p. 139. 
87 Ibid., p. 141. 
88 Ibid., p. 142. 
89 Ibid., p. 154. 
90 Ibid., p. 143. Āmana is not used in the sense of believing in God’s existence but in the sense of 
believing and obeying what God has said or shown through signs to be true, as is clear when al-
Qāsim says: ‘But God is above what they say about Him!’ Al-Qāsim defines belief (īmān) as 
‘safety (aman) from the transgressions of the transgressors’ (compare Abrahamov’s comments 
on this, ibid., p. 194, f. 118).  
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All the aforementioned allows us to conclude that, when al-Qāsim speaks of 
‘knowledge of God’ which is attained by pondering over the signs of 
arrangement in creation, he means the following: These signs teach humans 
that God, none other, is the sole creator of the whole word and everything in it, 
as we repeatedly made clear, the knowledge of which should induce the wise 
person to worship none but God. They also teach humans, if properly 
understood, what the right perception of God is. The notion that design in 
creation is evidence that God exists, is however not what we find in the words 
and thought of al-Qāsim. This specific argument is missing, and God’s existence 
appears to be considered apodictic.91  
Other Early Muʿtazilites and the Proof of God’s Existence: al-Fuwatī 
and al-Naẓẓām 
Abrahamov argues that, besides al-Qāsim, other Muʿtazilite theologians and 
contemporaries of his also made use of the design argument to prove God’s 
existence.92 Abrahamov bases his claim on the remarks made by al-Khayyāṭ (d. 
                                                          
91 In his discussion of the different ways of perceiving God, al-Qāsim mentions supposition (al-
ẓann) as the fourth kind and states: ‘The right supposition about His existence (annihi) might be 
right about Him and the wrong supposition about Him is a deviation from Him’ (ibid., p. 74). 
Furthermore, he says with reference to the eighth kind, which is knowledge of God in terms of 
His difference from all things: ‘Perception of Him and His existence (wujūdihi) takes place when 
they [i.e., the things] are perceived and their existence (wujūdihā) because He is different from 
every existent thing from among them’ (ibid., p. 74). Since it has become clear what it is that al-
Qāsim seeks to establish, we argue that his mentioning God’s existence – ann and wujūd 
respectively – in the context of perception of God does not refer to the dichotomy of existence 
and non-existence, much less that made by classical arguments for God’s existence. Rather, 
since God is counted among the entirety of existents, al-Qāsim endeavours to attain knowledge 
of God’s type of existence, as it were, which he declares to be different from the types of 
existence of all other things. We shall come across this point repeatedly in the chapters to follow, 
and it shall be seen, in particular in the works of Ashʿarite theologians, that God was seen to 
have in common with creation that they all are existents (mawjūdāt), while His type of 
existence was viewed as different from the types of created existence in that He is neither body, 
nor atom, nor accident.      
92 Abrahamov’s introduction to al-Qāsim, al-Dalīl, pp. 2-3. Hans Daiber (1975, pp. 155-162), in a 
section entitled ‘Der Gottesbeweis bei Muʿammar und in der übrigen islamischen Theologie’, 
states about the Muʿtazilite contemporary of al-Fuwatī and al-Naẓẓām, Muʿammar (d. 215/830), 
that he did not attempt a proof of God’s existence because of his conception of God as beyond 
description: ‘Muʿammar’s Annahme, daß Gott durch keinerlei Begriffe des Verstandes erfaßt 
werden kann, impliziert die Absage an jede Möglichkeit eines ontologischen Gottesbeweises’ (p. 
155). And: ‘Die Existenz Gottes ist für Muʿammar ein nicht beweisbares Postulat… ,und- ist 
somit für Muʿammar auch nicht aus der Schöpfung ableitbar’ (pp. 158-159). Daiber then quotes 
from al-Khayyāṭ, who quotes Ibn al-Rāwandī, who ascribes the view to Muʿammar that ‘Im 
Himmel und in der Erde sowie im Unterschied von Nacht und Tag liegt kein Hinweis (dalīl) auf 
Gott und kein Beweis (šāhid) für seine Einzigkeit (waḥdānīya)’ (p. 159). When comparing this 
statement with those ascribed, in al-Khayyāṭ, to al-Fuwatī and al-Naẓẓām (see our discussion), 
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300/913) in his Kitāb al-Intiṣār about the 3rd/9th century Basrian Muʿtazilites 
Hishām al-Fuwatī (d. 209/825) and Ibrāhīm al-Naẓẓām (d. 230/845). The 
former, Abrahamov argues, ‘employs the argument from design,’ or more 
specifically a variant of it: the ‘argument from composition.’93 ‘Bodies prove 
God’s existence,’94 thus Abrahamov’s understanding of al-Fuwatī’s words. Van 
Ess has also argued that al-Fuwati based his proof of God’s existence on his 
ontology, that is, the view that the world is made up of bodies and accidents.95 
In al-Khayyāṭ, however, we read the following:  
Hishām believed that the signs pointing to God (al-adilla ʿalā’llāh) must be known 
necessarily in terms of their existence. The accidents, however, are known, in 
terms of their existence, due to inference and speculation (al-istidlāl wa’l-
naẓar). ... So he assumed that the bodies together with their colours, their 
tastes,...their composition and separation are signs for God (dalāʾil ʿalā’llāh) that 
He created them and arranged them (annahu khalaqahā wa-dabbarahā).96  
By maintaining that ‘combination and separation prove that God is their Creator 
and Director,’97 Abrahamov correctly refers to the conclusion made by al-
Fuwatī; yet, Abrahamov does not seem to be right in assuming that al-Fuwatī’s 
reasoning and objective are those of the traditional argument from design for 
the existence of God. What al-Fuwatī in fact seeks to establish is not different at 
all from al-Qāsim’s endeavour, discussed above: God is the one to whom the 
creation of the world must be ascribed.98 The previously mentioned ‘signs for 
God’ are, as al-Fuwatī uses them, not evidence that there must be a God; rather, 
they are pointing towards God and His role as creator.  
The same is the case with al-Naẓẓām about whom Abrahamov writes that 
he ’uses the argument from composition...infer,ring- from the composition 
                                                                                                                                                                    
the conclusion can be drawn that Muʿammar did not think of a proof of God’s existence at all, 
but was referring to a different theological question.  
93 Ibid., p. 2. 
94 Ibid., p. 2. 
95 Van Ess 1991, Band IV, p. 7. See also Rudolph 2012, p. XXX who refers to van Ess’s view that 
the Muʿtazilites attempted a ‘Gottesbeweis e contingentia mundi’.   
96 Al-Khayyāṭ, al-Intiṣār, p. 59. 
97 Abrahamov’s introduction to al-Qāsim, al-Dalīl, p. 2. 
98 The context of al-Khayyāṭ’s presentation of al-Fuwatī and al-Naẓẓām’s arguments makes clear 
that they are ultimately concerned with the question of the origination of the world through 
God. For example, al-Khayyāṭ mentions Ibn al-Rawandī’s interpretation of al-Fuwatī’s argument 
as that ‘the accidents of the bodies in their entirety do not point to their creator (lā tadullu ʿalā 
khāliqihā)’ (al-Intiṣār, pp. 58-59). Al-Naẓẓām’s argument is introduced by al-Khayyāṭ as ‘a proof 
of his regarding the originatedness (dalīl lahu fī’l-ḥudūth)’ (ibid., p. 45). 
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observed in the world the coming of the world into being...[then] deduc[ing] 
God’s existence from the coming of the world into being.’99 It is true that al-
Naẓẓām first proves the originatedness of bodies (i.e., the world), arguing that 
opposing accidents, such as coldness and hotness, do not exist together in one 
body due to themselves as this would go against their nature, but due to ‘one 
who combined them (jāmiʿ) and subjugated them (qāhir).’100 That which is 
subjugated is weak (ḍaʿīf), and weakness as well as arrangement (tadbīr) are ‘a 
sign for its originatedness (dalīl ʿalā ḥadathihi).’101 Yet, what reveals that al-
Naẓẓām’s final objective is not the proof of God’s existence, but rather, as in the 
case of both al-Qāsim and al-Fuwatī, the proof that God is creator is the 
following:  
As for the composition of fire, water, soil and air through another than God (man 
siwā’llāh), it is also a sign for their originatedness, however, their originator 
(muḥdith) is no human being who brings the two together as humans also belong 
to what is subjugated. Therefore, the creator (mukhtariʿ) of these things and the 
creator of humans, who are similar to them, is God whom nothing resembles – 
nothing is like Him (laysa ka-mithlihi shayʾ).102  
This passage clearly attempts to answer the question of whether it can be 
shown that God is the creator of the whole of creation if it is humans who are 
responsible for the combination of certain elements and if, as previously stated, 
combination points to a thing’s originatedness and its coming to be at the hands 
of the one who combined it.103 In this context, it should also be kept in mind that, 
when al-Naẓẓām arrives at the conclusion that the bodies have a creator – like 
in his remark about the sign based on opposing accidents in one single body for 
‘its originatedness and that it has an originator (muḥdith)...and a creator 
(mukhtariʿ)’104 – he does not refer to the proof of the existence of an entity, but 
means to clarify the following point: Origination does not occur without 
originator. It would be false to assume that something can come to be due to 
                                                          
99 Abrahamov’s introduction to al-Qāsim, al-Dalīl, p. 2. 
100 Al-Khayyāṭ, al-Intiṣār, p. 46. 
101 Ibid., p. 46. 
102 Ibid., pp. 46-47. 
103 Compare al-Khayyāṭ’s mention of what Ibn al-Rawandī said about al-Naẓẓām’s argument: 
‘The one who joined them [i.e., opposing accidents like hotness and coldness] is the one who 
created (ikhtaraʿ) them as combined... Their combination despite their (inherent) opposition 
points to the fact that the one who combined them is their creator (mukhtariʿ lahumā)’ (al-
Intiṣār, p. 45). 
104 Ibid., p. 46. 
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itself or as the product of chance, for instance – two alternatives the refutation 
of which would later become a standard part of the theologians’ proof that 
origination occurs due to another. This concern is reflected in al-Khayyāṭ’s 
comments on al-Naẓẓām’s argument: ‘Ibrāhīm ,al-Naẓẓām- meant that...their 
originatedness makes it necessary that they have an originator who originated 
them since it is absurd that there is origination without originator.’105 God can 
only be affirmed as the creator of what has come to be if it is clear that 
origination occurs due to another. Even though not much attention is given to 
proving the correctness of this claim in al-Khayyāṭ’s presentation of al-Naẓẓām’s 
argument, it was, as we shall see, in fact an issue which many later theologians 
discussed as the origination of a thing due to another, not due to itself or chance, 
was deemed to require proof.  
It has therefore become clear that not only al-Qāsim, but also his 
contemporaries al-Naẓẓām and al-Fuwatī had a common objective: to affirm 
God alone as the creator of the world. In al-Qāsim, the proof of God as sole 
creator is evidently addressed to all sorts of mushrikūn. This shall also be seen 
to be of relevance when we consider al-Māturīdī’s Kitāb al-Tawḥīd in the next 
chapter. In al-Qāsim’s Kitāb al-Dalīl al-kabīr, we found that this proof also plays 
a decisive role with regards to the correct understanding of God’s nature which 
was based on the difference between creation and God as creator and 
addressed to al-Qāsim’s peers. Finally, the importance cannot be overstated of 
understanding that, when arguing that the proof of God’s existence is absent 
from al-Qāsim’s work, we mean by it the question of the purpose of his proofs: 
What does al-Qāsim want to establish? Abrahamov’s account of al-Qāsim’s 
arguments does not sound so much different from what we have argued – 
namely that al-Qāsim seeks to ascribe the creation of the world to none but God 
– when he states: ‘The signs in the world attest not only to the createdness of 
the world but also that it is conducted and ruled. This conduct and rule…are 
only God’s conduct and rule.’106 This is also true for Abrahamov’s remark that 
al-Qāsim attempts to ‘support his view that God is the creator of the world, its 
                                                          
105 Ibid., p. 47. 
106 Abrahamov 1986, p. 261. 
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conductor and ruler.’107 Yet, Abrahamov’s presentation of al-Qāsim’s arguments 
differs significantly from ours in that he regards them as serving a different 
purpose since they belong, in his view, to the class of design arguments, ‘one of 
the main arguments for the existence of God.’108 It evidently sheds an entirely 
different light on the nature of the discourse al-Qāsim is said to be part of, 
depending on whether he treats God’s existence as apodictic, which goes hand 
in hand with the absence of any proof of it – or whether the proof of God’s 
existence is a characterising feature of the Kitāb al-Dalīl al-kabīr. 
  
                                                          
107 Ibid., p. 262. 
108 Ibid., p. 260. 
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Al-Kindī  
It is well-known that al-Kindī (d. 256/873) was part of the so-called translation 
movement which took place in the early 3rd/9th century under the patronage of 
the ʿAbbāsid caliphs al-Maʾmūn (813-833) and al-Muʾtaṣim (833-842) and 
where the writings of Greek philosophy and science were made available in 
Arabic.109 It is also established that these two caliphs favoured the Muʿtazilite 
school of thought, and al-Maʾmūn even declared Muʿtazilism the official state 
doctrine.110 Considering the environment in which al-Kindī produced his own 
writings, it is therefore not surprising that his relationship with Muʿtazilism has 
been somewhat of a debated question. On the one hand, there is the view that 
al-Kindī was closely affiliated with this school of kalām. This has been suggested 
by Richard Walzer who argued so on the basis of certain similarities between 
Muʿtazilite doctrines and methodologies and al-Kindī’s.111 On the other hand, 
there is the view that, despite certain similarities between the doctrines held by 
al-Kindī and Muʿtazilite theologians, al-Kindī had no special affiliation with any 
particular group and ‘was not a mutakallim.’112 This position is held by Peter 
Adamson and Alfred Ivry. In general, it has, however, been agreed that al-
Kindī’s originality lies in his endeavour to present solutions to theological 
problems of his time by making recourse to ideas and methods of proof taken 
from philosophy.113  
The question of al-Kindi’s affiliation is of interest for us insofar as it can shed 
light on the question of whether he took part in the discussions which in 
secondary literature have been identified as integral to the discourse on 
arguments for God’s existence. If it is true that al-Kindi was influenced, to 
whatever extent, by the discussions characteristic of his Muʿtazilite 
contemporaries, it could be argued that the absence of arguments for God’s 
existence from their writings, as we have shown previously, is also reflected in 
                                                          
109 See §3 Die Wiedergeburt der Philosophie und die Ǜbersetzungen by Dimitri Gutas in 
Rudolph 2012 and Gutas 1998 on the translation movement. 
110 On the miḥna and related politics see De Gifis 2014; Turner 2013; Nawas 1994; Madelung 
1974; van Ess 1965/1966. 
111 Walzer 1962, p. 180. 
112 Adamson 2003, p. 76. Also Ivry 1974, pp. 32-33. 
113 Adamson 2003, p. 48 and 2005, p. 33; Gutas 1998, p. 120. 
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al-Kindi’s writings. This is in fact what we shall propose. Our discussion of al-
Kindi’s philosophico-theological thought shall show why we reject the 
commonly held view that al-Kindī, like his Muʿtazilite contemporaries, seeks to 
prove that God exists,114 and we shall reflect upon the questions he seeks to 
answer.  
The Objectives of First Philosophy 
Chapter One of al-Kindī’s Kitāb Fī al-falsafa al-ūlā (On First Philosophy), which 
can be regarded as a preface to his actual elaborations, contains some crucial 
remarks for our endeavour. Al-Kindī begins by praising philosophy as the 
noblest of all sciences as it seeks knowledge of all things as they really are or in 
terms of their true natures (ʿilm al-ashyāʾ bi-ḥaqāʾiqihā). This equals the 
attempt on the part of the philosopher of attaining the truth (al-ḥaqq). Truth, 
however, can only be found when seeking a cause (ʿilla) as the True One (al-
ḥaqq) – by which al-Kindī refers to God – is the cause of the existence and 
subsistence of all things and as every existent thing has a true nature (ḥaqīqa), 
which to understand means knowing the truth.115 The best part of the discipline 
of philosophy is therefore First Philosophy – which al-Kindī is concerned with 
in the present work – as it establishes knowledge about the First True One (al-
ḥaqq al-awwal) who causes all other truth – that is, all other existent things – to 
exist. The focus of First Philosophy is hence on attaining knowledge about the 
True One, God.116 Adamson has noted that al-Kindī, by maintaining that First 
Philosophy is first and foremost concerned with God, misunderstood Aristotle 
who named being qua being as its subject matter.117 While this may be true, it 
should be stressed that al-Kindī’s identification of First Philosophy with the 
study of God and His nature can also be seen as part of his endeavour to show 
that philosophy is able to answer the questions posed by theology and that the 
two disciplines are in fact compatible, in that they cogitate the same problems. 
                                                          
114 Endress and Adamson in Rudolph 2012, p. 130; Druart 2005, pp. 329-330; Rist 2005, p. 337; 
Adamson 2003, p. 50; Ivry 1974, p. 9; Abū Rīda 1950, pp. 75-80.  
115 In other words, knowing the true nature of things means knowing the truth. All existent 
things have a true nature (ḥaqīqa). True natures (i.e., truth) are known through knowing their 
cause: the True One.   
116 Al-Kindī (1950), Fī al-Falsafa al-ūlā, pp. 97-101. 
117 Adamson 2005, p. 34. 
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Kalām, it is well-known, seeks knowledge of God through His creation, and so 
does First Philosophy for al-Kindī, as shall become clear in more detail. First 
Philosophy, it is important to note, also considers God or the True One insofar 
as He is cause of all other existent things, as al-Kindī pointed out earlier when 
he said that truth cannot be attained without the knowledge of a cause. God’s 
role as cause is one of the major themes of Fī al-falsafa al-ūlā, and certain 
remarks on the part of al-Kindī undoubtedly remind us of al-Qāsim’s own 
remarks about the proof of God’s role as creator which is the main theme of his 
Kitāb al-Dalīl al-kabīr, as we have pointed out.         
In the same chapter, al-Kindī also states that ‘in the knowledge of the things in 
terms of their true natures,’ which is what First Philosophy is about, ‘lies the 
knowledge of al-rubūbiyya and the knowledge of oneness (al-waḥdāniyya).’118 
Like al-Qāsim who describes the prophet Joseph’s mission as to ‘present 
proof…that God is alone in terms of al-rubūbiyya,’119 al-Kindī states that ‘the 
truthful messengers, God’s blessings upon them, only brought the affirmation of 
God’s sole rubūbiyya (al-iqrār bi-rubūbiyya Allāh waḥdahu).’120 Al-Kindī then 
ends the preface in Chapter One by asking God for help who knows of ‘our 
striving to establish the proof for His rubūbiyya (ijtihādanā fī-tathbīt al-ḥujja 
ʿalā rubūbiyyatihi) and to make clear His oneness.’121 All three instances where 
al-Kindī speaks of al-rubūbiyya appear as ‘divinity’ in Ivry’s translation of Fī al-
falsafa al-ūlā.122 This seems to be a misconception on the part of Ivry, who 
assumes that al-Kindī refers to the proof of God’s existence, of both the meaning 
of the term and what al-Kindī declares to be his aim.123 It is far more convincing 
that al-Qāsim and al-Kindī, being contemporaries, use this particular term to 
denote the same concept, namely God’s role as creator. This is further 
supported by the fact that this term retained the same meaning, and continued 
to denote the same concept, some decades after al-Kindī’s death as is evident 
                                                          
118 Al-Kindī (1950), Fī al-Falsafa al-ūlā, p. 104.  
119 Al-Qāsim, al-Dalīl, p. 124. 
120 Al-Kindī (1950), Fī al-Falsafa al-ūlā, p. 104. 
121 Ibid., p. 105. 
122 Ivry 1974, p. 59: The first instance is rendered ‘includes knowledge of Divinity ,and- unity’; 
the second is ‘an affirmation of the Divinity of God alone’; and the third is ‘in establishing the 
proof of His Divinity and the explanation of His Unity.’ 
123 Ivry states: ‘The chapter concludes with an invocation of Divine assistance in the task of 
establishing proof of the Divinity (i.e., existence) ,sic- and unity of God’ (Ivry 1974, p. 9). 
 
 
36 
 
from al-Māturīdī’s (d. 333/944) Kitāb al-Tawḥīd. There, al-Māturīdī argues that 
what creation points to is that ‘there is no creator other than God and no rabb 
other than Him.’124 God’s being the only rabb is, for al-Māturīdī, closely linked to 
the term and concept of al-rubūbiyya. In the section on the proof of God’s 
oneness, he explains that, if another godhead was assumed besides God and if 
only God was able to enact His will, then this would show that ‘God…is alone 
(mutafarrid) with regards to al-rubūbiyya.’125 The term al-rubūbiyya therefore 
stands, according to al-Māturīdī, for God’s ability to act as He pleases, and His 
acting directly refers to the act of creation.126 All this allows us to conclude the 
following: When al-Kindī states that knowing the true nature of things also 
implies knowledge of al-rubūbiyya, he essentially expresses the same idea as al-
Qāsim, al-Fuwatī and al-Naẓẓām which would become the standard method 
followed by all theologians after him: Creation contains evidence that the world 
must be ascribed to God as His work. In his quest as a philosopher to 
understand the true nature of things, al-Kindī focuses in the first place on the 
cause of the existence of things, and this is exactly what the mutakallimūn 
associate with the term al-rubūbiyya.  
These are the indications al-Kindī himself gives as to the objectives of First 
Philosophy. Let us now turn to the remaining chapters of Fī al-falsafa al-ūlā and 
see what it is al-Kindī discusses there. Chapter Two is dedicated to the proof 
that ‘it is impossible that there is an eternal body,’127 which al-Kindī also applies 
                                                          
124 Al-Māturīdī, al-Tawḥīd, p. 230. 
125 Ibid., p. 21. 
126 In his Kitāb al-Badʾ wa’l-taʾrīkh, al-Maqdisī (d. 355/966) also makes use of the term al-
rubūbiyya. He seems to use it in the exact same sense as al-Kindī, al-Qāsim and al-Māturīdī. He 
states that ‘the signs (dalāʾil) which point to the affirmation of God are not numbered nor 
finite...because everything, howsoever small..., contains a number of indications (dalāʾil) which 
express His rubūbiyya’ (ibid., p. 15) and that ‘tawḥīd includes four things: knowledge of oneness 
(waḥdāniyya), affirmation of rubūbiyya, purity of divinity (ikhlāṣ al-ilāhiyya) and persistence in 
worship (al-ijtihād fī’l-ʿubūdiyya)’ (ibid., p. 22). Note that the meaning of the term al-rubūbiyya 
is still the same in the 13th/18th century in the writings of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (d. 1206/1792). 
G. R. Hawting states in his The Idea of Idolatry and the Emergence of Islam: From Polemic to 
History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): ‘In a commentary upon the first part of 
the shahāda (‘there is no god but God’) ,i.e., Fī tafsīr kalmia al-tawḥīd in his Majmūʿa al-tawḥīd 
al-najdiyya-, the founder of the Wahhābī school argued that the kuffār against whom the 
Prophet fought were monotheists but imperfect ones. Their monotheism was only tawḥīd al-
rubūbiyya whereas proper monotheism consists of tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya. Tawḥīd al-rubūbiyya he 
defines as accepting that God is the sole creator, giver of life and sustainer’ (p. 63).   
127 Al-Kindī (1950), Fī al-Falsafa al-ūlā, p. 122. 
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to the universe, ‘the body of it all (jirm al-kull).’128 He proves this, on the one 
hand, by pointing to his definition of the eternal as that which has no genus, 
which allows him to conclude that ‘inasmuch as body has genus…body is not 
eternal.’129 On the other hand, he shows that a body cannot in actuality be 
infinite in terms of quantity and quality, which means that its time and duration 
also have a beginning.130  
Chapter Three begins with the proof that nothing can actualise its own 
existence: ‘The thing cannot be the cause of the being of its essence (ʿilla kawn 
dhātihi).’131 Al-Kindī means by this that whatever comes to be does so due to a 
cause other than itself. It is furthermore established in Chapter Three that unity 
is said of everything that can be said in some way, referring to genus, species, 
property, accident and the like, however this unity belongs to it only in an 
accidental way and it is not essential for it. This means, al-Kindī explains, that its 
unity is caused by another who must have unity essentially – ‘a true one’ or ‘one 
who is truly one’ (wāḥid ḥaqq)132.133 It is moreover shown that the nature of 
sensible things involves that unity and multiplicity always occur together in 
them. Their association is not due to chance (bi’l-bakht ay al-ittifāq), which 
would imply its occurrence without cause (bi-lā ʿilla).134 Rather, it requires a 
cause which is not part of the association of unity and multiplicity and truly one, 
containing no multiplicity whatsoever in itself.135  
                                                          
128 Ibid., p. 120. 
129 Ibid., pp. 113-114. 
130 Ibid., p. 116. 
131 Ibid., p. 123. 
132 Ibid., p. 132. 
133 Ibid., pp. 123-132. 
134 Ibid., p. 141. 
135 Ibid., pp. 140-143. It should be noted that al-Kindī proves the coming to be of the association 
of unity and multiplicity in all sensible things due to an outside cause by denying the possibility 
of an infinite regress of causes from within this association based on the general denial of an 
actual infinite (lā yumkin an yakūna shayʾ bi’l-fiʿl bi-lā nihāya) (ibid., p. 142). It is evident that, if 
al-Kindī was to allow for the existence of an actual infinite, a past infinite chain of causes could 
not be denied and it would be difficult for him to argue that it is God who ultimately caused the 
world to be. His denial of an infinite regress of existents which are causes of other existents can 
be seen in the context of the belief of a group who are commonly referred to as dahriyya. One of 
the many instances of kalām works mentioning the dahriyya is Ibn Ḥazm’s (d. 456/1064) al-
Fiṣal. According to his account, they maintained that ‘the world is eternal, and that it does not 
have an originator, nor an arranger’ (ibid., p. 37). We shall refer to them again in later chapters.   
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In the last chapter, Chapter Four, al-Kindī finally states that the emanation (fayḍ) 
of oneness from the True One on things and their attributes equals their 
entering existence. They are hence created and caused and the True One is their 
cause (ʿilla), maker (fāʿil) and creator (mubdiʿ).136  
Why Proving the World’s Beginning? 
In order to understand al-Kindī’s arguments and to gauge how he seeks to 
affirm God’s rubūbiyya alone, we have to take a closer look at a few issues. 
There is, for instance, the noticeable issue that, even though the proof of the 
temporal beginning of the world appears at the very beginning of his discussion, 
in Chapter Two, al-Kindī does not make it the basis of the affirmation of God as 
creator. This is so since the proof that the world owes its existence to another 
does not rest on the premise that the world actually has come into existence 
from prior non-existence; rather, al-Kindī establishes the link between God and 
the world – which is what the affirmation of God’s rubūbiyya refers to – by 
arguing in Chapter Three, firstly, that unity in all sensible things is not essential 
to them and hence caused, and, secondly, that the association of multiplicity and 
unity which exists in all things only comes from one who is ‘outside’ all this. The 
link between God and the world is established on this basis. The temporal origin 
of the world is, in al-Kindī’s reasoning, not relevant to this point. Contrary to 
this, George Atiyeh has argued that in Fī al-falsafa al-ūlā al-Kindī uses the proof 
that the world has come to be (Chapter Two) as well as the proof that nothing 
causes its own existence (Chapter Three) as arguments for God’s existence.137 
Besides having argued that the proof of God’s existence is not part of the 
concerns of Fī al-falsafa al-ūlā, but even if it was admitted, for the sake of 
argument, that it is, it just does not hold true that al-Kindī draws the conclusion 
Atiyeh ascribes to him, that is: ‘The…proof is based upon the premise that the 
universe was created in time. …everything created in time must have a 
creator.’138 The conclusion that the world insofar as it is originated exists due to 
                                                          
136 Ibid., p. 162. 
137 Atiyeh 1966, pp. 58-59. 
138 Ibid., p. 58. 
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an outside cause is in fact also left implicit and not stated explicitly.139 It could, 
however, be inferred from al-Kindī’s definition of the eternal as constituting 
that which does not have a cause – the originated, consequently, has a cause, 
one could pose – as well as from his proof that nothing can give itself existence; 
but al-Kindī in fact never explicitly says that the world insofar as it is originated 
has an outside cause of its existence.  
Also at variance with our above suggestion that what al-Kindī seeks to affirm in 
Chapter Three is God’s role as sole creator, Atiyeh furthermore maintains that 
al-Kindī’s argument based on unity and multiplicity which are found together in 
every thing is meant to be a cosmological proof for God’s existence.140 Adamson 
argues the same: al-Kindī ‘first establishes the existence of God via an analysis 
of types of utterance…,which- fall under two main classes: the substantial and 
the accidental.’141 He continues: ‘This distinction between the substantial or 
“essential” and the accidental is crucial to al-Kindī’s first, brief argument for the 
existence of God.’142 We submit, however, that what al-Kindī intends to point to 
in his discussion of unity and multiplicity in things is that such phenomena 
underpin God’s role as creator. ‘The emanation (fayḍ) of oneness from the True 
One, the First,’ al-Kindī clarifies, ‘is the bringing about (tahawwī) of every 
sensible thing and what applies to it.’143 God is creator insofar as He emanates 
oneness. Al-Kindī’s concluding remark, after having explained the need of the 
aforementioned association for a cause, that ‘there is, hence, necessarily a true 
one whose oneness is not caused,’144 should not be construed as showing that 
al-Kindī claims to have established the existence of an entity besides the world. 
Rather, what he seeks to show is that God, being the cause of this association 
(that is, the cause of the world as a whole), must have true unity, in number and 
                                                          
139 The implicit character of this point has been acknowledged by Endress and Adamson in 
Rudoph 2012, p. 130 (despite arguing that al-Kindī seeks to prove that God exists with this 
argument): ‘Was Gott betrifft, so wird seine Existenz in <Fī l-Falsafa al-ūlā> nicht nur implizit 
aus der Tatsache bewiesen, dass die Welt geschaffen ist…’. 
140 Ibid., p. 58. 
141 Adamson 2003, p. 50. 
142 Ibid., p. 50. See also Endress and Adamson in Rudolph 2012, p. 130: ‘Was Gott betrifft, so 
wird seine Existenz in <Fī l-Falsafa al-ūlā>…explizit aus dem Grundsatz ,bewiesen-, dass 
geschaffene Dinge stets sowohl vieles als auch eines sind und daher notwendigerweise eine 
externe Ursache für ihre Einheit haben müssen.’ 
143 Al-Kindī (1950), Fī al-Falsafa al-ūlā, p. 162. 
144 Ibid., p. 132. 
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in essence, which is only known by considering His creation. One needs to bear 
in mind that in Chapter One of his work al-Kindī declared ‘knowledge of 
oneness (al-waḥdāniyya),’ just like ‘knowledge of al-rubūbiyya,’ a part of the 
knowledge of the true natures of things.145 Also, we recall that he asked God for 
assistance not only with regards to ‘establishing the proof for His rubūbiyya,’ 
but also ‘for the clarification of His oneness.’146 Like in al-Qāsim, and in fact in 
the majority of later theologians, as shall be seen, creation is conceived as 
pointing to God insofar as it reveals what God’s nature is like.   
The role the proof of the world’s beginning in time plays in Fī al-falsafa al-ūlā is, 
however, notably different from al-Kindī’s Risāla fī waḥdāniyya Allāh wa-tanāhī 
jirm al-ʿālam (On God’s Oneness and the Finitude of the Body of the World). In 
this epistle, al-Kindī states: ‘Therefore, the body must be originated, and the 
originated comes from the originator because the originator and the originated 
belong together. Hence, the whole has an originator who brought it about from 
non-existence.’147 Majid Fakhry and Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Hādī Abū Rīda both 
identify this reasoning as an argument for God’s existence on al-Kindī’s part.148 
Fakhry even credits al-Kindī with having formulated ‘the earliest statement of 
the argument a novitiate mundi.’149 Just as in the case of al-Kindī’s Fī al-falsafa 
al-ūlā, it can be argued that in the Risāla, too, the affirmation of the originator 
for the world serves the simple purpose of justifying the link between God and 
the world. The world’s finiteness is made the foundation of, and explanation for, 
the fact that it exists due to another, which we can term the principle of 
causation: A thing’s entering existence is its being brought into existence by 
another, not its coming to be uncaused or due to itself, which seems to come 
close to a priori certainty for al-Kindī. If – and only if – the world is originated, it 
is immediately evident that it must have been brought into existence by God.  
Returning to the reasoning we find in Fī al-falsafa al-ūlā where the 
originatedness of the world is not made the foundation of the link between God 
and the world, it needs to be pointed out that this reasoning is not specific to al-
                                                          
145 Ibid., p. 104. 
146 Ibid., p. 105. 
147 Al-Kindī (1950), Risāla fī waḥdāniyya Allāh wa-tanāhī jirm al-ʿālam, p. 207. 
148 Abū Rīda 1950, p. 76. 
149 Fakhry 1957, p. 140, f. 34. 
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Kindī. We have seen that al-Qāsim, too, showed that the world and everything 
contained in it is only due to God without always previously stating whether the 
world has come to be in time or is eternal. This was the case, for instance, where 
he referred to Abraham’s mention of things ‘which make clear that they are 
from God alone,’ such as the provision of food and the healing of illnesses.150 
The same is true for al-Ashʿarī, as we shall see in more detail in the next chapter, 
who answers the question ‘What is the proof that there is for creation a 
creator…?’ before dealing with the question of whether the world is eternal or 
not.151 Likewise, the philosopher Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198) is a proponent of the 
doctrine of the world’s eternity, but he nevertheless ascribes its existence to 
God, using a proof based on the notion of providence (ʿināya) contained in all 
things which he believes to be the proof favoured by the Qurʾān itself and which 
dispenses with the premise of a world that began to exist.152  
The question therefore arises of why al-Kindī dedicates such a considerable 
part of Fī al-falsafa al-ūlā to proving that the world is not eternal, but originated 
if this has no direct bearing on his objective of establishing the link between 
God and the world – that is, the affirmation of God’s rubūbiyya. Adamson has 
suggested that the proof of the world’s beginning in time is closely related to al-
Kindī’s effort to defend God’s uniqueness or tawḥīd.153 It is true that an eternal 
world would share God’s special characteristic of eternity. An eternal world also 
means an uncreated world since al-Kindī defines the eternal at the beginning of 
Chapter Two as ‘that which does not subsist due to another…which has no 
maker (fāʿil) and no cause (sabab).’154 In his Risāla fī waḥdāniyya Allāh wa-
tanāhī jirm al-ʿālam al-Kindī puts it this way: ‘He does not resemble His 
creation…because He is creator (mubdiʿ) and they are created, and because He 
is eternal and they are not eternal.’155 Harry A. Wolfson has pointed out that 
                                                          
150 Al-Qāsim, al-Dalīl, p. 118. 
151 Al-Ashʿarī, al-Lumaʿ, p. 17 and p. 19. 
152 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 118. 
153 Adamson 2003, p. 53: ‘To hold that the world is coeternal with God is to violate tawḥīd’; 
Adamson 2005, p. 48: ‘Thus proving that the world is not eternal is closely related to showing 
the absolute uniqueness and oneness of God.’ 
154 Al-Kindī (1950), Fī al-Falsafa al-ūlā, p. 113. 
155 Al-Kindī (1950), Risāla fī waḥdāniyya Allāh wa-tanāhī jirm al-ʿālam, p. 207. 
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some early Muʿtazilites equated the eternal with the divine.156 With regards to 
the debate about the reality of the divine attributes, he refers to Wāṣil b. ʿAṭāʾ (d. 
131/748) who declared: ‘He who posits a thing and an attribute as eternal 
posits two gods.’157 The question of whether the eternal is synonymous with the 
divine could easily also be applied to the issue of the world’s eternity contra its 
createdness, even though it seems to have been relevant primarily for God’s 
attributes. This becomes evident, for instance, in Abū al-Muʿīn al-Nasafī’s (d. 
507/1114) account of this debate in his Tabṣirat al-adilla fī uṣūl al-dīn. There he 
states that ‘al-Iskāfī, al-Ṣāliḥī and al-Jubbāʾī from the leaders of the Qadariyya 
said that the eternal is God (al-qadīm huwa Allāh).’158 Al-Nasafī dismisses this 
equation as ‘utterly false’159 and argues: ‘The dahriyya assume the eternity of 
every single part of the world, but they do not assume their [i.e., of every single 
part] divinity.’160 With regards to al-Kindī, however, it cannot be maintained 
that he upheld the createdness of the world because to do otherwise would 
have entailed the affirmation of more than one deity and a violation of tawḥīd in 
the sense of monotheism; the aspect of divinity is missing in his definition of the 
eternal in Fī al-falsafa al-ūlā. Al-Kindī seems to intend the defence of two 
different notions of tawḥīd, namely God’s uniqueness and complete difference 
from creation – as expressed in his remark in the Risāla referred to above – as 
well as His essential oneness which precludes any multiplicity that might arise 
from predicating a number of attributes of Him.161 With regards to the latter 
notion of tawḥīd, however, it needs to be pointed out that its affirmation again 
does not depend on having shown previously that the world has an origin in 
time. Al-Kindī proves God’s essential oneness and His being free from any 
multiplicity, firstly, on the premise that all sensible things are ‘one’ only in an 
accidental way and due to a cause and, secondly, on the basis that multiplicity 
and oneness always occur together in these things and that their association is 
                                                          
156 Wolfson 1976, p. 133. 
157 Ibid., p. 133. Thus stated by al-Shahrastānī in his Kitāb al-Milal wa’l-niḥal (1923), p. 31: ‘man 
athbata maʿnā wa-ṣifa qadīma fa-qad athbata ilāhayn.’ See also Daiber 1988 on Wāṣil. 
158 Al-Nasafī, Tabṣirat, p. 302. 
159 Ibid., p. 302. 
160 Ibid., p. 203. 
161 Al-Kindī (1950), Fī al-Falsafa al-ūlā, p. 160: ‘The True One therefore has neither matter, nor 
form, quantity, quality, relation… He is therefore simply and purely unity.’ For an analysis of 
Muʿtazilite influences on al-Kindī with regards to this latter point see Adamson 2003. 
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caused. We hence have to conclude that the proof of the world’s coming into 
existence is relevant only where al-Kindī seeks to distinguish God as eternal 
from the world as past-finite.  
Yet, there is in fact another reason why to establish the world as not eternal is 
of significance for al-Kindī, and this concerns the concepts of creation and the 
creator he puts forward. We have pointed out above that for Ibn Rushd the 
createdness of the world in time is not a prerequisite for calling God its creator. 
Yet, for al-Kindī this view would not be valid. He holds the view, in agreement 
with later theologians, as we shall see, that only that which enters existence 
after not having existed previously is creation when he states: ‘That which is 
brought about (yuhawwā) is not eternal, and that which is not eternal is created 
(mubdaʿ), that is, it comes to be from a cause (ʿilla).’162 In his Risāla Fī al-fāʿil al-
ḥaqq al-awwal al-tāmm wa’l-fāʿil al-nāqiṣ alladhī huwa bi’l-majāz (On the 
Perfect First True Agent and the Imperfect Agent Who is Such Metaphorically) 
al-Kindī is eager to stress that God’s creative act, specific to Him, consists in His 
‘bringing into existence the existing thing from non-existence’163 which he calls 
ibdāʿ, while distinguishing it from the acts performed by other entities and 
restricted to exerting influence (athr al-muʾaththir) on existing things.164 When 
al-Kindī, therefore, states at the beginning of Fī al-falsafa al-ūlā that he seeks to 
affirm God’s rubūbiyya alone, then this does not only refer to the fact that the 
world owes its existence to God and that God is its cause in some way. Rather, 
the proof of God’s rubūbiyya also includes that the world has a beginning in 
time and is created from prior non-existence. It follows that, while it is true that 
in Fī al-falsafa al-ūlā the link between God and the world is established without 
the premise of the world’s being past-finite, as pointed out before, the mode of 
God’s creative act does depend on proving that the world is in fact a temporal 
thing.  
It is this aspect where al-Kindī’s affiliation with certain kalām doctrines and his 
rejection of certain philosophical tenets, but not the philosophers’ methods, 
                                                          
162 Ibid., p. 162. 
163 Al-Kindī (1950), Risāla Fī al-fāʿil al-ḥaqq al-awwal al-tāmm wa’l-fāʿil al-nāqiṣ alladhī huwa 
bi’l-majāz, p. 182. 
164 Ibid., p. 183.   
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however, become evident. Adamson has asserted that in Fī al-falsafa al-ūlā al-
Kindī ‘gives no sign that his position on the eternity of the world departs from 
that of Aristotle.’165 This assessment seems incorrect when we take into account 
a number of other remarks al-Kindī makes in Chapter One. There he expresses 
his praise of all those who contributed to the quest for truth. Referring to the 
ancient Greek philosophers, among whom al-Kindī singles out Aristotle as ‘the 
most outstanding,’166 he stresses that they are the ones who ‘facilitated for us 
the hidden, true enquiries by teaching us the premises which eased for us the 
path to the truth.’167 Yet, while emphasising his own and his contemporaries’ 
indebtedness to their ‘ways and instruments which lead to much knowledge,’168 
al-Kindī makes the point that this knowledge also includes things regarding 
which ‘they failed to attain (the) true nature (ḥaqīqa).’169 When asking which 
aspects of knowledge al-Kindī might be referring to, we need to bear in mind 
that the one issue fundamentally distinguishing al-Kindī’s position from that of 
the Greek philosophers is the question of whether the world has a beginning in 
time or is eternal. This question in turn is directly linked with the varying 
notions of God as creator, as explained. It must be conceded to Adamson that al-
Kindī does not explicitly state his critique of the belief in eternal time, matter 
and motion held by Aristotle; at the same time, it is certainly not the case either 
that al-Kindī avoids expressing any critique of what he perceives to be 
shortcomings in the philosophical theories about the world and God. Despite 
this subliminal criticism, al-Kindī eagerly stresses the harmony between 
philosophy and theology by employing philosophical terminology alongside 
kalām terminology with regards to the description of God as creator and the 
world as His creation.170 The Neoplatonic conception of God as the bestower of 
eternal motion as well as the idea of the world’s eternal emanation from God 
are in fact only rejected insofar as they appear as processes without beginning; 
the terminology, however, is incorporated by al-Kindī into his own account of 
                                                          
165 Adamson 2014, pp. 3-4. 
166 Al-Kindī (1950), Fī al-Falsafa al-ūlā, p. 103. 
167 Ibid., p. 102. 
168 Ibid., p. 102. 
169 Ibid., p. 102. 
170 See Adamson 2005, p. 38 on al-Kindī’s incorporating Aristotelian and Neoplatonic notions of 
God.  
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God’s creative act.171 Also, in his Risāla Fī al-fāʿil al-ḥaqq, al-Kindī describes God, 
on the one hand, as ‘the true agent (al-fāʿil al-ḥaqq)’ and ‘creator (al-bāriʾ)’ and, 
on the other hand, as ‘ultimate cause (ghāya kull ʿilla)’ and ‘the first cause (al-
ʿilla al-ūlā).’172 The first two terms, al-fāʿil and al-bāriʾ, are terms very much 
characteristic of kalām. We shall see in the chapters to follow that certain 
mutakallimūn went to great lengths to show that God’s relation to the world is 
comparable to that between an agent (fāʿil) and his act (fiʿl) and that the 
concept of the agent was the same for them as that of the creator, for which they 
employed an array of terms, among them al-Kindī’s al-bāriʾ. Crucially, however, 
we shall also see that these same theologians generally agreed that the term ʿilla 
represents a different concept than the term fāʿil, and both were considered 
contraries. They therefore refrained from applying the term ʿilla to God in His 
role as ‘cause’ of the world. Al-Kindī seems to want to stress the unifying aspect 
underlying the different notions of God as conveyed by these terms, rather than 
emphasising their differences, when he employs them interchangeably to 
describe God as the one who gives existence to the world. Nevertheless, he is 
very clear that it is the concept of the fāʿil as propounded by the theologians, 
rather than that of the ʿilla associated with philosophy which he defends when 
using these terms. The same is true with regards to the term al-rubūbiyya 
which, as we have seen above, assumes a central position in al-Kindī’s Fī al-
falsafa al-ūlā. It has become evident how this term can very much be associated 
with works in the tradition of kalām. Yet, al-Kindī signals through his 
employment of this term in a philosophical treatise that the discipline of 
theology and the discipline of philosophy both pursue the same objectives and 
are hence compatible. This therefore confirms what has often been argued, 
namely that al-Kindī’s project is to show how philosophy can solve the very 
problems theology deals with.173  
  
                                                          
171 Ibid., p. 162: ‘The True One, the First, is the cause from which comes the principle of motion 
(ḥaraka), I mean: the mover is the principle of motion’; ibid., p. 162: ‘The emanation (fayḍ) of 
oneness from the True One, the First, is the coming to be of every sensible thing.’  
172 Al-Kindī (1950), Risāla Fī al-fāʿil al-ḥaqq al-awwal al-tāmm wa’l-fāʿil al-nāqiṣ alladhī huwa 
bi’l-majāz, p. 183. 
173 Adamson 2003, p. 48 and 2005, p. 33; Gutas 1998, p. 120. 
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Conclusions 
Al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm’s Kitāb al-Dalīl al-kabīr and al-Kindī’s Fī al-falsafa al-ūlā 
mark the beginnings of theological and philosophical enquiries in Islam in the 
2nd-3rd/9th centuries. It is said that the proof of God’s existence constitutes one 
important aspect of these enquiries. It is the underlying theme of al-Qāsim’s al-
Dalīl al-kabīr and it is what al-Kindī is concerned with in Fī al-falsafa al-ūlā as 
well as the Risāla fī waḥdāniyya Allāh wa-tanāhī jirm al-ʿālam, this being the 
prevailing view. It is also said to be what characterises the arguments of a 
number of other early Muʿtazilite mutakallimūn, such as al-Fuwatī and al-
Naẓẓām. Contrary to this view, we have argued that the goal of these thinkers 
has been misunderstood. Far from intending to prove God’s existence, in the 
sense of the word used in arguments for God’s existence known from western 
philosophy, these early scholars sought to prove, firstly, that the world began to 
exist which is how they understood creation, and, secondly, that none other 
than God is its creator. Any similarity to traditional design or cosmological 
arguments pertains only to their structure, and not to their purpose. Al-Qāsim 
made creation the basis for the proof of God’s rubūbiyya – God’s attribute of 
being creator – and an indication of what God’s nature is like. This is, according 
to him, the method the Qurʾān itself advocates. The stories of such prophets as 
Abraham clarified in particular that al-Qāsim’s concern lies with the proof of 
God’s oneness and uniqueness (tawḥīd),174 not however, His existence. 
Al-Kindī shared all these concerns with al-Qāsim. He likewise sought to show 
that the world came to be and is creation, and that God is its creator, which he 
phrased as ‘the proof for His rubūbiyya alone.’ In al-Kindī’s Fī al-falsafa al-ūlā , 
God’s attribute of being creator – rather than His existence, as has been claimed 
– is not established on the basis of the world’s origin in time, as it is in the Risāla, 
but on the basis that God is the bestower of oneness on things, which is 
identified with His creative act. The world’s finiteness in the past is, however, 
important for al-Kindī’s understanding of God’s uniqueness. Neither in al-Qāsim, 
nor in al-Kindī, does the proof of God’s existence play any role. 
                                                          
174 Oneness as creator and in terms of being deserving of worship alone, as well as in terms of 
His complete difference from creation. 
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Chapter Two: Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) 
 
Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī’s theological thought came to play an important role in 
the intellectual history of Islam. Alongside the Ashʿariyya, he is considered the 
founder of the second major orthodox school of kalām and a proponent of the 
middle path between the camp of the traditionalists and their rationalist 
antagonists.175 Al-Māturīdī’s only surviving kalām work (besides his Qurʾānic 
commentary Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān176), the Kitāb al-Tawḥīd, it has been said, 
‘überragt...alle älteren theologischen Texte aus Transoxanien an Umfang, an 
gedanklichem Reichtum und in der Methode.’177  
It is based on this work that we shall put forward our arguments that the proof 
of God’s existence was of no concern for al-Māturīdī, contrary to the view 
expressed in secondary literature on his thought. According to this view, the 
proof of God’s existence is an essential part of al-Māturīdī’s theological 
considerations, just as it is believed to be integral to the works of most other 
Islamic theologians. Generally, al-Māturīdī is seen to follow the same reasoning 
as the traditional cosmological arguments. David Thomas has described al-
Māturīdī’s argument this way: in the Tawḥīd, ‘the discussion about the existence 
of the world…is effectively a demonstration of its contingent nature and is thus 
prefatory to the long discussion about the existence and characteristics of 
God.’178 Fathalla Kholeif has, similarly, explained al-Māturīdī’s approach as that 
‘,b-y means of reason, we know the divine wisdom in creation and the evidence 
therein of the existence of the Creator.’179 Mustafa Cerić’s reading of al-
Māturīdī’s reasoning in the Tawḥīd likewise is that ‘through its ,i.e., the world’s- 
nature and function [we] find indisputable proof of the existence of its Creator, 
i.e., God.’180 Finally, Ulrich Rudolph has also taken up this reading, arguing in a 
                                                          
175 Rippin states that al-Māturīdī’s ‘influence at the time seems to have been significant in the 
emergence of Sunnī Islam. …al-Māturīdī followed a middle path between Traditionalism and 
Rationalism’ (2005, p. 85). See also Thomas 2008, p. 79. 
176 Al-Māturīdī, Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān. Edited by Ahmed Vanlıoğlu and Bekir Topaloğlu. Istanbul: 
Dār al-Mīzān, 2005.  
177 Rudolph 1997, p. 221. 
178 Thomas 2008, pp. 80-81.  
179 Kholeif’s introduction to al-Māturīdī, al-Tawḥīd, p. xix. 
180 Cerić 1995, p. 108. Cerić furthermore poses the question: ‘We know that the world exists 
because we see it with our eyes… However, we do not see God. So the question is: Does God 
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section entitled “Die Existenz Gottes” that al-Māturīdī seeks ‘den Nachweis, daß 
tatsächlich ein Schöpfer…existiere’ 181  by way of emphasising ‘ihre ,i.e., 
materielle Dinge – material things] Unselbständigkeit und ihre offenkundige 
Kontingenz.’182 Initially, this view seems to not be baseless; after all, it is al-
Māturīdī himself who speaks of ‘the proofs for the one who brought it ,i.e., 
creation] about (al-dalāla ʿalā man anshaʾahu)’183 and declares that ‘there is no 
way to knowledge of it except for through speculation (al-naẓar).’184 It is 
furthermore indeed the case that ‘the proof for the originatedness (ḥadath) of 
the atoms’185 – that is, the world as a whole – is made the basis of ‘the proof that 
there is for the world an originator (muḥdith).’186 Yet, while it is true for 
classical cosmological arguments for God’s existence that the proof that the 
world has a cause seeks to establish the existence of God, this does not appear 
to be al-Māturīdī’s intention when he infers the cause from the effect. We shall 
argue that his concern ultimately lies with confirming Scripture in its claim that 
the world constitutes creation and that God alone is its creator. In this 
endeavour, the proof of God’s existence does not play any role. Al-Māturīdī’s 
proof of the creator for the world is hence part of an entirely different discourse 
than the discourse on arguments for God’s existence, whatever different the 
arguments may have been, so significant in western philosophy. 
The Proof of the Originatedness of the World187 
The truth of religion and what it entails can be known, al-Māturīdī states, 
through Revelation (al-samʿ) and reason (al-ʿaql).188 One aspect this pertains to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
exist? “Yes, God does exist,” al-Māturīdī would answer, and, he would prove that by the fact of 
the world’s existence which must have been created by an agent’ (ibid., pp. 141-142). Also: ‘Al-
Māturīdī’s arguments for the existence of God are by and large Cosmological ,sic-’ (ibid., p. 144). 
181 Rudolph 1997, p. 291. 
182 Ibid., p. 291. 
183 Al-Māturīdī, al-Tawḥīd, p. 10. 
184 Ibid., p. 10. 
185 Ibid., p. 11. ‘Atom’ – or one could also translate ‘corporeal substance’ – is here designated by 
the term ʿayn, pl. aʿyān. Al-Māturīdī often uses this term interchangeably with jawhar (wāḥid), 
pl. jawāhir. See Rudolph 1997, pp. 271-272 on al-Māturīdī’s use of terminology. 
186 Al-Māturīdī, al-Tawḥīd, p. 17. 
187 See Rudolph 1997, pp. 257-268 and Cerić 1995, pp. 108-141 for a discussion of al-Māturīdī’s 
arguments. See also Daiber 1975 who comments briefly on al-Māturīdī ‘welcher in seinem 
Gottesbeweis…Elemente des kosmologischen und teleologischen Gottesbeweises verwertet hat’ 
(p. 156).  
188 Al-Māturīdī, al-Tawḥīd, p. 4. 
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is the question of whether the world has a beginning for its existence or 
whether it has existed from all eternity.189 The truth of this matter, and ‘the 
knowledge of the true natures (ḥaqāʾiq) of the things’ which it entails, can be 
established by recourse to sensory observation of the world around us (al-
ḥawās), to Revelation (al-akhbār) and to speculation (al-naẓar).190  
Among the proofs falling under the category of Revelation, al-Māturīdī refers to 
Qurʾānic pronouncements in which God Himself ‘informed that He is the creator 
(khāliq) of everything, and the maker (badīʿ) of the heavens and the earth.’191 It 
should be noted that al-Māturīdī here argues for the originatedness (ḥadath) of 
the world based on its having a creator; he does not simply state that the Qurʾān 
refers to the world as creation. Yet, this makes sense when we bear in mind that, 
according to al-Māturīdī, originatedness implies existence due to another, while 
eternal existence is uncaused, self-subsistent existence, as he has alluded to 
previously: ‘proofs for the one who originated it [i.e., creation] as opposed to for 
its being self-subsistent (kawn bi-nafsihi), as well as for (its) originatedness as 
opposed to (its) eternity.’192 It follows that, if God is the cause, as it were, of the 
existence of everything, then it means that this world has a beginning for its 
existence. The same reasoning becomes apparent elsewhere where al-Māturīdī 
states that the fact that ‘God created creation as creation (khalaqa al-khalq 
khalqan) proves its originatedness.’193  
Al-Māturīdī’s endeavour to prove the world’s originatedness, we must note, 
involves of course a particular understanding of the Qurʾānic declaration that 
the world is creation (khalq). Characteristic of the position of the mutakallimūn, 
and at variance with the understanding of these terms by the philosophers, as 
we shall discuss in the chapters to come, al-Māturīdī here defends a conception 
of creation as being ex nihilo. Origination means ‘being after not having been 
(al-kawn baʿda an lam yakun)’194 and denotes ‘being brought into existence 
                                                          
189 Ibid., p. 10.  
190 Ibid., p. 7. 
191 Ibid., p. 11. Al-Māturīdī gives no reference to particular verses but such statements can be 
found, for instance, in Q. 39.62 and Q. 2.117 respectively. 
192 Ibid., p. 10. 
193 Ibid., p. 45. 
194 Ibid., p. 13. 
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from non-existence (al-ikhrāj min al-ʿadam ilā’l-wujūd).’195 Even though one 
could argue that some Qurʾānic verses might give the impression that the 
world’s being khalq does not necessary imply that it came to be from absolutely 
nothing196 – as it is the case in such verses as Q. 23.12 saying {We created 
(khalaqnā) man from an essence of clay}197 where the same root kh-l-q appears 
–, al-Māturīdī is eager to reject the idea that God’s creation simply consists in 
the formation of the world from some prime matter.    
Among al-Māturīdī’s numerous arguments for the world’s originatedness based 
on sense observation we encounter again the reasoning mentioned above that 
originatedness and dependence on another go hand in hand. He argues: ‘Every 
single body is observed to be bound by necessity and based on need, but to the 
eternal applies the condition of self-sufficiency since it does not need another 
due to its eternity, but necessity and need mean being in need of another, which 
proves its ,i.e., the body’s- originatedness.’198 Al-Māturīdī furthermore adduces 
an argument which is reminiscent of the particularisation arguments later 
frequently employed by the mutakallimūn.199 Even though he does not use the 
terms ikhtiṣāṣ or takhṣīṣ commonly associated with this type of argument, he 
makes use of the same notion: Different and contrary natures (ṭabāʾiʿ), such as 
being small or big, good or evil, are conjoined in every observable thing, despite 
their natural repulsion, which proves not only their being conjoined due to 
another, but also their originatedness. These contrary natures also bear the sign 
of change (al-taghayyur) and perishableness (al-fanāʾ) in them which proves 
that ‘they do not exist self-sufficiently,’200 which means the same as their being 
originated.201  
                                                          
195 Ibid., p. 235. See also p. 45: ‘the origination of the world not from anything (ḥadath al-ʿālam 
lā min shayʾ).’ 
196 See Chapter V “Creation of the World” in Wolfson 1976, p. 355 et seqq.  
197 All translations of the Qurʾān are from Abdel Haleem 2004. 
198 Al-Māturīdī, al-Tawḥīd, p. 11.  
199 See Davidson 1987, Chapter VI “Arguments from the Concept of Particularization” (p. 154 et 
seqq.) and Davidson 1968 on the mutakallimūn’s argument from particularisation. 
200 Al-Māturīdī, al-Tawḥīd, p. 12. 
201 Ibid., p. 12. 
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Al-Māturīdī’s argument from the notion of change is not new to kalām. Al-Qāsim 
b. Ibrāhīm already referred to it in his Kitāb al-Dalīl al-kabīr,202 and so does al-
Māturīdī’s contemporary al-Ashʿarī in his own proof of the world’s 
originatedness. In al-Māturīdī, the notion of change which is observable by the 
senses appears almost as a forerunner of the idea of accidents associated with 
the atomistic worldview203 of many mutakallimūn and which al-Māturīdī 
expounds upon where he presents his proofs for the world’s beginning in time 
based on reasoning. The aforementioned changes occurring to a body ‘are not 
the body,’204 we are told, and they are identified as accidents (ʿaraḍ, pl. aʿrāḍ) 
and attributes (ṣifa, pl. ṣifāt) respectively.205 Motion and change, which should 
later become standard examples of accidents inhering in bodies, cannot coexists 
at the same time, al-Māturīdī’s argument runs. This indicates their finiteness 
(mutanāhin) and originatedness. Following the famous statement we will 
encounter numerous times in the works of other mutakallimūn that that which 
is not free from something originated is also originated, 206  al-Māturīdī 
concludes through reasoning that the world has a beginning. 
We should lastly note that in affirming the originatedness of the world, al-
Māturīdī makes recourse to the contentious, yet wide-spread idea among the 
mutakallimūn that ‘the realm of the observable (al-shāhid) serves as the basis 
for knowledge of the realm of the unobservable (al-ghāʾib).’207 Just as it is true 
for the shāhid that something written (kitāba) does not come about unless due 
to an author, al-Māturīdī argues, this must also be true for the ghāʾib: the 
                                                          
202 Al-Qāsim, al-Dalīl, p. 90: ‘All these changes (al-taṣārīf) must have a changer (muṣarrif).’ 
203 See the following works for an outline of Islamic atomism: Pines 1997; Sabra 2009, pp. 68-78; 
Wolfson 1976.  
204 Al-Māturīdī, al-Tawḥīd, p. 16. 
205 Ibid., p. 16. See the section “Die ontologische Struktur der Welt” in Rudolph 1997, pp. 268-
291 for an account of al-Māturīdī’s atomistic worldview as well as influences on him by earlier, 
especially Muʿtazilite, mutakallimūn. 
206 Al-Māturīdī, al-Tawḥīd, p. 12: ‘In this lies the originatedness of what is not free from it [i.e., 
accidents such as motion and rest] (wa-fī dhālika ḥadath mā lā yakhlū ʿanhu).’ 
207 Ibid., p. 45. Al-Māturīdī has a chapter dedicated to this analogy entitled ‘On the proofs of the 
shāhid for the ghāʾib’ (ibid., pp. 27-29). There, he mentions that disagreement existed even 
among those who made use of this analogy with regards to its proper use and what it implies. 
Some held that what is true for the shāhid is true for the ghāʾib in exactly the same way. Al-
Māturīdī himself objects that certain parallels can be drawn, but that a difference must be made 
in other aspects (e.g., the view that the whole world must be eternal (ghāʾib) because there is 
never a moment which is not preceded by another moment (shāhid) vs. the view that the world 
has a beginning for its existence (ghāʾib) since every observable thing enters existence 
(shāhid)).   
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writing and the world have in common that they are composed things (taʾlīf) 
which depend on another. This indicates their originatedness.208     
To affirm the originatedness of the world and in particular its creation from 
nothing is, for al-Māturīdī, a crucial teaching to defend on rational grounds not 
only because this is how the mutakallimūn understood Scripture’s account of it, 
but also because the failure to do so has for him some other unwanted 
implications. Against his fellow Muʿtazilite theologians and their teaching that 
the non-existent is a reality and thing (shayʾ), rather than complete denial,209 he 
argues that this leads to ‘the corruption of God’s oneness and uniqueness (fasād 
al-tawḥīd).’210 This is so since they believe that ‘its ,i.e., the world’s- essence 
was existent, but not the world (itself), and nothing else than the being (kawn) 
of the world came about,’211 which means ‘they made alongside God other 
things eternal.’212 This aspect of the affirmation of the world’s originatedness 
which is linked to the defence of God’s tawḥīd already appeared in a work as 
early as al-Kindī’s Fī al-falsafa al-ūlā, as we recall. Yet, while in al-Kindī’s 
reasoning the originatedness of the world has no direct bearing on the proof of 
its creator, in al-Māturīdī it is indeed made the basis for the inference ‘that there 
is for the world an originator.’213   
The Proof of the Originator for the World214 
‘The proof that there is for the world an originator (muḥdith),’ al-Māturīdī 
states in this chapter, ‘is that its originatedness has been established on the 
basis of what we (previously) mentioned…(and) it has been established that 
this is due to another than it.’215 What al-Māturīdī here refers to is the 
                                                          
208 Al-Māturīdī, al-Tawḥīd, p. 15. 
209 On this doctrine see, for instance, ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s Firaq wa-ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazila, p. 169 and 
al-Māturīdī’s own account in the chapter ‘The non-existent’s being a thing according to the 
Muʿtazila and a reply to them’ (al-Tawḥīd, p. 86 et seqq.). See Frank 2007 (“Al-maʿdūm wal-
mawjūd: the non-existent, the existent, and the possible in the teachings of Abū Hāshim and his 
followers”). 
210 Al-Māturīdī, al-Tawḥīd, p. 17. 
211 Ibid., p. 17. 
212 Ibid., p. 86. 
213 Ibid., p. 17. 
214 Discussed by Rudolph (1997, p. 291 et seqq.) in the section “Die Existenz Gottes” and by 
Cerić (1995, p. 141 et seqq.) as arguments for God’s existence. 
215 Al-Māturīdī, al-Tawḥīd, p. 17. 
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dichotomy introduced earlier between the eternal which is self-subsistent and 
the originated which is linked in terms of its existence to another. Since the 
world has a beginning for its existence, it necessarily follows that it exists due to 
another. It is precisely this reasoning which in secondary literature has been 
identified as al-Māturīdī’s argument for God’s existence, along the lines of a 
cosmological argument where it is proven that God does exist because the 
world has a cause for its existence. Yet, what al-Māturīdī has in mind rather 
seems to be the defence of the doctrine of God’s being the one who brought the 
world into existence, thus confirming what Scripture teaches. We shall argue 
this primarily based on certain statements we find in sections of the Tawḥīd 
other than the chapter on the proof of the creator itself, in which al-Māturīdī is 
rather silent as to what purpose exactly this proof is meant to serve. Elsewhere, 
however, we read the following: in his discussion of human action (afʿāl al-
khalq), al-Māturīdī speaks of ‘the testimony contained in creation (khalq) that 
there is no creator (khāliq) other than God and no rabb except for Him.’216 
While it is the case that al-Māturīdī here uses the testimony contained in 
creation to argue that human actions also belong to God’s creation, it must 
nevertheless be acknowledged that, according to him, creation does prove that 
God – and no other – is the one who brought the world into existence. Creation 
proves God’s attribute of being creator as well as His attribute of being rabb. 
What does the term rabb refer to, then? In our previous chapter we have shown 
that al-Kindī, alongside some other early mutakallimūn, makes use of this term 
to denote God’s role as creator of the world, and we have indicated that al-
Māturīdī employs it in the same sense. It is in al-Māturīdī’s discussion of the 
oneness of the world’s originator where he reveals what the term rabb denotes. 
There he states that, under the assumption of another god (ilāh) besides God, 
each of them should have power (yaqdiru) over the other one to hinder him 
from doing what he wishes. Consequentially, if both were unable to act, then 
this would be ‘the demise of al-rubūbiyya,’ and if only one of them had the 
power to hinder the other one, ‘then he would be al-rabb.’217 From this we can 
infer that what the term rabb implies is the power to act according to one’s wish 
                                                          
216 Ibid., p. 230. 
217 Ibid., p. 21. This reasoning has of course become well-known as dalīl al-tamānuʿ or proof 
from mutual hindrance.  
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and will, and rubūbiyya is ascribed only to the one from whom an act (fiʿl) 
emerges. We should here bear in mind that al-Māturīdī speaks of ‘God’s act (fiʿl 
Allāh)’218 when referring to God’s creation ex nihilo. Creation therefore serves 
al-Māturīdī to affirm the role of creator for God, and this evidently has the 
purpose – even if this is not spelled out by al-Māturīdī in clear words – of giving 
a rational foundation to certain pronouncements in Scripture, such as the 
admonition in Q. 3.64 that {none of us takes others beside God as lords 
(arbāban)}. In the Tawḥīd, al-Māturīdī is ultimately concerned with affirming 
God’s tawḥīd, and this involves, first and foremost, the recognition of God’s 
being sole creator, sometimes referred to as tawḥīd al-rubūbiyya, as well as of 
His divinity and worthiness of worship alone, known as tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya.219 
The latter aspect becomes apparent where al-Māturīdī explains: ‘If there was 
with God (another) god (ilāh)...and if he did not act, then it would be clear that 
God is one with regards to divinity (al-mutawaḥḥid bi’l-ilāhiyya) and one with 
regards to al-rubūbiyya (al-mutafarrid bi’l-rubūbiyya).’220 Creation therefore 
proves not only that God alone is creator, but also that divinity must not be 
ascribed to another than Him. This ultimate purpose of ‘the proof that there is 
for the world an originator’ has been overlooked by Thomas, Kholeif, Cerić and 
Rudolph alike when they argue that it is intended to show that God exists. The 
immediate purpose of al-Māturīdī’s ‘proof that there is for the world an 
originator’ is, we submit, nothing else than to affirm the principle of causation, 
which is known from the shāhid, for the ghāʾib. Unless it is proven that the 
origination of the world, which belongs to the realm of the unobservable, 
occurred due to a cause other than itself, al-Māturīdī has no basis to claim that 
the world is God’s product.  
  
                                                          
218 Ibid., p. 235. 
219 As noted in the previous chapter, al-Maqdisī lists the ‘affirmation of rubūbiyya’ among what 
defines God’s tawḥīd in his Kitāb al-Badʾ wa’l-taʾrīkh (ibid., p. 22). Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb explicitly 
distinguishes between tawḥīd al-rubūbiyya and tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya in his Majmūʿa al-tawḥīd al-
najdiyya (see Hawting 1999, p. 63). Nafi (2006, p. 218), referring to Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, offers 
‘the oneness of God as the Creator and Lord of the universe’ for tawḥīd al-rubūbiyya and ‘the 
master and ultimate sovereign of life’ for tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya.    
220 Al-Māturīdī, al-Tawḥīd, pp. 20-21. 
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The Argument from Evil for the Originator 
Al-Māturīdī presents a number of arguments to achieve this objective, yet it is 
one in particular that has attracted some attention in secondary sources. Kholeif 
has described this particular argument as rather ‘strange’221 considering that 
‘al-Māturīdī chooses to base his proof of the existence of God on the concept of 
evil, for philosophers usually prefer to base their proofs of God’s existence on 
more exalted concepts.’222 Al-Māturīdī’s argument is the following:  
The proof that there is for the world an originator is…: If the world was due to 
itself, then no time would be truer for it than any other, and no state (ḥāl) would 
be more appropriate for it than any other, and no characteristic (ṣifa) would be 
more suitable for it than any other. But since it has different times, states and 
characteristics, it has been established that it is not due to itself, because if it was, 
it would be permissible (jāza) that every thing gives itself states which are most 
beautiful and the best, and therewith moral and physical evils would be wrong, 
but their existence proves that it [i.e., the world] is due to another.223  
Kholeif and Pessagno both maintain that al-Māturīdī stands rather alone with 
his choice of argument among other theologians, both before and after him.224 
No other thinker, Pessagno states, has ‘picked up the threat and the style’225 of it. 
This is, however, not entirely correct. It is, admittedly, true that thinkers of the 
classical period do not seem to employ the notions of evil and good in their 
arguments from particularisation – among which al-Māturīdī’s argument is to 
be counted – to prove that creation has a creator at all, that is, in those sections 
of their works which are equivalents to al-Māturīdī’s ‘proof that there is for the 
world an originator.’ Yet, both notions do appear in sections seeking to establish 
that there is for creation only one creator. In doing so, they, like al-Māturīdī, 
accept the underlying idea that the existence of good and the existence of evil 
point to an agent who brought them about. Whether their existence then points 
                                                          
221 Kholeif’s introduction to al-Māturīdī, al-Tawḥīd, p. xxv. 
222 Ibid., p. xxv. 
223 Al-Māturīdī, al-Tawḥīd, p. 17. 
224 Kholeif’s introduction to al-Māturīdī, al-Tawḥīd, p. xxiv: ‘Then al-Māturīdī advances a proof 
which we do not find in the works of any of the philosophers or theologians who preceded him.’ 
Pessagno 1984, p. 73: ‘The extent of my own research has not revealed any thinker after him 
who picks up the threat and the style of this arguments [sic-.’  
225 Pessagno 1984, p. 73. 
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to one agent or to two agents – one bringing about good, the other one evil, for 
example – is a separate question. This reasoning can, for instance, be found in 
al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm’s Kitāb al-Radd ʿalā al-mulīd226 and in al-Shahrastānī’s 
Nihāya al-iqdām fī ʿilm al-kalām.227 
In any case, Pessagno, like Kholeif, explains al-Māturīdī’s argument as that ‘the 
existence of evils, moral and physical, is made the explicit basis for coming to 
know that there is a God.’228 They both maintain that al-Māturīdī proves God’s 
existence based upon the notion that the world, had it come into existence due 
to itself, would have been ‘satisfied only with the best of conditions’229 and 
hence ‘evil would not have existed,’230 but the factual existence of evil proves 
that God exists. There are two points we need to take into consideration. Firstly, 
al-Māturīdī’s phrasing indeed suggests that he wants to make the point that evil 
would not to be found in the world if the world was not creation, but caused its 
own existence; after all, he only presents the option where no evil exists, but not 
where no good exists. Yet, one could object to this reading of al-Māturīdī’s 
words that he never actually states that, were things to give themselves 
existence and bring about their own attributes, they would necessarily be free 
of all evil. ‘If it ,i.e., the world- was due to itself,’ al-Māturīdī states, ‘it would be 
possible (jāza) that…’.231 Good and evil, we must bear in mind, were mentioned 
previously by al-Māturīdī alongside any other pair of opposing characteristics 
to be found in creation,232 and his particular reference to evil has in fact no 
other purpose than the general mention of all kinds of states in things. What 
                                                          
226 Abrahamov mentions al-Qāsim’s argument that ‘,t-he existence of good and evil proves that 
the Creator of the universe is one’ (Abrahamov’s introduction to al-Qāsim, al-Dalīl, p. 16. The 
Kitāb al-Radd ʿalā al-mulīd is currently unpublished, but al-Qāsim’s argument appears in Ms. 
Berlin, fol. 61a, ll. 1-4).  
227 Al-Shahrastānī discusses the following view: ‘The act (al-fiʿl) proves the existence of a 
creator of the world… We find among the existents good and evil (khayran wa-sharran), order 
and disorder, and what good proves is different from what evil proves. The existence of good 
proves one who wants good and the existence of evil proves one who wants evil’ (Nihāya, pp. 
97-98 (of the Arabic text)). We have to concede to Pessagno and Kholeif that al-Qāsim’s Dalīl al-
kabīr was published by Binyamin Abrahamov only in 1990, while their publications are from 
1984 and 1970 respectively. Al-Shahrastānī’s Nihāya, however, was published by Alfred 
Guillaume in 1931 and was hence available to them.   
228 Pessagno 1984, p. 74. 
229 Kholeif’s introduction to al-Māturīdī, al-Tawḥīd, p. xxiv. 
230 Ibid., p. xxiv. 
231 Al-Māturīdī, al-Tawḥīd, p. 17. 
232 Ibid., p. 12. 
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applies to any such pair, like motion and rest, light and darkness, composition 
and separation, likewise applies to good and evil: if the world existed due to 
itself, it would be possible that there is only motion, but no rest, only light, but 
no darkness. One should not overlook the fact that, according to al-Māturīdī, 
change is impossible for something that exists due to itself. ‘If it ,i.e., the world- 
existed due to itself,’ he also stresses, ‘then it would remain as it is and in one 
state (ḥadd wāḥid).’233 If the world did not exist due to an outside cause, we 
would not encounter motion in it if it was in rest and no darkness if it is was 
illuminated, just as we would not find evil if it chose to bring about only 
goodness. 
The second point we need to consider concerns Kholeif and Pessagno’s claim 
that this particular argument has the purpose of proving God’s existence. We 
have shown above how al-Māturīdī makes the general point that creation 
contains proofs for God’s being creator, conveyed in the term rubūbiyya. 
Unsurprisingly, the existence of good and evil in creation is presented in the 
exact same way. In a much later section of the Tawḥīd, entitled ‘The wisdom in 
the creation of harmful elements (al-jawāhir al-ḍārra),’234 al-Māturīdī states:  
In this ,i.e., in creation’s consisting of harmful and beneficial elements- lies the 
clarification of the marvel of His wisdom, that is, the conjoining of what is 
harmful and what is beneficial as well as of what is good and what is evil (al-
khayr wa’l-sharr), even though they are opposed to each other, in (what 
functions as) proofs for His oneness (waḥdāniyyatihi) and in the testimony of His 
rubūbiyya alone.235  
This confirm that the purpose of the argument from evil (and good) is to 
establish, firstly, that the world exists due to an outside cause236 and, secondly, 
that this points to God’s attribute of being creator, just as Scripture says.    
Having shown that the arguments presented by al-Māturīdī as evidence that 
‘there is for the world an originator,’ including the argument from evil, are not 
intended as arguments for God’s existence, but rather for His being creator, we 
                                                          
233 Ibid., p. 18. 
234 Ibid., p. 108 et seqq. 
235 Ibid., p. 109. 
236 See also ibid., p. 230: ‘If it was permissible that good and evil exist without (coming from) 
one who brings them about, then this would also be permissible for everything (else), but this 
means abandoning Islam.’ 
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can nevertheless ask the question of why al-Māturīdī chose the – admittedly – 
rarely used notions of evil and good in particular to make the point that 
creation only exist because it has a creator, who is none other than God. One 
reason for his choice to put special emphasis on these two notions, out of all 
other possible pairs of opposing characteristics within the world, might have to 
do with the intention to criticise subliminally two of the groups whose beliefs 
he repeatedly attacks throughout the Tawḥīd: the Dualists (al-thanawiyya) and 
the Muʿtazilites. It is known that Dualist groups, such as Manichaeans and 
Zoroastrians, were present in Samarqand when al-Māturīdī lived there,237 and 
the same is true for a number of Muʿtazilite theologians, such as Abū al-Qāsim 
al-Balkhī al-Kaʿbī (d. 319/931) whom al-Māturīdī debated and about whom it 
has been said that he ‘zählte ohne Zweifel zu den herausragenden Theologen 
der Epoche.’238 The theologian’s concern, we must bear in mind, is not only to 
give a rational defence to the teachings found in Scripture, as we have seen, but 
also to point out inconsistencies in beliefs held by either adherents of other 
faiths or by fellow Muslims. This is certainly the case in al-Māturīdī’s Tawḥīd, as 
will become clear.239 With regards to the Muʿtazila, it is quite apparent where 
al-Māturīdī’s criticism would lie. ‘It is their belief,’ he states, ‘that there is no evil 
in God’s creation, and they speak of evil only in a metaphorical sense (bi’l-
majāz),’240 thus ascribing evil actions entirely to the authorship of humans.241 
Māturīdī rejects this view and upholds that ‘God is the creator of the body of evil 
as well as good, and He is the creator of evil and good acts done by creation.’242 
If, according to al-Māturīdī’s previously discussed argument from evil, God’s 
                                                          
237 Rudolph 1997, p. 183 et seqq.; Paket-Chy and Gilliot 2000, p. 130. 
238 Rudolph 1997, p. 174. See also the section “Die muʿtazilitische Herausforderung” in Rudolph 
1997, p. 171 et seqq. Galli has emphasised al-Māturīdī’s very apparent critique of the Muʿtazila 
throughout his Qurʾānic commentary: ‘al-Māturīdī took every opportunity to demonstrate the 
inconsistency of the Muʿtazilitie’ ,sic- views, the invalidity of their arguments, and the 
erroneousness of their doctrines’ (1982, p. 18). 
239 Thomas states: ‘many of al-Māturīdī’s theological concerns, similar to those of other 
theologians in his day, consisted in refutations of methods and ideas different from his own’ 
(2008, p. 79). Leaman and Rizvi state: ‘theology ,sought- to confront the arguments of non-
Muslims in the vastly expanding Islamic empire, and to deal with the early polemics between 
the Ashʿarites, the Muʿtazilites and the Qadarites’ (2008, p. 81). Rudolph (1997, pp. 163-165) 
lists the names of all opponents (individuals and groups) referred to, and refuted, by al-
Māturīdī in the Tawḥīd.  
240 Al-Māturīdī, al-Tawḥīd, p. 169. 
241 Compare De Cillis 2014, p. 12 and Hourani 1976. See Rudolph 1997, p. 339 et seqq. for al-
Māturīdī’s contribution to, and position on, the question of God’s action and human action. 
242 Al-Māturīdī, al-Tawḥīd, p. 170. 
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being sole originator is known because of good and evil, then the Muʿtazilites’ 
exclusion of evil from God’s creation and their denial of its reality must violate 
for al-Māturīdī the very foundation for the proof of tawḥīd al-rubūbiyya: both in 
the sense that God can be affirmed as the creator of the world as well as in the 
sense that every single thing truly is God’s creation.  
In the same vein, al-Māturīdī’s argument from evil poses a criticism of the 
position of the Dualists. They hold, according to him, that the world exists 
eternally due to the mixing of two principles, light and darkness or good and 
evil.243 We have seen how al-Māturīdī uses such opposite pairs as smallness and 
bigness, but also goodness and evil as well as light and darkness to prove that 
the world has a beginning in time. He furthermore employs them, as just 
discussed, to show that the world is the creation of a creator, that is, God. 
Bearing this function of good and evil in mind, al-Māturīdī’s argument must 
contain an intended hint at the absurdity of the belief of the Dualists that a 
world, being exclusively made of these very opposite principles, could be 
eternal as well as that these two contraries could be the originators of the world, 
rather than being themselves originated. For al-Māturīdī, we have to conclude, 
the existence of good and evil is proof of God’s oneness as creator – and so it is 
for al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm and al-Shahrastānī, as indicated – and he seeks to 
defend this position against two varying positions he repeatedly attacks in the 
Tawḥīd.   
The Importance of the Proof of the World’s Originatedness and Its 
Having an Originator 
Al-Māturīdī’s implicit, yet rather subtle attack against the Dualists and the 
Muʿtazilite mutakallimūn through the use of the concepts of evil and good in fact 
runs like a thread through the whole of the Tawḥīd and extends to the beliefs 
held by a variety of groups. It has been noted by Charles Genequand and Ulrich 
Rudolph that al-Māturīdī certainly did not have direct contact with every single 
group he refutes in the Tawḥīd. Rather, the view has to be taken that he 
‘partizpiert nur an der allgemeinen Auseinandersetzung mit bestimmten 
                                                          
243 Ibid., p. 34. 
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notorischen Gegnern, die im islamischen kalām allerorts geführt wurden’244 and 
which we will encounter over and over again in the works of other 
mutakallimūn after him. Yet, it is through an examination of the refutations he 
presents that we can gain some further insight as to which issues the proof of 
the world’s beginning in time and its existing due to a creator seeks to address.  
The chapter on ‘the proofs that there is for the world an originator’ is followed 
by a chapter which deals with ‘the beliefs of those who assume the eternity of 
the world.’245 In this section, al-Māturīdī states that those who uphold the 
world’s eternal existence, and who are hence evidently in major disagreement 
with the mutakallimūn’s understanding of Scripture as referring to the world’s 
coming to be in time, assume that things derive their existence from preceding 
things, without this state having a first beginning. Some of the proponents of 
this belief hold, al-Māturīdī points out, that the generation of existents 
constituting this world takes place ‘without one who brings them about (bi-lā 
munshiʾ).’246 There is no indication that al-Māturīdī means to say that the denial 
of an originator for the world on the part of this group denotes their denying 
God’s existence. The issue at stake rather is whether the world simply exists, by 
its own nature, or whether it is creation as the Qurʾān states. In the context of 
the traditional arguments for God’s existence, such as the cosmological one, it 
could rightly be argued that the denial of a creator implies the denial of God’s 
existence; yet, we have to acknowledge that this is not what al-Māturīdī means 
to say when he speaks of the denial of a creator for the world. The question of 
whether the group referred to by him assumes that God exists is different from 
the question of whether they agree with al-Māturīdī and his fellow theologians 
that God plays any role in bringing about the world (or whether the explanation 
of a thing’s existence can be found in the thing that precedes it). The latter 
question is tackled, while the former simply is absent.   
Another position al-Māturīdī mentions is that the world exists eternally ‘due to 
one who brings it about, but they make him the ʿilla of the being of the world, 
                                                          
244 Rudolph 1997, pp. 164-165. See also Genequand 1999, p. 198. 
245 Al-Māturīdī, al-Tawḥīd, p. 30 et seqq. 
246 Ibid., p. 30. 
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and the ʿilla cannot be without the maʿlūl.’247 The cause referred to by al-
Māturīdī as ʿilla is a kind of cause which brings about its effect necessarily (ṭarīq 
al-iḍṭirār) due to its nature (bi’l-ṭabʿ).248 It follows that, if this cause exists, its 
effect must exist as well. Besides the belief in the eternity of the world held by 
its adherents (which obviously results from their particular notion of God as 
cause), al-Māturīdī’s criticism is directed towards their very conception of God 
as a ʿilla: ‘His ,i.e., al-bāriʾ] being called an ʿilla is false!’249 For al-Māturīdī, 
defending a particular conception of God as creator, it is evidently not enough to 
acknowledge that the world is God’s work – it must be affirmed as God’s 
creation, which means existence after non-existence,250 as we remember. 
Likewise, to acknowledge God as some cause of the world is not sufficient, and 
indeed not what Scripture states: God is creator, not a necessary cause.  
Lastly, al-Māturīdī makes explicit mention of the Dualists and presents their 
view regarding the creation of the world from the two eternal principles of light 
and darkness.251 The Dualists believe in agreement with the ahl al-tawḥīd, as al-
Māturīdī states elsewhere, in one godhead.252 Al-Māturīdī’s criticism therefore 
does once more not concern the question of God’s existence, but has to do with 
the Dualists’ belief that the world could possibly be eternal even though it exists 
due to two opposing principles.253 Furthermore, al-Māturīdī must reject their 
belief that not all of creation comes from the one principle they identify as the 
godhead,254 as alluded to above, since some of them hold that evil is not God’s 
creation, but the devil’s, who is the product of an evil thought that occurred to 
God.255  
What al-Māturīdī’s mention of these beliefs and positions highlights is that 
neither the doctrine of the world’s creation in time, nor the belief in God as its 
                                                          
247 Ibid., p. 30. 
248 Ibid., p. 33. 
249 Ibid., p. 33. 
250 Ibid., p. 45 and p. 235. 
251 Ibid., p. 35. 
252 Ibid., p. 235. 
253 Ibid., p. 34. 
254 Ibid., p. 169 (‘the belief of the Dualists that the one from whom the creation of evil stems is in 
reality not the one from whom the creation of good stems’) and pp. 235-236 (‘they declare it 
wrong that the godhead, in whose worthiness of worship (ulūhiyyatihi) creation believes, is 
able to create most of the world’). 
255 Ibid., p. 88. 
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creator, defended by al-Māturīdī at the very beginning of the Tawḥīd, were 
without controversy when the Muslims came into contact with other faiths and 
when differences in doctrine started to crystallise among the Muslims 
themselves. Yet, they also highlight that the issue of God’s existence and the 
proof thereof do not play any role, even where the question is discussed of 
whether the world exists due to a creator or not. Rather, al-Māturīdī’s concerns 
in these refutations reflect his concerns as we explained them in the chapter 
‘that there is for the world a creator.’ 
Conclusions 
The overarching concern and purpose of al-Māturīdī’s Tawḥīd is to defend 
certain religious doctrines by giving them a rational justification. This is most 
evidently true for the proof of the world’s originatedness and its having a 
creator, which al-Māturīdī discusses at the very beginning of his work.  We have 
shown that ‘the proof that there is for the world an originator’ does for al-
Māturīdī not serve the purpose of proving God’s existence, along the lines of a 
cosmological argument, as suggested in secondary literature. It rather is the 
case that, on the one hand, al-Māturīdī seeks to establish the principle of 
causation for the unobservable realm (al-ghāʾib) in analogy to the observable 
realm (al-shāhid) in order to be able to defend the doctrine that it is God due to 
whom the world exists (i.e., the world is not the cause of its own existence); on 
the other hand, al-Māturīdī intends to defend a particular conception of God as 
creator in accordance with how he and indeed the majority of his fellow 
theologians understood the Qurʾānic teachings on this matter. This conception 
involves the createdness of the world ex nihilo and the notion that all of 
creation is God’s product. Both the affirmation of a beginning for the world and 
its creation from absolutely nothing as well as the affirmation of God’s being the 
sole creator of everything ultimately constitute two crucial aspects of the 
declaration of God’s oneness and uniqueness (tawḥīd), which the Tawḥīd is – 
‘nomen est omen’ – dedicated to.256 While al-Māturīdī’s refutations of a variety 
                                                          
256 Rudolph states in agreement with this: ‘Er verteidigt den Islam gegen eine fundamentale 
Herausforderung und kämpft dafür, daß der Glaube an den Einen Gott, der tauḥīd also, über 
seine Gegner triumphiert’ (1997, p. 196). 
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of beliefs contrary to his understanding of the Islamic account of creation and 
God’s role in it highlight the significance of the defence of these two doctrines, it 
also became clear that the question of whether God actually exists and how His 
existence can be proven is of no relevance within the overall conceptual thrust 
of the Kitāb al-Tawḥīd. 
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Chapter Three: Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/936) and the Qāḍī 
Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013) 
 
Al-Ashʿarī  
Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī must be regarded as one of the most significant 
mutakallimūn in the history of Islamic theology. He was one of those early 
scholars who sought to give their faith a rational, reason-based foundation and 
who defended the emerging discipline of theology (ʿilm al-kalām) against its 
critics.257 Al-Ashʿarī’s significance is reflected in the fact that his name would 
later be associated with one of Islam’s major theological schools of thought, the 
Ashʿariyya, from which a great number of mutakallimūn emerged whose 
contribution to – what has been seen as – the Islamic discourse on proofs of 
God’s existence we will consider in the following chapters.258   
The Objectives of Theology 
In his Risāla istiḥsān al-khawḍ fī ʿilm al-kalām, al-Ashʿarī argues in defence of 
the discipline of kalām that the mutakallim, who engages in ‘speculation and 
enquiry into religious matters (al-naẓar wa’l-baḥth ʿan al-dīn)’ and who 
‘investigates the principles of religion (uṣūl al-dīn),’259 dedicates himself to 
vindicating the very same matters of faith which the Qurʾān makes incumbent 
upon the believer. Whether it is the affirmation of God’s oneness and 
uniqueness (tawḥīd)260 or the defence of the doctrine of resurrection261 or 
finally God’s otherness from creation and the rejection of anthropomorphism it 
implies,262 al-Ashʿarī stresses that it is the verses of the Qurʾān which form the 
basis of the rational arguments employed by the theologians.263 The science of 
                                                          
257 See al-Ashʿarī’s Risāla istiḥsān al-khawḍ fī ʿilm al-kalām (n.p.: Dār al-Mashārīʿ, 1995) which is 
dedicated to defending kalām against the charge of innovation (bidʿa).  
258 See Richard M. Frank’s Classical Islamic Theology: The Ashʿarites (edited by Dimitri Gutas. 
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), Early Islamic Theology: The Muʿtazilites and al-Ashʿarī (edited by 
Dimitri Gutas. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007) and Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School (Durham, N.C.: 
Duke University Press, 1994). 
259 Al-Ashʿarī, Risāla, p. 38. 
260 Ibid., pp. 40-41. 
261 Ibid., p. 41 et seqq. 
262 Ibid., p. 44 et seqq. 
263 Al-Ashʿarī makes the point that the mutakallimūn’s defence of the doctrine of God’s oneness 
and uniqueness (tawḥīd), which they base on the world’s originatedness and the notions of 
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kalām, we are told in secondary literature, however, also seeks to defend by 
rational means another item of belief: the existence of God, and the proof of it is 
said to have its place in al-Ashʿarī’s works. Majid Fakhry, for instance, lists al-
Ashʿarī’s discussion of the question ‘What is the proof that there is a creator for 
creation who made it and an arranger who arranged it?’ in the Kitāb al-Lumaʿ 
among what he calls ‘the classical Islamic arguments for the existence of God.’264 
According to Fakhry, in the Kitāb al-Lumaʿ, the proof that the world exists due 
to a creator therefore serves the purpose of showing that God exists, which 
would then be a proof along the lines of the traditional cosmological arguments 
we know from western philosophy and theology. Eric Ormsby has described al-
Ashʿarī’s argument this way: al-Ashʿarī ‘proceeds from the glaring fact of the 
world’s contingency – the fact that it is not self-caused but depends on 
something outside itself for its existence’265 on which his argument for God’s 
existence supposedly rests. In the same vein, Muḥammad Ramaḍān ʿAbd Allāh 
has described the proof of the creator in the Kitāb al-Lumaʿ as seeking ‘the 
affirmation of the existence of God on the basis of the proof the mutakallimūn 
called the proof from the originatedness of the accidents.’266 
This reading of what al-Ashʿarī seeks to establish in his theological works shall 
be contested in the following. We shall argue that the proof of the creator, in al-
Ashʿarī’s Kitāb al-Lumaʿ, has the purpose of establishing God as the creator of 
the world. Al-Ashʿarī does not seek to answer the question ‘Is there a God and 
how can His existence be proven?’; rather, he seeks to defend the Qurʾānic 
doctrine – as he understands it – that the world, including every single thing 
and occurrence, is God’s product and that God is the world’s creator in a specific 
way. In doing so, God’s existence, as understood in the traditional arguments for 
                                                                                                                                                                    
motion and rest, is borrowed from the Qurʾānic story of Abraham and the setting of the star. The 
theologians’ dalīl al-tamānuʿ (proof from mutual hindrance) for God’s being the only deity (ilāh) 
is inspired by Q. 21.22 {If there had been in the heavens or earth any gods but Him, both 
heavens and earth would be in ruin…+. The theologians’ attempt to defend the doctrine of 
resurrection by rational means is not so different from the Qurʾānic approach which also gives 
arguments in support of it. 
264 See Majid Fakhry, “The Classical Islamic Arguments for the Existence of God”, The Muslim 
World, Volume 47, Issue 2, pp. 133-145, April 1957.  
265 Ormsby 2007, p. 53. Ormsby makes this statement with reference to al-Ghazālī’s proof of 
God’s existence in his al-Qisṭās al-mustaqīm in particular, but sees his argument in the tradition 
of al-Ashʿarī’s reasoning for God’s existence.  
266 Muḥammad Ramaḍān ʿAbd Allāh 1986, p. 402. 
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God’s existence, is never a matter of doubt or seen to require proof. Our reading 
of what the proof ‘that there is a creator for creation’ seeks to show in fact 
follows al-Ashʿarī’s own words when he states in a later section,267 referring to 
his discussion of this very matter: ‘the proofs have shown that God (Most-High!) 
is the creator of every originated thing (anna Allāh taʿālā khāliq kull shayʾ 
ḥādith)’268 as well as ‘the proofs have established that all originated things are 
creation by God (Most-High!) (anna kull al-muḥdathāt makhlūqāt li’llāh 
taʿālā).’269  
The Proof of the Creator 
The reasoning al-Ashʿarī puts forward to prove ‘that there is for creation a 
creator’ is strikingly Qurʾānic,270 and hence seems to give support to his 
statement in the Risāla that the arguments employed by the mutakallimūn 
follow the reasoning to be found in Scripture. Al-Ashʿarī rests his proof on the 
transformation of humans from state to state (ḥāl), which he describes as ‘the 
greatest miracle’ and ‘first in proving a creator.’271 Humans were once not more 
than a drop of sperm, al-Ashʿarī argues, then became a blood clot, then flesh. We 
begin our existence as children, then grow into young adults, elderly people and 
finally grow old.272 Everybody knows, al-Ashʿarī then concludes his argument, 
that humans cannot bring about this transformation from state to state by 
themselves which indicates that ‘there is one who transforms them…and who 
arranges them in the way they are.’273 This is the proof of the creator.  
Al-Ashʿarī’s argument is very reminiscent of such verses as Q. 75.37-38 which 
read {Was he not just a drop of spilt-out sperm, which became a clinging form, 
which God shaped in due proportion}274 as well as Q. 23.14 saying {then We 
                                                          
267 In the section entitled ‘On the will (al-irāda) and that it encompasses all originated things 
(al-muḥdathāt)’ (al-Ashʿarī, al-Lumaʿ, p. 47 et seqq.). 
268 Ibid., p. 47. 
269 Ibid., p. 49. 
270 Fakhry has made this point before: ‘The argument of Al-Ashʿarī in this treatise has a distinct 
Quranic ring. It…rests on the observation of the ‘phases’ of man’s growth from “a drop of water, 
to a leech to an embryo,” which the Qurʾān has rendered classical’ (1957, p. 140). So has 
Muḥammad Ramaḍān ʿAbd Allāh: ‘this is the Qurʾānic path’ (1986, p. 403). 
271 Al-Ashʿarī, al-Lumaʿ, p. 19. 
272 Ibid., p. 18. 
273 Ibid., p. 18. 
274 All translations of the Qurʾān are from Abdel Haleem 2004. 
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developed that clot into a clinging form, and We developed that form into a 
lump of flesh, and We developed that lump into bones, and We clothed those 
bones with flesh, and later We developed him into other forms – glory be to God, 
the best of creators!}.275 It must be noted that al-Ashʿarī is not the first, much 
less the only theologian to make use of this Qurʾānic reasoning to prove ‘that 
there is for creation a creator.’ Al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm, who died more than 70 
years before al-Ashʿarī, also referred to the aforementioned verses (i.e., Q. 
75.37-38) in his Kitāb al-Dalīl al-kabīr.276 We recall that al-Qāsim used these 
two verses, alongside a great many other Qurʾānic verses, in order to establish 
that everything contained in this world exhibits the signs of being created and 
that God alone is the one who brought it about. ‘There must hence be one who 
arranges (mudabbir) all affairs, and there exists none such other than God (wa-
lan yūjad illā’llāh),’ 277  al-Qāsim stated. With particular reference to the 
abovementioned two verses and the transformation of humans, al-Qāsim made 
the point that ‘this is not found except for coming from God.’278 It became clear 
that in al-Qāsim’s Kitāb al-Dalīl al-kabīr the notion of change in general, and 
humans’ transformation from state to state as a particular example,279 are used 
as an argument to prove that the role of creator must be ascribed to God, not 
however as an argument for God’s existence.280 It seems that, ultimately, al-
Ashʿarī does not have in mind anything different than al-Qāsim and that his 
proof that there is for creation a creator does not serve the purpose of proving 
God’s existence.  
This becomes evident when we take a closer look at the discussion surrounding 
– what we could term – the principle of causation, which plays a crucial role in 
al-Ashʿarī’s proof of the creator. Al-Ashʿarī would not be able to arrive at the 
conclusion that the changes witnessed in humans only come about due to a 
                                                          
275 The terms employed by al-Ashʿarī are the same as in the Qurʾān; both speak of the nuṭfa 
(sperm) developing into the ʿalaqa (blood clot, clinging form).   
276 Al-Qāsim, al-Dalīl, p. 92. 
277 Ibid., p. 82. 
278 Ibid., p. 92. 
279 Abrahamov 1986, p. 264. 
280 In his al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209) dedicates a separate chapter to 
the reasoning based on ‘how humans develop from sperm’ (vol. 1, part 1, p. 216) to prove the 
creator, by which he means the proof that God is the creator of the world, as we shall see 
Chapter Eight.  
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creator and arranger if it was not for his affirmation of this very principle, 
which entails that nothing can enter existence due to itself, chance or without 
cause. Al-Ashʿarī himself phrases it this way: ‘They [i.e., humans] are, in their 
state of weakness and imperfection, unable to effect (fiʿl) this [i.e., to bring 
about these transformations-… (However,) their transformation…is not 
possible without a transformer and arranger.’281  The affirmation of this 
principle forms the cornerstone of all the arguments employed by theologians 
and philosophers282 alike to prove that God is the world’s creator. It is therefore 
not surprising that some theologians, such as al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), would 
go to great length to establish that an effect needs a cause, as it were.283 In the 
Kitāb al-Lumaʿ, al-Ashʿarī also presents an argument in defence of the principle 
of causation. He states:  
What makes this clear is that cotton cannot become a spun thread, then a woven 
garment without a weaver or maker (ṣāniʿ) or arranger (mudabbir), and 
whoever takes cotton and waits for it to become a spun threat, then a woven 
garment without a maker or weaver is out of his mind and undoubtedly ignorant! 
The same is true for him who faces the wilderness where there is no firm castle 
and he expects clay to transform into the state of bricks and to staple themselves 
one on top of the other, without a maker or builder.284  
Al-Ashʿarī evidently derives the principle of causation from observation of this 
world, and seeks to affirm its general validity based on an analogy between the 
shāhid, the seen world, and the ghāʾib, the unseen world. Nothing comes into 
existence in the shāhid unless due to an agent, and the same must be true for 
                                                          
281 Al-Ashʿarī, al-Lumaʿ, p. 17. 
282 The main difference between the theologians and philosophers is of course that the former 
regard the world as being ḥādith/muḥdath insofar as there was once a state of affairs where the 
world did not exist and then entered existence; while the latter hold that there was never such a 
state of affairs where the world was not, yet it is ḥādith/muḥdath insofar as its existence is 
possible in itself (mumkin bi’l-dhāt). In any case, both groups have to show that what is 
ḥādith/muḥdath or mumkin requires an outside cause to give it existence. Compare the 
discussions in Ibn Sīnā’s Metaphysics (al-Ilāhiyyāt) of the Shifāʾ, in al-Ghazālī’s Tahāfut al-
falāsifa (especially the Third Dicussion) as well as in Ibn Rushd’s Tahāfut al-tahāfut (also the 
Third Discussion). Also see Kogan 1985. 
283 Compare al-Juwaynī’s Kitāb al-Shāmil where most of the discussion in the chapter on the 
affirmation of the creator is in fact dedicated to establishing the principle of causation. Al-
Juwaynī affirms the mukhaṣṣiṣ (one who particularises) who gave the world existence only 
after a lengthy discussion about whether the actualisation of existence instead of non-existence, 
which are both possible for the world, is ‘due to itself (li-nafsihi) or due to an entity (maʿnā) in 
addition to it and subsisting in it or due to permissibility or due to the particularisation of one 
who particularises’ or not due to any of them, which is equated with chance (ittifāq) (al-Shāmil 
(1960-61), p. 147).  
284 Al-Ashʿarī, al-Lumaʿ, p. 14. 
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the ghāʾib, to which the example of the transformation of humans can be 
counted since its agent is not observable.  
Now, in our quest to understand which purpose the argument based on humans’ 
transformation serves, we are able to gain clarity when turning to al-Juwaynī’s 
discussion of al-Ashʿarī’s analogy between the shāhid and the ghāʾib in his Kitāb 
al-Shāmil. In this work, al-Juwaynī makes mention of al-Ashʿarī’s use of this 
analogy based on a building’s need for a builder in a chapter which deals with 
the issue of ‘the need of origination for the originator’285 which discusses the 
principle of causation. There, al-Juwaynī also refers to certain criticisms 
brought forward by – unnamed – Muʿtazilite theologians, which take their 
starting point from al-Ashʿarī’s own position that humans are not the agents of 
their actions, rather God alone is agent, and humans only acquire (kasb, iktisāb) 
their actions.286 The implications of this position are twofold, according to the 
Muʿtazilites’ criticism: firstly, since al-Ashʿarī does not affirm the principle of 
causation for the shāhid (since human action does not come about due to 
humans as agents, that is, there is no agent for acts in the shāhid), he cannot 
make an analogy to the ghāʾib (that is, he cannot affirm that acts which are 
counted among the realm of the ghāʾib, like the origination of the world, must 
come about due to an agent). He has failed to affirm the principle of causation 
altogether. Secondly, even if al-Ashʿarī’s analogy between the shāhid and the 
ghāʾib was granted, it would necessarily follow that God is the agent and creator 
of the world in the same way as humans are linked to their actions – not in a 
truly creative way, but only through acquisition. This is, however, not how God 
as creator has to be understood.287  
What the aforementioned shows is the following: the issue at stake is not the 
provability or proof of God’s existence. The Muʿtazilites’ criticism does not 
concern the question of whether al-Ashʿarī’s allegedly flawed analogy to affirm 
                                                          
285 Al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil (1960-61), p. 153. 
286 Compare al-Ashʿarī’s exposition of this view in the Kitāb al-Lumaʿ: ‘If someone was to say: 
Why does the occurrence of the act (al-fiʿl) which is acquisition (kasb) not prove that there is no 
agent (fāʿil) for it other than God, just as it proves that there is no creator (khāliq) for it other 
than God (Most-High!)? We would say: This is what we believe’ (p. 72). See Frank 1966 and 
Abrahamov 1989 on al-Ashʿarī’s theory of acquisition.  
287 Al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil (1960-61), p. 157 et seqq. 
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the creator for creation means the failure to prove that God exists. Yet, this is 
precisely what David Norcliff has argued: ‘There is a problem… This comes into 
greater focus when one considers the impact of the denial of causality on the 
Ashʿarite proofs of God’s existence. If causality is denied, then the argument that 
a contingent world must point beyond itself to God must come into question.’288 
In reality, however, the problem the Muʿtazilites highlight, according to al-
Juwaynī’s account, pertains to the question on what grounds one could claim 
that the world came into existence due to God if one does not assume that 
actions have an agent in the seen world which is the basis of the principle of 
causation.289 It also pertains to the question of how al-Ashʿarī can uphold a 
specific conception of God as agent in view of his denial of human efficient 
causality. These considerations clarify the concerns underlying al-Ashʿarī’s 
attempt to affirm the creator for creation, and it has become clear that God’s 
existence does not play a role.  
The Proof of the World’s Beginning 
Since it has become clear that it is al-Ashʿarī’s concern in the Kitāb al-Lumaʿ to 
establish God as creator of the world, we must note that the concept of the 
creator held by the mutakallimūn is by far more specific than what al-Ashʿarī 
has defended so far. God is not simply the cause of the states this world exhibits 
(which is exemplified by al-Ashʿarī’s reference to the transformation of 
humans); rather, He is the cause and creator of the world’s very existence. It is 
therefore that al-Ashʿarī then turns to the proof that the world has an origin in 
time. He addresses the following question: ‘so you do not believe that sperm 
never ceases and is eternal (lam tazal qadīma)?’290 It seems evident that the 
questioner does not intend that every particular sperm is eternal (as its 
occurrence in time is rather self-evident, one could pose); rather, it seems that 
his question is to be understood as being representative of the position that 
matter, from which the things in this world arise (and humans’ being formed 
                                                          
288 Norcliffe 1999, p. 90. 
289 Compare ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Majmūʿ, p. 357: ‘Don’t you see that it is necessary to affirm one of 
us as originator in order to affirm the connection between the originatedness of the bodies and 
God Almighty and Exalted?’ 
290 Al-Ashʿarī, al-Lumaʿ, p. 19. 
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from sperm is only one such example), is eternal. A proponent of this view 
would then counter al-Ashʿarī’s claim that the changes in this world are due to 
God by maintaining either that the assumed eternity of sperm (or matter) 
precludes it from being the product of God, or that, while the transformation of 
matter due to God is conceded, the originatedness of matter itself is not. Both 
positions can in fact be identified with the dahriyya, a label we shall find 
mentioned numerous times by other later mutakallimūn. Ibn Ḥazm (d. 
456/1064) refers to the dahriyya in his al-Fiṣal and describes them as those 
who assume that the world is eternal.291 Some dahriyyūn hold that the world 
simply is, without depending on any originator; others believe that it has 
existed eternally with and through an arranger.292 Their argument for the 
world’s eternity is, according to Ibn Ḥazm, this: ‘We have not witnessed the 
occurrence (ḥadatha) of anything except for from something or in something. 
He who claims anything else claims something he does not witness and never 
witnessed.’293 This is exactly the position we find described in the question al-
Ashʿarī addresses: ‘So you do not believe that sperm is never ceasing and 
eternal?’ Al-Ashʿarī replies that change (taghayyur) is a sign of temporality and 
non-eternity: ‘the eternal cannot be transformed or changed and the signs of 
originatedness (al-ḥadath) do not apply to it.’294 Making recourse to what 
should later become an essential element of the theologians’ proof for the 
originatedness of the world, al-Ashʿarī remarks that ‘that which does not 
precede the originated is (itself) originated and produced (muḥdathan 
maṣnūʿan).’295 From this it follows for al-Ashʿarī that not only sperm, but also all 
other bodies (i.e., the world which is ‘the entirety of created things’296) have a 
beginning in time.297 What al-Ashʿarī has hence shown is the following: contrary 
to the claim, ascribed to individuals labelled by the theologians as dahriyyūn, 
                                                          
291 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Fiṣal, part 1, p. 47. 
292 Ibid., p. 37. 
293 Ibid., p. 48. 
294 Al-Ashʿarī, al-Lumaʿ, p. 19. 
295 Ibid., p. 19. Al-Ashʿarī does not mention the crucial premise of the impossibility of an infinite 
regress of originated things yet which al-Juwaynī should make an essential part of the proof of 
the originatedness of the world and which later theologians took over. The body insofar as it is 
the substrate of accidents which originate in time is also originated since the assumption of an 
infinite regress of accidents in an eternal substrate is absurd. Compare al-Juwaynī, al-Irshād, p. 
17 and al-Shāmil (1960-61), p. 67.  
296 Ibn Fūrak, Maqālāt, p. 36. 
297 Al-Ashʿarī, al-Lumaʿ, p. 19. 
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that the world has no beginning for its existence, the Qurʾānic tenet has been 
defended on rational grounds, as understood by the mutakallimūn, that there 
was once a state of affairs where only God existed, but not the world. The world 
is not a self-sufficient thing, but creation. God is not the creator of the world 
only insofar as He transforms eternally existing prime matter or brings about 
events, but insofar as He brought the whole of creation into existence from non-
existence, thus the theologians’ understanding of the Qurʾān.298  
God’s Oneness and Uniqueness 
Lastly, we should direct our attention to a statement we find in al-Ashʿarī’s 
Risāla. There he writes, in defence of the science of kalām:  
As for movement and rest and the kalām about them, their principles can be 
found in the Qurʾān where they prove God’s oneness and uniqueness (al-
tawḥīd)… God (Most-High!) mentioned, reporting about His friend Abraham in 
the story of the setting of the star and the sun and the moon and their moving 
from place to place, what proves that his Lord (rabbahu) cannot possibly be any 
of those [i.e., the aforementioned celestial bodies], and that he who can sink and 
move from place to place is not a godhead (ilāh).299  
This statement of al-Ashʿarī’s is of interest to us insofar as it mentions the 
notions of motion (al-ḥaraka) and rest (al-sukūn) which should become an 
important aspect of what could be called the standard kalām proof to affirm the 
creator which is based on the originatedness of accidents, as shall be seen in the 
following chapters. Contrary to the view propounded in secondary literature 
that the theologians’ reasoning on the basis of the accidents of motion and rest 
have the purpose of proving that God really does exist,300 al-Ashʿarī makes clear 
that they serve to prove God’s oneness and uniqueness and in particular His 
being the only rabb. We recall from our discussion of al-Qāsim and al-Kindī’s 
works in a previous chapter that they used the term rabb to refer to God’s role 
                                                          
298 In the section of the Kitāb al-Lumaʿ where al-Ashʿarī sets forth his theory of acquisition (kasb, 
iktisāb), he supports his claim that ‘there is no originated thing and action (muḥdath mafʿūl) but 
God is its originator, agent and creator (muḥdith lahu fāʿil khāliq)’ (p. 88) by the Qurʾānic 
statement {He created all things} (e.g., Q. 6.101). The discussion whether human actions do or 
do not fall under God’s efficacy is part of the wider discussion about the scope of God’s being 
creator. 
299 Al-Ashʿarī, Risāla, p. 40. 
300 See, for example, van Ess who states: ‘Abū al-Hudhayl based his proof of God’s existence on 
his ontology, especially his teachings on the accidents’ (1997, Band IV, p. 7). Generally, this view 
is held where it is said that God’s existence is inferred from the world’s originatedness, which in 
turn is proven on the basis of accidents inhering in bodies (i.e., the cosmological argument). 
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as creator and that they both made the proof of God’s rubūbiyya an essential 
part of their philosophico-theological enquiries. The same is true for al-Ashʿarī’s 
claim that God’s being the only ilāh is proven on the basis that the things in this 
world are moving objects, or at least have the capacity to move. In his Maqālāt 
al-shaykh Abī al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, Ibn Fūrak (d. 406/1015) explains that al-
Ashʿarī ‘chose (the view) that what is meant when we describe Him as ilāh is 
that He has ilāhiyya, and what ilāhiyya denotes is His ability to create (qudra 
ʿalā iktirāʿ) the atoms and accidents.’301 Motion and rest hence serve to prove 
God’s tawḥīd insofar as He alone is creator and all other existents creation, and 
insofar as the names of rabb and ilāh may only be ascribed to God based on His 
being creator. Speaking of God’s oneness and tawḥīd means, according to al-
Ashʿarī, ‘(His) uniqueness and the denial of association with Him (al-tafarrud al-
nāfī li’l-ishtirāk) as well as of ascribing a partner to Him in terms of…His 
act…and His arrangement (al-izdiwāj fī…al-fiʿl…wa-tadbīrihi) – He has no 
partner,’302 thus Ibn Fūrak’s explanation and words.303 
In al-Ashʿarī, the proof that God is the one who brought about the world serves 
the purpose not only of defending this key Islamic doctrine on rational grounds, 
which is one particular aspect of God’s tawḥīd, but also of establishing, at the 
same time, another aspect of God’s oneness and uniqueness, which likewise has 
its basis in the Qurʾān and such verses as Q. 42.11 {There is nothing like Him}. 
Ibn Fūrak explains that, according to al-Ashʿarī, God’s tawḥīd also includes ‘the 
denial…of ascribing an associate to Him in terms of His essence (al-nafs)…and 
His attribute(s) (al-ṣifa) since He is not divisible in terms of His essence and has 
no equal in terms of His description.’304 God’s tawḥīd therefore also means 
showing that His essence and attributes are unique and without comparison to 
creation.305 How is it then, we must ask, that al-Ashʿarī establishes what God’s 
essence and attributes are like? He does so on the basis of God’s being the 
                                                          
301 Ibn Fūrak, Maqālāt, p. 48. 
302 Ibid., p. 55. 
303 In a chapter entitled ‘On the clarification of his ,i.e., al-Ashʿarī’s- position (madhhab) 
regarding the meaning of the names of the Lord (Most-High!) and His attributes according to 
the Book and the Sunna and the consensus of the umma’ (ibid., p. 43 et seqq.). 
304 Ibid., p. 55. 
305 Ibn Furak’s mention of the non-divisibility of God’s essence is of course accounted for by the 
Ashʿarite position that all of created existence consists of bodies which are made up of atoms 
and hence divisible. This can, consequentially, not apply to God. Compare Pines 1997.  
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creator of the world, following the reasoning, which we will come across over 
and over again in the works of other theologians, that the characteristics of an 
act point to the characteristics of its agent. This reasoning can be exemplified by 
reference to al-Ashʿarī’s al-Ibāna ʿan uṣūl al-diyāna. There, we encounter an 
argument from design, as it were, which however does not have the purpose of 
proving that God does exist, as usually understood when we speak of arguments 
from design we know it from the Western philosophical tradition; rather, it 
serves to establish certain divine attributes, which are ascribed to God in the 
Qurʾān. 306  ‘The existence of produced things (al-ṣanāʾiʿ) according to 
arrangement and system (tadbīr wa-niẓām) is only possible due to one who is 
knowing, powerful and living,’307 al-Ashʿarī explains. God’s knowledge, power 
and life are evidently proven on the basis of His being the creator of creation 
and due to the design apparent in His creation, and this is part of the affirmation 
of His tawḥīd.  
Conclusions 
Our investigation of al-Ashʿarī’s theological writings has shown that the proof of 
the creator for creation does not have the purpose of proving the existence of 
God. Its objective rather is to defend the Qurʾānic promulgation, based on the 
Qurʾān’s own reasoning which addresses itself to human reason, that the world 
is creation and God is its creator. The defence of this doctrine evidently appears 
in response to individuals who held opposing beliefs, such as in the eternity of 
the world. For al-Ashʿarī, to establish this is part of the affirmation of God’s 
tawḥīd: God is one and unique in His role as creator. Another aspect of the 
affirmation of tawḥīd includes God’s otherness from creation, which al-Ashʿarī 
establishes on the basis of God’s being creator: the characteristics of creation, 
such as their being bodies, proves that God is of a different nature.  
                                                          
306 This argument from design appears in a section entitled ‘On the refutation of the Jahmiyya 
and their denial of God’s knowledge and power and all other attributes’ (p. 87) which indicates 
what audience it addresses. Note that there is no proof of God’s existence to be found in the 
Ibāna, nor is there any proof that God in fact is the creator of the world. All discussions take 
their starting point from the acknowledged principle that it is God who created the world. The 
only question al-Ashʿarī discusses which is related to God’s role as creator is that of the 
authorship of human actions and where evil stems from (e.g., p. 17 et seqq.  and p. 115). 
307 Ibid., p. 94. 
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Al-Bāqillānī 
It is said that Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī’s (d. 403/1013) significance as a mutakallim 
lies in his contribution to systemising the theological thought he inherited from 
his Ashʿarite predecessors.308 This is most evidently true in his modification of 
the atomistic theory,309 which became the cornerstone of a number of Ashʿarite 
doctrines, including the proof of the originatedness of the world and the 
inference of the creator from it.310 In his Kitāb al-Tamhīd, we are told, al-
Bāqillānī makes this atomistic worldview the basis of his proof for the existence 
of God. Herbert Davidson writes that ‘Al-Bāqillānī states the proof of creation 
from accidents…and then infers the existence of the creator in three ways.’311 
Muḥammad Ramaḍān ʿAbd Allāh likewise counts al-Bāqillānī among those 
theologians who ‘were concerned with the issue of proving His existence 
through their kalām proofs which take their starting point from the 
originatedness of atoms and accidents or their possibility.’312  
The Affirmation of the Creator 
It is indeed the case that, in the Tamhīd, al-Bāqillānī proceeds from the proof 
that the world has a beginning for its existence to ‘the affirmation of the creator 
(ithbāt al-ṣāniʿ).’313 That the world must be originated (muḥdath), he argues, is 
established when considering that the accidents (aʿrāḍ, sg. ʿaraḍ), which 
necessarily inhere in bodies (ajsām, sg. jism), come about in time as well as that 
‘that which does not precede something originated is (itself) originated.’314 Both 
                                                          
308 Fakhry 1958, p. 40; Wolfson 1976, p. 41 who refers to Ibn Khaldūn’s Muqaddima in which he 
describes al-Bāqillānī as having ‘perfected’ what he inherited from al-Ashʿarī; Collins 2000, p. 
414.  
309 On this aspect see Tabbaa 1985, p. 68. 
310 See Sabra 2009, Pines 1997 and Wolfson 1976 for an outline of the (Ashʿarite) atomistic 
theory. Not only the doctrine of the temporal beginning of the world is proven based on atoms 
and accidents, but also such doctrines as God’s non-corporeality (since corporeality implies 
originatedness).     
311 Davidson 1986, p. 300. 
312 ʿAbd Allāh 1986, p. 415. Majid Fakhry mentions al-Bāqillānī in his article entitled “The 
Classical Islamic Arguments for the Existence of God” (The Muslim World 47:1957, pp. 133-
145). 
313 Al-Bāqillānī, al-Tamhīd (1947), p. 44. 
314 Ibid., p. 44. Al-Bāqillānī’s argument for the world’s originatedness involves a difficulty which 
we do not encounter when recalling, for instance, al-Māturīdī’s argument for the world’s 
finiteness. He argued that the eternal is characterised as not changing, and that the world 
cannot be eternal because of changes taking place in it. Al-Bāqillānī’s argument hinges on the 
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bodies and their accidents therefore have a beginning in time, and since ‘the 
world (al-ʿālam)’ is an expression for nothing else than the entirety of bodies 
(or atoms (jawāhir, sg. jawhar), of which they consist) and accidents, the world 
has been shown to be originated.315 From this it follows, so al-Bāqillānī, that 
‘this originated and formed (al-muḥdath al-muṣawwar) world must have an 
originator and former.’316 It is this reasoning which Davidson and ʿAbd Allāh 
have identified with the endeavour on al-Bāqillānī’s part to prove God’s 
existence. Let us therefore investigate what al-Bāqillānī seeks to prove when he 
speaks of ‘the affirmation of the creator’ as a close reading of his statements 
suggests a different intention. 
The First Argument Based on the Analogy Between the shāhid and the 
ghāʾib 
Davidson correctly states that al-Bāqillānī presents three ways of proving the 
creator for the originated world.317 The first argument involves the following 
reasoning:  ‘The proof for this is that for the writing (al-kitāba) there 
necessarily is a writer, for the form (al-ṣūra) a fashioner, and for the building 
(al-bināʾ) a builder.’318 Al-Bāqillānī then continues: ‘We would not doubt the 
ignorance of him who told us that something written came about – but without 
a writer… It is, hence, (also) necessary that the forms of the world and the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
claim that the finiteness of accidents proves bodies to be finite, too. One wonders why al-
Bāqillānī did not consider the question (or deem it important) of what the possibility of an 
infinite chain of accidents in bodies would mean for the proof that the world has a beginning for 
its existence. Al-Māturīdī (al-Tawḥīd, pp. 13-14) and al-Kindī (On First Philosophy, pp. 92-95), 
for instance, obviously considered it of importance to address this point as both of them prove 
the impossibility of an infinite chain of existent things, which otherwise would negate a 
beginning for the world’s existence. The only instance where al-Bāqillānī actually rejects the 
possibility of an infinite regress is where this regress pertains to the maker (fāʿil) of the 
originated world. He argues that this maker cannot himself be originated as he would be in need 
of an originator, and the same would then apply to that second originator. Consequentially, the 
existence of all originated things would be impossible if their existence was dependent on the 
existence of other originated things when there is no end to this chain (lā ghāya lahu) (al-
Bāqillānī, al-Tamhīd (1947), p. 46. Compare also ibid., p. 53 which contains a similar argument 
in refutation of those who call nature the creator). 
315 Ibid., p. 44. 
316 Ibid., p. 44. 
317 Davidson 1986, p. 300. 
318 Ibid., pp. 44-45. 
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movements of the planets are connected with a creator (ṣāniʿ) who created 
them.’319  
Al-Bāqillānī’s use of this analogy is not new to kalām works. We recall that al-
Ashʿarī, in whose tradition al-Bāqillānī saw himself, already referred to the 
connection between the occurrence of a building and its builder to prove the 
general validity of what we termed the principle of causation.320 Al-Māturīdī, 
too, employed this analogy, making use of the very same example of the writing 
and its author as al-Bāqillānī, yet he used it as an argument for the origination 
of the world, not the inference of a creator for creation.321 Al-Bāqillānī seems to 
employ this analogy with the exact same objective in mind as al-Ashʿarī: its 
purpose is to affirm the principle of causation for the ghāʾib in analogy to the 
shāhid. This implies that it is true for the ghāʾib, the realm of the unobservable 
(to which the origination of the world belongs), that effects have causes, as it 
were, just as it is true for the shāhid, the observable world.322 For al-Ashʿarī, the 
general affirmation of the principle of causation was an essential step in 
affirming God to be the creator of the world: the world has a beginning in time, 
and it is not possible that it entered existence by chance and uncaused; rather, it 
does have a cause.  
Which purpose does the affirmation of the principle of causation, then, serve for 
al-Bāqillānī? Ultimately, he appears to share with al-Ashʿarī the same objective 
when he seeks to affirm the creator for creation: the world is creation and God 
alone is its creator; God’s existence and the proof thereof play no role. Not only 
the Tamhīd, but also, and particularly, the Inṣāf give us an insight into the 
importance al-Bāqillānī assigns to the proof of God’s being sole creator of the 
world and everything therein, which has to do with the unequivocal 
proclamation of this in the Qurʾān. In the Tamhīd, he states that God described 
Himself with the words ‘I am creator (innī khāliq).’323 In the Inṣāf, al-Bāqillānī 
                                                          
319 Ibid., p. 45. 
320 Al-Ashʿarī, al-Lumaʿ, p. 14. 
321 Al-Māturīdī, al-Tawḥīd, p. 14. 
322 This is, of course, not to say that the Ashʿarites affirm efficient causality for beings in the 
shāhid in the same manner as for the ghāʾib, as discussed previously with regards to al-Ashʿarī.  
323 Al-Bāqillānī, al-Tamhīd (1957), p. 215. The editor remarks in a footnote (p. 215, f. 364.3) that 
this self-description on the part of God is not taken literally from the Qurʾān, but its meaning can 
obviously be found there. 
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repeats this and says: ‘He called Himself creator (khāliq) and everything 
besides Him created.’324 He furthermore mentions Q. 13.16 which reads {Have 
the partners (shurakāʾ) they assign to God created anything like His creation? Is 
their creation indistinguishable from His? Say, ‘God is the Creator (khāliq) of all 
things…+325 and comments that in it ‘God refuted the unbelievers when they 
associated partners with Him in creation (shurakāʾ fī’l-ikhtirāʿ).’326 A number of 
other Qurʾānic verses are adduced by al-Bāqillānī in support of the claim that 
‘there is no creator (khāliq) other than Him,’327 such as Q. 16.20 saying {Those 
they invoke beside God create nothing; they are themselves created}. Al-
Bāqillānī, finally, also notes that God has made ‘belief in Him (al-īmān bihi)’ 
obligatory upon all humans. Belief in God, he explains, means ‘assent (al-taṣdīq) 
by the heart that He is God, the One, the Unique, the Pre-Eternal, the Eternal, the 
Creator (al-khāliq), the All-Knowing – *There is nothing like Him…+328.’329 While 
it is the case that all of these statements appear in sections other than that on 
the proof of the creator and that they concern different aspects related to God’s 
role as sole creator,330 they nevertheless highlight how al-Bāqillānī’s proof of 
the originatedness of the world and the affirmation that it has a creator seek to 
give a rational foundation to the Qurʾānic claim that the world and everything 
contained in it is creation and that God alone is its creator. 
Returning to al-Bāqillānī’s affirmation of the principle of causation in the first 
argument he presents as proof of the creator, which is an essential step in 
affirming God as the creator of the world, we must note the following: al-
Bāqillānī was evidently aware that to establish some cause which brought about 
the existence of the world is not sufficient to prove that this cause is none other 
                                                          
324 Al-Bāqillānī, al-Inṣāf, p. 70. 
325 All translations from the Qurʾān are taken from Abdel Haleem 2004. 
326 Al-Bāqillānī, al-Inṣāf, p. 41. 
327 Ibid., p. 27. 
328 This is Q. 42.11. 
329 Ibid., p. 22. 
330 The statement ‘I am creator’ in the Tamhīd appears as part of a discussion about God’s 
attributes of action (ṣifāt al-afʿāl) and attributes of essence (ṣifāt al-dhāt) and it serves as an 
example of the former category of attributes. The statement ‘He called Himself creator…’ in the 
Inṣāf is part of a discussion about the createdness vs. uncreatedness of the Qurʾān. Q. 13.16 is 
mentioned in the context of the defence of the doctrine that God creates human actions, 
including belief and unbelief (doctrine of kasb/acquisition). Q. 16.20 appears in support of the 
claim that God alone provides for humans. These examples are all different aspects of God’s 
being sole creator. 
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than God, as he addresses the issue whether the world could be its own cause. 
Only if this is denied, it can be established that the world depends on a cause 
other than itself and outside itself. This issue is not actually tackled in al-
Bāqillānī’s first proof based on the analogy between the shāhid and the ghāʾib331 
– he does, however, discuss it in the second and third proof for the creator, as 
we shall see –, yet the section immediately following al-Bāqillānī’s three proofs 
is dedicated to showing ‘that the originated thing is not its own maker (fāʿil li-
nafsihi)’332 and ‘that there is for the whole world a creator other than it (khāliq 
ghayrahu) who is not part of it (laysa minhu).’333 It should not be forgotten that 
theologians and philosophers alike before and after al-Bāqillānī dealt with this 
particular question and were keen to refute the possibility that something can 
cause its own existence. Ibn Ḥazm, for example, presents three options in his 
Fiṣal as to what the cause of the origination of the world is: either it originated 
itself; or it came about independent of another who originated it; or another 
originated it.334 Ibn Ḥazm concludes the discussion of these three options with 
the words: ‘So if it is wrong that the world originated itself, and if it is wrong 
that it independently came about, without another who originated it, then the 
third option must be correct...and this is that another brought about the world, 
from non-existence into existence.’335  
The Second Argument Based on the Earlier and Later Occurrence of 
Things in Time  
Besides the proof based on the analogy between the shāhid and the ghāʾib, al-
Bāqillānī presents another argument to support the claim that the originated 
world exists due to a cause outside it. This argument focuses on ‘the earlier 
occurrence (taqaddum) of some originated things than others as well as the 
                                                          
331 In the Inṣāf, however, al-Bāqillānī uses the analogy to argue that the originator must 
necessarily be another than the originated. He states: ‘We do not doubt the ignorance of the one 
who informed us about a writing which came about on its own/due to itself (bi-nafsihā), not 
due to a writer’ (pp. 29-30). 
332 Al-Bāqillānī, al-Tamhīd (1947), p. 45. 
333 Ibid., p. 45. The proof of this is based on the postulate that any agent (fāʿil) must be living, 
powerful and knowing, but the world contains death and is ignorant of its own essence and 
arrangement. 
334 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Fiṣal, part 1, p. 66. 
335 Ibid., p. 67. 
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later occurrence (taʾakhkhur) of some of them than others.’336 Their occurrence 
at a specific time cannot be due to the thing itself or dependent on its kind (li-
nafsihi wa-jinsihi), al-Bāqillānī argues, as this would mean that all things of the 
same kind would have to occur simultaneously. This proves, he then concludes, 
‘that there is for it one who makes it occur earlier and who brings it into 
existence according to his will (maqṣūran ʿalā mashīʾatihi).’337 It is interesting to 
note that in the Inṣāf, where al-Bāqillānī presents the exact same argument, 
concluding that it ‘proves an agent who effected it ,i.e., the earlier or later 
occurrence] and who brings it into existence according to his will (irādatihi) 
and makes it according to his wishing (mashīʾatihi),’338 he establishes a link 
between this conclusion and the Qurʾānic verses Q. 11.107 and Q. 16.40. The 
former verse states about God that {[your Lord] carries out whatever He wills 
(faʿʿāl li-mā yurīdu)}; the latter describes God in His role as creator this way: 
{When We will (aradnā) something to happen, all that We say is, ‘Be,’ and it is.+ 
Al-Bāqillānī comments that God points in these verses to our knowledge that an 
act is connected with an agent.339 This indicates that, contrary to Davidson’s 
view that al-Bāqillānī employs the argument in question to ‘infer the existence 
of God’340 from it, he rather uses it to establish the following three things: firstly, 
the world came into existence due to another; secondly, it is God to whom the 
world owes its existence; and finally, all this confirms on rational grounds what 
the Qurʾān says about God in His role as creator.   
The Third Argument Based on the Different Forms and Shapes of 
Things 
The chapter on ‘the affirmation of the creator’ contains a third argument which 
also serves the purpose of proving that the originated world came into 
existence due to a cause which is not part of the world. Al-Bāqillānī argues that 
‘every body contained in this world could have received a structure (tarkīb) 
                                                          
336 Al-Bāqillānī, al-Tamhīd (1947), p. 45. 
337 Ibid., p. 23.  
338 Al-Bāqillānī, al-Inṣāf, p. 18. 
339 Ibid., p. 18. 
340 Davidson 1986, p. 303: ‘To infer the existence of God, Bāqillānī contended that the 
appearance of a thing at a certain time and also its “composition” (tarkīb) and shape cannot be 
due to “itself” but must be due to another factor.’  
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different from the one it has.’341 As in the aforementioned case of the earlier and 
later occurrence of things, al-Bāqillānī now argues that the realisation of a 
particular shape or form ‘cannot be due to (the thing) itself or due to its (mere) 
receptiveness to it’342 as in this case all possible shapes would have to occur in a 
body together, which he declares an absurdity. This proves that ‘whatever has a 
form only receives it from one who composes (muʾallif) and intends (qāṣid) it 
this way.’343   
Davidson has rightly pointed out that al-Bāqillānī’s arguments for the creator 
fall into the category of arguments from particularisation (takhṣīṣ),344 which 
would later be employed by a great number of theologians.345 Al-Bāqillānī 
himself makes use of the term ikhtaṣṣa when he speaks of the impossibility ‘that 
the bodies which are particularised (ikhtaṣṣa) with a specific, particular 
(makhṣūṣ) shape are particularised with it’346 due to anything else than an 
outside cause. Davidson’s description of al-Bāqillānī’s work as containing the 
‘earliest explicit use of the concept of particularization’347 needs to be reviewed: 
al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm, who died some 150 years before al-Bāqillānī, already made 
use of the notion of particularisation when he argued: ‘One can infer from the 
differences…visible in them ,i.e., things in this world- that they have a creator 
who particularised (khaṣṣahā) them with their differences and characteristics 
(al-khaṣāʾiṣ).’348 It must furthermore be noted that we have also shown, on the 
basis of some explicit statements in the Inṣāf, in particular, that the notion of 
particularisation is employed by al-Bāqillānī to prove that God is the world’s 
                                                          
341 Al-Bāqillānī, al-Tamhīd (1947), p. 45. 
342 Ibid., p. 45. 
343 Ibid., p. 45. The same argument appears in the Inṣāf: ‘There are existent forms which are 
squares, others round, and there are persons who are taller than others… It must hence be the 
case that there is one for them who forms them…according to his will (irāditi) and wishing 
(mashīʾatihi)’ (p. 30). 
344 Davidson 1986 p. 300 
345 Such as by al-Juwaynī (al-Irshād, p. 28), al-Ghazālī (al-Risāla, p. 385 and p. 386) as well as al-
Rāzī (al-Arbaʿīn, vol. 1, p. 121). Davidson (1986, p. 300) has rightly noted that arguments from 
particularisation for the creator have  the occassionalistic worldview as their underlying 
assumption as otherwise the determinant of particular occurrences in this world would have to 
be sought in the events preceding them.  
346 Al-Bāqillānī, al-Tamhīd (1947), p. 45. 
347 Davidson 1986, p. 300. 
348 Al-Qāsim, al-Dalīl, p. 114. Note that Davidson’s article in which he ascribes the earliest 
explicit instance of the argument from particularisation to al-Bāqillānī appeared in the same 
year – 1986 – as Abrahamov’s article in which he mentions al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm’s explicit use of 
the same argument.    
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creator, in defence of statements of this nature in the Qurʾān. Davidson’s claim 
that in the Tamhīd ‘the concept of particularization ,is-…used to infer the 
existence of God from creation,’349 and that in the third proof in particular ‘a 
direct proof of the existence of God from the presence in things of particular 
characteristics’350 is given, does therefore not do justice to al-Bāqillānī’s use of, 
and intention behind, it. 
The Conception of God as an Agent Endowed with Will 
The second and third arguments presented by al-Bāqillānī in the Tamhīd – and 
this is also true of the Inṣāf – to affirm the creator in fact introduce an aspect of 
the conception of God as creator which is absent from the first argument. While 
all three arguments have the purpose of establishing the principle of causation 
for the ghāʾib (that is, pertaining to the issue of the originatedness of the world), 
it is only in the last two arguments that al-Bāqillānī stresses the role will and 
intention play in the notion of God as agent.351 The proofs al-Bāqillānī presents 
establish not only that it is God who brought the world into existence, in 
accordance with the teachings of Scripture, but also that God is the cause of the 
world in a specific way: He is an agent possessed of will. We have seen above 
how in the Inṣāf al-Bāqillānī connects these two aspects to those Qurʾānic 
verses which ascribe creation to God in a way that involves that ‘He wills 
(yurīdu).’352   
Volition should come to be regarded by the theologians as an important aspect 
of their conception of the creator, for a host of reasons, as we will see in the 
                                                          
349 Davidson 1986, p. 304. 
350 Ibid., p. 301. A direct proof of the creator (even if not for God’s existence), Davidson rightly 
notes, because the inference of the creator from particular shapes does, at the end of the day, 
not depend on the premise of an originated world. We in fact notice that al-Bāqillānī reverses 
the order al-Ashʿarī followed in his Lumʿ. Al-Ashʿarī proved the creator for creation first, based 
on the notion of change, and then answered the question of whether the world itself has a 
beginning in time or whether its matter is eternal (al-Ashʿarī phrased this differently though), 
as previously discussed.  
351 This is also the case in the Inṣāf. The second proof mentions an agent who brings into 
existence ‘according to his wishing (mashīʾatihi),’ the third proof mentions ‘his will (irādatihi) 
and wishing (mashīʾatihi)’ (pp. 29-30). It should be noted that al-Bāqillānī uses the exact same 
argument from the earlier and later occurrence of actions (afʿāl), as he has it there, in a later 
section where he presents it as proof that the creator is ‘a willing one (murīd)’ (al-Tamhīd 
(1947), p. 27). 
352 Al-Bāqillānī, al-Inṣāf, p. 18. This is from Q. 11.107. See also Q. 16.40 which says ‘if We want it 
(aradnāhu).’ 
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following chapters. For the theologians preceding al-Bāqillānī, such as al-Qāsim 
b. Ibrāhīm, al-Māturīdī and al-Ashʿarī, but also for the philosopher al-Kindī, 
whose works we have discussed previously, the notion of will did not play an 
equally crucial role in their defence of God as cause of the world. Al-Kindī and 
al-Qāsim were not concerned with it. Al-Ashʿarī also paid more attention to the 
notion of creation ex nihilo, and will plays a role only in his proof that ‘the 
creator of the things is one’ in which the idea is put forward that being creator 
and not being able to realise what one wills (murād) are mutually exclusive.353 
In al-Māturīdī, on the other hand, it is the notion of power (qudra), rather than 
will, which characterises the creator of the world.354 
The reason why al-Bāqillānī places such great importance on the notion of the 
creator’s will can be found not only in the fact that the Qurʾān mentions this 
attribute of God numerous times, as alluded to, but also in that it enables him to 
declare any alternative position of what the cause of the existence of the world 
is invalid. This latter aspect becomes apparent when we turn to al-Bāqillānī’s 
refutation of a number of beliefs he considers contrary to what Scripture 
teaches. Al-Bāqillānī’s first refutation concerns the belief of those who claim 
that ‘the creator (ṣāniʿ) of the world is a nature from among the natures (ṭabīʿa 
min al-ṭabāʾiʿ), from the existence of which the origination of the world became 
necessary (wajaba).’355 In the course of his refutation, al-Bāqillānī suggests that, 
if his opponents were to hold that nature is eternal, the following would have to 
be inferred: ‘If it was eternal, then it would be necessary that the originated 
things which exist due to it are (also) eternal, since nature is eternally existent, 
and there is nothing that hinders the originated things from existing, being 
necessitated by it (al-mūjaba ʿanhā)…like (it is the case with)…fire which 
necessitates burning.’356 The example given by al-Bāqillānī of fire necessarily 
causing burning brings to mind al-Ghazālī’s (d. 505/1111) refutation of the 
position held by the philosophers in his Tahāfut al-falāsifa where he mentions 
the exact same example. The philosophers maintained, at variance with the 
occasionalistic worldview of al-Bāqillānī, al-Ghazālī and their fellow Ashʿarite 
                                                          
353 Al-Ashʿarī, al-Lumaʿ, p. 20. 
354 Al-Māturīdī, al-Tawḥīd, pp. 19-21. 
355 Al-Bāqillānī, al-Tamhīd (1947), p. 52. 
356 Ibid., p. 52. 
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theologians, that things are created by God with certain natures, and that these 
natures account for necessary causal connections between things.357 Even 
though ascribing causal efficacy to nature, the philosophers, however, agreed 
with the theologians that it is ultimately God who is the creator of the world, 
which the above mentioned position seems to oppose. It therefore appears that 
al-Bāqillānī might be addressing those groups which, in kalām works, we often 
find referred to as the dahriyya. They represent the view that the world is 
eternal and does not depend for its existence on God, and that the natures of 
things sufficiently explain how things come about. Al-Juwaynī, for example, 
ascribes the following statement to them in his Shāmil: ‘We do not observe a 
hen unless it originates from an egg, and no human unless he originates from a 
drop of sperm.’358 Al-Bāqillānī himself mentions them by name in his Inṣāf and 
speaks of ‘the belief of those among the ahl al-dahr who assume that the 
originated things have no beginning for their existence.’359 The adherents of the 
position referred to by al-Bāqillānī in his first refutation evidently commit the 
error of attributing the role of creator to these natures, while according to al-
Bāqillānī and his fellow theologians this role appertains to God alone. The 
crucial point in al-Bāqillānī’s response to them, however, is that nature cannot 
possibly be given the attribute of being creator of the world since the notion of 
the creator involves the beginning in time of creation (i.e., the world), as 
pointed out by him before, as well as the creator’s will – all of which is contrary 
to the assumption of an eternal world, existing due to eternal natures, which 
cause necessarily, not due to an act of will. 
Al-Bāqillānī here introduces two different conceptions of a cause: one which 
causes by virtue its nature and from which the effect follows necessarily; and 
one which causes due to will and which has the ability to act and abstain from it. 
This is made explicit by al-Bāqillānī in the following when he states: ‘According 
                                                          
357 In the seventeenth discussion of the Tahāfut al-falāsifa, al-Ghazālī describes the philosophers’ 
position as this: ‘the agent of the burning is only fire, and it is an agent due to (its) nature (bi’l-
ṭabʿ), not due to choice, thus incapable of abstaining from (enacting) what is its nature after it 
has come into contact with a substrate receptible to it’ (Tahāfut al-falāsifa (2000), p. 167). His 
own (Ashʿarite occasionalistic) position, in contrast, is the following: ‘The agent of the 
burning…is God, either through the mediation of the angels or without mediation. Fire, which is 
inanimate, has no act’ (ibid., p. 167).  
358 Al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil (1960/1961), p. 115. 
359 Al-Bāqillānī, al-Inṣāf, p. 32. 
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to us, (the divine will) is a will for the occurrence of the act in a way that it is 
delayed (ʿalā’l-tarākhī)360 and…it is not an ʿilla for the existence of what is 
willed.’361 The cause referred to by al-Bāqillānī as ʿilla denotes ‘something that 
necessitates the act (mūjib li’l-fiʿl),’362 as opposed to one that ‘acts according to 
power and choice.’363 What al-Bāqillānī means to say is that for him God caused 
the world to exist after it had not existed, and this occurred due to the eternal 
divine will. The divine will is, however, not a cause in the same way as a 
necessitating cause. Since the world has an origin in time, it has been proven 
that it must exist due to God as its creator who is endowed with will and choice. 
To conceive of the cause of the world as an ʿilla which necessitates the world, as 
opposed to the concept of the creator (ṣāniʿ) who decides upon creation, 
involves another absurdity for al-Bāqillānī which, as we will see, should later 
become a key aspect of the arguments put forward by none other than the great 
philosopher Ibn Sīnā (d. 427/1037) in his defence of the teaching of a world 
existing eternally through and with God. Al-Bāqillānī continues his 
argumentation in response to his opponent: ‘So if nature was eternal, and what 
exists from it was also eternal, then why is it that one of them necessitates 
(mūjib) and causes (sabab) the other, rather than that the caused one 
(musabbab) is cause (sabab wa-ʿilla)?’364 What this statement highlights is that, 
for al-Bāqillānī, the relationship between the world as effect and God as cause 
must be seen as one characterised by temporal priority. If the effect is believed 
to be eternal, just as its cause is, then one has no grounds to claim that one of 
                                                          
360 Al-Bāqillānī evidently makes this point in response to such views as that held by the 
philosopher al-Fārābī who defended the eternity of the world as well as a certain conception of 
God as cause on the following grounds: ‘Any maker of anything knows that his making that thing 
at a particular time is better or best, or it is worse or worst. What delays his making it is the 
obstacle to his making it... If there is no cause of non-success, its non-existence is not preferable 
to its existence, and why did it not happen? At the same time, has the maker power to stop the 
non-success...? If he has the power, then...(the thing’s) coming into existence at some time is not 
impossible for its maker. But if he has not power to stop the non-success, then the cause of the 
non-success is stronger... In any case then not he [the maker] alone is sufficient to complete the 
action... For if he were personally the sole cause of the success, the success of the action should 
not be retarded in time...it follows that the existence of the thing is not later than the existence 
of the agent’ (al-Fārābī, Fuṣūl al-madanī, p. 66). See also Chapter One “How did God create the 
world?” (esp. pp. 58-59) in Leaman 2002.  
361 Al-Bāqillānī, al-Tamhīd (1947), p. 53. 
362 Ibid., p. 53. 
363 Ibid., p. 53. 
364 Ibid., pp. 54-55. 
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them exists due to the other, and not the other way round. This is, of course, 
how al-Bāqillānī, the mutakallim, conceives of the relation between God and the 
world. Yet, what he leaves unmentioned here is that he himself did accept that 
cause and effect can coexist eternally without this compromising identifying 
one as cause and the other as effect. In the section on the divine attributes (bāb 
al-kalām fī’l-ṣifāt) in the Tamhīd, al-Bāqillānī seeks to defend the Ashʿarite 
position that God’s descriptions, such as His being knowing, point to hypostatic 
entities (maʿānin), such as knowledge, subsisting in Him.365 In this context he 
states: ‘The one from among us who is alive cannot be alive…if life is non-
existent… It is hence necessary that they [i.e., the entities] are the ʿilla for his 
being such ,i.e., alive, knowing etc.-.’366 Since these entities subsist eternally in 
God, they must eternally be the cause (ʿilla) of His being described as such. Ibn 
Sīnā should later argue, maybe with a view to such arguments as the above one 
brought forward by al-Bāqillānī and his fellow theologians, that there is no 
contradiction between the assumption of the world’s eternal coexistence with 
God, on the one hand, and the claim that God is its cause, on the other. The 
world is essentially an effect and therefore essentially dependent on a cause. 
God’s priority to the world is essential, not temporal.367 Al-Bāqillānī, however, 
does not allow for essential priority when it comes to the world and its cause. 
After his refutation of those who ‘believe that nature can act (fiʿl al-ṭabāʿ),’368 al-
Bāqillānī turns to the refutation of another group whom he labels the 
munajjimūn, and it is again the creator’s special characteristics of will and 
choice he focuses on. The munajjimūn are described as believing that the 
planets, such as the sun and the moon, are the creator, fashioner and arranger 
(ṣāniʿ, muṣawwir, mudabbir) of the world.369 Al-Bāqillānī seeks to expose the 
invalidity of their belief on the basis that these planets are originated in time 
                                                          
365 On the Ashʿarite conception of the divine attributes see Wolfson 1959 and Frank 1967. 
366 Al-Bāqillānī, al-Tamhīd (1947), p. 152. 
367 See Chapter Four on Ibn Sīnā. Kogan has argued that Ibn Sīnā’s defense of essential priority 
between cause and effect is in answer to the upholders of occasionalism: ‘For in attacking the 
notion of ontological priority which is both necessary and necessitating, he [i.e., the 
occasionalist per se referred to by Ibn Sīnā- clearly indicates his rejection of essential efficient 
causation itself’ (1985, pp. 100-101). Compare al-Bāqillānī’s rejection of essential priority in the 
Tamhīd (1947), pp. 54-55. 
368 Al-Bāqillānī, al-Tamhīd (1947), p. 52. 
369 Ibid., p. 48. 
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(proven through the notion of movement), and he infers from this that they are 
in need of an originator of their own. This originator, he carries on, ‘must have 
originated them either according to nature (bi’l-ṭabʿ) or through power and 
choice (bi’l-qudra wa’l-ikhtiyār).’370 The first option is ruled out following 
similar considerations as in the aforementioned discussion, and al-Bāqillānī 
concludes: ‘It has been established that all this is the act of a powerful, choosing 
agent (fāʿil qādir mukhtār) who originates if he wishes so (shāʾa) and who 
abstains from it if he wishes so.’371 Once more, al-Bāqillānī’s reasoning involves 
that what the fact of the temporal origination of the world tells us is, firstly, that 
it must come from an entity who is its originator – it has not popped into 
existence uncaused or caused its own existence – and, secondly, that this entity 
must have will and choice. Having established this, al-Bāqillānī is able to 
counter the munajjimūn and present the Islamic view of God as creator (not 
simply as cause) of the world, which he defended at the beginning of the 
Tamhīd, as more reasonable. Al-Bāqillānī’s refutation of the munajjimūn brings 
to mind al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm’s discussion of Q. 21.52-56 which relates 
Abraham’s attempts to dissuade his people from worshipping the stars besides 
God. Al-Qāsim also made the originatedness of the stars the basis of their not 
being creators (while leaving the aspect of will and choice unmentioned), and it 
became clear that he sought to defend God in His role as creator against the 
ascription of this attribute to any other entity.   
Finally, al-Bāqillānī turns to the refutation of the Dualists (ahl al-tathniyya) who 
are described by him as believing that ‘the world came from two eternal 
principles, one of them light, the other one darkness.’372 Their refutation 
likewise centres around the premise that any agent (fāʿil) must be able to 
choose (mukhtār), and that this does not apply to these two principles.373 
Furthermore, al-Bāqillānī stresses, light and darkness are themselves originated, 
                                                          
370 Ibid., p. 62. 
371 Ibid., p. 62. 
372 Ibid., p. 68. 
373 Ibid., p. 69. 
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not eternal, which he proves on the basis of an argument from 
particularisation.374   
What these refutations shed light on is the reason why al-Bāqillānī includes the 
creator’s will, intention and choice375 in his proof that the world exists due to a 
cause other than itself (i.e., the affirmation of the principle of causation for the 
ghāʾib) in the chapter on ‘the affirmation of the creator’: the endeavour to 
establish God as the creator includes not only that the world exists due to God; 
it also includes that it has come about in time, after not having existed, in 
accordance with the theologians’ reading of the Qurʾān.376 Furthermore, God is 
not some cause, much less in the way fire causes burning, which is due to its 
nature; rather, God is creator, endowed with will, intention and choice. Our 
examination of al-Bāqillānī’s arguments in the chapter on ‘the affirmation of the 
creator’ in the Tamhīd alongside other sections in both the Tamhīd and the 
Inṣāf has therefore shown that they do not serve the purpose of proving God’s 
existence. It is entirely different aspects al-Bāqillānī is concerned with, as 
became clear.  
Creation as Proof of God’s Existence 
How does the following statement made by al-Bāqillānī in his Inṣāf then fit in 
with our findings, which at first seems to contradict them? ‘The first thing God 
has made obligatory upon his servants,’ al-Bāqillānī states, ‘is speculation (al-
naẓar) about His signs…because He is not known necessarily and not 
observable by the senses; His existence and being (wujūduhu wa-kawnuhu) are 
only known through the compelling proofs contained in His deeds.’377 Al-
Bāqillānī here unequivocally states that it is God’s existence which is proven on 
the basis of creation – so how does this go together with our claim that, in the 
                                                          
374 Ibid., p. 69: ‘As for what proves that the two of them are not eternal, it is the proofs we 
presented earlier that they are contraries and that something can sometimes be luminous and 
sometimes obscure.’ 
375 Note that these terms all eventually refer to God’s volition: ‘Note that there is no difference 
between the (divine) will (al-irāda), the wishing (al-mashīʾa) (and) the choosing (al-ikhtiyār)’ 
(al-Bāqillānī, al-Inṣāf, p. 43). 
376 In the Inṣāf al-Bāqillānī clarifies this point: ‘The meaning of muḥadth is: what was not, then 
was’ (p. 16). This is seen to be in accordance with such Prophetic traditions as the one saying: 
‘When they said to him: O Messenger of God, inform us about the beginning of this matter! He 
said: Yes. God was and nothing else was, then God created (all) things’ (p. 29). 
377 Al-Bāqillānī, al-Inṣāf, p. 21. 
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chapter on ‘the affirmation of the creator,’ God’s existence is not under 
discussion, but taken for granted, and that all al-Bāqillānī seeks to prove on the 
basis of the createdness of the world is God’s being sole creator? We shall see 
that there is in fact no contradiction involved and that al-Bāqillānī’s reference to 
God’s existence which is known only through pondering over His signs must not 
be understood the way it is used in the traditional arguments for God’s 
existence. Al-Bāqillānī does not refer to a proof of God’s existence along the 
lines of a cosmological argument. Rather, it turns out that the knowledge of 
God’s existence is mentioned by al-Bāqillānī as part of the declaration that God 
is completely different from creation. To declare God’s oneness and uniqueness 
(al-tawḥīd lahu), we are told, is one aspect of belief in God (al-īmān bi’llāh).378 
The affirmation of God’s tawḥīd likewise includes a number of aspects. Al-
Bāqillānī refers to the Sufi by the name of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Būshanjī (d. 348/960) 
who was reportedly once asked what tawḥīd means, to which he replied: ‘It is 
that you know that He has no similarity to the essences (dhawāt) (of created 
things) and that the (divine) attributes must not be denied.’379 Al-Bāqillānī 
further presents the opinion of some theologians that ‘it ,i.e., al-tawḥīd] is that 
one knows that He is different from them [i.e., humans] through His eternity, 
just like they are different from Him through their originatedness.’380 Finally, 
we are given the following definition: ‘Declaring Him one and unique is the 
affirmation that He is real (thābit) and existent (mawjūd), one unique godhead 
(ilāh) and the object of worship – nothing is like Him ,i.e., Q. 42.11-.’381 We can 
infer from these definitions of God’s tawḥīd the following: it is the theologian’s 
task, who defends the principles of religion, to establish God’s essence as being 
different from the essences of created things. This means that God is affirmed as 
eternal, while creation is originated. Another aspect, which is not explicitly 
mentioned in al-Bāqillānī, but upon which most theologians agreed, is that God 
is neither atom, nor body, nor accident, which the world (i.e., creation) is 
composed of.382 We must here bear in mind that according to the Ashʿarite 
                                                          
378 Ibid., p. 22. 
379 Ibid., p. 32. 
380 Ibid., p. 31. 
381 Ibid., p. 22. 
382 Al-Shahrastānī gives this position in his Nihāya (p. 103 of the Arabic text): ‘The ahl al-ḥaqq 
maintain that God does not resemble the created things and they do not resemble Him in any 
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doctrine, essence and existence are one and the same thing.383 Classifying God’s 
essence means characterising His existence. Just as God’s essence is known only 
in contradistinction to creation, it is true for an Ashʿarite such as al-Bāqillānī 
that God’s existence is known – as being eternal, non-corporeal, etc. – ‘through 
the compelling proofs contained in His deeds,’ as it appears in al-Bāqillānī’s 
above statement. That al-Bāqillānī speaks of God’s existence where he means 
God’s essence is in fact confirmed in the Tamhīd. There he states, seeking to 
defend the Ashʿarite conception of certain divine attributes as hypostatic 
entities subsisting in God’s essence: ‘It has been shown that the act which 
proves the agent’s being knowing and powerful must be connected with an 
object (madlūl). This object cannot be the essence (nafs) of the agent or his 
existence (wujūdahu), nor an attribute which has to do with his essence (nafsihi) 
since it has been established that saying that He is knowing and powerful is 
more (zāʾid ʿalā) than saying that He is a thing (shayʾ) and existent 
(mawjūd).’384  
What, however, about the statement that the affirmation of God’s tawḥīd 
comprises ‘that He is real (thābit) and existent (mawjūd)’? Al-Bāqillānī explains 
elsewhere in the Inṣāf that being existent belongs to the attributes of God just as 
being eternal, one, living and others.385 To affirm God as existent is therefore 
related to the aspect of God’s tawḥīd phrased by al-Būshanjī as that ‘the (divine) 
attributes must not be denied.’ Yet, there is more to it. For the Ashʿarites, saying 
that something is existent – or we should rather say: an existent – is the same as 
saying that it is a ‘thing (shayʾ), being (kāʾin) and established (thābit).’386 Al-
                                                                                                                                                                    
respect – nothing is like Him… The Creator is not an atom (jawhar), nor a body (jism), nor an 
accident (ʿaraḍ). He is not in a place, nor in time. He is not receptive to accidents and is not the 
substrate of originated things.’  
383 Al-Ashʿarī reports in his Maqālāt al-islāmiyyīn (al-juzʾ al-awwal, p. 250) on the views of 
several theologians and schools, such as Ibn Kullāb and the Muʿtazilites, the Khawārij and the 
Murjiʿites, that they all held that ‘His essence (dhātahu) is He and His self (nafsahu) is He, and 
He is an existent not due to (the maʿnā of) existence.’ See Frank 1982, pp. 268-271 for the 
Ashʿarite position on essence and existence. 
384 Al-Bāqillānī, al-Tamhīd (1947), p. 153. In this particular section, al-Bāqillānī does evidently 
not use the term dhāt to refer to God’s essence, which would later become the most widely-used 
term among theologians. Yet, he does employ it elsewhere where he divides God’s attributes in 
two qualitatively different types: ṣifāt dhātihi, the attributes of essence, and ṣifāt afʿālihi, the 
attributes of deed (al-Tamhīd (1957), p. 215. Compare also the Inṣāf, p. 25). 
385 Al-Bāqillānī, al-Inṣāf, p. 18. 
386 Ibid., p. 15. Compare al-Ashʿarī’s Maqālāt al-islāmiyyīn (al-juzʾ al-thānī, p. 202) on the 
disagreement between the early mutakallimūn about the meaning of ‘thing (shayʾ)’: ‘The 
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Bāqillānī evidently relates the issue of God’s being an existent to one of the 
mutakallimūn’s debated issues, that is, the question of whether it is legitimate 
to speak of God as a ‘thing.’387 Does the Qurʾān not say about God *There is 
nothing like Him (laysa ka-mithlihi shayʾ)},388 hence seemingly implying that no 
‘thing’ is like God? And does it not at the same time state: *Say, ‘What (ayy shayʾ) 
counts most as a witness?’ Say, ‘God…’+,389 giving the impression that God is a 
‘thing’? Al-Bāqillānī himself adduces both verses where he states that God is an 
existent.390 He must also arrive at the conclusion that ‘He (Praised!) is an 
existent, not a non-existent (maʿdūm)’ since according to the Ashʿarites ‘the 
things that can be known are two: non-existent and existent; there is no third 
(option) in addition to them and no middle between them.’391 Even though it is 
part of the affirmation of God’s tawḥīd that He is entirely different from creation, 
He must nevertheless be acknowledged as an existent, an essence, a thing, a 
being and something established, just like this is true of created things. To deny 
this would mean to deny a divine attribute and to violate God’s tawḥīd, hence 
al-Bāqillānī.  
God has provided the theologian, who endeavours to establish these points, 
with one method which is ‘speculation and pondering over the things God has 
created (makhlūqāt Allāh).’392 Speculation about God’s essence (dhāt Allāh) 
itself is forbidden, even though it is the object of the theologian’s enquiry, since 
God Himself mentions in the Qurʾān those *who reflect on the creation of the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
mushabbiha say: God is a shayʾ means He is a body (jism). Some people say it means He is an 
existent (mawjūd)… Al-Ṣāliḥī said: God is a shayʾ unlike (created) things means that He is 
eternal… Al-Jubbāʾī said: The word shayʾ denotes everything that can be known…and since God 
is known…it is necessary that He is a shayʾ.’ Similar disagreement existed about the question of 
what it means to say that God is an existent (mawjūd) (ibid., al-juzʾ al-thānī, pp. 203-204): ‘Al-
Jubbāʾī said speaking of the Creator’s being an existent means that He is known… Hishām b. al-
Ḥakam said it means that He is a body… Some say: it means that He is a thing (shayʾ).’  See 
Wisnovsky 2000, pp. 182-200 for the discussion surrounding the terms mawjūd and shayʾ in 
early kalām. 
387  Compare al-Ashʿarī’s Maqālāt al-islāmiyīn (al-juzʾ al-awwal, p. 259) on this: ‘The 
mutakallimūn are in disagreement whether the Creator (al-bāriʾ) is to be called a ‘thing 
(shayʾan)’ or not. There are two opinions: Jahm ,b. Ṣafwān- and some Zaydis said that the 
Creator must not be called a ‘thing’ as the ‘thing’ is that which is created and has a likeness 
(mithl). All Muslims say that the Creator is a ‘thing,’ but unlike the (created) things.’  
388 This is Q. 42.11.  
389 This is Q. 6 19.  
390 The former verse on p. 18, the latter on p. 15 of the Inṣāf.  
391 Al-Bāqillānī, al-Inṣāf, p. 15. 
392 Ibid., p. 28. 
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heavens and the earth}.393 ‘He did not say: on the creator,’394 al-Bāqillānī points 
out. The same is confirmed by the Qurʾānic story of Pharaoh and Abraham, al-
Bāqillānī states, where the king asked the prophet ‘about God’s essence’ and 
received an answer alluding to ‘the created things which point to knowledge of 
Him.’395 Furthermore, creation is the proof ‘that He is…rabb’396 and ‘bears 
witness to His rubūbiyya.’397 We have discussed previously that a number of 
early theologians, such as al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm and al-Māturīdī, as well as the 
philosopher al-Kindī used this term to denote God’s role as creator. Al-
Bāqillānī’s statements in the Inṣāf and the Tamhīd make clear that he, too, uses 
the createdness of the world as the foundation of the proof that God is the 
world’s creator, in accordance with what Scripture teaches.398  
Conclusions 
Al-Bāqillānī’s concern as a mutakallim consists in defending religious principles 
and doctrines by recourse to reason. This is also – and maybe especially – true 
for what the Qurʾān says about God’s role as creator of the world. Al-Bāqillānī’s 
‘affirmation of the originatedness of the world’ and his ‘affirmation of the 
creator’ deal with the defence of precisely this issue. The proof from accidents 
establishes that the world is not eternal, but has a beginning of its existence, 
which is how al-Bāqillānī and his fellow theologians understood the Qurʾānic 
                                                          
393 This is Q. 3.191. 
394 Al-Bāqillānī, al-Inṣāf, p. 28. 
395 Ibid., p. 28. 
396 Ibid., p. 28. 
397 Ibid., p. 21. 
398 ʿAbd Allāh poses the following question: ‘These are the proofs al-Bāqillānī presented to 
affirm the existence of God, but it is natural that we ask: Is belief in the existence of God not 
inherent (fiṭrī) in the souls of humans…? So why were the mutakallimūn, and among them al-
Bāqillānī, then concerned with proving His existence?’ (ʿAbd Allāh 1986, p. 414) His attempt at 
an answer follows very much al-Bāqillānī’s own words where he speaks of God’s existence not 
being known necessarily, but only through reasoning, as discussed above. ʿAbd Allāh also relates 
al-Bāqillānī’s proofs to the concern of ‘refuting the dahriyyūn…who deny the creator and 
arranger for the world’ (ibid., p. 414). Since ʿAbd Allāh, however, identifies the objective of al-
Bāqillānī’s proofs with that of classical arguments for God’s existence, it is evident where his 
understanding of al-Bāqillānī’s mentioning God’s existence diverges from the understanding of 
it proposed above by us. Also, the context in which ʿAbd Allāh mentions the dahriyyūn shows 
that he identifies them with atheists – the denial of the creator for the world means the denial of 
God’s existence, according to this view (this being a theme we will encounter further times in 
our chapters to come) –, while it has become clear that al-Bāqillānī rather focuses on the 
position that the world is eternal and a self-sufficient thing, but not on the question of whether 
this implies the denial of God altogether (it shall also become clear in the following chapters 
that the identification of the dahriyyūn with atheists is unconvincing).      
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description of the world as creation. The affirmation of the principle of 
causation for the ghāʾib in analogy to the shāhid allows the conclusion that the 
originated world did not come to exist by itself or due to chance; rather, a cause 
other than itself brought it about. The world must hence be God’s creation, as 
God Himself states in the Qurʾān. The argument from particularisation proves 
that God is the cause of the world in a specific way: He is a creator endowed 
with will, not a necessary cause bereft of choice. The characteristic of will, 
which must be ascribed to the creator of the world, proves that a number of 
other beliefs al-Bāqillānī discusses erroneously give the attribute of being 
creator to entities other than God. To acknowledge God as sole creator is part of 
the affirmation of His oneness and uniqueness (tawḥīd). Another aspect of the 
affirmation of tawḥīd is, according to al-Bāqillānī, to affirm all divine attributes, 
of which God’s being (an) existent is one. This does, however, not relate to the 
question of God’s existence in the traditional sense, but to the inherently Islamic 
debate, sparked by certain Qurʾānic statements, whether God is a thing and an 
existent just as creation consists of things and existents. This ties in with 
another aspect of the affirmation of God’s tawḥīd which concerns the proof that 
His essence is unlike the essences of created things, in line with the Qurʾānic 
dictum that nothing exists like God. Al-Bāqillānī seeks to characterise God’s 
essence through, and in contradistinction to, the characteristics of creation. 
Since according to the Ashʿarite view essence and existence are one and the 
same, ‘His existence and being are only known through the compelling proofs 
contained in His deeds’:399 created existence is originated and consists of atoms 
and accidents – God’s existence is eternal and of a wholly different kind. In all 
this, the objective to prove God’s existence, in the sense of the term associated 
with it in western philosophy, is absent from al-Bāqillānī’s works, despite the 
claim to the contrary we find in secondary sources.      
  
                                                          
399 Al-Bāqillānī, al-Inṣāf, p. 21. 
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Chapter Four: Ibn Sīnā (d. 427/1037) 
 
Inniyya Allāh and wujūd al-ilāh as Things Sought in Metaphysics 
In book 1, chapter 1 of the Ilāhiyyāt of the Shifāʾ, Ibn Sīnā is concerned with 
establishing the subject matter of metaphysics. He discusses several things 
which could be thought to be its subject matter, and he rules out all of them to 
establish finally the existent qua existent (al-mawjūd bi-mā huwa mawjūd) as 
metaphysics’ true subject matter.400 In the course of this discussion, Ibn Sīnā 
asks: ‘Is the subject matter of this science inniyya Allāh or is it not, this rather 
being something from among the things this science seeks (maṭālib)?’401 In his 
translation of the Metaphysics, Michael E. Marmura suggests ‘the existence of 
God’402 for inniyya Allāh and remarks in a footnote that ‘the term in Avicenna’s 
writings often refers also to individual existence – hence the distinction 
between essence and existence is expressed as the distinction between al-
māhiyya and al-inniyya/anniyya. In certain contexts it is best to translate 
inniyya/anniyya as ‘existence.’’403 Ibn Sīnā then explains why ‘it is not possible 
that that (dhālika) is the subject matter’404: The subject matter of every science 
is something whose existence is accepted (musallam al-wujūd). The existence of 
the godhead (wujūd al-ilāh), however, cannot be accepted so that it could be 
made metaphysics’ subject matter for the following reason: If it was the subject 
matter, it would follow that it [i.e. wujūd al-ilāh] would have to be accepted in 
metaphysics and sought in another science; or it would have to be accepted in 
metaphysics and not sought in any other science. Both options are wrong, Ibn 
Sīnā states. As for the first one, it cannot be sought in any other science because 
no science other than metaphysics has anything to do with ‘affirming the 
godhead (ithbāt al-ilāh).’405 The second option is rejected as it would follow that 
‘it is either self-evident (bayyinan bi-nafsihi) or cannot be shown through 
                                                          
400 Ibn Sīnā, al-Shifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyyāt, b. 1, ch. 1, p. 6. All translations of the Metaphysics of the Shifāʾ 
are mine and the references refer to the Arabic text of Marmura’s edition of it. 
401 Ibid., p. 3. 
402 Ibid., p. 3, lines 21-22. 
403 Ibid., p. 383, f. 1. 
404 Ibid., p. 3. 
405 Ibid., p. 4. 
 
 
95 
 
rational speculation (maʾyūsan ʿan bayyānihi bi’l-naẓar),’406 which is denied. 
Rather, Ibn Sīnā states, ‘there is proof for it (ʿalayhi dalīlan).’407 Having 
established that the existence of the subject matter of every science is accepted 
in it, and that wujūd al-ilāh cannot be accepted in metaphysics in this way, he 
concludes that ‘the investigation of it (al-baḥth ʿanhu) belongs in this 
science.’408 This investigation includes the following two aspects: ‘one of them is 
the investigation of it (baḥth ʿanhu) under the aspect of His existence 
(wujūdihi), and the other under the aspect of His attributes (ṣifātihi).’409 As for 
the aspect of ‘His existence,’ Ibn Sīnā gives an explanation of why this enquiry 
can only take place in metaphysics and no other science:  
We will soon also make clear to you that the investigation of His existence 
(wujūdihi) can only take place in this science, because it has become clear to you 
already from the state of this science that it investigates the things that are 
essentially (aṣlan) separated from matter. You have glimpsed in the Physics that 
the godhead (al-ilāh) is not a body, and not the power of a body, rather He is one, 
free from matter and free from mixture with motion in every respect. Therefore, 
the investigation of it (baḥth ʿanhu) belongs to this science.410  
Previously, Ibn Sīnā focused on explaining why the investigation of God’s 
existence has to be undertaken at all and he named its not being self-evident as 
the reason. Now, Ibn Sīnā focuses on the question of why it is metaphysics, and 
no other science, that has to fulfil this task: God is not corporeal, as already 
alluded to by Ibn Sīnā in his works on physics. Only metaphysics deals with this 
kind of existents. In the Dānish-nāma, for instance, Ibn Sīnā explains that ‘things 
are classified only into three kinds’411 with respect to their being,412 which is 
reflected in the threefold division of the speculative science:  
Either (1) their being [i.e., that of the subject matter of these sciences] is in no 
way connected to sensible matter, mixture and motion... Or (2) there are other 
kinds of subjects whose beings are not separated from sensible matter and things 
in motion. The imagination can separate these, however, because, by definition, 
they are not necessarily connected to a body of sensible matter nor to what is 
                                                          
406 Ibid., p. 4. 
407 Ibid., p. 4. 
408 Ibid., p. 4. 
409 Ibid., p. 4. 
410 Ibid., p. 4. 
411 Ibn Sīnā, Dānish-nāma, ch. 1, p. 12.  
412 Note that in the Dānish-nāma, written in Persian, Ibn Sīnā makes use of the term hastī, 
translated as ‘being,’ where in his Arabic works he would refer to wujūd, translated as 
‘existence.’ On the subtle differences see Morewedge’s explanation in the glossary (pp. 300-302) 
to the Dānish-nāma. 
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susceptible of motion. ... Or (3) other kinds of subject are such that their being is 
in materials, and defining and imagining them are related to matter and to the 
nature of motion.413  
The first division poses the kind of being metaphysics deals with.  
The Meaning of wujūd al-ilāh – What Does Metaphysics Investigate? 
A number of questions arise from this. When Ibn Sīnā speaks of metaphysics’ 
task of investigating God’s existence, and when he states that God’s existence is 
neither self-evident, nor unprovable – what exactly does he refer to? The view 
we encounter in the secondary literature is that Ibn Sīnā’s reference to the 
investigation of God’s existence denotes his endeavour to prove that God exists, 
as it is understood in the classical arguments for God’s existence.414 Yet, when 
we take into consideration a passage from Ibn Sīnā’s Taʿliqāt a somewhat 
different picture emerges. There we read the following:  
The natural science has a subject-matter...and that subject-matter is the body 
insofar as it is moving and resting... As for the enquiry about whether the body is 
made up of atoms, whether it is finite or not, whether every body has extension 
and form or not, this relates to the science that is after nature [i.e., metaphysics]... 
And this is the enquiry about the kind of its existence (baḥth ʿan naḥw wujūdihi) 
which is characteristic of it (alladhī yakhaṣṣuhu).415 
 Furthermore, Ibn Sīnā explains:  
The speech about whether the body is made up of atoms is the speech about the 
kind of its existence (fī-naḥw wujūdihi). And likewise, the speech about whether 
it is made up of matter and form. This is not related to physics. ... Movement 
belongs to the accidents of the subject matter of physics, which is the body 
insofar as it is moving or resting, therefore to establish movement has to take 
place in physics. But movement does not belong to the parts of the body insofar 
as it is made up of form and matter, therefore establishing them (ithbātuhā) 
belongs to metaphysics.416  
In these passages, Ibn Sīnā touches upon the aforementioned issue that the 
subject matter of every science is accepted in it in terms of its existence, but 
needs to be established in another science. The subject matter of physics is the 
body, yet only insofar as the accidents of movement and rest occur to it. The 
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existence of physics’ subject matter, that is, body, however, firstly, is established 
in metaphysics and, secondly, relates to the body’s consisting of atoms, form 
and matter, as well as its being finite and extended. A look at Ibn Sīnā’s various 
books on metaphysics indeed reveals that a great deal of attention is dedicated 
to establishing this: The entire book 4 of the Metaphysics of the Shifāʾ, for 
instance, deals with ‘substance and its division’ (ch. 1), with ‘ascertaining 
corporeal substance and what is composed from it’ (ch. 2), with establishing 
that ‘corporeal matter is not devoid of form’ (ch. 3), and, finally, that ‘form is 
prior to matter in rank of existence (ch. 4). The importance of this discussion 
for our question lies in the fact that Ibn Sīnā does not seem to mean by 
‘establishing the existence of the subject matter of physics’ that he intends to 
prove that there is such thing as ‘body’ in this world, thus disproving its non-
existence. Rather, Ibn Sīnā himself explicitly states that establishing the 
existence of ‘body’ means ‘the enquiry about the kind of existence which is 
characteristic of it,417 so that this particular kind of existence can be accepted in 
another science. In analogy to this, it therefore appears that what Ibn Sīnā 
means when he speaks of the investigation of God’s existence is not what is 
meant when we speak of the proof of God’s existence in the traditional sense. 
The investigation of God’s existence in metaphysics refers to its task of 
establishing what type of existence God’s existence is. The existence 
characteristic of body is corporeal existence; God’s existence is characterised as 
not being corporeal, as Ibn Sīnā indicated in the Physics, and it is metaphysics 
task to investigate this. Yet, that God is, that He belongs to the entirety of 
existents, is not the issue in question.  
Another point requiring clarification concerns Ibn Sīnā’s statement that God’s 
existence is not self-evident (bayyin bi-nafsihi). Does he mean by this that the 
knowledge that God (the object of a believer’s worship, one might say) actually 
exists is not self-evident, as secondary literature has it? Or might he not rather 
intend to say that God’s existence as being free from matter and motion, this 
being the existence ‘which is characteristic for’418 Him, is not a self-evident 
matter? After all, why should one not maintain that God is material just as 
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creation is? To answer this question, let us consider the following passage from 
the Shifāʾ, which follows shortly after the discussion of metaphysics’ subject 
matter:  
Also, the knowledge of the absolute causes comes about after the knowledge of 
the affirmation of the causes for the things that have causes. ... As for sensation, it 
only leads to concomitance. ... This is not something primary and (self-)evident 
(bayyinan awwaliyyan)... And it is not necessarily self-evident (bayyinan bi-
nafsihi), even if close to being self-evident (min al-bayyin bi-nafsihi) to the mind, 
that originated things have some kind of principle for them.419  
This passage clarifies Ibn Sīnā’s use of the term bayyin (bi-nafsihi)/(self-
)evident in line with how he uses it in his discussion whether inniyya Allāh can 
be the subject matter of metaphysics: Something is self-evident when it is 
beyond the need of being established through proof. Neither God’s existence 
(wujūd al-ilāh) nor the truth of causal relations, mentioned here, qualify for this.  
Ibn Sīnā furthermore links the idea of being self-evident to being primary 
(awwalī). The meaning of awwalī becomes evident in the Kitāb al-Burhān of the 
Najāt where Ibn Sīnā explains: ‘The awwaliyyāt are issues (qaḍāyā) and 
premises (muqaddimāt) that occur to humans, through their mental power 
(ʿaqliyya), without any cause (sabab) which makes necessary their 
confirmation (taṣdīq) except for their essences (illā dhawātihā).’420  The 
awwaliyyāt are, therefore, tantamount to a priori knowledge as they are known, 
and their truth confirmed, without recourse to experience. In the Taʿliqāt Ibn 
Sīnā draws the same picture when he characterises primary knowledge (maʿrifa 
awwaliyya) as not acquired (min ghayr iktisāb).421 In the Shifāʾ, Ibn Sīnā 
likewise confirms the a priori nature of knowledge that falls under the category 
of being primary:  
The ideas of the existent, the thing and the necessary are impressed in the soul in 
a primary way (irtisāman awwaliyyan). This impression does not need to be 
brought about by (other) things to be known from them. Hence, it is similar to 
primary principles (mabādiʾ awwaliyya) in the category of confirmation (al-
taṣdīq). ... Similarly, in terms of things conceived, there are things which are 
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principles for conception (taṣawwur), while they are conceived by their essences 
(li-dhawātihā).422  
Having understood the sense in which Ibn Sīnā employs the notions of ‘being 
primary’ and ‘being self-evident,’ we need to return to our question of how they 
relate to the issue of God’s existence.  
In all his works on metaphysics, Ibn Sīnā presents a particular twofold division 
of existence. In the Ishārāt, he states: ‘Every existent, when you consider it in 
terms of its essence, not considering anything else, existence is either necessary 
(yajibu) for it in itself (fī-nafsihi) or not.’423 Turning to that for which existence 
is not necessary, he specifies:  
If it is not necessary, it cannot be said: it is impossible (mumtaniʿ) in itself after it 
has been assumed to be existent; rather, if a condition is coupled with it 
considering its essence, like the condition of the non-existence of its cause, then it 
becomes impossible, or like the condition of the existence of its cause, then it 
becomes necessary (wājib). But if there is no condition coupled with it, neither 
its having a cause nor the cause’s non-existence, then the third case remains for 
its essence, namely possibility (imkān): therefore, it is considering its essence the 
thing which is not necessary and not impossible.424  
Ibn Sīnā explains concerning that for which existence is necessary (wājib) that 
this implies ‘the assuredness of existence (taʾakkud al-wujūd).’425 It seems 
rather obvious, one could argue, that Ibn Sīnā would ascribe necessary 
existence, rather than possible existence, to God, even if this is not stated 
explicitly in the Shifāʾ. In the Taʿliqāt, on the other hand, Ibn Sīnā is very clear 
about this. There he states: ‘We know about the First [i.e., God] that He is 
necessarily existent by virtue of His essence, which is primary knowledge, not 
acquired.’426 This leaves no doubt that it is God to whom the necessity of 
existence must be ascribed, and moreover that our knowledge of this belongs in 
the category of primary intelligibles or awwaliyyāt. One could, therefore, argue 
that it seems questionable how God’s existence (as opposed to there not being a 
God) could not be regarded as self-evident by Ibn Sīnā, considering the a priori 
nature of our knowledge that existence contains necessary existence and that 
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this describes God’s existence. Contrary to this, Herbert Davidson has, however, 
argued that Ibn Sīnā’s twofold division of existence ‘has been conducted 
exclusively in the realm of concepts, and he has not committed himself to the 
existence of anything. He has merely stated that whatever might be assumed to 
exist would have to be classified as either necessarily existent by virtue of itself 
or necessarily existent by virtue of another.’427 Davidson’s remark implies that, 
even if it is granted that necessary existence represents God, God’s being 
existent cannot be self-evident since it depends on showing that there really is 
something existent and that it is necessary in itself. This objection seems to 
contradict Ibn Sīnā’s own statements in two ways: Firstly, he holds that 
existence itself cannot possibly be denied – ‘there is no doubt that there is 
existence,’428 as the Najāt has it. In the Shifāʾ, the reality of existence is ever 
inscribed on the human mind.429 Secondly, ‘necessity’ is likewise counted 
among those things whose reality is known immediately and it applies to 
existence as part of the twofold division: Ibn Sīnā refers to ‘the state of necessity, 
that is, necessary existence...and the state of possibility and its true nature,’430 
among a number of other things, as being ‘the sequels of existence insofar as it 
is existence.’431 This leaves no doubt that Ibn Sīnā’s twofold division of 
existence must not be understood as belong in the world of concepts only 
without corresponding to reality. The picture that emerges from all this is that 
God’s being an existent constitutes, according to Ibn Sīnā, primary, a priori 
knowledge and is consequentially a self-evident matter.   
From this, something else of importance follows: With regards to Ibn Sīnā’s 
enquiry about metaphysics’ subject matter, where he maintains that wujūd al-
ilāh is not a self-evident matter and can hence not be taken for granted 
(musallam) in metaphysics so that inniyya Allāh could be its subject matter – it 
is simply not possible that he means by it God’s being an existent. Wujūd al-ilāh 
must be understood in a different sense, and the passage quoted above from the 
Taʿliqāt, referring to ‘body’ being the subject matter of physics, suggest that this 
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is the kind of existence which must be ascribed to God. It would be a mistake to 
assume that Ibn Sīnā’s mentioning existence with regards to God can only refer 
to the dichotomy between being existent and being non-existent. He clearly 
uses the term wujūd where he introduces three different types of existence, 
such as in the following statement: ‘The existence of every existent is due to the 
First because it emanates (fāʾiḍ) from Him, but His existence is due to Himself, 
hence His existence is different from the existence of the other existents and 
nothing is of the kind of His existence (min jins wujūdihi).’432 Ibn Sīnā writes in 
the same manner that ‘the existence of the creator is an intellectually perceived 
existence (wujūd maʾqūl), that is, pure existence (wujūd mujarrad),’433 thus 
distinguishing it from the corporeal existence of creation. We should also note 
that, as opposed to the self-evident character of God’s being an existent, it is the 
kind of God’s existence which Ibn Sīnā himself identifies as a rather obscure and 
certainly not self-evident issue. Towards the very end of the Metaphysics of the 
Shifāʾ, Ibn Sīnā deals with ‘the manner of the Prophet’s call to God (Most-High!)’ 
and he explains that it does not belong to the duties of the prophet to  
involve them [i.e., the common people] in anything pertaining to knowledge of 
God (Most-High!) beyond knowledge that He is one, truth, and has no 
comparison. Hence, to go beyond this and obligate them to assert His existence 
(wujūdahu) as not being referred to in place, and as not being classified by words, 
and as not being outside the world and not inside it, nor anything of this kind, 
this is too much for them... Only very few of them can conceive the true nature 
(ḥaqīqa) of this tawḥīd and transcendence (al-tanzīh), hence they would not 
hesitate to deny such an existence (mithl hādhā al-wujūd).434  
 
The Meaning of the Term inniyya Allāh – What does Metaphysics Seek? 
Let us now turn our attention once more to Ibn Sīnā’s discussion at the 
beginning of the Ilāhiyyāt of the Shifāʾ whether inniyya Allāh could be 
metaphysics’ subject matter. We recall that Marmura translates the expression 
as ‘the existence of God,’435 thus rendering inniyya the same as wujūd where Ibn 
Sīnā speaks of the investigation of wujūd al-ilāh. The reason why inniyya Allāh 
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is not metaphysics’ subject matter, thus Ibn Sīnā’s explanation runs, is that 
wujūd al-ilāh needs to be established by metaphysics. Since we have shown that 
wujūd al-ilāh does not refer to God’s existence (in the traditional sense), the 
question arises of what inniyya Allāh really stands for. A number of passages in 
the Shifāʾ allow us to infer what Ibn Sīnā means by it. He explains:  ‘There is no 
māhiyya for the necessarily existent other than that He is necessarily existent, 
and this is the inniyya.’436 He carries on: ‘Every possessor of a māhiyya is caused. 
All other things besides the necessarily existent have māhiyyāt.‘437 This clarifies 
that inniyya is contrasted with māhiyya, and that the former denotes the 
necessity of existence which has no cause, whereas the latter refers to 
something possibly existent which requires a cause it to exist.  Elsewhere in the 
Shifāʾ Ibn Sīnā speaks of ‘the true nature (ḥaqīqa) of necessary existence,’ which 
is conveyed by the term inniyya, and explains that it is ‘only the assuredness of 
existence.’438 In this case, existence, he carries on, is ‘a necessary concomitant 
(lāzim) for the true nature.’439 This reference to the true nature of the 
necessarily existent is of importance for our quest to understand what inniyya 
Allāh denotes and what metaphysics seeks with regards to it. A look at the 
Taʿliqāt helps clarify this. There, too, Ibn Sīnā speaks about true natures and we 
learn: ‘Humans cannot grasp the true nature of things...but they grasp one of the 
necessary concomitants (lawāzim) or one of the specifics (khawāṣṣ).’440 God, 
whom Ibn Sīnā usually refers to as the First (al-awwal) in the Taʿliqāt, has a true 
nature just like everything else in this world, yet humans do not know this true 
nature, they only know that existence is necessary for Him. Ibn Sīnā clarifies 
that the necessity of existence in God belongs to His necessary concomitants or 
lawāzim.441 It should be recalled at this point that our knowledge of this 
particular concomitant of God constitutes, according to Ibn Sīnā himself, 
‘primary knowledge, not acquired.’442 The necessity of existence poses only one 
among a number of God’s necessary concomitants, to which ‘creation (al-
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khalq)...just as oneness (waḥdāniyya) and knowledge (ʿilm)’443 belong. What 
singles out God’s lāzim of necessary existence is that it is ‘the most specific of 
the concomitants of the true nature and the first of them, because the necessity 
of existence belongs to the true nature without being through other 
concomitants (huwa lahā bi-lā wāsiṭa lāzim ākhir).’444 Thanks to this particular 
necessary concomitant we are able to learn about others of God’s necessary 
concomitants (or specifics/khawāṣṣ which Ibn Sīnā uses interchangeably): ‘We 
establish something that is specific and we know it is from among its khāṣṣa or 
khawāṣṣ, then we know that this thing has other khawāṣṣ thanks to what we 
knew first.’445 Finally, we are told that ‘the true nature of the First is His 
anniyya’446  and that ‘the true nature of the necessarily existent is the 
anniyya.’447 We have already seen that Ibn Sīnā applies the name ‘necessarily 
existent’ to God. Elsewhere, he speaks of our knowledge ‘that the necessarily 
existent due to Himself is the name (ism) of the First.’448 This leaves no doubt 
that, when Ibn Sīnā speaks about the true nature of the First and the true nature 
of the necessarily existent due to Himself, he refers to God. It is important to 
note that anniyya is not the proper name of the true nature of God. Ibn Sīnā 
remarks: ‘The human minds do not realise the essence (kanh) and true nature 
of the First and the First has a true nature which has no name (ism) in our 
view.’449 So how does anniyya relate to God’s true nature and what does the 
term anniyya denote? We are told the following: ‘Existence belongs to the 
concomitants of the essences (māhiyyāt), not to their constituents 
(muqawwimāt), but regarding the First, who has no essence (māhiyya) other 
than the anniyya…’450 Furthermore: ‘He is not caused because He has no 
essence (māhiyya), rather He has al-anniyya since every possessor of an 
essence is caused because this possessor’s existence is not due to his essence 
but from another.’451 We can infer from these passages that anniyya, as used in 
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the Taʿliqāt, conveys the exact same meaning as inniyya which Ibn Sīnā employs 
in the Shifāʾ.   
It might appear as if a contradiction arises from all this: Ibn Sīnā initially said 
that God’s true nature is not known, only His necessary concomitants, which 
follow from His true nature, and in particular the most specific of them, this 
being the necessity of His existence as denoted by anniyya. So how is it possible 
that he equates anniyya with God’s true nature when anniyya denotes the first 
of what is only one of God’s necessary concomitants? Ibn Sīnā clarifies this issue 
when he states: ‘If the true nature of the First was known, then the necessity of 
existence would be the explanation (sharḥ) of the name of that true nature.’452 
This passage shows that God’s true nature, which in itself has no name, is called 
anniyya because it takes its name from the most specific of God’s concomitants, 
which serves as an explanation of the otherwise obscure true nature.453  
We may infer from this discussion the following: It is certainly wrong to 
translate inniyya Allāh in the context of the discussion of metaphysics’ subject 
matter as ‘the existence of God,’ as Marmura does. It would be equally mistaken 
to render this expression ‘the necessity of God’s existence,’ as this is clearly 
something that belongs to the self-evident truths of metaphysics and does not 
need to be established first. It is much more convincing that Ibn Sīnā uses 
inniyya Allah in the present context to denote God’s true nature, which to 
investigate indeed belongs to the things sought by metaphysics. God’s true 
nature or inniyya cannot be metaphysics’ subject matter for the sole reason that 
the kind of God’s existence (wujūd) cannot be taken for granted in this science. 
Our conclusion is further supported when we take into account that Ibn Sīnā 
declares the purpose of philosophy (i.e., metaphysics) 454 as to ‘determine the 
true natures of all things (ḥaqāʾiq al-ashyāʾ kullihā) inasmuch as it is possible 
for humans.’455 We should also bear in mind that according to Ibn Sīnā, the 
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investigation of inniyya Allāh includes the aspect of His existence (wujūd) as 
well as the aspect of His attributes.456 
An Ontological Proof of God’s Existence? 
Contrary to the picture that has emerged, it has been argued by Toby Mayer 
that Ibn Sīnā’s aforementioned twofold division of existence hints at an 
ontological proof of God’s existence.457 The ontological nature of Ibn Sīnā’s 
proof becomes most apparent, thus Mayer’s claim, in the Ishārāt. There, after 
having presented his division of existence, Ibn Sīnā turns to that for which 
existence is necessary due to itself and states: ‘If it is necessary, then it is the 
Truth in Himself (al-ḥaqq bi-dhātihi), the Necessarily Existent due to His 
essence (al-wājib al-wujūd min dhātihi), namely the Self-Subsistent (al-
qayyūm).’458 Mayer assumes: ‘Ibn Sīnā seems immediately to proceed to infer 
the actual, extra-mental, reality of God. ... In this, the shaykh makes the crucial 
ontological move from the idea of a ‘necessary’ division in the dichotomy of 
existence...to the affirmation of a particular instance of it in reality, a divinity.’459 
This reading of Ibn Sīnā can be questioned in two ways: Firstly, one could pose 
that all he establishes is that one division of existence, this being existence 
which is necessary considering the essence, not the other division he mentions, 
represents God. This is in accordance with the Taʿliqāt where Ibn Sīnā declares 
our knowledge that God’s existence is necessary an a priori insight. To make the 
point that it is God who is necessarily existent, is part of Ibn Sīnā’s endeavour to 
investigate God’s particular existence – which also means distinguishing it from 
the kind of existence characteristic of creation – and His true nature. This 
concern, however, is different from the concern of ontological arguments for 
God’s existence. Secondly, while it is true that Ibn Sīnā does apply the name al-
ḥaqq (the Truth) elsewhere to God,460 not least because it is a Qurʾānic term, as 
is the name al-qayyūm (the Self-Subsistent),461 it could be argued that he does 
not use them as proper names of God in the above passage from the Ishārāt. 
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Rather, he offers further explanation of what al-wājib al-wujūd min dhātihi 
means. It is, of course, no coincidence that these alternative terms are God’s 
very names, since Ibn Sīnā’s ultimate objective is, we submit, to confirm 
Scripture. Rather than attempting to prove that God really exists, Ibn Sīnā 
intends to show that necessary existence, expressed through whatever term, 
only belongs to God, while all other existents are different from Him in their 
being possibly existent. At this stage, however, one has to bear in mind, Ibn Sīnā 
has not yet clarified that the terms al-ḥaqq, al-qayyūm and al-wājib al-wujūd 
min dhātihi do not apply to the world. We have seen previously that the 
mutakallimūn in fact dealt with the claim that the world simply is, from all 
eternity, independent of any outside cause.462 Ibn Sīnā seems to have in mind 
the very same issue which poses a problem to the claims of Scripture. 
Mayer, who evidently conceives of the purpose of the twofold division of 
existence as being a different one, then asserts that it is in fact a passage from 
Ibn Sīnā’s Najāt which ‘better brings out the ontological character of Ibn Sīnā’s 
reasoning in this part of the proof.’463 After having made the famous utterance 
that ‘there is no doubt that there is existence,’464 Ibn Sīnā states: ‘Every 
existence is either necessary or possible. If it is necessary, then the existence of 
the necessary is certain (fa-qad ṣaḥḥa wujūd al-wājib)...and if it is possible, then 
we will make clear that the existence of the possible ends in the necessarily 
existent.’465 According to Mayer’s reading of this passage, Ibn Sīnā intends to 
show that God exists, and he does so by focusing on the certainty of God’s 
necessary. Yet, a close look at Ibn Sīnā’s statement rather suggests that his 
intention is to compare the necessarily existent with the possibly existent in 
terms of their respective claim to existence, as it were. That for which existence 
is possible has existence only thanks to the necessarily existent, in contrast to 
that for which existence is a necessity: Its being an existent is a certainty, 
without the need for, or reference to, another. In the Shifāʾ we find the same 
thought as expressed in the above passage from the Najāt: ‘As for the truth (al-
ḥaqq), it is understood as existence in external things (aʿyān) absolutely, and as 
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perpetual existence (al-wujūd al-dāʾim)... Hence, the necessarily existent is the 
truth in itself permanently, and the possibly existent is truth due to another.’466 
Here, too, the focus is on the fact that necessary existence means eternal and 
uncaused existence, while possible existence depends on another for its 
actualisation. It can be argued that to read Ibn Sīnā’s division of existence into 
essentially necessary and essentially possible as pointing to an ontological 
argument for God’s existence is erroneous on two accounts: Firstly, it stems 
from the mistaken assumption that Ibn Sīnā’s speaking of the investigation of 
God’s existence refers to a traditional argument for God’s existence. Secondly, it 
seems to misunderstand Ibn Sīnā’s real concern, which is a comparison of two 
types of existence. 
A Cosmological Proof of God’s Existence? 
The most common view we encounter in secondary literature, however, is that 
Ibn Sīnā does not present an ontological proof, but rather a cosmological one – 
or that his cosmological argument dominates. Herbert Davidson has expressed 
this view, arguing that Ibn Sīnā ‘does not...wish to offer an a priori or ontological 
proof of the existence of God, but rather a new form of the cosmological 
proof.’467 Lenn Goodman agrees on this and states: ‘The core of the new 
metaphysics is Avicenna’s argument for the existence of God, a cosmological 
argument.’468 Majid Fakhry, too, ascribes ‘the cosmological mode of reasoning to 
prove His existence’469 to Ibn Sīnā. Even Mayer, who defended the ontological 
character of Ibn Sīnā’s proof, admits that the ‘treatment of the overall proof as 
cosmological may turn out to be far from misleading, insofar as the greater part 
of it does not reason on the basis of the first division in the dichotomy of 
existence, the necessary, but on the basis of the second, the contingent.’470 The 
parallels between Ibn Sīnā’s proof and the proofs employed by previous 
mutakallimūn are obvious, Goodman argues, as the ‘appeal to contingency’ is 
                                                          
466 Ibn Sīnā, al-Shifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyyāt, b. 1, ch. 8, p. 38. Compare also the Dānish-nāma (ch. 18-19, pp. 
47-48) where Ibn Sīnā makes the same point. 
467 Davidson 1987, p. 298. 
468 Goodman 1992, p. 63. 
469 Fakhry 1986, p. 15. 
470 Mayer 2001, p. 25. See also Netton (1994, pp. 172-174) who mentions ‘the ontological proof’ 
alongside ‘,t-he proof from necessity,’ ‘the proof from movement’ and ‘the proof from causality.’ 
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something that characterises the kalām method to establish God’s existence.471 
It is indeed the case that Ibn Sīnā presents a proof which is very much 
reminiscent of a cosmological argument and which takes into account the 
notions of causality and contingency.472 Yet, just as in the case of the theologians 
before him, we argue that Ibn Sīnā’s cosmological argument, as it were, does not 
serve the purpose of proving God’s existence, as it is understood in secondary 
literature. Rather, just like them, he is concerned with vindicating Scripture’s 
declaration that the world is creation by God. While it may therefore be true 
that he employs an argument, the character of which could be called 
cosmological (since it starts from an effect), it is important to note that it is not 
intended to prove that God (conceived of as the necessarily existent due to 
Himself) exists, but with the purpose of establishing a causal connection 
between God and creation, which are in the realm of metaphysics conceived of 
in terms of their types of existence: necessary or possible.473  
Before explaining the details of this, let us turn to Ibn Sīnā’s proof itself. After 
having divided existence into the necessary and the possible, he turns his 
attention to an assumed existent which is possible in itself. It requires, per 
definitionem, a cause which gives precedence to its existence over its non-
existence.474 This cause in turn is either necessarily or possibly existent in itself. 
By demonstrating that an infinite regress of causes is impossible, there must 
                                                          
471 Goodman 1992, p. 63. Fakhry (1986, p. 8) similarly characterises Ibn Sīnā’s proof as an 
argument from the contingency or possibility of the world. 
472 Sabine Schmidtke (2000, p. 39) likewise speaks of ‘de,m- von Ibn Sīnā formulierten Beweis…, 
der von der Kontingenz der Welt ausgeht.’ Egbert Meyer (1980, pp. 227-228), who analysed Ibn 
Sīnā’s Risāla ʿarshiyya, ascribes the same kind of proof for God’s existence to him: ‘Ibn Sīnā 
unterscheidet hier unter ausschließlicher Verwendung des Gottesbeweises a contingentia 
mundi zunächst zwischen dem Seienden (mawǧūd), das eine Ursache (sabab) seines Seins 
(wuǧūd), und solchem, das keine Ursache seines Seins hat.’ 
473 Peter Adamson (“From the necessary existent to God” in Adamson 2013, pp. 170-189), 
however, has argued: ‘If one were asked to name Avicenna’s greatest contribution to the history 
of philosophy, one might reasonably choose his proof of God’s existence. The proof shows that 
there must be a ‘necessary existent’...’ (p. 170). He therefore identifies the intention behind Ibn 
Sīnā’s proof as an entirely different one: ‘God’ is conceived in a certain way (i.e., as the necessary 
existent) and the task is to show that ‘God’ really does exist. This is different from our 
suggestion that the intention is to show that created existence (i.e., possible existence) is 
ultimately dependent on God (i.e., the necessarily existent). Mind you, metaphysics does not 
speak of God and creation unless in terms of their being part of all of existence, necessary or 
possible respectively.  
474 Ibn Sīnā, al-Ishārāt, al-Ilāhiyyāt, p. 447. 
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hence be a final cause which is only cause, but not effect:475 ‘Every regress ends 
in the necessarily existent in itself.’476 It is here where Ibn Sīnā’s proof of God’s 
existence is said to culminate: ‘there is a necessary being, QED,’477 as Goodman 
puts it. 
Davidson has argued that Ibn Sīnā’s ‘cosmological argument’478 follows the 
structure of a particular form of proof called dalīl. Amos Bertolacci has 
suggested the same.479 We recall that in his discussion of metaphysics’ subject 
matter at the beginning of the Shifāʾ, Ibn Sīnā stated that God’s existence is 
neither self-evident, nor unprovable, but ‘there is a proof (dalīl) for it.’480 Based 
on this statement, Davidson maintains that ‘according to Avicenna, ...a ‘proof’ 
(dalīl)...of the existence of God...will...reason from the existence of a possibly 
existent being to the existence of necessarily existent being ,sic-.’481 The dalīl, 
Davidson then informs us, ‘is a syllogism wherein the middle term is the 
effect...of the presence of the major term in the minor term; it is a chain of 
reasoning that moves...from the posterior to the prior, from the presence of the 
effect to the existence of the cause.’482 It is important to note that, according to 
this view, the dalīl has the function of inferring the existence of the cause – God 
– from the existence of the effect – the contingent world. Let us then consider 
whether this view is in accordance with what Ibn Sīnā himself has to say about 
the dalīl.  
The Kitāb al-Burhān of the Najāt as well as the Kitāb al-Burhān of the Shifāʾ can 
help resolve this question. Ibn Sīnā explains that every knowledge falls either 
into the category of conception (taṣawwur) or into the category of confirmation 
(taṣdīq). Confirmation is acquired through syllogisms (qiyās)483 which establish 
                                                          
475 Ibid., pp. 448-455. 
476 Ibid., p. 455.  
477 Goodman 1992, p. 64. 
478 Davidson 1987, p. 298. 
479 Bertolacci 2006, p. 225: ‘In I, 1, ,Ibn Sīnā- admits that there is a ‘sign’ (dalīl), namely a 
‘demonstration quod’, of God’s existence.’ 
480 Ibn Sīnā, al-Shifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyyāt, b. 1, ch. 1, p. 4. 
481 Davidson 1987, p. 299. 
482 Davidson 1987, p. 299. See also Goodman 1992, p. 75: ‘the syllogisms leading to the 
recognition of God’s existence...are evidentiary, arguing...from effect to cause.’ 
483 Ibn Sīnā, al-Najāt, al-Burhān, p. 97. Compare, for example, Tony Street’s “Avicenna on the 
Syllogism” and Deborah L. Black’s “Certitude, justification, and the principle of knowledge in 
Avicenna’s epistemology”, both in Adamson 2013. 
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a truth and that something is such and cannot be other.484 A syllogism of this 
kind is the burhān.485 The burhān comprises two different types, ‘one of which 
is the burhān limā and the other the burhān anna, which is called dalīl.’486 
Turning to the burhān anna, which we are interested in, Ibn Sīnā clarifies that it 
is divided into two different types:  
It is agreed that the middle term is not, regarding the existence, a cause for the 
existence of the major term in the minor term and not an effect of it, rather 
something additional for it487... And it is agreed that the middle term is, regarding 
the existence, an effect of the existence of the major term in the minor term. The 
first is called burhān al-anna ʿalā al-iṭlāq, and the second is called dalīl.488  
One of the examples Ibn Sīnā gives for the dalīl is the following: This tree is 
burnt; everything burnt was touched by fire; therefore, this tree was touched by 
fire. He explains that ‘the burning is an effect of the existence of the major term 
in the minor term’489 – in other words: The fact that this tree (major term) 
belongs to what was touched by fire (minor term) explains the effect of being 
burnt (middle term). Or to turn it around: This particular syllogism allows us to 
infer that it was fire (cause) which led to the tree’s being burnt (effect) (see 
Appendix, Figure 1). The dalīl ‘clarifies the cause from the effect.’490 
Retuning to our question about the purpose of the dalīl, one crucial thing 
became evident: As opposed to Davidson and Bertolacci’s claim that it is God’s 
existence which is established by the dalīl, Ibn Sīnā nowhere indicates that it is 
the existence of a certain entity or thing which the dalīl is meant to prove. All his 
examples show that the dalīl allows identifying something as cause based on a 
given effect. In the above example, it is not the existence of fire which the dalīl 
proves or seeks to prove; rather, it has the purpose of establishing that it is fire 
which caused a particular effect.    
                                                          
484 Ibn Sīnā, al-Shifāʾ, al-Burhān, pp. 30-31. 
485 Ibn Sīnā, al-Najāt, al-Burhān, p. 102 and al-Shifāʾ, al-Burhān, p. 31. 
486 Ibn Sīnā, al-Shifāʾ, al-Burhān, p. 30. 
487 One example Ibn Sīnā gives for this type of the burhān anna is the following: This person who 
suffers from fever has white urine; everybody who has this is feared to have a tumour in the 
head; therefore, this person who suffers from fever is feared to have a tumour in the head. He 
then explains that the white urine and the tumour are both effects of one single cause. The 
middle term (white urine) is therefore neither cause nor effect of the fact that this person who 
suffers from fever (major term) has a tumour (minor term), but something additional (al-Shifāʾ, 
al-Burhān, p. 32). 
488 Ibid., p. 32. 
489 Ibn Sīnā, al-Najāt, al-Burhān, p. 103. 
490 Ibn Sīnā, al-Shifāʾ, al-Burhān, p. 33. 
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Nevertheless, Davidson has attempted to extract a syllogism along the lines of 
the dalīl from Ibn Sīnā’s alleged cosmological proof (see Appendix, Figure 2). 
His proof is said to contain the following two premises: Firstly, ‘[p]ossibly 
existent beings are traceable to a being necessarily existent by virtue of 
itself,’491 which Ibn Sīnā establishes on the basis of the principle of causality as 
well as the impossibility of an infinite or circular regress of causes.492 Secondly, 
‘[s]omething exists which is...possibly existent by virtue of itself.’493 These two 
premises lead to the conclusion that ‘something exists which is traceable to a 
being necessarily existent by virtue of itself; and the latter also exists.’494 The 
first thing we notice is that Davidson’s arrangement of the premises does not 
follow the prescribed structure of the dalīl as given by Ibn Sīnā in a number of 
examples (see Appendix, Figure 3). Davidson’s first premise should be the 
minor (i.e., second) premise, since it contains the minor term, and the second 
premise should be the major (i.e., first) premise, containing the major term. 
More crucially, however, Davidson’s dalīl does in fact not fulfil its prescribed 
purpose. We recall that in the dalīl the minor term provides the cause for the 
effect which is contained in the major premise. Applied to Davidson’s dalīl this 
means the following: Being ‘traceable to a being necessarily existent by virtue of 
itself’ (minor term) is the cause that explains the effect ‘possibly existent by 
virtue of itself’ which is contained in the major premise and which applies to 
‘[s]omething exists’ (major term). In other words: The fact that this something 
which exists is traceable to a being necessarily existent is the cause of this 
something’s being possibly existent by virtue of itself. Davidson’s mistake is 
obvious: According to Ibn Sīnā, an existent is certainly not possibly existent due 
to itself because it ends in the necessarily existent due to itself. Rather, its being 
traceable to the necessarily existent is something that goes hand in hand with 
its nature of being possibly existent. Considering all this, we submit that Ibn 
Sīnā’s mention of the dalīl in connection with wujūd al-ilāh at the beginning of 
the Ilāhiyyāt of the Shifāʾ should therefore be understood as simply denoting a 
                                                          
491 Davidson 1987, p. 304. 
492 Ibid., p. 299. 
493 Ibid., p. 304. 
494 Ibid., p. 304. 
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proof for – or better: indication of – God’s kind of existence, rather than 
referring to its other, more specific meaning of a certain type of syllogism.495 
The Proof of God’s Being Creator 
Yet, it is in fact the aspect of establishing the causal connection between the 
necessarily existent and the possibly existent, we argue, which Ibn Sīnā seeks to 
establish in the aforementioned passage from the Ishārāt. This is of course not 
an end in itself, but has the purpose of showing that everything besides God 
only exists due to God. It is not God’s existence which Ibn Sīnā seeks to prove by 
linking the possibly existent to the necessarily existent; instead, it is God’s 
attribute of being creator. This objective becomes apparent in some passages of 
the Taʿliqāt. There we read:  
The path followed to knowledge of the Creator (al-bāriʾ) is that we divide 
existence into the necessary and the non-necessary. Then we divide the 
necessary into what is due to essence and into what is not due to essence. And 
we divide the non-necessary into what is not necessary due to essence, which is 
the impossible, and into what is not necessary not due to essence, which is the 
possible. So we know the special characteristics (khawāṣṣ) of every one of them, 
some of them thanks to others, like that we know the knowledge the necessarily 
existent due to Himself possesses thanks to the negation of quantities for Him, 
that is, that which is not a body necessarily intellectually apprehends His 
essence... And after that we know the special characteristics of every remaining 
division, until we know from this that what is other than the necessarily existent 
due to Himself, who is one, is related regarding (its) existence with the 
necessarily existent.496  
Ibn Sīnā furthermore explains:  
When we find two things...together in existence, but one of them is essentially 
necessarily existent and the other essentially possibly existent, and when we 
know the true nature of each of them thanks to the special characteristics, then 
we know that what has the nature of possibility is an effect and the other a cause. 
So if we know the necessity of existence (anniyya) of the necessarily existent due 
to Himself and His true nature according to what we know from the Metaphysics 
(al-ilāhiyyāt)..., then we know that what is other than Him from among the 
existents is necessary due to Him and possible due to essence, and the priority of 
the necessarily existent over it is the priority of sufficiency (istighnāʾ), and the 
posteriority of it after Him is the posteriority of need (hājja). Between the cause 
and the effect lie sufficiency and need.497  
                                                          
495 Compare al-Shifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyyāt, b. 8, ch. 5, p. 283 where Ibn Sīnā speaks of there being ‘clear 
indications (al-dalāʾil al-wāḍiḥa)’ for God. 
496 Ibn Sīnā, al-Taʿliqāt, pp. 162-163. 
497 Ibid., p. 163. 
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Both the investigation of the necessarily existent and its true nature as well as 
the possibly existent and its true nature, based on their respective necessary 
concomitants, makes possible the conclusion that the existence of the possible 
in itself is due to the necessary in itself – this ultimately implying that the cause 
we seek for the effect which is the existence of the world is God.  
In order to appreciate the significance of this discussion, we need to bear in 
mind two things: Firstly, neither for a great number of mutakallimūn, as we 
have seen, nor for Ibn Sīnā was the reality of causal connections between things 
a self-evident matter. Yet, the defence of the Qurʾānic declaration that the world 
is God’s product depends for both theologians and philosophers on the 
affirmation of the principle of causation. Secondly, even where this principle 
was acknowledged, both mutakallimūn and philosophers had to face opposing 
views about the ultimate explanation of the fact that the contingent world exists. 
They understood, as we have previously seen and as Ibn Sīnā’s own account 
makes clear, that it does not immediately follow from the fact that things have 
causes that it is ultimately God who causes the whole to exists. All these 
considerations play a crucial role in the Shifāʾ. Already in book 1, chapter 1, Ibn 
Sīnā himself emphasises the necessity for metaphysics of affirming the principle 
of causation, ‘for if we have not established the existence of causes for things 
which are effects (wujūd al-asbāb li’l-musabbabāt) by establishing that the 
latter are connected with what precedes them in existence, it is not necessary 
for the mind that there should be an absolute cause or some cause.’498 Crucially, 
when Ibn Sīnā speaks here of the existence of causes for effects, he means the 
same as when he asks whether ‘there is for originated things (ḥādithāt) some 
principle’499: Is it true that things come about due to causes or do they enter 
existence uncaused? It is then in book 8 of the Metaphysics that Ibn Sīnā tackles 
the issue of showing that the principle of causation also involves that something 
must be a first cause which gives existence to all causes after it. He states: ‘Now 
that we have reached this state in our book, it is apt that we conclude it with the 
knowledge of the first principle of the whole of existence.’500 This knowledge 
                                                          
498 Ibn Sīnā, al-Shifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyyāt, b. 1, ch. 1, p. 5.  
499 Ibid., p. 6. 
500 Ibn Sīnā, al-Shifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyyāt, b. 8, ch. 1, p. 257. 
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pertains to the questions of ‘whether it is existent (mawjūd), one and without 
equal.’501 Again, Ibn Sīnā’s mentioning the existence of this first cause solely 
refers to the question of whether it is the case that all causes end in a final cause 
– or whether this is not the case and no entity can be said to be this final cause. 
In order to accomplish his task, Ibn Sīnā states that it is necessary to prove, 
firstly, ‘that the causes are in all respects finite,’ secondly, ‘that there is a first 
principle in each of their classes,’ thirdly, ‘that the principle of all of them is one,’ 
and finally, ‘that it alone is necessarily existent and that the existence of every 
existent comes from it.’502 The all-important proof of the finiteness of causes 
also poses a refutation of those individuals and groups we have encountered in 
the previous chapters who are described as believing that the world is its own 
cause, eternally generating its existence from itself. Ibn Sīnā therefore presents 
a refutation of the position that an infinite regress of causes is a possibility, 
where every single cause is also effect of a preceding cause.503 In the Dānish-
nāma and the Najāt, Ibn Sīnā furthermore deals with, and refutes, what he calls 
‘the argument for the circularity of causes’504 which poses that ‘every (member 
of a sequence of causes) is possibly existent in itself, but necessary due to 
another (member) in which it ends in a circular way (dawran).’505 Since God is 
the necessarily existent due to His essence, and since the final cause of all of 
existence is none other than this necessarily existent, Ibn Sīnā has achieved his 
objective of showing that God is the creator of the world.  
Yet, we should not forget that Ibn Sīnā indicated at the beginning of the Shifāʾ 
that metaphysics seeks to investigate the true nature of the godhead, which 
includes His particular type of existence as well as His attributes, as explained. 
In this regard, it is a statement we find in the Ishārāt which makes clear how it 
is once more the twofold division of existence into the necessary and the 
possible which enables Ibn Sīnā to achieve this aim. There he states:  
Consider how our explanation of the affirmation of the First and His oneness as 
well as His being free from the attributes does not require the consideration of 
                                                          
501 Ibid., p. 257. 
502 Ibid., p. 257. 
503 Ibid., p. 258. 
504 Ibn Sīnā, Dānish-nāma, p. 59. 
505 Ibn Sīnā, al-Najāt, al-Ilāhiyyāt, p. 272. 
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anything else than existence itself. It does not require the consideration of His 
creation and act (khalqihi wa-fiʿlihi), even if this can be an indication (dalīl), but 
(what we explained) is truer and more exalted, for if we consider the state (ḥāl) 
of existence, existence bears witness insofar as it is existence, and it also bears 
witness for everything that is after it in existence.506  
God is known not only to be the principle of all other existents – He is the 
First507 – based on the twofold division of existence and the examination of 
their respective natures, but also to be one and unique – which is the essence of 
His tawḥīd. As opposed to the mutakallimūn – implicitly referred to508 – who 
prove God’s role as creator and infer His attributes from the consideration of 
His acts, that is, creation, Ibn Sīnā makes the point that his approach is more 
exalted in that he investigates God’s nature without considering only one aspect 
of existence, that is, created existence. The mutakallimūn’s method, even if 
effective, is ‘a rule for the common people (ḥukm li-qawm).’509 They need 
creation to understand, an approach the Qurʾān itself offers in Q. 41.53: {We 
shall show them Our signs in every region of the earth and in themselves, until 
it becomes clear to them that this is the Truth.} The more exalted approach, 
however, is what Ibn Sīnā declares ‘a rule for the veracious (ḥukm li’l-
ṣiddīqīn)’510 and which follows the above statement in Q. 41.53: {Is it not 
enough that your Lord witnesses everything?} The veracious make God the 
basis of their judgements about reality, while the mutakallimūn use creation to 
arrive at their verdicts about God.511  
The kind of existence which is characteristic of God can be known, according to 
Ibn Sīnā, as a consequence of His being necessarily existent due to essence. 
God’s true nature is nothing else than necessary existence. This implies that 
everything that is said of entities having a quiddity (māhiyya) in terms of their 
existence, such as their being composed or corporeal, their belonging to a genus 
(jins) or having differentia (faṣl), cannot be said of God. God is ‘pure intellect 
                                                          
506 Ibn Sīnā, al-Ishārāt, al-Ilāhiyyāt, p. 482. Compare Meyer 1980, p. 245 et seqq. on Ibn Sīnā on 
God’s attributes in the section ‘Die Eigenschaften Gottes gemäß den begebrachten Grundlagen’. 
507 Being the First means being the principle of existence: ‘If the existence of everything other 
than Him derives from His existence, then He is the First’ (Ibn Sīnā, al-Shifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyyāt, b. 8, ch. 
4, p. 273). 
508 Al-Ṭūsī identifies ‘al-mutakallimūn’ as the ones this passage speaks about (see al-Ṭūsī’s 
commentary on p. 482 of the Ilāhiyyāt of the Ishārāt). 
509 Ibn Sīnā, al-Ishārāt, al-Ilāhiyyāt, p. 483. 
510 Ibid., p. 483. 
511 Ibid., p. 483: ‘the veracious who bear witness through Him (bihi), not for Him (ʿalayhi).’ 
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(ʿaql maḥḍ).’512 In the same manner, the divine attributes can be known 
through the mere consideration of what God’s necessary existence entails. In 
being pure intellect, the necessarily existent intellectually apprehends 
Himself513 and His essence as being the principle of every other existent.514 This 
self-apprehension is an ‘act of knowing (ʿālimiyya)’ about the emanation (yufīḍ) 
of existence from Him.515 His knowledge is also His life (ḥayāt)516 and the 
emanation represents His power (qudra).517 The necessarily existent is ‘a lover 
(ʿāshiq)’ of His essence, and the existence emanating from it ‘becomes loved’ by 
Him and ‘this is His will (irādatuhu).’518 This account exemplifies Ibn Sīnā’s 
method of deriving knowledge about God’s true nature (inniya Allāh), which 
includes the investigation of His particular existence and the affirmation of the 
divine attributes, evidently following the Qurʾānic utterances about them, 
through the mere consideration of existence qua existence, as he declared it to 
be his aim. The mutakallimūn, too, derive their knowledge of God’s particular 
existence and His attributes on the basis of His being the creator of creation, as 
is known, yet, in Ibn Sīnā’s view, they must commit a few grave errors: One of 
these errors has to do with the Ashʿarites’ conception of the divine attributes as 
real entities (maʿnā, pl. maʿānin) subsisting in God’s essence, which for Ibn Sīnā 
introduces plurality into the simple divine essence. 519  For him, the 
aforementioned divine attributes are but expressions, as it were, denoting the 
only and ‘primary attribute (al-ṣifa al-ūlā)’520 God has: His being ‘that-ness (inn) 
and an existent.’521 Ibn Sīnā explains: ‘As for the other attributes, some of them 
include the meaning (maʿnā) of this existence with an addition (iḍāfa), others 
the meaning of this existence with a negation (salb).’522 God’s attribute of being 
willing (murīd), for example, means nothing else than ‘the being of the 
                                                          
512 Ibn Sīnā, al-Shifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyyāt, b. 8, ch. 6, p. 284. 
513 Ibid., p. 285. 
514 Ibid., p. 288. 
515 Ibn Sīnā, al-Shifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyyāt, b. 8, ch. 7, p. 291. 
516 Ibid., p. 295. 
517 Ibid., p. 295. 
518 Ibid., p. 292. 
519 Ibid., p. 294. Ibn Sīnā’s conception of the divine attributes is, of course, much closer to that of 
the Muʿtazilite mutakallimūn who maintain that God is, say, knowing by virtue of His essence, 
not due to the maʿnā of knowledge (compare El-Bizri 2008). 
520 Ibid., p. 296. 
521 Ibid., p. 296. 
522 Ibid., p. 296. 
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necessarily existent with His being an intellect – that is, the negation of matter 
of Him – as a principle for the whole system of the good by Him intellectually 
apprehending it.’523 Had the Ashʿarites followed the path of the veracious and 
considered ‘the state (ḥāl) of existence,’524 as Ibn Sīnā does, instead of having 
made creation their foundation,525 they would have understood that they 
profess a flawed conception of God’s true nature.526 
The other grave error the mutakallimūn commit has to do with their 
understanding of creation as having a first beginning. Ibn Sīnā, on the other 
hand, presents a notion of creation as an eternal, beginningless act on the part 
of God, which is, as his account described above made clear, a direct 
consequence of God’s being necessarily existent. In the Taʿliqāt, he explains that 
not only God’s existence is a necessity, but also everything else that is true of 
Him: ‘The meaning of ‘the necessarily existent in Himself’ is that He is necessity 
itself (nafs al-wājibiyya).’527 Necessity means actuality and impossibility of 
becoming or change: ‘If non-existence was possible for Him, then there would 
be receptiveness (qubūl) for non-existence in Him. ... Everything which has 
receptiveness for something in it, has potentiality in it, hence the necessarily 
existent is pure actuality.’528 On this basis, Ibn Sīnā concludes that God’s 
                                                          
523 Ibid., p. 296. 
524 Ibn Sīnā, al-Najāt, al-Ilāhiyyāt, p. 482. 
525 The Ashʿarites, like other mutakallimūn, formulated their conception of the divine attributes 
in comparison to how they conceived of the attributes of corporeal beings. For the Ashʿarites, 
this meant that God is, say, knowing due to the maʿnā of knowledge, just as humans are knowing 
due to the accident of knowledge. The Muʿtazilites of course denied this analogy. Compare 
Wolfson 1959. See also Ibn Rushd’s critique of the Ashʿarite conception of God’s attributes in 
analogy to corporeal things in his Kashf, p. 139.  
526 Note that Peter Adamson (“From the necessary existent to God” in Adamson 2013, pp. 170-
189) has argued that the inference of all these divine attributes constitutes part of Ibn Sīnā’s 
attempt to prove that God exists, of whom he conceives as the necessary existent: ‘proving the 
existence of a necessary existent is different from proving the existence of God. Avicenna was 
fully aware of this… So what would it take to show that the necessary existent is God? For 
Avicenna, it means showing that a range of traditional divine attributes are implied by the 
fundamental trait of necessity’ (pp. 170-171). This is at variance with our suggestion of what 
Ibn Sīnā is intending to do: Like the theologians before him, he seeks to show on rational 
grounds that the Qurʾānic descriptions of God are true. At the same time, he also seeks to defend 
the philosophers’ conception of God against the theologians’, which differs in certain respects. 
And finally, he proposes a way of doing so which he considers nobler than the method of the 
theologians. In doing so, the proof and provability that God, the entity believed to have created 
the world, actually exists is not at stake; rather, this is part of a debate about what God really is 
like and what method establishes this. 
527 Ibn Sīnā, al-Taʿliqāt, p. 50. 
528 Ibid., p. 151. 
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attributes must be actual and necessary as well, and that God ‘never ceases to 
be such.’529 Since God’s will, knowledge, power and so on are nothing else than 
the emanation coming from Him, as explained before, it means that creation 
exists eternally with and through God as its cause (ʿilla).530  
Ibn Sīnā’s description of God as ʿilla is worth noticing when we bear in mind 
what such mutakallimūn as al-Bāqillānī had to say about this term. Al-Bāqillānī, 
we recall, drew a clear line between the notion of the creator or ṣāniʿ who 
brings about the world in time according to his will, on the one hand, and the 
ʿilla which necessitates its effect unwillingly and due to its nature, on the 
other.531 For al-Bāqillānī, it followed from the world’s having entered existence 
after not having been that only an entity possessed of will could be its cause, 
and this excluded this entity’s description as ʿilla. Ibn Sīnā’s notion of the ʿilla is 
an entirely different one when applied to God. We have seen that will and 
knowledge play an essential part in his account of God’s creation. He also 
stresses that ‘the existence of the whole from Him is not due to nature (bi’l-
ṭabʿ).’532 And while it is true that for him creation is necessitated – ‘the existence 
of the whole from Him is a necessary consequence (yalzamuhu)’533 –, it is not 
blind necessity, but rather the necessity with which cause and effect coexist 
when there is no obstacle, whether external or internal, to the fulfilment of the 
agent’s will.534 Al-Bāqillānī’s objection that it is not possible to distinguish 
between cause and effect unless the cause is temporally prior to the effect does 
not pose a problem for Ibn Sīnā as it is the world’s true nature of being possibly 
                                                          
529 Ibid., p. 50. 
530 Ibn Sīnā, al-Shifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyyāt, b. 8, ch. 3, p. 271. 
531 Al-Bāqillānī, al-Tamhīd (1947), p. 53.  
532 Ibn Sīnā, al-Shifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyyāt, b. 9, ch. 4, p. 327. 
533 Ibid., p. 327. 
534 Ibn Sīnā, Dānish-nāma, ch. 15/pp. 41-44 and ch. 33/pp. 66-68. Morewedge holds, contrary to 
Ibn Sīnā’s own illustration, that ‘,f-or Ibn Sīnā emanation is an involuntary process which 
follows from God’s nature’ (1976, p. 419). He is right in maintaining that emanation follows 
from God’s nature (or essence), but he fails to see that it is willed by God. Zedler’s evaluation 
also seems to be misleading when she argues that ‘the only kind of causality Avicenna seems to 
know’ is ex necessitate naturae which implies the non-voluntary creation of the world by God 
and which she contrasts with creation ex voluntate (1948, p. 113). See also Chapter Three “The 
Nature of Creative Action” (pp. 131-168), especially sections “God Creates by Will not by Nature” 
and “Good Freely and Necessarily Creates the Universe,” in Acar 2005. 
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existent and God’s true nature of being necessarily existent which define their 
causal relation.535  
Conclusions 
Metaphysics and theology are not that far apart. Both ask and answer many 
similar questions, despite making use of sometimes different concepts and 
terminology. In Ibn Sīnā’s eyes, it is, however, metaphysics which follows an 
approach more exalted than that of the theologians and which is closer to the 
truth than them. One issue which plays an important role in the thought of both 
theologians and philosophers is the question of God’s being the cause of the 
world and the world’s being creation. God’s attribute of being creator, first 
ascribed to Him by Scripture, is proven through a conceptual analysis of His 
true nature – insofar as He is the necessarily existent due to essence – and the 
true nature of everything else in existence. The way in which God is creator as 
well as the mode of His creative act, however, is known solely on the basis of 
God’s true nature itself; it is not creation which determines the correct 
understanding of this divine attribute. This is where the mutakallimūn went 
wrong: Creation is an eternal act, due to the divine attributes of power, 
knowledge, will and so on. The proof and provability that God exists is of no 
concern for Ibn Sīnā. His investigation of God’s existence is part of the 
endeavour to make known God’s true nature, which pertains to distinguishing 
the type of existence which is characteristic of God from the kind of existence 
which defines creation as well as so to the examination of the divine attributes. 
This endeavour on the part of Ibn Sīnā is ultimately the defence of God’s 
oneness and uniqueness (tawḥīd), so essential to the Qurʾānic message.    
  
                                                          
535 It should be kept in mind that, like the mutakallimūn, Ibn Sīnā also employs the term 
muḥdath for the world, yet he includes the aspect of essential priority in its definition in 
addition to the aspect of temporal priority exclusively espoused by the mutakallimūn. In the 
Ilāhiyyat of the Najāt he states: ‘The muḥdath has two aspects: Firstly, it is that which has a 
principle for its its essence through which it is existent. Secondly, it is that which has a 
beginning for its (existence in) time’ (ibid., p. 254; see also p. 259 on al-ḥudūth al-dhātī).    
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Chapter Five: al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085) 
 
The Method to Affirm the Knowledge of the World’s Originatedness 
and the Creator 
It has rightly been said that al-Juwaynī’s contribution to two of the most 
fundamental issues of kalām, that is, the proof of the world’s originatedness and 
the affirmation of the creator, is not the most innovative.536 This is true for the 
order in which he presents these two discussions in all three major theological 
works of his – the Irshād, the Shāmil as well as the ʿAqīda Niẓāmiyya – where 
the knowledge of the creator is inferred from the createdness of the world. With 
this order, al-Juwaynī follows in the footsteps of several theologians who 
preceded him: those, like al-Bāqillānī, affiliated with the Ashʿarite school of 
thought, but also those of a different affiliation, such as al-Māturīdī and even al-
Kindī in one of his works. Al-Juwaynī himself describes this particular order in 
the Shāmil as the one ‘we recommend,’537 while being aware that none other 
than the founder of his school, al-Ashʿarī, ‘had turned over the known 
arrangement and opposed the established structure’ – a criticism uttered by the 
Muʿtazilites – ‘where he presented the affirmation of the creator before the 
affirmation of the creation and the act.’538 
Al-Juwaynī’s following the established method of his predecessors also becomes 
apparent in his making recourse to the concepts of permissibility (jawāz) and 
necessity (wujūb) when discussing the question of the originatedness of the 
world and its having an originator. These concepts can be found already in 
Muʿtazilite discussions of the same questions, as al-Juwaynī himself 
acknowledges.539 Likewise, in al-Juwaynī, these two concepts are brought 
together with the argument from particularisation (takhṣīṣ), a common 
argument among the theologians, as indicated, the roots of which can be found 
already in the works of such individuals as al-Ashʿarī and al-Māturīdī. 
Furthermore, al-Juwaynī follows a common pattern in the Irshād and the Shāmil 
                                                          
536 Davidson 1968, p. 299. 
537 Al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil (1960-61), p. 33.   
538 Ibid., p. 156. 
539 Ibid., p. 162. 
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when basing his conclusion that the world has an origin in time on the following 
four principles: ‘the affirmation of accidents; the affirmation of their 
originatedness; the affirmation of the impossibility that atoms are free from 
accidents; and the affirmation of the impossibility of originated things which 
have no beginning.’540 ‘When these principles are affirmed,’ al-Juwaynī explains, 
‘we know that what is not free from the originated does not precede it, and 
what does not precede it is originated.’541 Besides the fourth principle, which in 
fact constitutes an important contribution to the whole reasoning on the part of 
al-Juwaynī, we encounter the same method in the works of earlier 
theologians.542 It is only in al-Juwaynī’s later work, the ʿAqīda Niẓāmiyya, that 
an approach somewhat different from that of the Shāmil and the Irshād and 
indeed that of previous theologians is chosen to prove the originatedness of the 
world, as we shall see later.  
Considering that al-Juwaynī’s own approach to the discussion of the 
originatedness of the world and its having an originator very much resembles 
those we find in earlier theological writings, it is not surprising that al-Juwaynī’s 
objective has been compared to the alleged endeavour on the part of 
theologians and philosophers before him of proving that God exists. It is in 
particular the cosmological argument – the mutakallimūn’s ‘favourite 
argument,’543 as Majid Fakhry believes – which al-Juwaynī is seen to make use 
of.544 In this context, Fakhry has also highlighted the importance of ‘the concept 
of contingency upon which…al-Juwaynī…has based ,his- proof for the existence 
of God.’545 Herbert Davidson has likewise pointed to the aforementioned 
argument from particularisation which, he believes, al-Juwaynī’s uses with the 
objective to ‘infer the existence of a creator from creation.’546 Frank Griffel 
credits al-Juwaynī with having been ‘the first Ashʿarite who developed a 
stringent argument for God’s existence based on the principle of 
                                                          
540 Al-Juwaynī, al-Irshād, p. 17. Compare al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil (1960-61), p. 67. 
541 Al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil (1960-61), p. 67. 
542 See Shihadeh 2008, pp. 205-206 on al-Juwaynī’s contribution. 
543 Fakhry 1957, p. 137. 
544 This is to the exception of the ʿAqīda niẓāmiyya where al-Juwaynī is believed to follow a 
different method, as we shall discuss. 
545 Fakhry 1986, p. 9. Compare Shihadeh 2008, pp. 210-211. 
546 Davidson 1968, p. 306. 
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particularization.’547 Tilman Nagel has expressed the same view when he speaks 
of al-Juwaynī’s endeavour to infer ‘the existence of the one Creator…from 
postulating the world’s createdness.’548  
We shall contest this reading of the purpose which the discussion about the 
originatedness of the world as well as the proof of the creator are said to have 
in al-Juwaynī’s works. The createdness of the world, we shall argue, is not made 
the basis of the inference that God exists. Rather, the nature of al-Juwaynī’s 
arguments as well as their similarity to the arguments and discussions we have 
encountered in the works of theologians preceding him give an indication of his 
true concerns: Scripture and its claim that none other than God has caused the 
world to exist is sought to be confirmed. For al-Juwaynī, this involves the 
defence of a particular manner in which God is creator and the world creation. 
Furthermore, it shall become apparent that the significance of establishing a 
causal connection between God and the world lies, for al-Juwaynī, in that it is 
the characteristics of creation which say something about the characteristics of 
its creator. God’s nature is known only through His role as creator. This 
approach and objective of al-Juwaynī is not unique to him and can, for instance, 
already be found in the Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa by the Muʿtazilite mutakallim 
ʿAbd al-Jabbār who died more than half a century before al-Juwaynī. There, he 
explains:  
It is necessary to speculate about these originated things in the bodies...so that it 
is known that they have an originator... Then he reasons that this originator 
cannot be he himself or one like him, so he knows that he has an originator 
different from us and this is God (Most-High!)… Then he reasons that it is true 
that the act comes from Him, and he gains the knowledge of His being 
powerful…and he comes to know that He is knowing. Then he speculates about 
His being powerful and knowing and he knows that He is living. … Thanks to 
these methods he acquires everything the knowledge about tawḥīd involves.549 
It should be noted that ʿAbd al-Jabbār makes a distinction between what we 
termed the affirmation of the principle of causation and the conclusion that it is 
God who is creator. This shows that the principle of causation serves the only 
purpose of establishing that origination occurs but due to an outside cause, 
                                                          
547 Griffel 2009, p. 170. 
548 Nagel 2000, p. 169. 
549 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Sharḥ, pp. 65-66. Compare also ibid., p. 151: ‘The proofs that He (Most-High!) 
is the originator of the world also prove directly...that He (Most-High!) is powerful.’ 
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which is then made the basis of the inference that none but God – not humans 
or any other entity – is the cause we seek for its occurrence. It is furthermore on 
the basis of the principle that the characteristics of the act say something about 
the nature of the agent that God’s nature is revealed. This endeavour is 
ultimately linked to the task, so crucial in kalām, of defending God’s oneness 
and uniqueness (tawḥīd). Al-Juwaynī, we argue, pursues a very similar 
objective.  
The Affirmation of the Knowledge of the Creator in the Shāmil and the 
Irshād 
As mentioned, in the Irshād and the Shāmil, al-Juwaynī establishes the 
originatedness of the world on the basis of four principles. In the Irshād, he 
concludes his discussion with the statement that ‘this explanation is sufficient 
to affirm the originatedness of the atoms and accidents,’550 which constitute ‘the 
world.’551 ‘After this,’ he continues, ‘we will explain the method which leads to 
the knowledge of the creator.’552 This method is the same in both works, except 
for some slight differences: In the Irshād, al-Juwaynī declares that the 
originated world is ‘possible (jāʾiz) in terms of its existence and its 
annihilation.’553 Likewise, the moment of the world’s coming into existence 
belongs to ‘the possible things (mumkināt).’554 In the Shāmil, al-Juwaynī 
explains that, even though there might be different versions of the proof of the 
creator, they all focus on the same idea: Whatever is originated has been 
particularised (ikhtaṣṣa) in terms of the moment it entered existence since its 
existence in this particular moment is only possible (jāʾiz), not necessary 
(wājib), as al-Juwaynī establishes on the basis of several subordinate proofs.555 
The next step in al-Juwaynī’s reasoning for the creator differs in the Irshād and 
                                                          
550 Al-Juwaynī, al-Irshād, p. 27. 
551 Ibid., p. 17. 
552 Ibid., p. 27. 
553 Ibid., p. 28. 
554 Ibid., p. 28. 
555 One method al-Juwaynī declares to be ‘the best and first’ (al-Shāmil (1960-61), p. 146) is this: 
If the originated thing exists necessarily at a certain time, after not having existed, then this 
implies that it is impossible for it to remain non-existent at that time. It is, however, absurd to 
think that at a previous time non-existence was possible and at the time of its coming to be non-
existence is impossible, despite the equality of both times. 
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the Shāmil. In the Irshād, al-Juwaynī argues that, if the world’s existence, but 
also the endurance of its being non-existent are both equally possible, then 
‘reason decides a priori (bi-badāha) that it is in need for one who particularised 
(mukhaṣṣiṣ) it with its actual occurrence. This is evident and necessary, and 
there is no need for the investigation of postulates and to follow the path of 
speculation (al-naẓar).’556 In the Shāmil, however, which al-Juwaynī wrote 
before the Irshād, the knowledge of the mukhaṣṣiṣ is far from being a priori and 
self-evident.557 The only knowledge described as self-evident by al-Juwaynī in 
this discussion concerns the rejection of the belief that ‘origination is affirmed 
not due to a necessitator (muqtaḍin) and not due to a cause (ʿilla)’558 and 
‘without a particulariser (mukhaṣṣiṣ) or one who brings about out of necessity 
(mūjib) or the influence of an influential one (muʾaththir),’559 which is the belief 
that things come about due to chance (ittifāq).560 Chance, evidently, stands for 
the denial of the principle of causation. To hold this belief, al-Juwaynī states, 
means ‘the denial of a priori premises (al-badāʾa) and what is necessary.’561 As 
opposed to the Irshād, al-Juwaynī only affirms the particularising agent after a 
lengthy discussion about whether the realisation of possible existence instead 
of possible non-existence is ‘due to itself (li-nafsihi); or due to an entity (maʿnā) 
in addition to it and subsisting in it; or due to (its) possibility; or due to the 
particularisation of a particulariser.’562 It is evident that the affirmation of the 
principle of causation involves not only that origination occurs due to a cause, 
but a cause which is different from the originated thing itself. Furthermore, this 
outside cause is not just some cause for the existence of the world, but a cause 
in a particular way. Al-Juwaynī’s mentioning the ʿilla and the mūjib alongside 
                                                          
556 Al-Juwaynī, al-Irshād, p. 28. 
557 Davidson overlooked this difference between the argument in the Irshād and that in the 
Shāmil. He states with reference to these two works: ‘But, Juwaynī recognizes, the step from the 
selection between equal possibilities to a particularizing agent who makes the selection must 
itself ultimately be taken as self-evident’ (1987, p. 161, f. 34). 
558 Al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil (1960-61), p. 148. 
559 Ibid., p. 149. 
560 Compare ibid., p. 149: ‘Their being occurred due to chance (ittifāq) at a certain time without 
the requirement of a necessitator (muqtaḍin) or the specification of a particulariser 
(mukhaṣṣiṣ).’ 
561 Ibid., p. 149. Compare ibid., p. 91: ‘If the opponent were to say that non-existence and 
existence are both possible and existence is affirmed without a necessitator, then this would go 
against what can be conceived by reason and it would be denial of necessity and a priori 
knowledge (khurūjan ʿan al-maʿqūl wa-jaḥdan li’l-ḍarūra wa’l-badihiyya).’ 
562 Ibid., p. 147. 
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the muqtaḍī, the mukhaṣṣiṣ and the muʾaththir in the above passage is revealing: 
It shows that, when he reaches the conclusion that only a mukhaṣṣiṣ is 
responsible for the origination of the world, he intends to get across a certain 
conception of this cause – namely the very concept associated with the term 
ṣāniʿ or creator. That this is the case becomes clear when we bear in mind that 
the mūjib and the ʿilla, mentioned above, represent a particular kind of cause 
which is incompatible with the notion of the creator who brings the world into 
existence from non-existence.  
In the chapter on the affirmation of the creator in the Shāmil, al-Juwaynī does 
not say much about the difference between the concepts of the mūjib and the 
ʿilla, on the one hand, and the mukhaṣṣiṣ, on the other; yet, we can infer from a 
number of other passages the following: The concept of the mukhaṣṣiṣ involves 
intention (qaṣd),563 will (irāda)564 and wishing (mashīʾa)565 and the mukhaṣṣiṣ 
is hence described as an agent (fāʿil).566 In contrast, the ʿilla is something which 
causes out of necessity (mūjib).567 Al-Juwaynī’s definition of these different 
kinds of causes therefore follows the tradition of his predecessors, such as al-
Bāqillānī.568 Like them, al-Juwaynī is evidently also concerned with defending a 
particular understanding of the descriptions of God as creator to be found in the 
Qurʾān. His intention is not to prove that God exists because the created world 
points to the existence of an entity of whose existence we only know because 
this entity is the world’s creator. Rather, the world’s nature of being creation 
from non-existence allows the inference that the entity who brought it about – 
God – has a specific nature: He is creator, originator, particulariser and agent 
possessed of will, but He is certainly not to be characterised as an ʿilla which 
causes out of necessity and without choice.  
Al-Juwaynī’s treatment of this question in the Irshād makes this point even 
more evident. The mukhaṣṣiṣ, whom al-Juwaynī had affirmed ‘in general (ʿalā’l-
jumla)’569 and the knowledge of whom he characterised as self-evident, is at this 
                                                          
563 Ibid., p. 149 and p. 152. 
564 Ibid., p. 151. 
565 Ibid., p. 152. 
566 Ibid., p. 150. 
567 Ibid., p. 150. 
568 See Chapter Three on al-Bāqillānī. 
569 Al-Juwaynī, al-Irshād, p. 28. 
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stage a far cry from the creator or ṣāniʿ, the knowledge of whom al-Juwaynī 
seeks to establish. He then presents three options of what nature this mukhaṣṣiṣ 
could be: Either the mukhaṣṣiṣ is ‘one who necessitates (mūjib) the realisation 
of the origination in the same manner as the ʿilla which necessitates (mūjiba) its 
effect;’ or the mukhaṣṣiṣ is like ‘a nature (ṭabīʿa) as the naturalists (ṭabāʾiʿiyyūn) 
assume;’ or he is ‘a choosing agent (fāʿil mukhtār).’570 Al-Juwaynī then rules out 
the first two options, in order to establish that the mukhaṣṣiṣ, from whom the 
world derived its existence, is nothing other than an agent or fāʿil. It is 
impossible, al-Juwaynī reasons, that the mukhaṣṣiṣ can be an ʿilla since the ʿilla 
coexists with its effect: If the ʿilla is eternal, its effect is eternal, too, but this 
contradicts the proven originatedness of the world. If the ʿilla is originated, this 
contradiction does not arise, yet, it leads to the absurdity of an infinite regress 
of causes. It is for the same reason that the mukhaṣṣiṣ cannot be a nature which 
likewise ‘necessitates its influences if impediments are removed’ and which 
brings into being ‘not due to choice.’571 The similarity between al-Bāqillānī’s 
Kitāb al-Tamhīd and al-Juwaynī’s discussion is obvious, both in terms of the 
terminology which is used and the objectives which are pursued. Considering, 
however, that Ibn Sīnā died almost half a century before al-Juwaynī one might 
regard it as surprising that al-Juwaynī does not seem to take into account at all 
the definitions of these terms offered by the philosopher. He simply ignores Ibn 
Sīnā’s account of God’s being the ʿilla of the world’s existence according to 
knowledge, will and power.    
The Affirmation of the Knowledge of the Creator in the ʿAqīda 
Niẓāmiyya 
Al-Juwaynī’s last work of kalām, al-ʿAqīda al-niẓāmiyya is somewhat dissimilar 
from his own earlier writings as well as works by other mutakallimūn in terms 
of its reasoning to establish the creator. While in the Shāmil and the Irshād al-
Juwaynī is said to have based his proof of God’s existence on the premise of the 
createdness of the world, in the ʿAqīda, Davidson has argued, al-Juwaynī 
appears as ‘the originator of…a combined proof of creation and the existence of 
                                                          
570 Ibid., p. 28. 
571 Ibid., p. 29. 
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God’572 when ‘infer,ring] both…directly from the fact that the universe has 
particular characteristics.’573 Mohammad Saflo has argued the same, noting that 
‘al-Juwaynī proves both the contingency of the world and the existence of God 
with a single argument.’ 574  This is, however, not accurate: Firstly, the 
originatedness of the world is not proven directly on the basis of its 
particularised characteristics, but is inferred from the specific nature of the 
entity it comes from, which, in turn, is inferred from the world’s 
particularisation. It is hence an indirect proof. Secondly, just as in his two 
previous works, it is not al-Juwaynī’s aim to prove the existence of God, we 
argue, but rather to show that none but God brought the world into existence 
and that He is but a creator, which again represents a very specific concept. 
Thirdly and lastly, even though it is true that the concept of the creator plays an 
important role already in the chapter on the originatedness of the world, it is in 
the next chapter that ‘the affirmation of the knowledge of the creator who 
choses (ṣāniʿ mukhtār)’575 follows the realisation that the world is originated.576 
Both Davidson and Saflo leave this rather striking fact unmentioned. 
In the ʿAqīda, the chapter on the originatedness of the world begins with the 
definition of the world as ‘every existent other than God’577 which denotes 
bodies (or atoms) (ajsām maḥdūda mutanāhiya) and their accidents. Like in the 
Shāmil and the Irshād, al-Juwaynī makes use of the notion of the world’s 
possibility, but while in his earlier works he applies this notion to the world’s 
existence and non-existence and to the time of its coming to be, in the ʿAqīda the 
focus lies on the possibility of its attributes,578 such as the accidents of colour, 
shape, and motion. If the world is possible in this respect, al-Juwaynī reasons, 
then ‘it is in need of one who necessitates (muqtaḍin) it as it is’579 since ‘it is 
                                                          
572 Davidson 1968, p. 299. Also ibid., p. 307 and Davidson 1987, p. 190. 
573 Ibid., p. 306. 
574 Saflo 2000, p. 204. 
575 Al-Juwaynī, al-ʿAqīda, p. 20. 
576 Ibid., p. 20. 
577 Ibid., p. 16. 
578 Al-Juwaynī himself does not speak of attributes or ṣifāt, he only speaks of accidents (aʿrāḍ), 
but he makes clear elsewhere that accidents are attributes: ‘Know that substance (jawhar) has 
necessary attributes and possible attributes (ṣifāt wājiba wa-ṣifāt jāʾiza). … As for what is 
possible for substance, it is the existence of various accidents (aʿrāḍ) in it’ (al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil 
(1960-61), p. 67). 
579 Al-Juwaynī, al-ʿAqīda, p. 16. 
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absurd that the possible is realised due to chance (ittifāqan) and without one 
who necessitates.’580 Interestingly, in the ʿAqīda al-Juwaynī seems to have 
abandoned the view he expressed in the Irshād and the Shāmil that the 
knowledge about the impossibility that something possible is realised without 
any cause is self-evident (badīha al-ʿaql).581 In the ʿAqīda, the affirmation of the 
principle of causation is said to require speculation (naẓar), consideration 
(iʿtibār), searching (ṭalb), and contemplation (iftikār).582 It should be noted that 
so far, al-Juwaynī has not yet affirmed the world’s originatedness; all he has 
established is that the world receives its accidental forms and so on from an 
outside cause. This is very reminiscent of al-Ashʿarī’s approach in his Kitāb al-
Lumaʿ where the world’s dependence on God is proven before it is ruled out 
that God simply transforms eternally existing prime matter.583  
Al-Juwaynī then moves on to a discussion of the nature of this cause which 
particularises the world’s accidents: The muqtaḍī might be like an eternal ʿilla, 
and the connection between it and the world is like that of cause and effect (fi 
ḥukm al-ʿilla wa’l-maʿlūl) which are concomitant (yatalāzimān),584 defined by 
necessity (mūjib); or the muqtaḍī might be one who prefers and choses 
(muʾthir mukhtār). 585  These two options are very reminiscent of those 
presented in the Irshād.586 It is the particularisation of the world with possible 
attributes which leads al-Juwaynī to conclude that the muqtaḍī is one possessed 
of will (irāda) and wishing (mashīʾa), and not an ʿilla which cannot choose 
between equals. He then dismisses the assumption that the world could 
eternally coexist with its cause, but nevertheless be due to will and choice.587 
This reasoning shows that, contrary to Davidson and Saflo’s claim, it is the 
particular nature associated with the muqtaḍī from which it is inferred that the 
world as a whole has entered existence: The world with its possibility is 
                                                          
580 Ibid., p. 16. 
581 Ibid., p. 13. 
582 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
583 See Chapter Three on al-Ashʿarī. 
584 Al-Juwaynī, al-ʿAqīda, p. 16. 
585 Ibid., p. 17. 
586 Saflo thinks that in the ʿAqīda ‘al-Juwaynī does not prove that the particulariser is a free 
agent as he did in the Irshād’ (2000, p. 204), meaning by free agent a fāʿil mukhtār (ibid., p. 197). 
This is obviously wrong. 
587 Al-Juwaynī, al-ʿAqīda, p. 17. 
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something willed (murād) as it is the object of the muqtaḍī’s will. ‘That which 
occurs due to will,’ al-Juwaynī postulates, ‘is an act (fiʿl)’588 and ‘that which is 
eternal is not an act.’589 It is hence in fact the muqtaḍī’s will on the basis of 
which the world is declared to be originated; particularisation itself is only an 
indirect indication of this. 
Al-Juwaynī’s method to decide the question about the eternity versus 
originatedness of the world on the basis of the nature of its cause is not 
common among the mutakallimūn, as our previous chapters have also shown. 
At the same time, al-Juwaynī is certainly not the first Islamic thinker to do so: 
We should not forget that it was none other than Ibn Sīnā who argued that the 
world must have existed in pre-eternity with God because of God’s very nature 
as the necessarily existent due to essence.590 It seems questionable that al-
Juwaynī developed his argument with a refutation of Ibn Sīnā in mind, even 
though Davidson has argued – rather unconvincingly591 – that the notion of an 
agent choosing existence for a thing over non-existence ‘must have been 
suggested to Juwaynī by Avicenna’s analysis of the concepts of possibly existent 
and necessarily existent.’592 One could have expected a more elaborate and 
thorough refutation of Ibn Sīnā’s reasoning if al-Juwaynī had had his refutation 
in mind. Nevertheless, it shows how the notion of God’s willing the world’s 
existence, which unites Ibn Sīnā and al-Juwaynī, also contains one of their 
biggest points of disagreement. 
Having thus proved the originatedness of the world through a method al-
Juwaynī praises as ‘the best and truest (anjaḥ wa-awqaʿ),’593 he turns to the 
actual affirmation of ‘the knowledge of the creator (ṣāniʿ).’594 His reasoning in 
                                                          
588 Ibid., p. 18. 
589 Ibid., p. 18. 
590 Compare Chapter Four on Ibn Sīnā. 
591 Al-Juwaynī himself, however, states in the Shāmil that this concept was already in use among 
the Muʿtazilites, such as Abū Hāshim b. al-Jubbāʾī (d. 321/933), who died more than one 
hundred years before Ibn Sīnā: ‘…he knows that they ,i.e., things in this world- were not, then 
were, and he considers the possibility of their being and the possibility of the endurance of non-
existence. When he affirms these principles, he knows necessarily that these originated things 
were not due to themselves and without a necessitator or particulariser. Ibn al-Jubbāʾī said this 
and others of the Muʿtazila’ (al-Shāmil (1960-61), p. 162). 
592 Davidson 1987, p. 161. 
593 Al-Juwaynī, al-ʿAqīda, p. 18. 
594 Ibid., p. 20. 
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this chapter is somewhat surprising: The proof of the creator turns out to 
involve the exact same discussion we encountered in the previous chapter: Is 
the entity who brought about the world (mūqiʿ) one who causes out of necessity 
(mūjib) and who has no preference (ithār)? Or is this entity one who choses 
(mukhtār), wills (murīd) and acts according to his wishing (mashīʾa)? This 
reasoning seems even more surprising since al-Juwaynī explicitly states that the 
creator is to be affirmed after and following the proof of the world’s origin in 
time as well as the insight that it originated due to one who made it occur 
(mūqiʿ), not due to itself (bi-nafsihi).595 As indicated above, this fact has, for 
some reason, remained unmentioned in secondary literature596 when al-
Juwaynī is credited with having presented a direct proof of God’s existence 
which does not rest on the premise of the world’s createdness.  
With regards to the question about the purpose of the arguments leading to the 
affirmation of the creator in the ʿAqīda, it is evidently the same as in the Shāmil 
and the Irshād: Al-Juwaynī’s intention is to prove that the world is creation as 
the Qurʾān states, understood by him as creation ex nihilo, and that God is the 
one who brought it about, which makes Him nothing other than the world’s 
creator (ṣāniʿ), endowed with will.  
Like in ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s account quoted above, the connection between God and 
the world is then made the basis on which knowledge about God becomes 
possible. ‘What is necessary for God (Blessed and exalted be He!)’ can be known 
by ‘the one who understands the possible attributes of the created things’ as he 
‘will be lead to what is necessary for their creator.’ 597 The divine attributes can 
be known, al-Juwaynī explains this method, as 
                                                          
595 Ibid., p. 25. 
596 Nagel simply states that ‘al-Juwaynī would finally abandon the conventional method of 
deriving the existence of the Creator...from postulating the world’s createdness’ (2000, p. 196), 
thus ignoring al-Juwaynī’s own representation of things. Davidson nowhere mentions that al-
Juwaynī explicitly states that the proof of the creator follows the originatedness of the world, he 
only knows of his ‘combined proof of the existence of God and creation’ (1987, p. 190) and his 
inferring ‘the existence of God directly from the fact that the universe has particular 
characteristics’ (1986, p. 306). Saflo likewise ignores the latter part of al-Juwaynī’s argument 
and maintains that he ‘proves both the contingency of the world and the existence of God with a 
single argument’ (2000, p. 204) and ‘simultaneously’ (ibid., p. 205). 
597 Al-Juwaynī, al-ʿAqīda, p. 24. 
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the possibility of the originated things proves their creator’s (bāriʾ) being 
powerful because we know that the one who exerts influence and the agent (al-
muʾaththir al-fuʿʿāl) must have power over his act (fiʿl), and he must will it 
(murīd lahu) because power alone does not bring about the act, rather it is the 
acting of the powerful one due to power when he wills so. It is also absurd that he 
wants what he does not know… It became clear that the possibility of the 
attributes established for the originated things proves the necessity of these 
attributes for the creator.598 
It is evident that the inference of God’s attributes on the basis of His act and 
creation has the purpose of confirming Scripture’s ascription of these names to 
God. Saflo has rightly highlighted the importance of this task for al-Juwaynī 
when stating that ‘proving that the world was created does not necessarily 
imply that it was created by God as we understand it. It could well be an agent 
which has no will or choice at all.’599 Yet, he considers this part of the proof of 
God’s existence, rather than the endeavour to establish a certain nature for God 
which can be known through the consideration of creation. 
The Role of the Analogy between Writing and Author as well as 
Origination and Originator 
One famous argument which we encountered in the writings of a number of 
mutakallimūn before al-Juwaynī, such as al-Ashʿarī, al-Māturīdī and al-Bāqillānī, 
is notably missing in al-Juwaynī’s discussions pertaining to the affirmation of 
the creator. This is the analogy between the realm of the observable, the shāhid, 
and the realm of the unobservable, the ghāʾib, in particular based on the 
common examples of a building and its builder or a writing and its author.600 
Even though al-Juwaynī himself does not employ this analogy as an argument to 
prove God’s attribute as creator, he does refer to it several times in the Shāmil. 
There, al-Juwaynī sets out to defend the arguments put forward by the founder 
of his school, al-Ashʿarī, relating to the question of ‘the need of origination for 
the originator’601  against numerous criticisms on the part of Muʿtazilite 
mutakallimūn. This discussion also sheds light on the reasons why al-Juwaynī 
                                                          
598 Ibid., p. 24. 
599 Saflo 2000, p. 206. 
600 Davidson (1987, pp. 154-156) states in Chapter VI.1 entitled “Inferring the existence of God 
from creation” that this analogy serves in al-Māturīdī and in al-Bāqillānī to prove the existence 
of God. Fakhry (1957, p. 139) also mentions this analogy with reference to al-Bāqillānī’s alleged 
argument for God’s existence. 
601 Al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil (1960-61), p. 154. 
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seems to have chosen not to include this often referred to analogy among his 
own arguments. 
Al-Juwaynī reports that the Muʿtazilites criticised al-Ashʿarī’s use of the analogy 
between the shāhid and the ghāʾib as ineffective.602 ‘There is no connection 
between the building and the builder according to his [i.e., al-Ashʿarī’s- principle, 
neither in an acquired way (iktisāban), nor in a creative way (ikhtirāʿan),’603 the 
Muʿtazilites criticised, and ‘the building does not occur, according to him, as 
something the servants have power over.’604 The Muʿtazilites obviously have a 
point as it is well-known that al-Ashʿarī declared only God to be ‘creator 
(khāliq),’ ‘agent (fāʿil)’ and ‘capable of (qādir ʿalayhi) (the act which is 
acquisition (al-fiʿl alladhī huwa kasb)).’605 Their criticism evidently involves 
that, unless one acknowledges the principle of causation for the shāhid, one 
cannot claim its validity for the ghāʾib. Al-Juwaynī then presents a number of 
attempts on the part of – unnamed – fellow Ashʿarites to refute these charges. 
Al-Ashʿarī intended, thus one argument goes, to establish a general rule about 
the connection between building and builder, and in doing so the question of 
whether this connection is characterised as acquisition (kasb), creation (ikhtirāʿ) 
or just the continuity of habit (iṭṭirād al-ʿāda) is subordinate and may be figured 
out later. 606  Interestingly, al-Juwaynī himself dismisses the analogy as 
‘unsatisfactory (ghayr marḍia).’607 The problem lies in the fact, he explains, that 
‘there is no connection between the building and the builder whatsoever 
(aṣlan),’608 thus very much agreeing with the Muʿtazilites. Pointing to habit does 
not help either, al-Juwaynī states, as ‘the continuation of habits does not pose a 
connection between two things, and the principle of the connection is therefore 
                                                          
602 Ibid., p. 157: ‘There is no point (maʿnā) to testify with something which is opposed to his [i.e., 
al-Ashʿarī’s- principle.’ 
603 Ibid., p. 157. 
604 Ibid., p. 157. 
605 Al-Ashʿarī, al-Lumaʿ, p. 72. See Frank 1966 for al-Ashʿarī’s position on human efficient 
causality and Frank 1971, p. 7 and p. 10 for the Muʿtazilite position. See Abrahamov 1989 on al-
Ashʿarī’s doctrine of acquision (kasb, iktisāb). 
606 Al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil (1960-61), p. 163: ‘If something is connected with something else and 
if the objective is to oppose the affirmation of the connection in general without detail, then it 
does not do harm that this connection might go back to acquisition or creation or the continuity 
of habit. This is the case because the reasonable person knows about the connection first and 
then knows about the details of it thanks to reasoning.’ 
607 Ibid., p. 163. 
608 Ibid., p. 163. 
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denied for us.’609 In al-Juwaynī’s occasionalistic worldview, it only makes sense 
to speak of a causal connection between building and builder if one means God 
by the builder and the world by the building, and this is in fact a view he does 
defend.610 In general, however, he makes clear that the affirmation of the 
principle of causation for the ghāʾib has to happen without recourse to 
observation of the shāhid: ‘The connection between the originated thing and the 
originator...is established without reference to the shāhid and the ghāʾib,’611 he 
declares, and we recall that it is in fact the inherent possibility of a thing’s 
origination (in the ʿAqīda its attributes) which points to its connection with an 
outside cause.612  
The Difference between the Affirmation of the Originator and the 
Proof of God’s Existence 
Al-Juwaynī’s discussion of the Muʿtazilites’ aforementioned criticisms also 
allows us to establish with clarity what the affirmation of the creator for 
creation is all about. One of their points of critique, al-Juwaynī reports, is that al-
Ashʿarī was not successful in presenting ‘the affirmation of the originator’613 
because he denied that humans truly are the creators of their deeds, as 
indicated above. The Muʿtazilite ʿAbd al-Jabbār makes this point very clear 
when he explains regarding ‘the method through which it is known that the 
Eternal (Most-High!) is the originator of an act from among the acts’614:  
If we declare it wrong for the shāhid, then we cannot affirm the creator and 
relate the acts to Him (iḍāfa al-afʿāl ilayhi). Do you not see that it is necessary to 
                                                          
609 Ibid., p. 163. See Kogan’s discussion of al-Ghazālī’s position on ‘the habitual course of things 
in nature’ (1985, p. 137 et seqq.). 
610 See ibid., p. 161 where al-Juwaynī defends the terminology used in the analogy and aims to 
show that it is permissible to ascribe the world to God when represented as a building and a 
writing: ‘If someone were to say: Your mentioning the building and the writing proves that he 
[i.e., al-Ashʿarī- intended to speak about the created things, but the Lord (Most-High!) is 
described as creator (khāliq) and inventor (mubdiʿ) and He is not characterised with the 
building and the writing. This is inattentiveness on the part of the one who asks. The Lord 
(Most-High!) ascribed the building to Himself as an act (fiʿlan) in verses of His book, such as: {by 
the sky and how He built it (banāhā)} [Q. 91.5; translation from Abdel Haleem 2004]. It is hence 
not forbidden to ascribe the building and the writing to God (Most-High!) as creation (khalqan) 
and act (fiʿlan).’ 
611 Ibid., p. 164. 
612 Compare ibid., p. 164: ‘The possible origination needs in view of its possibility a 
particulariser.’ 
613 Ibid., p. 157. 
614 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Majmūʿ, p. 357. 
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affirm one of us as originator of his actions so that the connection (taʿalluq) of 
the origination of the bodies with God (Almighty and Exalted!) can be declared 
correct?615 
It is important to note that ʿAbd al-Jabbār explicitly states that the analogy 
between the shāhid and the ghāʾib serves for nothing else than to affirm God’s 
being the creator of the world; it is not God’s existence which the affirmation of 
the creator denotes. Al-Ashʿarī’s position that humans acquire their power to 
act from God is problematic, according to the Muʿtazilites, since this would 
imply that God is connected with His act in an acquired way, too, but ‘the Lord is 
high above this.’616 God’s connection with His act is in a truly creative way (al-
ikhtirāʿ wa’l-kḥālq) – this being something al-Ashʿarī himself was eager to point 
out as well. Al-Ashʿarī commits the mistake, the Muʿtazilites maintain, that he 
affirms one thing for the shāhid, but wants to affirm another for the ghāʾib, 
hence he cannot use the shāhid as testimony for the ghāʾib. Crucially, however, 
this discussion shows that al-Juwaynī, just like ʿAbd al-Jabbār, presents the 
question of ‘the affirmation of the originator’617 as pertaining to the objective of 
proving God’s role as creator. This involves not only the proof that it is God who 
brought about the world, but also the proof that God is creator in a certain way. 
In al-Juwaynī’s account, the dispute about the success or failure to affirm the 
originator has nothing to do with the question of whether God exists, despite 
claims to the contrary we find in secondary literature.618  
The Existence of the Creator 
In addition to what has become evident about the true purpose of al-Juwaynī’s 
arguments for the creator, it is worth taking into account another discussion in 
his writings as it highlights where certain aspects characteristic of the 
traditional arguments for God’s existence do not match how the mutakallimūn 
approached them. The discussion in question is part of al-Juwaynī’s treatment 
of the divine attributes, which in all three works of his follows the affirmation of 
the knowledge of the creator. In the Irshād we read:  
                                                          
615 Ibid., p. 357. 
616 Al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil (1960-61), p. 157: It is the Muʿtazilites who utter this. 
617 Ibid., p. 157. 
618 Shihadeh (2008, p. 207) believes that the analogy serves to prove God’s existence, rather 
than His being creator. Davidson (1987, p. 159) argues the same. 
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Our method in this treatise is to turn to the affirmation of the knowledge of the 
essential attributes that are affirmed of the creator (al-bāriʾ) (Most-High!), and 
we begin with the reasoning about the affirmation of His existence (thubūt 
wujūdihi). So if someone were to say: You proved previously the knowledge of 
the creator, but how do you refute someone who considers the creator non-
existent (ʿadam)? We would say…619  
In the Shāmil, al-Juwaynī states in a similar fashion: ‘The first (aspect) with 
which the attributes have to be introduced is the clarification of the proofs for 
the existence of the Eternal (wujūd al-qadīm) (Most-High!).’620 For some reason, 
these chapters ‘on the proof of the existence of the Eternal (Most-High!),’621 as 
the heading appears in the Shāmil, have found no mention in secondary 
literature where al-Juwaynī’s – and others’ – alleged arguments for God’s 
existence are discussed.622 In the Shāmil, al-Juwaynī then adds:  
Those who affirm the creator are in agreement about the necessity of His 
existence (wujūb wujūdihi). None of them disputes this except for the bāṭiniyya 
and the heretics. They prohibit the description of the creator with existence and 
non-existence.623 … We will now clarify the favoured paths that lead to the 
knowledge of the existence of the creator (wujūd al-ṣāniʿ).624  
Elsewhere, al-Juwaynī explains the reason why the bāṭiniyya, and even some of 
the ‘philosophers who affirm the creator,’625 avoid speaking of God’s attribute of 
existence. According to al-Juwaynī, ‘they said: If we describe the Lord with 
something belonging to the attributes of the originated things, this means 
likening Him to creation (tashbīh).’626 These passages contain some striking 
points: The question of whether it can be said about the creator of the world – 
                                                          
619 Al-Juwaynī, al-Irshād, p. 30. 
620 Al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil (1969), p. 609.  
621 Ibid., p. 609.  
622 This is to the exception of Saflo (2000, pp. 201-202) who states with reference to the Irshād 
and the discussion of the divine attributes that al-Juwaynī attempts to deny the assumption ‘that 
the creator is non-existent’ (ibid., p. 201). Saflo himself hence allows for a distinction between 
the affirmation of the creator and the question of whether the creator is existent or non-existent, 
yet he nowhere discusses what this means for the claim that the affirmation of the creator is the 
same as the affirmation of the existence of God. 
623 Compare al-Shahrastānī’s Nihāya where he reports about those who deny God His attributes 
(taʿṭīl): ‘Some of the learned people are reported to have said: He is He and we do not call Him 
existent and not non-existent...and this belief is ascribed to the ghāliyya of the Shīʿa and the 
bāṭiniyya’ (ibid., p. 128 (of the Arabic text)). Walker states about the Ismaili conception of God: 
‘He is totally outside of comprehension. We can only say what He is not and also add that He is 
not not. The affirmation of God is outside the realm of negation altogether’ (1947, p. 83). 
624 Al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil (1969), p. 609.  
625 Al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil (1960-61), p. 166. 
626 Ibid., p. 166. Compare Williams 2009, p. 30. 
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that is, God: ‘the Eternal (Most-High!)’627 – that He is existent or non-existent is 
different from the issue of the affirmation of the creator for creation and in fact 
follows it. With regards to the bāṭiniyya and certain philosophers who do affirm 
the creator, but who do not believe that He can be described as existent (nor as 
non-existent), this means that they do affirm that God is creator of the world, 
hence agreeing with al-Juwaynī on the relation between God as choosing, 
willing agent and the world as His act brought into existence from non-
existence, but this affirmation is not the same as the affirmation of God’s 
existence, which is obviously a point of disagreement. For al-Juwaynī, there is 
no doubt that the affirmation of the creator leads to certainty about His being 
(described as) existent. Following the Ashʿarite teachings on what ‘existence’ 
and ‘non-existence’ denote,628 he states that ‘the existent has no other meaning 
than being a thing (shayʾ) and affirmed (thābit). When the opponent 
understands the affirmation of the creator, he understands what we mean by 
existence.’629 Yet, this issue is in fact not that clear-cut, and al-Juwaynī himself 
has his opponent come up with a rather valid objection: The affirmation of 
‘something,’ so to say, does not mean that this ‘something’ is necessarily 
described with existence. Those who follow the theory of states or aḥwāl, first 
introduced by the Muʿtazilite Abū Hāshim b. al-Jubbāʾī (d. 321/933),630 the 
opponent points out, say that ‘they are something affirmed (thābita) but they do 
not describe them with existence.’631 Al-Juwaynī himself actually was an 
adherent of this theory when he wrote the Shāmil,632 and in the Irshād he 
                                                          
627 Al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil (1969), p. 609.  
628 Compare Frank 1980: ‘For the major schools of kalām in its classical period, viz., the 
“orthodox” schools of Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī...and the Moʿtazilite traditions that follow Abū 
Hāshim al-Jobbāʾī...the divergence of doctrine on the question of the non-existent is often 
defined in terms of the question of whether the “non-existent”...is or is not posited as a real, not 
merely mental, object, an entity (“something”: shayʾ) and one finds the Moʿtazila for the most 
part affirming the proposition and the Ashʿarites on the whole...denying it’ (p. 186). 
629 Al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil (1969), p. 610.  
630 See al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya, p. 131 (of the Arabic text), chapter 6 on the states (al-aḥwāl): 
‘Note that the mutakallimūn were in disagreement about the states, denying them and affirming 
them, after Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī originated his theory of them and this question was not heard 
of at all before him.’ See Frank 1971 on Abū Hāshim b. al-Jubbāʾī’s theory of states. 
631 Al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil (1969), p. 610. Compare al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal, p. 67: ‘Thus he ,i.e., 
Abū Hāshim b. al-Jubbāʾī- maintained that there are modes ,i.e., aḥwāl] which are attributes 
neither existing nor non-existing’ and his Nihāya, p. 133 (of the Arabic text): ‘The states are for 
those who affirm them neither existent nor non-existent.’ 
632 Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya, p. 131 (of the Arabic text): ‘The Imām al-Ḥaramayn belonged to 
those who affirmed them first but then denied them.’ 
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likewise speaks of ‘the affirmation of the states,’633 while denying their 
description as being existent or non-existent.634 In the Shāmil, al-Juwaynī seeks 
to avert his opponent’s objection by stating that those who affirm the states do 
in fact not mean that they are affirmed, and they do not regard them as denied 
or non-existent or existent either. Their affirmation simply means ‘the 
knowledge of them.’635 In order to defend his claim that the affirmation of the 
creator must imply that God is described as existent, al-Juwaynī poses that 
‘affirmation, generally taken, means general knowledge of the thing known’636 
and ‘we mean by affirmation knowledge itself.’637 Still, this does not solve al-
Juwaynī’s dilemma, as becomes apparent when we take into consideration what 
he says at the very beginning of the Shāmil about things known and their 
relation to existence.  
In a section entitled ‘What the originatedness of the world points to is 
knowledge (madlūl ḥadath al-ʿālam al-ʿilm),’ 638  al-Juwaynī discusses the 
question of whether the thing proven (madlūl) by a proof (dalīl) for the 
originatedness of the world is the originatedness itself or the knowledge of it. In 
the course of this discussion, he states that proof (dalīl) and thing proven 
(madlūl) are connected (yataʿallaqu) with each other. The one who 
understands the connection between what functions as a dalīl and its madlūl 
necessarily gains knowledge of the madlūl.639 It is therefore that al-Juwaynī 
speaks of ‘the affirmation of the knowledge of the creator,’ not the affirmation of 
the creator, as it is the knowledge of the madlūl (i.e., the creator) one gains 
when understanding its connection with the dalīl (i.e., the created world). Every 
item of knowledge (ʿilm), al-Juwaynī explains, is connected with its object of 
knowledge (maʿlūm).640 Something known can be an existent, a non-existent 
and even, as we have seen in his discussion of the aḥwāl, something which is 
described neither with existence nor with non-existence. This threefold division 
                                                          
633 Al-Juwaynī, al-Irshād, p. 80. 
634 Ibid., p. 80: ‘The state (al-ḥāl) is an attribute for an existent, not described with existence and 
not with non-existence.’ 
635 Al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil (1969), p. 610.  
636 Ibid., p. 610.  
637 Ibid., p. 610.  
638 Al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil (1960-61), pp. 19-21. 
639 Ibid., p. 21. 
640 Ibid., p. 20. 
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applied to the object of knowledge makes clear that the affirmation of the 
knowledge of the creator must be a far cry from what we mean when we speak 
of a traditional proof of God’s existence: The affirmation of the knowledge of the 
creator, which is said to be where God’s existence is proven, says nothing about 
whether the object of this knowledge, namely the creator – God Himself – is 
existent, non-existent or neither. For instance, al-Juwaynī refers to God’s 
knowledge in pre-eternity ‘that the world will exist.’641  The pre-eternal 
knowledge of this is something affirmed, whereas the object of this knowledge 
is something non-existent, as the world is then in the state of non-existence.642  
Returning to the discussion between al-Juwaynī and his opponent, the former 
admits that the same division also applies to the question about the creator. Yet, 
God’s attribute of existence can be established by ruling out the absurdity of His 
being non-existent and His being an attribute for existence (ṣifa wujūd), which 
is the definition of the ḥāl.643 Arguing again on the basis of the Ashʿarite 
teachings on the definition of existence and non-existence, al-Juwaynī reasons 
that non-existence is universal denial (nafī maḥḍ), and something denied in 
every respect cannot possibly be a creator, when this has been established 
previously.644 Al-Juwaynī furthermore presents the following reasoning: The 
originatedness of the world proves God to be its originator, and the nature of 
His act, which is the world, proves His being wise and powerful. These entities 
or maʿānī of power and wisdom subsisting in God prove His existence and 
negate His non-existence ‘because that which is described with non-existence 
and absence cannot be specified with entities (maʿānī) which subsist in it. The 
one who has specification has existence.’645 What is important about this 
argument is that the attribute of existence can only be established for God once 
                                                          
641 Ibid., p. 46. 
642 Ibid., p. 46. 
643 Al-Juwaynī, al-Irshād, p. 80: ‘The ḥāl is an attribute for an existent.’ 
644 See al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil (1969), p. 609. 
645 Ibid., p. 612. Note the very Ashʿarite nature of this argument: The Muʿtazilite ʿAbd al-Jabbār, 
for instance, declares this kind of reasoning invalid. He states that it is not possible to reason 
this way on the basis of God’s being powerful and knowing due to power and knowledge – 
which al-Juwaynī terms maʿānin – which require the existence of their substrate to subsist in it, 
since God is described as such by virtue of His essence, not due to entities subsisting in His 
essence. ‘This is not the case for the Eternal (Most-High!) because He is knowing by virtue of His 
essence (li-dhātihi) and powerful by virtue of His essence, hence His existence is not a necessity 
even if He is knowing and powerful’ (Sharḥ, p. 177). 
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His attributes of knowledge, power and life among others have been affirmed, 
and this in turn depends on showing that God is the creator of the world 
because knowledge of God is gained only on the basis of the nature of His 
acts.646  
‘This is correct,’ al-Juwaynī avers, ’but according to the principles of the 
Muʿtazila it is wrong.’647 Al-Juwaynī evidently aims to excoriate the Muʿtazilite 
teaching that the non-existent is a thing and an essence (shayʾan wa-dhātan) 
and described with certain characteristics (khaṣāʾiṣ),648 which is at odds with 
that of the Ashʿarites. He hence points to what appears as an absurdity to him 
that ‘it is not far from their principles that the creator is non-existent while 
being specified with the attributes of affirmation.’649 What these two attacks 
aim at is of course the defence of God’s essential attribute of existence, this 
being al-Juwaynī’s original aim, since an agent – which God is in His role as 
creator – cannot be anything else than existent. The crucial point for our 
discussion, however, is that, even when the bāṭiniyya refuse to describe God 
with existence and even if the Muʿtazilites had gone so far as to regard God as a 
non-existent, they nevertheless agree on God’s being the creator of the world. 
This shows that the concepts of existence and non-existence as discussed above 
are somewhat different from the existence/non-existence dichotomy we find in 
the classical arguments for God’s existence. According to the latter, the 
conclusion that the world has a cause means nothing else than that this cause – 
God – is existent, and this is in fact what this argument aims for. The option that 
God is proven, while being considered non-existent is simply not part of the 
traditional arguments for God’s existence, nor is it discussed. According to the 
former, however, the conclusion that the world comes from God and that He is 
hence creator does not immediately mean that God is existent. This is even true, 
as we have seen, for an Ashʿarite like al-Juwaynī himself. The notion and use of 
the term ‘existence’ in the traditional arguments for God’s existence hence fails 
                                                          
646 Ibid., p. 611. 
647 Ibid., p. 617.  
648 Al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil (1960-61), p. 34. Compare al-Juwaynī, al-Irshād, p. 31. 
649 Al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil (1969), p. 611. 
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to convey the subtle differences associated with it by the mutakallimūn 
discussed here.650 
 
Conclusions 
The objectives al-Juwaynī pursues in all three works of his we have considered 
here – the Shāmil, the Irshād and the ʿAqīda – are the very same we find 
discussed in kalām works before him: The proof of the originatedness of the 
world seeks to confirm Scripture in its claim that the world is creation, which 
means for a mutakallim like al-Juwaynī that it has a beginning for its existence. 
The proof of the originator for creation intends to establish a number of things: 
Firstly, it affirms the principle of causation for the unobservable realm, which 
means that things entering existence do so due to an outside cause; they do not 
pop into existence uncaused and by chance. Secondly, this is made the basis for 
the defence of the Qurʾānic declaration that it is God who brought about 
creation. God is, for al-Juwaynī, the creator of the world in a particular way: He 
willed it and chose its creation; He did not cause it necessarily, a belief the 
mutakallimūn commonly ascribe to the philosophers and such individuals they 
label the naturalists. God’s being the creator of the world is then made the basis 
for the confirmation of the divine attributes and names Scripture ascribes to 
God. This method rests on the idea that the characteristics of creation point to 
the characteristics of their creator – God. In many respects, al-Juwaynī follows 
into the footsteps of his predecessors, such as when he makes use of the 
concepts of possibility/necessity and particularisation. This is also true where 
he makes the atomistic worldview the basis of the proof that the world has a 
beginning in time. Only in the ʿAqīda, however, does his method to prove this 
doctrine come strikingly close to that of the philosopher Ibn Sīnā. It, therefore, 
seems to be misleading to assume that al-Juwaynī intends to prove God’s 
existence along the lines of the traditional cosmological arguments.    
                                                          
650 In the ʿAqīda, al-Juwaynī does not discuss the question of God’s existence at length as he does 
in the Shāmil and also to some degree in the Irshād. He only points out that ‘the permissibility 
(jawāz) of the existence of the originated things proves the necessity (wujūb) of the existence of 
their creator because the permissible does not come to be due to itself…and the existence of the 
creator is not described with permissibility’ (al-ʿAqīda., p. 24). 
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Chapter Six: Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) 
 
The Tahāfut al-falāsifa 
It is known that al-Ghazālī was a very multifaceted scholar. Some works of his 
reflect his initial training in Ashʿarite kalām, others reveal his later inclination to 
Sufism. Some works of his also make evident the influence the study of 
philosophy had on him.651 One of al-Ghazālī’s earliest works, which he wrote 
when he was still teaching Ashʿarite kalām at the Niẓāmiyya college in Baghdad 
before his first nervous breakdown in 488/1095, is the Tahāfut al-falāsifa. Al-
Ghazālī intended this work – as its title indicates – as a refutation of Aristotle’s 
philosophy as presented in the works and commentaries of al-Fārābī (d. 
339/950) and Ibn Sīnā.652 The Tahāfut is essentially a work of kalām – not of a 
particular school though, as al-Ghazālī himself stresses653 –, which is apparent 
not only in the views defended, but also in the terms and concepts used, as shall 
be seen. 
One of the many criticisms al-Ghazālī presents in the Tahāfut concerns, we are 
told in secondary literature, the proof of God’s existence. The main issue 
dividing philosophers and mutakallimūn, al-Ghazālī states, is the question of 
whether the world is eternal or originated, the latter clearly taking up the view 
that the world has a beginning.654 Al-Ghazālī’s critique of the philosophers 
therefore is, Herbert Davidson argues, that they have no grounds to prove that 
God exists as ‘the existence of God cannot be demonstrated on the assumption 
of the eternity of the world. It can be demonstrated only by those who subscribe 
to the Kalam arguments for creation.’655 Lenn E. Goodman has likewise 
maintained that al-Ghazālī ‘argues extensively...that the eternity of the world is 
                                                          
651 For al-Ghazālī’s life and works see his autobiography al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl (Deliverance 
from Error: An Annotated Translation of al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl and Other Relevant Works of 
al-Ghazālī by Richard Joseph McCarthy (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, [1999])); Griffel 2009, 
chapter 1 on his biography; Frank 1994, pp. 1-3; Hourani 1984, pp. 292-293 on dating his works. 
652 Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut (1927), p. 6 and pp. 8-9. See Griffel 2009, chapter 5 which analyses how 
differing positions in cosmology (issues of creation and causation) gave rise to the Tahāfut. 
653 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
654 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
655 Davidson 1987, p. 370. 
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incompatible with the existence of God’656 and Majid Fakhry holds that, 
according to al-Ghazālī, ‘the Neo-Platonists are unable to prove the existence of 
God’657 as they uphold the eternity of bodies. It appears then that al-Ghazālī 
defends the mutakallimūn’s use of the cosmological argument in order to prove 
the existence of God since ‘creation is the only binding, reasoned proof of God’s 
existence,’658 as Goodman has it. William Lane Craig has gone even further, 
perceiving al-Ghazālī’s criticism as not solely related to the provability of God’s 
existence, but as also pertaining to the charge of atheism: ‘to his mind the thesis 
of an eternal universe was quite simply equivalent to atheism.’659 
The Proof of the Creator Based on the World’s Originatedness 
The critical question is: Where in the Tahāfut is it that al-Ghazālī does say so? 
We will in fact not encounter him speaking of the philosophers’ inability to 
prove ‘the existence of God,’ and it seems that what Davidson, Goodman and 
Fakhry have in mind is al-Ghazālī’s concluding remark in Chapter Ten of the 
Tahāfut that ‘he who does not assume the originatedness of the bodies has no 
ground at all for his assumption of the creator (ṣāniʿ).’660 The reading of this 
statement on the part of the aforementioned three scholars as referring to a 
cosmological argument is not surprising as it resembles its notion that the 
existence of God is proven on the basis of His being the cause of the world. Yet, 
we have previously argued that this is not the mutakallimūn’s objective and 
reasoning, and this is also true for al-Ghazālī: Creation is not meant to prove 
that God exists; rather, the affirmation of the creator seeks to show, firstly, that 
the world, being creation, came to be due to another, following the principle of 
causation; secondly, that it must therefore be linked to God as its cause, just as 
Scripture says; and thirdly, that God is creator in a specific way. In the following 
it shall become clear that in the Tahāfut al-Ghazālī follows the tradition of his 
predecessors who were not concerned with the proof of God’s existence as we 
know it from the cosmological and other arguments. When al-Ghazālī states that 
                                                          
656 Goodman 1971 (II), p. 184.  
657 Fakhry 2004, p. 231. 
658 Goodman 1971 (II), p. 168. 
659 Craig 1980, p. 99. 
660 Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut (1927), p. 209. 
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the creator cannot be affirmed unless on the basis of the world’s originatedness, 
we submit, he intends to say the following: The philosophers fail to show that 
there is a causal connection between God and the world, and they cannot justify 
their calling God creator since they assume the eternity of the world. For al-
Ghazālī, the dispute is not about the reconcilability of the doctrine of an eternal 
world with the issue of the provability of God’s existence; a contradiction arises 
when seeking to ascribe the world to God as His creation, while upholding the 
tenet of an eternal world.  
This becomes clear when we consider a number of chapters from among the 20 
chapters of the Tahāfut. It is the discussion in Chapter Three that gives us a first 
glimpse of what al-Ghazālī intends when he speaks of the contradictoriness of 
an eternal world and the creator. He states that most philosophers maintain 
that ‘there is for the world a creator (ṣāniʿ) and God is the creator of the world 
and its maker (fāʿiluhu).’661 Like the theologians, they also say that the world is 
‘His act and His creation (fiʿluhu wa-ṣanʿuhu).’662 Yet, al-Ghazālī has an issue 
with this statement of theirs which concerns their use of terminology. Their 
calling God ṣāniʿ and fāʿil and the world His fiʿl and ṣanʿ is in contradiction to 
their own principles, which pertains, on the one hand, to the concepts these 
terms convey and, on the other, to the way the philosophers perceive the 
relation between God and the world.663 His intention, al-Ghazālī states, is 
nothing but ‘to reveal that you ,i.e., the philosophers] make up names without 
verification (taḥqīq) of them’664 which means that ‘God is not truly a fāʿil for you 
and the world is not truly His fiʿl.’665  
Why is it then that the philosophers call God falsely, according to al-Ghazālī, an 
agent and the world His act? An agent, he explains, is defined as one who is 
‘willing, choosing and knowing.’666 This definition is of course very reminiscent 
of what certain previous mutakallimūn have said, as we have seen. The 
philosophers’ conception of God, however, comes closer to that of an ʿilla 
                                                          
661 Ibid., p. 95. 
662 Ibid., p. 95. 
663 Ibid., p. 95. 
664 Ibid., p. 109. 
665 Ibid., p. 109. 
666 Ibid., p. 96. 
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causing out of necessity as they deny the divine attributes (as real entities), in 
particular God’s will, which al-Ghazālī considers tantamount to depriving Him 
of these very characteristics.667 The philosophers’ affirmation that the world 
exists due to God is hence not enough in al-Ghazālī’s eyes to call God an agent or 
creator: ‘The agent is not called fāʿil and ṣāniʿ because he is a cause (sabab), 
only, rather because he is a cause in a specific way, namely due to will and 
choice.’668 Similarly, the philosophers are mistaken in labelling the world God’s 
act since the term fiʿl conveys a certain concept which is incompatible with their 
belief in the world’s eternity. Fiʿl, al-Ghazālī states, is an expression for 
origination (al-iḥdāth). Origination means a thing’s coming into existence from 
non-existence.669 It follows with regards to the eternal world that ‘existence 
which is not preceded by non-existence, rather which is eternal (dāʾim), is not 
the act of the agent.’670 If God’s relation to the world is like that between ʿilla 
and maʿlūl, God cannot be called ṣāniʿ and the world His fiʿl.671  
This discussion gives us an idea why al-Ghazālī maintains that the belief in an 
eternal world cannot possibly be compatible with the belief in the ṣāniʿ: They 
represent two mutually exclusive notions. Furthermore, it should be noted that 
the relation between God and an eternal world, if characterised as that between 
ʿilla and maʿlūl (as opposed to the one discussed above), does, in principal, not 
pose a logical problem for al-Ghazālī. He states that he does not dispute the 
eternal coexistence of ʿilla and maʿlūl – this being the philosophers’ view on God 
and the world – as God’s eternal knowledge is the ʿilla of His being knowing in 
eternity. What he disputes is the use of the terms fiʿl for the maʿlūl.672 
Goodman’s statement that ‘[h]e explicitly affirms his willingness to part with 
the conception that God exists if it can be shown that the world has not come to 
be’673 seems to overlook the aforementioned. This shows that the interpretation 
                                                          
667 Ibid., p. 96: ‘God (Most-High!) is not willing according to you as He has no attribute at all, and 
what comes from Him does so necessarily.’ Also ibid., pp. 96-97: ‘According to you, the world 
comes from God like the maʿlūl from the ʿilla in the manner of necessary causation.’  
668 Ibid., p. 97. 
669 Ibid., p. 103. 
670 Ibid., p. 106. 
671 See Fakhry (2004, p. 231) on al-Ghazālī’s critique of the philosophers’ use of terminology in 
Chapter Three of the Tahāfut. 
672 Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut (1927), p. 108. 
673 Goodman 1971 (II), p. 184. 
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of al-Ghazālī’s aforecited statement at the end of Chapter Ten as saying that 
God’s existence can only be proven when the world is affirmed to be originated 
misses the point. It is God’s attribute of being creator which requires the 
premise of a created world, and this is where the philosophers fail. Davidson 
leaves this aspect of terminology, which hints at al-Ghazālī’s objectives, 
unmentioned.674 
Yet, there is more to al-Ghazālī’s remark. He not only stresses the philosophers’ 
incoherence with regards to terminology. He also emphasises that they cannot 
even maintain their claim that there is any relation between God and the world. 
In Chapter Four, al-Ghazālī states that two views exist about the world, which 
both make sense.675 The first is that of ‘the people of the truth (ahl al-ḥaqq)’676 
who regard the world as something originated (ḥādith) with a beginning, the 
origination of which is due to an originator or creator (ṣāniʿ). This is of course 
the standard kalām view on this matter: Things enter existence due to an 
outside cause, not by chance or due to themselves. The other view is, al-Ghazālī 
explains, that the world is eternal (qadīm) and does not depend for its existence 
on an originator.677 Both views unsurprisingly seem reasonable to al-Ghazālī, 
even though he himself of course does not subscribe to the latter, as they are in 
line with what he had expounded upon earlier with regards to the relation 
between agent and act. The philosophers, however, hold a third view which is 
completely incomprehensible: They believe that the world is eternal, but they 
nevertheless want to ascribe it in terms of its existence to an originator.678 We 
have seen how the mere terminology used has to be a thorn in al-Ghazālī’s eye, 
and he hence has his opponents throw in that in this context ṣāniʿ does not 
stand for ‘an agent (fāʿil) who is choosing and acts after not having acted,’ 
rather ‘we mean the ʿilla.’679 The issue at stake therefore becomes whether the 
                                                          
674 Interestingly, Davidson does acknowledge elsewhere (1987, pp. 2-3) that the (alleged) 
proofs of God’s existence presented by theologians and philosophers respectively also involve 
different concepts of God, but he fails to see that certain discussions between them are hence 
concerned with God’s nature as cause only (such as in the Tahāfut), where His existence is of no 
concern. 
675 Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut (1927), p. 133. 
676 Ibid., p. 133. 
677 Ibid., p. 133. 
678 Ibid., pp. 133-134. 
679 Ibid., p. 134. 
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eternal world depends on God who caused it necessarily, not willingly. Al-
Ghazālī has his opponents argue, in a manner reminiscent of Ibn Sīnā,680 that an 
infinite regress of causes is impossible and that the world, despite its eternity, 
owes its existence to another who is described as ʿilla.681 In his endeavour to 
invalidate the philosophers’ conception of the relation between God and the 
world (note that al-Ghazālī states in his introduction that he wants to show that 
the world is God’s act (fiʿl)!682), he now attacks the crucial tenet of the 
impossibility of an infinite causal chain. Al-Ghazālī’s strategy is to show that the 
philosophers cannot defend this tenet, so that their belief in an eternal world 
and their claim that it is due to another become irreconcilable. His aim is to 
refute the possibility that God and the world could stand to each other like ʿilla 
and maʿlūl – a belief on the part of the philosophers which is completely 
contrary to the theologians’ understanding of the Qurʾānic pronouncements on 
this. Al-Ghazālī then concludes this discussion by stating that the philosophers 
fail to prove that the whole series of causes, being essentially possible, cannot in 
its entirety be necessary, based on their own principle that an aggregate of 
originated events, that is, of effects, can be eternal.683 It must follow, according 
to al-Ghazālī, that the philosophers cannot maintain their claim that the world is 
eternal and nevertheless God’s product, be it as His fiʿl or His maʿlūl. We have 
seen that it escaped Goodman, Davidson and Fakhry that this is the point al-
Ghazālī want to make.684 
Interestingly, Chapter Ten, where the statement about the necessity of affirming 
the createdness of bodies for the assumption of the creator is made, discusses 
essentially the same issue. Al-Ghazālī states that it is correct to assume that 
                                                          
680 See, for example, Ibn Sīnā, Dānish-nāma, chapter 16, p. 45. 
681 Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut (1927), pp. 134-135. 
682 Ibid., p. 13. 
683 Ibid., p. 139. 
684 Arabic editions of the Tahāfut as well as translations of it usually provide a heading for each 
of its 20 chapters. For Chapter Four, Bouyges’ Arabic edition (1927) gives ‘fī bayān ʿajzihim ʿan 
al-istidlāl ʿalā wujūd al-ṣāniʿ li’l-ʿālam’ and ‘…ʿalā ithbāt al-ṣāniʿ li’l-ʿālam.’ Kamali’s translation 
(1963) offers the title ‘To show their inability to prove the existence of the creator of the world.’ 
It should be noted that both versions in the Arabic edition are taken from manuscripts of Ibn 
Rushd’s Tahāfut al-Tahāfut where he quotes al-Ghazālī, which can be inferred from footnotes 
mentioning the manuscripts (p. 133, IV f. 4 and pp. XXI-XXII). Al-Ghazālī himself names Chapter 
Four in his own list of contents as ‘fī taʿjīzihim ʿan (min) ithbāt al-ṣāniʿ.’ The mention of 
‘existence/wujūd’ with reference to the creator is hence missing in al-Ghazālī, and it in fact 
reflects Ibn Rushd’s choice of terminology, as will be seen.    
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something originated exists due to a ṣāniʿ or ʿilla, but he asks how the 
philosophers come to assume that the eternal bodies of the world are also due 
to such an ʿilla. They could say like the dahriyya, he maintains, that the matter685 
these bodies are made of is eternal and without cause and that it is only the 
forms and accidents (al-ṣuwar wa’l-aʿrāḍ) which originate in time. He has the 
philosophers reply that these eternal bodies in the world cannot be necessarily 
existent as they, being composed, carry the signs of making in them. This shows 
that the world, even though eternal, depends on an outside cause, which is the 
issue at stake here. Al-Ghazālī counters them, arguing that he has shown 
previously that they are not able to justify their claim that something corporeal 
cannot be necessary in itself and independent of a cause for its existence. 
Furthermore, he states the only thing that can be proven by rational 
demonstration is – but the philosophers failed again – that an infinite regress is 
impossible. Yet, this does not constitute a problem for the dahriyya’s claim that 
the bodies of the world are eternal and uncaused in their existence: All causal 
series terminate in the endless rotary motion of the spheres of the heavens 
which are without cause. On the contrary, it constitutes a problem for the 
philosophers as they have no grounds for their assumption of an eternal, yet 
caused world. According to Kamali’s translation, al-Ghazālī concludes: ‘So he 
who reflects over the points we have mentioned will see the inability of all 
those who believe in the eternity of bodies to claim that they have a cause. 
These people are in consistency bound to accept Materialism [al-ilhād] and 
Atheism [al-dahr].’686 Kamali’s rendering of al-dahr as atheism – with which he 
is not alone687 – is just as misplaced as Davidson, Goodman and Fakhry’s 
reading of al-Ghazālī’s statement that only the assertion of the createdness of 
the bodies justifies asserting the creator as referring to a proof of God’s 
existence. Firstly, with regards to the term al-dahr and the group referred to as 
                                                          
685 Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut (1927), p. 206: ‘The bodies, which are the heavens, which are eternal, 
and the four elements (al-ʿanāṣir al-arbaʿa), which are the stuff (ḥashw) of the sphere of the 
moon, and their bodies and their matter (mawāduha) are eternal.’ 
686 Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut (1963), p. 141. 
687 Wisnovsky speaks of ‘atheist Materialists (dahriyya), who believed in the eternity of the 
world’ (2004, p. 69). Goodman states: ‘It is against the Peripatetics’ seeming unwillingness to 
assign concrete implications to the existence of God that Ghazālī’s rancor toward eternalism and 
his charges of atheism are directed’ (1971 (I), p. 68). Najjar has: ‘Al-Dahriyah. In the Arabic 
sources, this term refers to an undetermined group of naturalists and materialists who denied 
the existence of God’ (2001, p. 38, f. 57). 
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dahriyya, we have encountered them several times in the works of theologians 
before al-Ghazālī. The unanimous picture that emerged is that their equation 
with atheists who deny that there is a divine being, as Kamali’s translation 
suggest, is not tenable. They rather represent the view that the matter of the 
world exists independent of a cause, which poses a problem for philosophers as 
well as mutakallimūn.688 Secondly, the mention of atheism in this context 
completely misses the point. Al-Ghazālī intends to show, in ways not different 
from his treatment in Chapter Four, that the only way for the philosophers to 
maintain that the world in its eternity is God’s creation is to show that the 
bodies of the world do not exist necessarily and uncaused, yet they fail in this 
endeavour. Consequentially, they fail to prove the creator, whether this is 
understood as the concept of the ṣāniʿ and fāʿil or that of the ʿilla. Al-Ghazālī, the 
mutakallim, accuses the philosophers of being inconsistent when they describe 
the connection between the world and God as characterised by eternal 
coexistence, while at the same time claiming to adhere to the Qurʾānic 
descriptions of God as creator and the world as creation. With this endeavour of 
his, al-Ghazālī does not differ at all from the many theologians of various 
affiliations who came before him.689 The concepts of the ṣāniʿ, the fāʿil and the 
ʿilla he employs are exactly the same his teacher al-Juwaynī and before him al-
Bāqillānī already expounded upon when they attempted to show that God is to 
be called the creator of the world. The objective al-Ghazālī pursues in his 
discussion about the affirmation of the creator does not differ either from what 
we find in kalām works written before al-Ghazālī’s time, such as in ʿAbd al-
Jabbār’s Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa, as well as after him, for instance in al-
Malāḥimī’s (d. 536/1141) al-Muʿtamad fī uṣūl al-dīn. Both authors speak in this 
context unmistakably about ‘the proofs that He (Most-High!) is the creator of 
the world’690 as well as that ‘there is no proof to be found in reason and 
revelation that the originator of the world...is something other than God (Most-
                                                          
688 See Stroumsa 1999. 
689 Clayton rightly states that the theologians’ ‘over-riding concern…was by means of rational 
argument to protect the Qurʾanic doctrine of God as creator and sustainer of all that is,’ yet he 
nevertheless assumes that the proof of God as creator was part of the argument for God’s 
existence which he believes to be based upon the ḥudūth argument which ‘,the theologians- 
were favourably disposed toward’ (1987, p. 10). 
690 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Sharḥ, p. 151. 
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High!)..., rather revelation proves that He (Most-High!) is the originator...for the 
world.’691  
The Iqtiṣād fī al-iʿtiqād and the Risāla qudsiyya 
Shortly after al-Ghazālī finished the Tahāfut in 1095 and around the time of his 
first crisis in the same year, he completed another work of kalām, al-Iqtiṣād fī 
al-iʿtiqād.692 Al-Ghazālī himself describes al-Iqtiṣād as an exposition of the 
fundamental doctrines of the Muslim belief and their defence against heretical 
objections. The same can be said of al-Risāla al-qudsiyya, another manual of 
kalām expounding upon Islam’s basic tenets, which al-Ghazālī describes in very 
similar terms.693 Al-Risāla, which became part of one of al-Ghazālī’s most 
famous works, Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn, was written shortly after al-Iqtiṣād694 and 
both works resemble each other in a number of respects, as will be seen.  
God’s Existence and the Affirmation of the Creator 
There is something noticeable about the Iqtiṣād and the Risāla, not only when 
compared to al-Ghazālī’s previous work, the Tahāfut, but also in comparison to 
the works of the mutakallimūn before him we considered previously, when it 
comes to the sections which concern the affirmation of the creator. What is 
striking about the Iqtiṣād and the Risāla is that the ‘existence’ of the creator and 
the proof thereof is mentioned explicitly by al-Ghazālī. This is not encountered 
in the works of other mutakallimūn before al-Ghazālī. To name but a few, al-
Ashʿarī asked in his Kitāb al-Lumaʿ ‘What is the proof that there is a creator for 
creation…?’ 695  Al-Bāqillānī argued in his Kitāb al-Tamhīd that ‘for this 
originated, formed world there must be an originator, a former’696 and al-
Māturīdī spoke of ‘the proof that the world has an originator’697 in his Kitāb al-
Tawḥīd. None of them mentioned the ‘existence’ of the originator, much less 
God’s existence in this context. The same is true for al-Juwaynī who in his Kitāb 
                                                          
691 Al-Malāḥimī, al-Muʿtamad, p. 184. 
692 See Hourani 1984, p. 293 and Griffel 2009, p. 35 on its dating. 
693 See Frank 1994, pp. 30-31 for an analysis of traditionally Ashʿarite elements in the Iqtiṣād 
and instances where al-Ghazālī seems to somewhat diverge from this school in other works.  
694 See Hourani 1994, p. 295 and Griffel 2009, p. 45. 
695 Al-Ashʿarī, al-Lumaʿ, p. 17. 
696 Al-Bāqillānī, al-Tamhīd, p. 23. 
697 Al-Māturīdī, al-Tawḥīd, p. 17. 
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al-Irshād and in al-ʿAqīda al-niẓāmiyya sought to make known ‘the method 
which leads to the knowledge of the creator.’698 In sharp contrast to these 
theologians, al-Ghazālī does speak, in the first introduction of the Iqtiṣād, of the 
endeavour ‘to establish the proof of the existence of the Lord (wujūd al-rabb) 
(Most-High!)’699 as one of the aims of the science of kalām and he makes the 
proof of ‘the existence of the creator’700 the first point of his enquiry about God. 
Likewise, in the Risāla, the first task al-Ghazālī undertakes with regards to God 
is to establish ‘the knowledge of the existence of God.’701  
The method al-Ghazālī employs to prove this is the same in the Iqtiṣād and the 
Risāla and it is very reminiscent of the method used by earlier mutakallimūn to 
affirm the creator on the basis of the world’s originatedness. Al-Ghazālī reasons, 
presenting the argument in the form of a syllogism, 702  that ‘the world 
necessarily has a cause (sabab)’ based upon the two premises that ‘every 
originated thing has a cause for its origination’ and that ‘the world is 
originated.’703 Yet, despite this similarity between al-Ghazālī’s reasoning and 
the reasoning we find in the works of the aforementioned mutakallimūn, it 
seems that the former has a different objective in mind than the latter who 
sought to prove God’s role as creator, not His existence. This is not the only 
aspect distinguishing al-Ghazālī’s reasoning from the arguments employed by 
his predecessors. We recall that in the works of his predecessors, God’s being 
creator involved that He is the cause of the world in a specific way. Whether 
                                                          
698 Al-Juwaynī, al-Irshād, p. 27. See also al-ʿAqīda, p. 20. 
699 Al-Ghazālī, al-Iqtiṣād, p. 8. 
700 Ibid., p. 34. 
701 Al-Ghazālī, al-Risāla, p. 382. 
702 See Ulrich Rudolph’s “Die Neubewertung der Logik durch al-Ġazālī” (in Perler and Rudolph 
2005, pp. 73-97) for al-Ghazālī’s views on logic and, particularly, the syllogism; especially p. 90 
for the syllogism employed to prove the originatedness of the world. 
703 Al-Ghazālī, al-Iqtiṣād, p. 24. See also the Risāla, p. 384: ‘In view of its origination, the 
originated thing needs a cause (sabab) which originates it, and the world is originated, hence it 
needs a cause in view of its origination.’ In the Iqtiṣād, al-Ghazālī defends both premises thus 
(similarly in the Risāla): The major premise is defended in the manner of al-Juwaynī: A thing’s 
existence before its origination is possible (mumkin), not necessary (wājib), nor impossible 
(muḥāl). The cause (sabab) tips the scales in favour of existence. The minor premise is 
defended on the basis of the old kalām argument that bodies are never free from accidents (i.e., 
motion and rest), which are originated in time, and what is not free from the originated is itself 
originated. Al-Ghazālī’s syllogism follows hence very much the tradition of previous 
mutakallimūn. See Goodman 1971 (I), in particular pp. 73-75, on the details of al-Ghazālī’s 
argument.    
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these mutakallimūn called God ṣāniʿ,704 muḥdith705 or muṣawwir,706 the crucial 
point was that these terms represented a single concept, namely that of the fāʿil 
or agent who is endowed with will, knowledge and power. In the Tahāfut, al-
Ghazālī himself had gone to great lengths to stress this very point against the 
philosophers’ conception of God. His word choice in the aforementioned 
syllogism in both the Iqtiṣād and the Risāla is therefore rather astonishing: He 
does not conclude that the world has an originator or the like, rather its having 
a sabab must be affirmed. The mutakallimūn before al-Ghazālī would not have 
opted for this term to describe God in His role as creator. Just like the ʿilla, the 
sabab denotes something which produces its effect necessarily, not due to will, 
and this term would hence have been completely at odds with the 
mutakallimūn’s conception of God as a willing agent. Al-Bāqillānī, for instance, 
used this term in his refutation of the view that nature could have been the 
cause that brought about the world. Nature is here described as a sabab and the 
world as its musabbab, being necessitated by it (mūjaba ʿanhā).707 This concept 
was evidently still associated with the term sabab after al-Ghazālī’s death. The 
Muʿtazilite al-Malāḥimī, who died 30 years after al-Ghazālī, makes a clear 
distinction between ‘an influence coming from one who acts (muʾaththir) 
according to choice (ikhtiyār), and this is the act (al-fiʿl)’ and ‘an influence from 
one who acts necessarily (mūjib), and this is…the musabbab of the sabab.’708 He 
then states that it is his endeavour to clarify that ‘God’s essence is not one which 
necessitates (mūjib), so that it would be…a sabab.’709 In the context of God’s 
description as cause of the world, the term sabab is in fact very reminiscent of 
the terminology used by such philosophers as Ibn Sīnā who equated the sabab 
with the ʿilla.710 This is in accordance with how al-Malāḥimī uses both terms.711 
In view of all this, and given that al-Ghazālī portrays God in both the Iqtiṣād and 
the Risāla in typical kalām manner as one who has the attributes of power, 
                                                          
704 Al-Juwaynī, al-Irshād, p. 23. 
705 Al-Māturīdī, al-Tawḥīd, p. 17.  
706 Al-Bāqillānī, al-Tamhīd, p. 23. 
707 Ibid., pp. 34-35 and p. 38.  
708 Al-Malāḥimī, al-Muʿtamad, p. 83. 
709 Ibid., p. 83. 
710 See Craig 1980, p. 114, f. 35. 
711 Al-Malāḥimī, al-Muʿtamad, p. 83: The influence of the necessitating cause is ‘the ḥukm of the 
ʿilla or the musabbab of the sabab’ and God’s essence is not ‘like an ʿilla or a sabab.’ 
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knowledge and will,712 it seems rather surprising that he would opt for the term 
sabab. It is only later in the Iqtiṣād that al-Ghazālī adds, without much 
explanation, that ‘by the sabab we mean nothing other than the murajjiḥ,’713 
who represents ‘one who gives preponderance to the existence (of what 
originated) over (its) non-existence so that non-existence changes into 
existence.’714 In the Risāla, he equates the sabab with the muḥdith and the 
mukhaṣṣiṣ who particularises the time of a thing’s coming into existence, but 
again without much explanation.715 These terms are employed by earlier 
mutakallimūn, and al-Ghazālī also follows in their footsteps by making use of 
the argument from particularisation. At the same time, the term murajjiḥ is in 
fact borrowed from Ibn Sīnā.716 However, it should not be forgotten that al-
Ghazālī did seemingly distance himself not only from the occasionalistic 
worldview of his Ashʿarite predecessors,717 but also from their rather strict and 
determined terminology which is reflected in his calling God the ‘musabbib al-
asbāb.’718 What all this indicates, and what can further be confirmed when one 
examines the whole of al-Ghazālī’s discussions surrounding his syllogism, is that 
he, unlike his predecessors, did not see the need of engaging in a lengthy and 
detailed exposition of which term applies to God in His role as the cause of the 
world and which term does not. This fact, taken together with the 
aforementioned fact that al-Ghazālī explicitly speaks of the proof of God’s 
existence, might indicate that we witness a change in the discourse during al-
Ghazālī’s lifetime. His predecessors’ focus on establishing on the basis of the 
originatedness of the world that God is nothing else than its ṣāniʿ seems to have 
                                                          
712 Al-Ghazālī, al-Iqtiṣād, p. 79: ‘The second section on the attributes...we assume that He is 
powerful, knowing...willing’ and al-Risāla, p. 382: ‘The second section on His attributes...the 
knowledge of His being knowing, powerful, willing.’ 
713 Al-Ghazālī, al-Iqtiṣād, p. 26. 
714 Ibid., p. 25.  
715 Al-Ghazālī, al-Risāla, p. 385 and p. 386. 
716 See Frank 1994, p. 34 and Griffel 2009, p. 170 on this term. Interestingly, al-Malāḥimī uses 
the term ‘murajjiḥ’ in the same sense as al-Ghazālī (al-Muʿtamad, p. 168).   
717 See Frank 1994, pp. 36-39 and Frank 1992, p. 18 on al-Ghazālī’s distancing himself from 
certain aspects of classical Ashʿarite occasionalism and his adoption of concepts and 
terminology closer to Ibn Sīnā. See also Abrahamov 1988 on al-Ghazālī’s theory of causality. See 
Griffel 2009, chapter 6 who shows that al-Ghazālī accepts causality in nature, which is at odds 
with classical Ashʿarite occasionalism, but he rejects the necessity of any causal relation 
advocated by Ibn Sīnā. 
718 Al-Ghazālī, al-Risāla, p. 275: ‘Al-tawḥīd means that one regards all things as coming from the 
musabbib al-asbāb (i.e., the one who makes the causes function as causes).’ 
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shifted in al-Ghazālī, it appears, and he now uses the same premise in order to 
prove something else, namely the existence of the godhead.  
In secondary literature, at least, we encounter the view that al-Ghazālī’s 
aforecited syllogism in the Iqtiṣād and the Risāla is a clear case of a traditional 
argument for God’s existence. Davidson identifies al-Ghazālī’s argument in the 
Risāla as ‘the proof from creation, the proof that first establishes the creation of 
the world and then infers the existence of a creator.’719 Richard M. Frank 
likewise states concerning ‘the proof given in Iqtiṣād’ that it is an argument for 
‘the existence of God’ following the traditional method ‘based on bodies and 
accidents.’720 Frank Griffel ascribes ‘versions of ,the- (argument for God’s 
existence based on the principle of particularization)’721 to al-Ghazālī in his 
Risāla. Let us therefore investigate whether the aforementioned shift in 
discourse, as it were, really took place as it appears from al-Ghazālī’s works. 
Was the endeavour to prove God’s role as creator been replaced by the attempt 
to prove His existence?  
In order to attempt an answer to this question, we shall take into consideration 
the works written by two contemporaries of al-Ghazālī. Their treatment of the 
much debated issue of the affirmation of the creator can help shed light on the 
meaning and purpose of al-Ghazālī’s dubious reference to the proof of the 
existence of God. The first text we will investigate is Abū al-Qāsim al-Anṣārī’s al-
Ghunya fī al-kalām. Al-Anṣārī was, like al-Ghazālī, a disciple of al-Juwaynī and he 
died only a few years after al-Ghazālī in the year 511/1118. The other one is a 
work by Abū al-Muʿīn al-Nasafī entitled Tabṣirat al-adilla fī uṣūl al-dīn. Al-Nasafī 
belonged to the Maturidite school of kalām and died in 507/1114. 
Al-Anṣārī – Continuation or Change of the Discourse? 
It is immediately apparent that al-Anṣārī’s al-Ghunya is a traditional kalām 
work and that he very much follows in the footsteps of his teacher al-Juwaynī, 
whom he cites repeatedly. Al-Anṣārī uses the premise of the originatedness of 
                                                          
719 Davidson 1987, p. 227. 
720 Frank 1994, p. 72. See also Frank 1992, p. 29: ‘In the beginning of al-Iqtiṣād, where he wishes 
to prove the existence of the Creator as the cause (sabab) of the existence of the universe…’  
721 Griffel 2009, p. 170. 
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the world, which he defends against ‘the view of many early ones that the world 
has always been as it is now,’722 as the foundation of ‘the affirmation of the 
knowledge of the creator (ithbāt al-ʿilm bi’l-ṣāniʿ).’723 Al-Anṣārī’s reasoning is 
essentially the same as that of his teacher: All originated things are only 
possible (jāʾiz, mumkin) in terms of existence and non-existence and with 
regards to the time of their coming to be. If they enter existence, rather than 
remaining non-existent, this points to ‘(their) need for a particulariser 
(mukhaṣṣiṣ)’ 724  and ‘one who necessitates (muqtaḍin) one aspect of 
possibility.’725 Al-Anṣārī then turns to a discussion whether this muqtaḍī could 
be ‘something that necessitates (mūjib) like the ʿilla and nature (al-ṭabʿ),’726 
where cause and effect coexist. Both options are of course rejected and the 
conclusion is reached that the muqtaḍī is ‘an agent who brings into existence 
(fāʿil mūjid), as the ahl al-ḥaqq say’727 and who is ‘one who chooses, (being) 
living, knowing and powerful.’728  
When we compare al-Anṣārī’s discussion surrounding the affirmation of the 
creator with al-Ghazālī’s we immediately notice differences. There is no talk of 
the existence of the creator, much less of God. Instead, we find that al-Anṣārī 
focuses on ascertaining the nature of the cause of the existence of the world, 
and he refers to the very three alternatives – the fāʿil, the ʿilla and nature – 
which we know from previous kalām works. In fact, the only instance where al-
Anṣārī is concerned with God’s existence and the proof thereof is in the section 
on ‘what is necessary for God in terms of the attributes’729 where he confirms 
the tenet that ‘God is (an) existent (Allāh mawjūd).’730 Again, this section is very 
reminiscent of al-Juwaynī’s chapter on ‘the proofs for the existence of the 
Eternal (Most-High!)’731 as both theologians are concerned with affirming that 
God has to be called an existent. Similar to his teacher’s concern in the Shāmil, 
                                                          
722 Al-Anṣārī, al-Ghunya, p. 316. 
723 Ibid., p. 333. 
724 Ibid., p. 333. 
725 Ibid., p. 337. 
726 Ibid., p. 338. 
727 Ibid., p. 338. 
728 Ibid., p. 338. 
729 Ibid., p. 347. 
730 Ibid., p. 345. 
731 Al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil (1969), p. 609. 
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al-Anṣārī first and foremost has in mind to point out the absurd consequences 
of the belief held by some Muʿtazilites that the non-existent is something real 
described with ‘the attributes of affirmation and...specific attributes’732: It forces 
them to assume ‘a non-existent creator.’733  It does not require further 
explanation that this debate surrounding God’s being an existent in al-Anṣārī 
has nothing to do with the traditional proof of God’s existence.  
With regards to our initial question whether it might be possible that al-
Ghazālī’s approach to the affirmation of the creator – or rather the existence of 
God, as he has it – bears witness to a fundamental, broader change in the 
discourse among theologians, it can be inferred from al-Anṣārī’s discussion of 
these questions that this is not the case. For all the points discussed by al-Anṣārī 
we can find instances in earlier theological writings. It therefore remains to be 
seen whether al-Nasafī’s treatment of this question reveals any fundamental 
changes. 
Al-Nasafī – Continuation or Change of the Discourse? 
An examination of the relevant passages in al-Nasafī in fact reveals that there 
exists a rather conspicuous similarity between his discussion surrounding the 
affirmation of the creator and al-Ghazālī’s. Even though the section affirming 
that the world has an originator (muḥdith) follows, as it is tradition, the 
affirmation of the originatedness of the world, al-Nasafī does not show much 
concern with the question of whether the cause of the world is an ʿilla, a nature, 
a fāʿil or the like. The concept of the originator, which is involves the notions of 
will and choice, is not expounded upon by al-Nasafī. The only instance where he 
discusses whether the cause of the world could be an ʿilla is in the section on the 
originatedness of the world, not on the affirmation of the creator. There he 
refutes the belief in an eternal world based on the conception of God as ʿilla, 
which necessitates the co-existence of its effect. The aim of this discussion is, 
                                                          
732 Al-Anṣārī, al-Ghunya, p. 348. 
733 Ibid., p. 348. 
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however, not to show that God is not an ʿilla, but that it is false to assume that 
the world is eternal.734  
A greater similarity also exists between al-Nasafī and al-Ghazālī than between 
al-Anṣārī and the latter in that he does speak of ‘a proof for the existence of a 
creator for them’735 in the context of the affirmation of the creator. He does not 
speak of God’s existence though. He, for instance, draws the famous analogy 
between the world and its originator and a building and its builder. The world, 
like the building, can be existent or non-existent and ‘its particularisation 
(ikhtiṣāṣuhu) with this state [i.e., existence] will not take place unless due to the 
particularisation of a particulariser, and this proves the existence of the builder 
for every building we observe in this world.’736 Al-Nasafī’s argument – the 
argument invoking a thing’s particularisation (ikhtiṣāṣ) – is not new; his 
mentioning ‘existence’ in this context, however, is. Nevertheless, it appears that 
al-Nasafī seeks to establish the same in this section as all theologians before him, 
namely that the world could not have come into existence without another who 
is its originator. He hence says that one has to be declared ignorant when one 
‘allows for the existence of it by chance without a creator’737 and that the 
assumption that ‘it originated itself’738 is likewise absurd.  
Even though al-Nasafī’s argument might look like a traditional argument for 
God’s existence, there are hints that can be discerned to suggest that his 
affirmation of the creator serves a different purpose. In the chapter on the 
affirmation of the divine attributes, al-Nasafī states: ‘If it has been established 
that He is the maker (mukhtariʿ) of this world with its different kinds and that 
He is the creator (khāliq) of it as it is in terms of the characteristics…then it has 
been established that He is living, powerful (and) knowing.’739 Al-Nasafī here 
describes the gist of the affirmation of the creator in exactly the same terms as 
his predecessors: It has been shown that God is the one who brought about the 
world.  
                                                          
734 Al-Nasafī, Tabṣirat, p. 97. 
735 Ibid., p. 107. 
736 Ibid., p. 105. 
737 Ibid., p. 105. 
738 Ibid., p. 105. 
739 Ibid., p. 246. 
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Furthermore, another passage provides greater clarity regarding the question 
of what al-Nasafī means when he speaks of the existence of the creator. In a 
later section where al-Nasafī is concerned with the refutation of the 
anthropomorphists or the mujassima, he presents their argument that God 
must be a body since ‘He is living, hearing, seeing and an agent, and every living, 
hearing and seeing one and every agent in the shāhid is a body, and it is 
impossible to describe what is not a body with these attributes, and what is 
impossible for the shāhid is also impossible for the ghāʾib.’740 To regard God as a 
body is of course a belief the majority of theologians, and likewise philosophers, 
rejected.741 This is also true for al-Nasafī and he hence states that in the view of 
the ahl al-ḥaqq this doctrine leads to a number of absurdities, namely ‘the belief 
in the eternity of the world or the originatedness of the creator (al-bāriʾ) (Most-
High!) and the non-existence of the creator (ʿadam al-ṣāniʿ) for the world.’742 If 
it is true that al-Nasafī’s reference to the ‘proof of the existence of a creator for 
them’743 denotes his attempt at proving God’s existence in the traditional sense, 
then it must be the case that his aforementioned reference to ‘the non-existence 
of the creator’ implies that there is no God. Al-Nasafī’s reasoning is the 
following:744 If God were a body, He would have a specific shape, such as being 
round or a triangle. If He were of a particular shape to the exclusion of all others, 
then this would either be due to the particularisation of a particulariser or not. 
In the first case, this would imply that God is originated because He is receptive 
to the influence of another. This is an absurdity as it leads to an infinite regress 
of originators. This is what al-Nasafī means when he says that the belief in God’s 
being a body leads to ‘the originatedness of the creator.’ On the other hand, if 
God’s having a particular shape was not due to the particularisation by another, 
it follows, al-Nasafī states, that this must also hold true for the world. The 
world’s having a particular shape cannot longer be used as ‘proof for its 
                                                          
740 Ibid., p. 160. 
741 Al-Shahrastānī reports: ‘The ahl al-ḥaqq uphold that God...is not an atom (jawhar), nor a 
body (jism), nor an accident (ʿaraḍ). He is not in a place, not in time, not receptive to accidents 
and not a substrate for originated events. ... But the mughīriyya, the bayāniyya, the hāshimiyya 
and those who followed them believed that the godhead has a form like humans’ (Nihāya, p. 103 
(of the Arabic text)). See Williams 2009 on the question of anthropomorphism.  
742 Al-Nasafī, Tabṣirat, p. 161. 
743 Ibid., p. 107. 
744 Al-Nasafī, Tabṣirat, pp. 161-163. 
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originatedness and its need for an originator who brought it about.’745 It is 
therefore that al-Nasafī concludes that the belief in God’s being a body leads to 
‘the belief in the eternity of the world and the taʿṭīl of the creator’746 or, as he 
phrased it earlier, ‘the non-existence of the creator for the world.’ Crucially, 
what this discussion makes clear is that ‘the non-existence of the creator for the 
world’ does not denote God’s non-existence or the denial of a divine being 
altogether. After all, the assumption of the non-existence of the creator follows 
from the claim that God is a body – how could it, therefore, refer to God’s non-
existence? Rather, al-Nasafī simply expresses the old idea, characteristic of the 
mutakallimūn, that an eternal world is a world independent of another. It, hence, 
follows in analogy that, when al-Nasafī speaks of ‘the existence of a creator’ for 
the originated world, he does not mean anything else than that the world is due 
to another.  
The above provides important insights germane to the initial quest to 
understand whether al-Ghazālī’s mention of God’s existence in connection with 
his syllogism points to a change of the theological discourse on the proof of the 
creator. It became clear that al-Nasafī, even though speaking, similarly to al-
Ghazālī, of the creator’s existence in his affirmation of the originator, is far from 
seeking to prove God’s existence. Neither al-Nasafī, nor al-Anṣārī, being al-
Ghazālī’s contemporaries, hence indicates that such a fundamental change of 
the discourse occurred and it appears that the mutakallimūn continued to be 
concerned with the proof that the world is creation and God its creator, just as 
Scripture states.747 In view of this, we might pose the question of whether it is 
not possible and indeed likely that al-Ghazālī is concerned with the same 
questions which have nothing to do with a cosmological or other proof for God’s 
existence? This is in fact what we will argue.  
  
                                                          
745 Ibid., p. 162. 
746 Ibid., p. 163. 
747 The differences between al-Anṣārī’s treatment of the proof of the creator, on the one hand, 
and al-Nasafī and al-Ghazālī’s, on the other, of course represent certain changes that took place 
in Ashʿarite kalām and which led scholars, such as Ayman Shihdeh, to distinguish between 
‘classical Ashʿarism’ and ‘neo-Ashʿarism,’ taking shape post-al-Juwaynī and around the time of 
al-Ghazālī under the influence of Avicennan philosophy. Shihadeh mentions al-Anṣārī among the 
classical Ashʿarites, and al-Nasafī among the neo-Ashʿarites (2012, p. 434).    
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The Meaning of ‘God’s Existence’ 
There is something striking about the place where al-Ghazālī’s discussion and 
proof of God’s existence appear in both the Iqtiṣād and the Risāla: It is the first 
point of the investigation of God’s essence (dhāt). In the Risāla, al-Ghazālī 
repeatedly describes the purpose of the science of kalām as to make known ‘the 
essence of God and His attributes.’748 ‘The investigation of God’s essence and His 
attributes’749 is something kalām and the metaphysical branch of philosophy 
(al-ilāhiyyāt) have in common, according to al-Ghazālī. In the Iqtiṣād, al-Ghazālī 
likewise undertakes the investigation of God’s essence, followed by the 
investigation of His attributes.750 Yet, it is striking that in the introduction he 
substitutes the term ‘essence’ for ‘existence’ when he states that ‘the aim of this 
science is to establish the proof for the existence of the Lord (Most-High!) and 
His attributes.’751 How does this fit together? It appears less perplexing when 
we bear in mind that in Ashʿarite kalām – this being the kalām of the Iqtiṣād and 
the Risāla –, but even according to some mutakallimūn of other affiliations, ‘the 
existence of the thing is its essence.’752 When speaking of the existence of an 
atom, for instance, what is meant is that it has extension in space, and this is its 
essence.753 In the case of God, this is not different and ‘His existence is nothing 
other than His specific essence.’754 This allows us to conclude that, when al-
Ghazālī speaks of the investigation of God’s essence or existence respectively, 
which denote for him the same thing, he refers to the question about the kind of 
                                                          
748 Al-Ghazālī, al-Risāla, p. 54. Similarly ibid., p. 381: ‘...the two words of the shahāda include the 
affirmation of the essence (dhāt) of the godhead and the affirmation of His attributes.’  
749 Ibid., p. 85. 
750 Al-Ghazālī, al-Iqtiṣād, p. 24 and p. 79: ‘The first section on speculation about the essence of 
God (Most-High!) containing ten points’ and ‘The second section on the attributes containing 
seven points.’ 
751 Ibid., p. 8. 
752 Al-Malāḥimī, al-Muʿtamad, p. 254. Al-Malāḥimī reports that the Muʿtazilites Abū Isḥāq al-
Naṣībī and Abū al-Ḥusayn also held this view. Rather than seeing al-Ghazālī’s equation of dhāt 
and wujūd in this context as reflective of the view held by the Ashʿarite mutakallimūn, 
Abrahamov supposes that it ‘echo,es- Ibn Sīnā’s thesis that states, unlike created beings, in God 
there is no difference between essence and existence’ (2002, p. 207). This seems unconvincing 
since for the Ashʿarites, essence and existence are the same even in created beings, unlike for 
Ibn Sīnā.   
753 Al-Malāḥimī, al-Muʿtamad, p. 256: ‘The existence of the atom is its essence.’ Compare the 
discussion whether the atom’s being extended in space (mutaḥayyiz) and having volume (ḥajm) 
is different from its existence or the same (ibid., p. 254). 
754 Ibid., p. 329. 
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God’s existence/essence, that is: Which existence/essence is characteristic of 
God?  
In the Iqtiṣād, al-Ghazālī states that all existents comprise God, on the one hand, 
and the world, on the other, which denotes bodies and their accidents. All 
existents are divided into spatial ones (mutaḥayyiz) and non-spatial ones 
(ghayr mutaḥayyiz). The former division includes atoms and bodies, while the 
latter comprises accidents, which inhere in bodies, and God, who is self-
subsisting. 755  This division basically illustrates the four kinds of 
existence/essences Ashʿarite kalām proposes. The issue with God’s specific 
existence or essence is, according to al-Ghazālī, however, the following: ‘As for 
the existent which is not a body, nor a spatial atom, nor an accident, it is not 
perceived through observation, but we maintain its existence and that the 
world is existent through it and its power, and this is conceived through 
proof.’ 756  What al-Ghazālī means to say is not that God’s existence as 
understood in the traditional arguments requires proof to be known of, but that 
God’s specific existence, which is completely different from everything observed 
in this world (i.e., atoms, bodies and accidents), requires proof as it cannot be 
determined by the senses – why should God’s existence, one could ask, be 
different from the existents surrounding us? Furthermore, it should not be 
overlooked that al-Ghazālī here establishes a link between his syllogism757 and 
the aforementioned declaration that ‘the world is existent through it’: He states 
that the latter is known through proof, and ‘the proof is what we mentioned, so 
let us investigate it,’758 which refers to nothing else than the syllogism. All these 
objectives of al-Ghazālī – that is, to show that the world comes from God and 
that God has a specific essence/existence which is different from creation – are 
exactly the same as those we encountered in the works of theologians and 
philosophers before him. We recall that Ibn Sīnā, for instance, spoke of the proof 
of God’s existence in the sense of establishing that God’s specific existence is 
                                                          
755 Al-Ghazālī, al-Iqtiṣād, p. 24. 
756 Ibid., p. 25. 
757 Ibid., p. 24: ‘every originated thing has a cause for its origination’; ‘the world is originated’; 
therefore, ‘the world necessarily has a cause.’ 
758 Ibid., p. 25. 
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different from that of a body or accident.759 Theologians such as al-Bāqillānī 
were eager to stress that ‘the creator of the originated things cannot resemble 
them...neither in genus (jins) nor in form (ṣūra).’760 
Now that it has become clear what the investigation and proof of God’s essence 
or existence refer to, it might seem somewhat puzzling that al-Ghazālī mentions 
the proof of ‘His existence’ as one, specifically the first, of ten points constituting 
this broader investigation of the divine essence (see Appendix, Figure 4). Yet, 
we should once more bear in mind that the Ashʿarite equation of essence and 
existence, which al-Ghazālī evidently upholds, was not an uncontested matter. 
The Muʿtazilite al-Malāḥimī, who shares with al-Ghazālī the tenet that essence 
and existence are the same, reports on the following dispute taking place among 
the mutakallimūn concerning the question of how existence relates to essence 
in God: Some mutakallimūn maintained that ‘the existence of the thing is its 
essence’ and they said: ‘When we prove that there is for the world an originator, 
then we have also proven that He is an essence... It has hence been proven that 
He (Most-High!) is an existent.’761 Other mutakallimūn, al-Malāḥimī reports, 
disagreed on this:  
When the followers of Abū Hāshim assumed that the non-existent is an essence 
in the state of its non-existence...and that existence is an attribute in addition to 
(zāʾida ʿalā) the essence762...they allowed with that after the affirmation of the 
creator for the world who is powerful and knowing...that he is non-existent. 
Hence they need to prove that He (Most-High!) is an existent.763  
The first position clearly reflects al-Ghazālī’s own view on this matter and al-
Ghazālī’s method to prove ‘His existence’ is indeed the one described by al-
                                                          
759 See Chapter Four on Ibn Sīnā. 
760 Al-Bāqillānī, al-Tamhīd, p. 23. 
761 Al-Malāḥimī, al-Muʿtamad, p. 261. 
762 With regards to the proper translation of the expression that existence is zāʾid ʿalā the 
essence see Morewedge 1972 who discusses it with reference to Ibn Sīnā. He suggest: ‘Instead 
of saying, “existence is an addition to an essence”, we should say that the justification of the 
existence of an instance of an essence requires more than the mere conceptual analysis of that 
essence’ (ibid., p. 432, f. 35). This phrasing is better, he argues, because ‘,t-he order in which 
essence and existence are arranged as being “prior” or “posterior” to each other is a problem 
that is not encountered in Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy.’ While this might be true for Ibn Sīnā, we 
should bear in mind that from the perspective of those, like al-Malāḥimī, who upheld that 
essence and existence are the same, the Muʿtazilite view implied that God’s creative act only 
consisted in giving the eternal non-existent essences existence. From their perspective it 
therefore makes sense to speak of existence being an attribute (or a description) added to the 
essence which contains already all other attributes of a thing. 
763 Ibid., pp. 261-262. 
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Malāḥimī which has God’s being the cause (sabab) of the world as its starting 
point.  
Al-Malāḥimī’s report on this debate also sheds light on another significant 
aspect of al-Ghazālī’s mentioning God’s existence in the section discussing the 
divine essence. Unlike Abū Hāshim b. al-Jubbāʾī and his followers, al-Ghazālī did 
not maintain that existence is an attribute in addition to the essence, as such 
attributes as power and knowledge are, which he consequently discusses in the 
section on the divine attributes. To include God’s existence in the section on His 
essence is hence also a clear statement on the part of al-Ghazālī which marks his 
position in a debate with a long history.764 The same concern becomes apparent 
where al-Ghazālī includes God’s being eternal (qadīm) and enduring (bāqin) as 
the second and third points of his discussion of His essence.765 The relation 
between God’s essence and His endurance was a debated matter just like the 
relation between His essence and His existence, as we know.766    
Furthermore, al-Ghazālī’s emphasis of God’s existence as the first point of the 
investigation of His essence might also have been directed at those groups like 
the bāṭiniyya whose refusal to call God an existent was frequently criticised by 
theologians before al-Ghazālī, as we have seen. It is known that al-Ghazālī had 
dedicated himself to the study of their doctrines just after he wrote the Tahāfut 
and he produced a work by the title Faḍāʾiḥ al-bāṭiniyya (The Infamities of the 
Bāṭiniyya) in refutation of them just before the Iqtiṣād and the Risāla.767 In this 
work, he also reports on their view that God – or more precisely: one of the two 
gods they believe in, according to al-Ghazālī – ‘is described neither by existence 
nor by non-existence’ and ‘they maintain that all the names are to be denied of 
Him.’768  
                                                          
764 We recall, as mentioned previously, that al-Ashʿarī already reports on this debate in his 
Maqālāt al-islāmiyyīn (al-juzʾ al-awwal, p. 250): ‘His essence is He...and He is existent not due to 
(the maʿnā of) existence.’ See Wisnovsky 2000, pp. 182-200 for the discussion surrounding the 
terms mawjūd and shayʾ in early kalām. 
765 Al-Ghazālī, al-Iqtiṣād, p. 35: ‘Do not think that eternity (al-qidam) is a maʿnā in addition to 
the essence of the eternal.’ 
766 Al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt al-islāmiyyīn, al-juzʾ al-awwal, p. 250: ‘The followers of Ibn Kullāb 
disagreed whether God is eternal due to (the maʿnā of) eternity or not.’ 
767 Hourani 1984, p. 293 and Goldziher 1916. 
768 Al-Ghazālī, Faḍāʾiḥ, p. 39. 
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Lastly, the emphasis placed by al-Ghazālī on the equation of God’s essence with 
existence might also appear in answer to those who maintained that ‘the 
existents are divided into three: accidents, atoms and bodies, and no existent is 
conceivable which is outside these divisions,’769 as al-Nasafī reports on those 
who upheld God’s corporeality. Al-Ghazālī reports on the same view that some 
maintained regarding God: ‘If He is an agent and an existent…then He is not free 
from the six directions because no existent is known which is not such.’770 Al-
Nasafī replies to those who uphold God’s corporeality and who seek to declare 
God’s otherness from creation absurd by arguing that this would imply ‘His 
non-existence’771 the following: ‘The existent’s being body or accident or atom 
are aspects after (its) mere existence (maʿānin warāʾ muṭlaq al-wujūd) and 
belong to the signs of originatedness, not existence. Therefore, the denial of 
originatedness does not mean the denial of existence.’772 The aim of the whole 
discussion in al-Nasafī is to establish that ‘He is an existent (but) unlike the 
(other) existents’773 with the emphasis that ‘there is no equal to Him, even if He 
is an existent.’774 In al-Ghazālī’s Iqtiṣād, we find a very similar discussion, 
emphasising the point that upholding God’s otherness from created existents 
does not entail His not being an existent. In answer to the question of how God 
can be seen in the hereafter, al-Ghazālī states that this question is absurd as the 
interrogative ‘how (kayfa)’ demands a comparison with something known, but 
‘what he asks about is not like anything we know.’775 Al-Ghazālī admonishes the 
notion that this does not imply ‘the non-existence of the essence of God (Most-
High!).’776 Rather, it must be concluded that ‘His essence is an eternal essence 
and nothing is like it.’777 This discussion makes clear that, while al-Ghazālī 
himself maintains that essence and existence are the same thing, he also takes 
into account to stress that God and creation’s being counted among the entirety 
                                                          
769 Al-Nasafī, Tabṣirat, p. 161. 
770 Al-Ghazālī, al-Iqtiṣād, p. 63. 
771 Al-Nasafī, Tabṣirat, p. 161: ‘...then no way to affirm Him remains and His not belonging to 
these (three) divisions [i.e., atom, body, accident] means His non-existence.’ See also ibid., p. 
168: ‘If He (Most-High!) is not accident, nor atom, nor body, He is described with non-existence.’ 
772 Ibid., p. 170. 
773 Ibid., p. 196. 
774 Ibid., p. 206. 
775 Al-Ghazālī, al-Iqtiṣād, p. 123. 
776 Ibid., p. 123. 
777 Ibid., p. 124. Note the similarity between al-Ghazālī’s expression ‘laysa ka-mithlihā shayʾ’ and 
Q. 42.11 ‘laysa ka-mithlihi shayʾ’. 
 
 
164 
 
of existents does not entail any similarity between God’s specific existence and 
the originated existence of atoms, bodies and accidents. In the Risāla, al-Ghazālī 
likewise stresses that ‘He is known, thanks to reason, in terms of existence 
when it comes to His essence’778 while emphasising that ‘He does not resemble 
an(other) existent and no existent resembles Him – nothing is like Him [i.e., Q. 
42.11-.’779 
Conclusions 
That al-Ghazālī was concerned with the proof of God’s existence, more precisely 
in the form of a cosmological argument, seems, at first glance, out of question. 
Does he not himself speak, in the Iqtiṣād and the Risāla, of the proof of God’s 
existence as part of what the science of kalām seeks to establish? And does he 
not himself infer the existence of the creator from the previously affirmed 
origination of the world? A second glance, however, teaches us better. Whether 
al-Ghazālī speaks of the proof of God’s existence or the proof of God’s essence, 
alongside the proof of His attributes, this sort of position is replicated in 
Ashʿarite kalām where essence and existence are posited as one and the same 
thing. It is al-Ghazālī’s stated aim to show, on the basis of rational proofs, that 
God’s specific existence (essence) is different from the kinds of existence 
(essences) of created things, that is, accidents, atoms and bodies. This 
endeavour of al-Ghazālī’s is directed against those who assumed, invoking the 
analogy between the shāhid and the ghāʾib, that God must be corporeal. 
Furthermore, al-Ghazālī’s stressing that God is an existent is in response to 
those groups like the bāṭiniyya who objected to applying the names of created 
beings to God. Lastly, by including His existence in the discussion of God’s 
essence, al-Ghazālī makes clear his standpoint on how certain attributes, 
including His being eternal, knowing or indeed an existent, relate in different 
ways to the divine essence. What all this shows is that al-Ghazālī’s proof of 
God’s existence has nothing to do with the concern of traditional arguments for 
                                                          
778 Al-Ghazālī, al-Risāla, p. 333. 
779 Ibid., p. 332. Note that the beginning of al-Ghazālī’s Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn (i.e., al-aṣl al-awwal fī al-
dhāt and al-aṣl al-thānī fī al-taqdīs, pp. 7-8), where he expounds upon God’s otherness from 
creation while stressing His being a mawjūd, contains the exact same wording as the beginning 
of the Risāla/the Kitāb qawāʾid al-ʿaqāʾid of the Iḥyāʾ (i.e., al-tawḥīd and al-tanzīh, pp. 331-333).     
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God’s existence. It is rather the case that al-Ghazālī’s treatment of these 
questions poses a continuation of the issues long discussed in kalām and even in 
philosophy. Therefore, while it is true that in some matters, such as the use of 
terminology appropriate to describe God the creator, al-Ghazālī’s focus shifted 
somewhat, he nevertheless follows the same method as his predecessors to 
establish God’s nature by linking Him to the world in an agent-act relationship. 
Ultimately, it is al-Ghazālī’s aim to defend on rational grounds what Scripture 
says – more precisely: the way he understands Scripture – about God and His 
relation to the world.  
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Chapter Seven: Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198) 
 
The Kashf ʿan manāhij al-adilla 
It is evident that Ibn Rushd’s Kashf, even though written by a philosopher, 
comes much closer to the genre of kalām works.780 This is manifest in the 
structure and arrangement of its chapters, the topics and problems it discusses 
as well as the language and terminology it uses. Ibn Rushd presents his 
discussions pertaining to God divided in four sections, and his approach is more 
reminiscent of the mutakallimūn’s approach to their investigation of God and 
related questions than that to be found in the works of the philosophers. The 
Kashf’s first section is entitled ‘on the essence,’ followed – rather unsurprisingly 
– by a section on the seven divine attributes, then a section on God’s 
transcendence and otherness from creation (al-tanzīh) and finally a section on 
His acts. Ibn Rushd’s approach does not seem so surprising when bearing in 
mind that the Kashf is intended as a critique of the mutakallimūn, in particular 
the Ashʿarites, whom Ibn Rushd repeatedly charges with engaging in 
speculative discussions which are not based on sound arguments and with 
exerting a bad influence on the common people.781 Besides pointing to flaws in 
their arguments, Ibn Rushd also sets forth his own position in these matters and 
how they should be presented to the common people. 
The Affirmation of the Creator 
It is then also not surprising that Ibn Rushd should begin his remarks on God 
with ‘the affirmation of the creator (ithbāt al-ṣāniʿ),’782 which, as we recall, was 
also the starting point for the mutakallimūn’s investigation of God’s nature after 
having shown that the world has a beginning for its existence and was hence 
caused by another, that is, by none but God. In Ibn Rushd’s Kashf, however, the 
question about the originatedness of the world (ḥudūth al-ʿālam) follows the 
affirmation of the creator, to be precise in the fourth section dealing with God’s 
acts, and is not made its foundation. The reason for this is, of course, well-
                                                          
780 Kukkonen characterises it as ‘a work of rational theology’ (2002, p. 406). 
781 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 103 and p. 107. 
782 Ibid., p. 101. 
 
 
167 
 
known: Ibn Rushd, the philosopher, does not share the mutakallimūn’s 
understanding of the Qurʾānic account of creation as denoting its past-finiteness. 
He holds, inspired by the position of such philosophers as Aristotle and Ibn Sīnā, 
that the world is co-eternal with and through God. Even though Ibn Rushd 
makes use of the same terminology as the mutakallimūn, such as when he 
describes the world as being ‘created by God (maṣnūʿ li’llāh),’783 he gives it a 
different meaning, which he indicates in the Kashf784 and more fully expounds 
upon in his Faṣl al-maqāl and the Tahāfut al-tahāfut,785 written in the same year 
as the Kashf,786 as shall become clear. This then explains why Ibn Rushd would 
not follow the mutakallimūn in their approach of making the originatedness of 
the world – in particular in their understanding of the term ḥudūth which Ibn 
Rushd clearly contrasts with the notion of maṣnūʿ or being produced in the 
Kashf – the basis of the affirmation of the creator. Ibn Rushd’s position prevents 
him from arguing in the way the Muʿtazilite ʿAbd al-Jabbār, for instance, did that 
‘the first knowledge of God is the knowledge that these originated things 
(ḥawādith), that is, the bodies, colours and so on, are in need of some 
originator,’787 and it is in fact this very reasoning to which Ibn Rushd draws 
attention when castigating the mutakallimūn.788 Nevertheless, it shall be seen 
that Ibn Rushd essentially follows the same idea as the mutakallimūn when he 
bases the knowledge about God on His role as creator of the world – which, 
however, involves a different understanding of the terminology involved: It is 
not the temporal aspect of creation maintained by the mutakallimūn which 
points to the creator. He, thus, states that the starting point of all theological 
                                                          
783 Ibid., p. 161. 
784 In the Kashf, Ibn Rushd states that the notion of creation ex nihilo and outside time is not 
conceivable for the common people and that Revelation values terminology more easily 
accessible over revealing the true mode of creation (ibid., pp. 171-172). 
785 In his Faṣl al-maqāl, Ibn Rushd states that bodies (e.g., water, air) come about in time. The 
whole world is existent due to another (i.e., God), but it is not preceded by time as time 
accompanies motion and bodies. It is neither really originated, nor really eternal. The 
philosophers stress more its resemblance to the eternal and hence call it eternal, while the 
theologians emphasise more its originated aspect and hence call it originated (ibid., pp. 55-56). 
See Leaman 1988, pp. 42-45 and Kogan 1985, pp. 205-207 on Ibn Rushd’s rejection of the 
theologians’ notion of a temporal beginning of the world as a whole and his insistence that the 
world is, in one sense, eternal and, in another, originated.  
786 Urvoy dates all three works to the years 575/1179-80 (1991, p. 71). 
787 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Majmūʿ, p. 68. 
788 See Ibn Rushd’s critique of the Ashʿarites’ method to affirm the creator (al-Kashf, p. 103 et 
seqq.). 
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enquiry about God is ‘the knowledge of the method which leads to the existence 
of the creator (wujūd al-ṣāniʿ), as this is the first knowledge which the believer 
(al-mukallaf) has to have.’789 But what does this method entail? Different 
groups of Muslims have, according to Ibn Rushd, argued different things. The 
arch-traditionalists or ḥashwiyyya, as Ibn Rushd refers to them, maintain that 
‘revelation, not reason’ is the prescribed way to knowledge of God, but Ibn 
Rushd argues that ‘this group does not understand the intention of Scripture’ 
which urges people to revert to ‘rational proofs.’790 The Sufis who believe that 
‘knowledge of God and other existents is something cast in the soul’ are met 
with the same criticism on the part of Ibn Rushd who holds against them that 
revelation ‘calls to speculation and reasoning.’791 Ibn Rushd furthermore 
compares the Sufi’s method with that employed by the mutakallimūn in that 
their arguments are not suitable for the masses and rather produce more 
uncertainties.792 It is hence only the mutakallimūn’s insistence on the principle 
of reasoning vis-à-vis questions of a theological nature on which Ibn Rushd 
agrees with them.  
In any case, the position to be found in secondary literature is that what Ibn 
Rushd intends to say at the outset of the section on the affirmation of the 
creator is that all theological enquiry about God has to start with the proof of 
God’s existence.793 After all, does not Ibn Rushd clearly say that it is the 
existence of the creator which has to be known first? The arguments Ibn Rushd 
presents ‘with which Revelation has called all people, despite their different 
natures, to affirm the existence of the creator (al-iqrār bi-wujūd al-bāriʾ)’794 
have been studied and discussed extensively.795 It is well known that Ibn Rushd 
singles out two methods in particular in the Kashf, which he calls the dalīl al-
ʿināya and the dalīl al-ikhtirāʿ and which he believes to be the arguments 
                                                          
789 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 101. 
790 Ibid., pp. 101-102. 
791 Ibid., p. 117. 
792 Ibid., p. 107 and p. 117. 
793 Kukkonen states: ‘the book is a work of rational theology… As is the norm in such works, the 
first chapter deals with the existence of God. Averroes takes this to be equivalent to the task of 
proving the existence of a creator’ (2002, p. 406). Fakhry writes: ‘,The Kashf] opens with a 
chapter on the demonstration of God’s existence’ (Fakhry’s introduction in Najjar 2001, p. 4).  
794 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 118. 
795 See for instance Kukkonen 2002; Najjar 1996, pp. 204-207; Davidson 1987, pp. 229-231; 
Nirenstein 1924, pp. 440-441. 
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favoured by Scripture itself. The dalīl al-ʿināya takes its starting point from the 
notion of providence found in this world, as its name indicates. It rests on two 
principles, one of which entails that ‘all existents in this world are beneficial for 
the existence of humans’ and the other that ‘this benefit necessarily comes from 
an agent who intended and willed it.’796 The dalīl al-ikhtirāʿ, in turn, invokes the 
notion of the createdness of all existents. It, too, rest on two principles which 
are that ‘these existents are created,’ an item of knowledge Ibn Rushd 
interestingly considers to be self-evident (maʿrūf bi-nafsihi), and that 
‘everything created has a creator.’ It then follows from these two principles that 
‘the existent has an agent who created it.’797 
The view to be found in secondary literature is, as alluded to, that ‘Averroes 
proposes two...proofs for the existence of God, that of providence and that of 
invention,’798 to cite Majid Fakhry’s words. Taneli Kukkonen has argued that, 
more precisely, ‘the substance of both arguments put forward in the Kitāb al-
kashf is teleological’799 and that they exhibit the characteristics of ‘an argument 
from design.’800 Anke von Kügelgen has suggested that ‘,d-er erste Gottesbeweis, 
den Ibn Rušd in al Kašf unter Heranziehung von Koranversen aufstellt, der 
Providenzbeweis (dalīl al-ʿināya), ist ein teleologischer Gottesbeweis, ein 
Beweis aus der Zweckmäßigkeit…in der Welt… Der zweite Gottesbeweis, der 
der “substantiellen Schöpfung” (dalīl al-iḫtirāʿ), ist ein vereinfachter, mit dem 
ersten Argument verzahnter kosmologischer Beweis.’801 Ibn Rushd’s two proofs 
are hence of a nature distinct from the traditional ‘cosmological arguments of 
                                                          
796 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 118. Note that Ibn Rushd does not actually state the conclusion which 
follows from both principles, which would be that these existents are due to an agent. 
797 Ibid., pp. 118-119. 
798 Fakhry’s introduction in Najjar 2001, p. 6. 
799 Kukkonen 2002, p. 408. See also Davidson 1987, p. 229: ‘Another writer who makes use of 
teleological reasoning is Averroes’ and Fakhry 1986, p. 9: ‘Ibn Rushd opted for a version of the 
teleological argument.’ 
800 Kukkonen 2001, p. 405. 
801 Von Kügelgen 1994, p. 403. See also Daiber 1975 who briefly refers to Ibn Rushd: ‘Auch Ibn 
Rušd benutzt den teleologischen Gottesbeweis (neben dem kosmologischen): Die 
Zweckmäßigkeit der Natur beweist für ihn die Existenz der göttlichen Vorsehung’ (p. 160). 
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Ibn Sīnā and the theologians in general,’802 as Fakhry stresses, whose evaluation 
is shared by Kukkonen.803    
In the section on ‘the affirmation of the creator,’ Ibn Rushd not only speaks of 
‘the proofs for the existence of the creator (which) are confined to these two 
kinds, that is, the proofs from providence and the proofs from creation’804; he 
also mentions ‘the existence of God,’ even though less often than the former 
phrase. The existence of God is mentioned where Ibn Rushd refers to the 
ḥashwiyya who ‘say that the method to know the existence of God (wujūd Allāh) 
is revelation’ and for whom ‘belief (īmān) in His existence…is enough,’ without 
the requirement of proof.805 It is also with a view to ‘the existence of God’ that 
Ibn Rushd condemns the arch-traditionalists’ approach as being inconsistent 
with that intended by Scripture.806 ‘The existence of God’ is once more 
mentioned in relation to the Ashʿarite position that reason (al-ʿaql) is the sole 
basis of its affirmation.807 Lastly, Ibn Rushd speaks of God’s existence near the 
end of the section on the affirmation of the creator, after having presented the 
two – as he sees it – Qurʾānic methods which he describes as ‘the straight path 
by which God called the people to knowledge of His existence.’808  
Besides his mentioning the existence of the creator and of God respectively, we 
also encounter in a few places the more general ‘knowledge of God.’ As part of 
his debate about the appropriate method leading to the affirmation of the 
creator, Ibn Rushd states that ‘the famous methods of the Ashʿarites to arrive at 
knowledge of God (maʿrifa Allāh) are not based on speculation and not 
certain’809 and that ‘it is hence necessary that this is not made the principle for 
knowledge of God.’810 Rather, ‘the method (leading) to knowledge of God,’ that 
                                                          
802 Fakhry 1986, p. 10. 
803 Kukkonen states: ‘In the modern classification of the proofs for God’s existence, all this puts 
us more in mind of a teleological argument than any cosmological proof’ (2001, p. 408). 
Davidson does speak with regards to Ibn Rushd’s two proofs of cosmological arguments, but in 
a ‘simplified’ form and not without stressing their teleological nature (1987, p. 229). 
804 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 122. 
805 Ibid., p. 101. 
806 Ibid., p. 102. 
807 Ibid., p. 103. 
808 Ibid., p. 121. 
809 Ibid., p. 116. 
810 Ibid., p. 107. 
 
 
171 
 
is, the Qurʾānic method, ‘is much clearer’ than theirs.811 With regards to the 
Sufis’ method of attaining ‘knowledge of God (al-maʿrifa bi’llāh),’ Ibn Rushd 
deems it, as we have seen above, not suitable for the common people.812    
Despite this variety of formulations employed by Ibn Rushd, it is hardly 
surprising that in secondary literature ‘the existence of the creator’ and ‘the 
existence of God’ are regarded to denote the same thing.813 This also applies to 
his use of the phrase that the world ‘has a creator,’ which likewise appears in a 
number of instances in the section in question.814 The reason for this lies, of 
course, in the interpretation of Ibn Rushd’s proofs as teleological arguments 
which means that the ‘,p-roof of the existence of God ,is- undertaken by stating 
the necessity of the existence of a creator,’815 in Dominique Urvoy’s words. The 
unquestioned equation of these phrases has let scholars on Ibn Rushd to state 
that, in certain instances, he speaks of the proof of God’s existence when he 
himself in fact makes mention of the existence of the creator. This is the case in 
Fakhry’s introduction to Najjar’s translation of the Kashf. There, Fakhry refers 
to Ibn Rushd’s criticism of al-Juwaynī’s proof that the world has a creator based 
on the notion of possibility (jawāz).816 Fakhry correctly describes Ibn Rushd’s 
position as being that the Ashʿarites’ denial of arrangement (or design) in 
creation and of causality in nature poses a repudiation of God’s wisdom 
apparent in creation; yet, Fakhry fails to do justice to Ibn Rushd’s intention 
when he has him conclude that the Ashʿarites are hence ‘unable in fact to offer a 
coherent proof of God’s existence.’817 A glance at Ibn Rushd’s own words, 
however, reveals that ‘the existence of God’ which the Ashʿarites allegedly fail to 
prove is absent. What Ibn Rushd says is that ‘he who denies the existence of 
                                                          
811 Ibid., p. 107. 
812 Ibid., p. 117. 
813 Urvoy, for instance, speaks of the ‘Proof of the existence of God’ (1991, p. 71) and ‘the idea of 
Providence which he used in his proof of the existence of God’ (p. 75), and describes Ibn Rushd’s 
method as the ‘inference from the existence of created things of the existence of a Creator’ (p. 
72).  
814 Najjar, for instance, translates Ibn Rushd’s ‘wa-ammā mithāl al-dahriyya, fī hādhā, al-ladhīna 
jaḥadū al-ṣāniʿ subḥānahu...’ as ‘As for the materialists, those who deny the existence of the 
Almighty Artisan...’ (2001, p. 38) and comments on the term al-dahriyya that ‘,i-n the Arabic 
sources, this term refers to an undetermined group of naturalists and materialists who denied 
the existence of God’ (p. 38, f. 57).  
815 Urvoy 1991, p. 71. 
816 See Fakhry’s introduction in Najjar 2001, p. 9 on Ibn Rushd’s criticism of this argument. 
817 Ibid., p. 6. 
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arrangement of effects and causes in this world also denies the wise creator (al-
ṣāniʿ al-ḥakīm).’818 Furthermore, he adds that ‘the belief in possibility (jawāz) 
comes closer to pointing to the denial of the creator than to pointing to his 
existence.’819 According to Ibn Rushd himself, it is not the existence of God 
which the Ashʿarites fail to prove, but that the world comes from a ‘wise creator,’ 
and this is tantamount to ‘the denial of the creator’ or ‘his existence.’  
Any accusation of pettiness for pointing out the difference between the 
expression used by Ibn Rushd and that ascribed to him by Fakhry would, 
however, only be warranted if there really was no difference in their meaning 
and use in Ibn Rushd, and in particular if all these formulations ultimately 
denoted nothing else than the traditional proof for God’s existence. The 
importance of being accurate about their meaning and use is hence ultimately a 
prerequisite for understanding what it is that Ibn Rushd discusses. This 
problem can be clarified on the example of the expressions ‘the existence of the 
creator’ and ‘has a creator,’ which are understood to be used in the same way by 
Ibn Rushd, namely to denote an argument for God’s existence.820 We recall Ibn 
Rushd’s statement that ‘the existence of the creator’ is ‘the first knowledge 
which the believer has to acquire.’ This appears to be in line with statements we 
encounter in the writings of other mutakallimūn – with the only difference that 
they did not speak of the existence of the creator. ʿAbd al-Jabbār stated before 
Ibn Rushd in his Majmūʿ that ‘the first knowledge of God is the knowledge that 
the bodies have an originator.’821 We also recall that ʿAbd al-Jabbār and his 
fellow mutakallimūn did not mean by the world’s having an originator what the 
                                                          
818 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 167. 
819 Ibid., p. 169. 
820 There is a great number of instances in the Kashf where Ibn Rushd uses the expression ‘has a 
creator’ in connection with what is considered his proof of God’s/the creator’s existence. For 
example, in his description of the dalīl al-ikhtirāʿ Ibn Rushd states: ‘This method rests on two 
principles… Firstly, these existents are created… We see inanimate bodies, then life appears in 
them, and we know that there is one who brings about life (mūjidan li’l-ḥayāt)… Secondly, every 
created thing has a creator (lahu mukhtariʿ). It follows from both principles that the existent has 
an agent who created it (li’l-mawjūd fāʿilan mukhtariʿan lahu).’  
821 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Majmūʿ, p. 17 and p. 21. Note that, even though some disagreement existed 
among earlier theologians as to what exactly constitutes the first item of knowledge pertaining 
to God, we do not find one of them explicitly stating that it is whether there God exists. Abū 
Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī, for instance, is said to have characterised the first item of knowledge 
pertaining to God as ‘that He is known in terms of one essential attribute, like His being 
powerful due to Himself,’ which obviously presupposes that God actually exists, but leaves open 
room for debate about His nature (ibid., p. 68). 
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traditional cosmological argument means by it. This shows that, ultimately, the 
difference between our interpretation and that to be found in secondary 
sources of these arguments comes down to the question of their purpose. This 
became most evident in our chapter on al-Ghazālī who distinguished himself 
from earlier generations of mutakallimūn only insofar as he did speak of the 
existence of the creator and even of God’s existence, not, however, with regards 
to what he sought to prove.  
Since it has been suggested in secondary literature that in Ibn Rushd the proof 
of ‘the existence of the creator’ refers to a traditional argument for God, and that 
the affirmation of the world’s ‘having a creator’ does so too, while this is not the 
case for the mutakallimūn before him, we have to ask the following questions: 
Does Ibn Rushd pursue a somewhat different objective with regards to what he 
attempts to prove, and is this reflected in his speaking of the existence of the 
creator, which he then uses as an equivalent of the expression that the world 
‘has a creator’? Or is his objective not different from that of earlier generations 
of mutakallimūn? However, in this case, it seems, his explicit mention of the 
word ‘existence’ in connection with the creator has to be accounted for. What 
we hence need to figure out is the following three points: Firstly, what does Ibn 
Rushd mean when he speaks of ‘the existence of the creator’? Secondly, does he 
use this phrase as an equivalent of ‘the existence of God’? And lastly, do these 
expressions denote a traditional argument for God’s existence, which – 
admittedly – seems plausible at first glance.  
The Meaning of ‘the Existence of the Creator’ 
As we have seen before, there is a number of passages in the section on ‘the 
affirmation of the creator’ where Ibn Rushd speaks of ‘the existence of the 
creator’. A number of other passages indicate that the mention of existence in 
this expression does not, as one could expect, refer to the dichotomy of 
existence and non-existence as it is used in the traditional proof: here ‘the 
existence of the creator’ has nothing to do with proving, along the lines of what 
we refer to by cosmological arguments, that God exists. One such instance is the 
following: At the beginning of the section entitled ‘the affirmation of the creator,’ 
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where Ibn Rushd discusses and criticises the Ashʿarite method of attaining 
knowledge of God, he presents their position in the following way: ‘If we 
assume that the world is originated, then it is necessary, they say, that is has a 
maker and originator.’ 822  Ibn Rushd then comments on their method, 
expressing his disapproval of its validity: ‘But regarding the existence of this 
originator (wujūd hādhā al-muḥdith), doubt arises which the science of kalām 
cannot dispel: We cannot say whether this originator is eternal or originated.’823 
This passage contains an instance where the ‘existence’ of the creator (or as it 
appears here: the originator) clearly does not denote the opposite of ‘non-
existence’ and the denial of an entity altogether – and mind you, this expression 
appears in direct relation to, and in the context of, the Ashʿarites’ method of 
proving ‘the existence of the creator.’ Here, the ‘existence’ of the originator 
refers to the question of what kind of existence the originator is as there are 
two kinds of existence: eternal and originated.  
There is another passage where Ibn Rushd also speaks of ‘the existence of the 
creator,’ but means by it neither the question about the existence versus non-
existence of an entity (as in the traditional arguments for God), nor the 
aforementioned sense of eternal versus originated existence. This passage 
appears in the section discussing God’s non-corporeality. There, Ibn Rushd 
states that most people affirm for the ghāʾib, the invisible realm, what they 
know from the shāhid, the visible realm. He then gives an example which 
clarifies this point, and it is this example which is of relevance for us. With 
regards to God’s attribute of knowledge, they argue: ‘If it [i.e., knowledge] is a 
condition for the existence of the creator in the shāhid, then it is a condition for 
the existence of the creator in the ghāʾib.’824 It is beyond doubt that when Ibn 
Rushd states that knowledge is the condition for the existence of the creator in 
this world, he does not intend to say that the existence versus non-existence of 
an entity – in the case of the shāhid obviously humans – is decided on the basis 
of the existence of knowledge. Rather, what this statement is meant to express 
is that it would not be correct to say about an entity – whether humans or God – 
                                                          
822 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 103. 
823 Ibid., p. 103. 
824 Ibid., p. 147. 
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that they are creator unless this entity is assumed to have knowledge – 
knowledge is part of what defines an entity as creator, and this is true for both 
the shāhid and the ghāʾib.      
Yet another passage confirms the same point. It shows that even in the case 
where the expression ‘the existence of the creator’ appears together with the 
all-important question of its affirmation or denial, Ibn Rushd does not use it as 
it is used in the traditional arguments for God. In a section belonging to the 
chapter on God’s acts, where Ibn Rushd attacks the Ashʿarite notion of 
occasionalism and their rejection of efficient causality other than through 
God,825 he states the following: ‘From the belief in the denial of causes in the 
shāhid follows that an efficient cause cannot be affirmed (ithbāt sabab fāʿil) for 
the ghāʾib.’826 This is the case if the shāhid is made the basis of knowledge about 
the ghāʾib. If the principle of causation is denied for the shāhid and if, therefore, 
‘they cannot acknowledge that every act has an agent,’ it follows that ‘they have 
no way to know God,’ as the very basis of knowledge about Him is removed.827 
Ibn Rushd then concludes that ‘the denial of the existence of the agent (nafī 
wujūd al-fāʿil) in the shāhid’ presents the adherents of occasionalism with a 
serious problem ‘since the existence of the agent (wujūd al-fāʿil) in the shāhid is 
the basis for the inference of the existence of the agent (wujūd al-fāʿil) in the 
ghāʾib.’828 It should be kept in mind that for our aim of investigating the sense in 
which Ibn Rushd uses the word ‘existence’ in such expressions as ‘the existence 
of the creator’ it makes no difference that in the above example he speaks of the 
existence of the agent, rather than that of the creator. God’s being the cause of 
the existence of the world and all occurrences in it is described by Ibn Rushd no 
less by the term fāʿil than it is by the terms ṣāniʿ, bāriʾ and the like as they all 
represent equal concepts.829 There is no doubt what Ibn Rushd’s above 
argument is concerned with: It deals with the question of how God can be 
                                                          
825 See Kogan 1985, Chapter Three “Averroes on Necessary Connection: Causes, Effects, and the 
Missing Link” (p. 71 et seqq.) for the different positions as represented by Ibn Rushd and al-
Ghazālī. 
826 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 193. 
827 Ibid., p. 193. 
828 Ibid., p. 193. 
829 Ibn Rushd says about those who believe that the world came to be due to chance (ittifāq) 
that they deny a creator (ṣāniʿ) for this world and likewise a choosing agent (fāʿil mukhtār) 
(ibid., p. 167).  
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shown to be an agent if agency is rejected for humans. In particular, Ibn Rushd 
wishes to points out the irreconcilability of the claim that God alone is an agent 
with the endeavour to affirm the principle of agency for the ghāʾib in the first 
place. It is therefore evident that the mention of ‘existence’ in Ibn Rushd’s 
aforecited statement has nothing to do with how existence and non-existence 
are understood in traditional arguments for God’s existence. It is solely about 
the question of whether certain entities can be described as agents or not. 
Lastly, there are a few passages which reveal yet another meaning and use of 
the expression ‘the existence of the creator.’ One of them is the section, we 
already touched upon earlier, where Ibn Rushd criticises the Ashʿarites’ use of 
the proof from possibility which he ascribes in particular to al-Juwaynī in his al-
ʿAqīda al-Niẓāmiyya.830 We recall Ibn Rushd’s utterance that ‘the belief in 
possibility comes closer to pointing to the denial of the creator than to pointing 
to his existence.’831 He then continues to explain that if system and arrangement 
exhibited in things are denied since, according to the proof from possibility, 
everything could have been different from what it actually is, then the very 
foundation of the ‘proofs that these existents have a willing, knowing agent (fāʿil 
murīd ʿālim)’832 is removed. To assume that the existents in this world with 
their particularities constitute nothing more than one actualised possibility out 
of a number of equally possible alternatives is, according to Ibn Rushd, 
tantamount to assuming that they could be ‘due to an agent who is not wise 
(fāʿil ghayr ḥakīm) and due to chance from him (ʿan ittifāq ʿanhu),’833 in the 
manner of a stone which happens to fall on the ground. This passage allows us 
                                                          
830 Ibid., p. 111. It is noticeable that Ibn Rushd only refers to the ʿAqīda Niẓāmiyya, without 
mentioning the Kitāb al-Shāmil and the Kitāb al-Irshād in which al-Juwaynī likewise makes use 
of the concept of permissibility. The reason for this might be sought in the fact that it is only in 
the ʿAqīda that al-Juwaynī applies the notion of possibility to the world’s attributes, whereas in 
the other two works he speaks of the possibility of the world’s existence and non-existence as 
well as the time of its coming to be. In the Kashf, it is only the aspect of the possibility of the 
world’s attributes which has to conflict with Ibn Rushd’s assumption of God’s wisdom and 
arrangement behind creation, which characterises his dalīl al-ʿināya. 
831 Ibid., p. 169. 
832 Ibid., p. 169. 
833 Ibid., p. 169. Compare the same reasoning in the Tahāfut al-tahāfut (1954, pp. 627-628): 
‘according to the philosophers, there is no quantity nor quality in an existent which does not 
have a purpose based on wisdom... Why did the creator of this work chose this quantity and this 
quality and no other? If it was said: ...not because of wisdom and consideration in the work, as 
all quantities and qualities are equal in terms of the purpose of the work...’. 
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to infer the following: Acknowledging wisdom in creation is, for Ibn Rushd, the 
basis of the affirmation that the world has ‘a willing knowing agent,’ whereas 
the denial of arrangement and system necessitates to uphold the world’s 
existence by chance, and this is essentially the same as ‘the denial of the creator’ 
and the opposite of affirming ‘his existence.’ To bring it to the point: All the 
affirmation of the existence of the creator means is, hence, that the world owes 
its existence not to chance, but to an outside cause (a wise creator, more 
specifically). Crucially, it has to be noted that this is in answer to the question of 
where the world stems from – as, mind you, this discussion in fact appears in 
the chapter on God’s acts which is ultimately concerned with establishing that, 
and in which way, ‘the world is produced by God.’834 The above remarks by Ibn 
Rushd do not intend to answer the question of whether there is an entity other 
than the world, even though this is clearly how such expressions as ‘the 
affirmation of the existence of the creator’ or ‘the denial of the creator’ have 
been understood in secondary literature. Fakhry, for instance, who refers to this 
very discussion presented here, seems to overlook the context of Ibn Rushd’s 
argument and believes it to be concerned with ‘the demonstration of the 
existence of God.’835 To negate causal determination of things, thus Fakhry’s 
description of Ibn Rushd’s reasoning, ‘leaves us with no clue to the existence of 
God’ and the ‘consequence of this position is…to repudiate the existence of the 
author of the universe altogether.’836 If Fakhry meant by the repudiation of ‘the 
author of the universe’ that one could not establish the universe’s coming from 
another, rather than its being self-subsistent or the product of chance, he would 
state Ibn Rushd’s position correctly; since this is, however, not what Fakhry 
intends to say, extending the denial that the world exists due to another entity 
to the denial of God Himself, it must be pointed out that this is not in line with 
Ibn Rushd’s exposition.    
All this is confirmed by a second passage which can also be found in the chapter 
on God’s acts, more precisely in the section that deals with the proof that the 
world is God’s creation. In the course of this discussion, Ibn Rushd explains that 
                                                          
834 Ibid., p. 161. 
835 Fakhry 1958, p. 128, f. 17. 
836 Ibid., p. 128, f. 17. 
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it is, once more, the dalīl al-ʿināya which is ‘the method Revelation follows to 
teach people that the world is God’s creation.’837 This time, however, the dalīl al-
ʿināya appears in a slightly different form from its version in the section on the 
affirmation of the creator. The first principle still refers to the world’s 
beneficial838 nature, yet the second principle now states that ‘everything 
beneficial…is necessarily produced,’839 while it previously appeared as that ‘this 
benefit necessarily comes from an agent.’840 The conclusion following from 
these two principles is of course precisely what Ibn Rushd intends to establish 
in the present section; however, this is not where Ibn Rushd ends and he 
therefore adds: ‘From these two principles it follows that the world is created 
and that it has a creator (ṣāniʿ).’841 This is the case as ‘the proofs from 
providence (dalāla al-ʿināya) prove both things together and they are therefore 
the noblest proofs for the existence of the creator (wujūd al-ṣāniʿ).’842 Just as in 
the passage quoted before, the expression that the world ‘has a creator’ and the 
formulation ‘the existence of the creator’ appear here in one breath and in one 
and the same meaning, and both formulations denote an antithesis to the 
world’s being due to chance,843 which is crucial for Ibn Rushd’s present 
endeavour to show that the world’s existence is to be ascribed to God. 
Therefore, the reason why Ibn Rushd calls the proofs based on providence ‘the 
noblest proofs for the existence of the creator’ is because this method refers to a 
single characteristic about the world – its beneficial nature – to prove that the 
world is created and not self-sufficient in its existence as well as that its being 
created precludes its being a product of chance, but rather points to its being 
due to another who is a creator, endowed with will and knowledge. We have to 
keep in mind that for many mutakallimūn the conviction that a created thing 
exists due to a creator was not an item of knowledge considered self-evident, 
                                                          
837 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 162. 
838 See Hourani 1962 and Leaman 1988, pp. 155-156 on the question of how Ibn Rushd 
reconciles the occurrence of evil with the claim that the world as a whole is of a beneficial 
nature.  
839 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 163. 
840 Ibid., p. 118. 
841 Ibid., p. 163. 
842 Ibid., p. 163. 
843 Ibn Rushd states that contemplation about the world and its parts makes humans recognise 
the benefit contained in them and ‘they know for sure that it is impossible that this benefit…is 
due to chance, rather it is due to one who intended it (qāṣid qaṣadahu) and one who willed it 
(murīd arādahu)’ (ibid., p. 163). 
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even though some did believe so.844 In Ibn Rushd’s view, the proofs of the 
Ashʿarites and Muʿtazilites alike cannot claim this simplicity and in order to 
establish the same point, they need to go through several complicated, dubious 
steps, as he emphasises repeatedly.   
There are in fact several other indications that the section on the affirmation of 
the creator in general, and Ibn Rushd’s talking about the proofs for the existence 
of the creator and that the world has a creator in particular, do not deal with 
establishing that another entity, in addition to the world, exists as the 
traditional arguments for God’s existence do. For instance, there is Ibn Rushd’s 
remark that the dalīl al-ʿināya serves to establish ‘one who intended and willed 
it [i.e., the world] (qāṣid qaṣadahu wa-murīd arādahu)’845 to which he adds: 
‘and this is God.’ Likewise, the dalīl al-ikhtirāʿ, the other of the two Qurʾānic 
methods, Ibn Rushd explains, involves reflection about ‘the inanimate bodies’ in 
which ‘life appears’ and from which humans know that ‘there is one who causes 
(mūjib) life, and this is God.’846 In secondary literature we do not encounter the 
view proposed here that the annex ‘and this is God’ indicates that Ibn Rushd 
seeks to identify God, whose existence is not at issue, as the one from whom the 
world comes, this being in answer to the question: Who is the creator of the 
world? Fakhry, once more, correctly reproduces the way Ibn Rushd presents 
the dalīl al-ikhtirāʿ when he explains that it ‘rests on the premise that 
everything in the world is “invented” or made by an Inventor or Maker, who is 
God,’847 but he nevertheless interprets the whole argument, and thus also the 
reference to God in ‘who is God,’ as being indicative of a traditional proof for the 
existence of God. Similarly, Kukkonen argues that ‘the fact of God’s fashioning 
the world…discloses His existence as God: that we have a…maker…means that 
we have a God.’848 According to this view, the addition ‘and this is God’ does not 
pose an identification of the world’s creator with God but implies that, because 
                                                          
844 Al-Juwaynī, to name only one scholar, maintained in his Kitāb al-Shāmil (1960-61, p. 148) 
that the knowledge about the impossibility that something permissible is realised without any 
kind of necessitator is self-evident (badīha al-ʿaql), while later arguing in his al-ʿAqīda al-
Niẓāmiyya (pp. 13-14) that the realisation of this fact is dependent on speculation (naẓar). 
845 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 163. 
846 Ibid., p. 119. 
847 Fakhry’s introduction in Najjar 2001, p. 6. 
848 Kukkonen 2002, pp. 406-407. 
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the world has a creator, that is, because the existence of an entity other than the 
world has been proven, God must exist. As argued before, what this comes 
down to is first and foremost a difference in opinion concerning the purpose of 
Ibn Rushd’s proof and the question regarding what is it that he seeks to 
establish.  
Yet, even the all-important phrase ‘the existence of the creator’ is used by Ibn 
Rushd in the context of answering this very question about the identification of 
God as the creator of the world. At the beginning of the section on the 
affirmation of the creator, where Ibn Rushd defends reasoning and speculation 
as a necessary prerequisite for knowledge of God, he relates the position of the 
ḥashwiyya who want to make the point that reason cannot be made the basis of 
correct belief. They argue that ‘all the Arabs accepted the existence of the 
creator’849 before the Prophet presented any rational proof to them, and 
reasoning can, consequently, not be made a condition for belief. In support of 
this position they refer to the Qurʾān, as Ibn Rushd relates, where ‘God said: If 
you ask them: Who created the heavens and the earth? They will say: God.’850 As 
argued before, the point of focus is again the question of who is to be 
acknowledged as having brought the world into existence, and since the Arabs, 
according to the ḥashwiyya, believed God to be the creator of the world anyway, 
there was no need for the Prophet to produce a proof for ‘the existence of the 
creator,’ that is, to establish that the world in fact does owe its existence to 
another and that its cause is only God. The present debate, and therefore also 
the phrase ‘the existence of the creator,’ has clearly nothing to do with the 
question of whether God exists. But yet again, the way this passage is 
understood in secondary literature is at odds with Ibn Rushd’s own words: 
Samuel Nirenstein, for example, who takes the proof of ‘the existence of the 
creator’ to denote a traditional proof for God, interprets the aforementioned 
Qurʾānic words as that the ‘Arabs believe in God instinctively,’851 that is, in His 
existence. 
                                                          
849 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 102. 
850 Ibid., p. 102. This is Q. 31.25. 
851 Nirenstein 1924, p. 432. 
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Our analysis of the instances in the Kashf where Ibn Rushed speaks of ‘the 
existence of the creator’ or closely related terms has highlighted the importance 
of being cautious with any possible preconceived opinion about the meaning 
and use of this phrase as it in fact denotes different things. It became clear that 
what Ibn Rushd seems to have in mind when he speaks about the method 
leading to ‘the existence of the creator’ and the like in the context of the chapter 
on the affirmation of the creator is nothing else than to say that the world 
comes from another entity who is its creator, just as its opposite, that is, the 
denial of the creator simply denotes the belief that the world either is self-
sufficient in terms of its existence or came about by chance. This particular 
relation has been represented correctly in secondary literature, but the claim 
that this includes and denotes the question about God’s existence is not 
substantiated. We can, therefore, conclude that in the section on the affirmation 
of the creator, Ibn Rushd is concerned with the exact same issues as the 
mutakallimūn who came before him. At the same time it is also true for Ibn 
Rushd, just as it is for al-Ghazālī and al-Nasafī, that the terminology he uses in 
these discussions has changed, and this is in particular evident in his speaking 
of the ‘existence’ of the creator.  
The Meaning of ‘the Existence of God’ 
Now that it has become clear what Ibn Rushd means to denote by the 
expression ‘the existence of the creator’ in the context of ‘the affirmation of the 
creator,’ the question still remains of whether in this section Ibn Rushd is at all 
concerned with the proof of God’s existence, in particular since the fact remains 
that he speaks of the method leading to ‘knowledge of the existence of God’852 
and ‘the affirmation of the existence of God.’853 We recall that Ibn Rushd speaks 
of the ‘existence of God’ in those instances where he presents his critique of the 
various methods pursued by Muslim scholars to attain knowledge of God, but 
that much more often he refers to ‘the existence of the creator,’ in particular 
when engaging with the details of these different methods. The reason for this 
                                                          
852 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 101 and 102. See also ibid., p. 121: ‘This method is the straight path 
with which God called people to knowledge of His existence (maʿrifa wujūdihi).’ 
853 Ibid., p. 103. 
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becomes clear when we keep in mind that according to Ibn Rushd, just as for 
the majority of mutakallimūn, the only way to attain any knowledge about God 
is the one that links Him to creation in an act-agent relationship.854 It is through 
God’s role as creator that God’s nature can be known. However, what is it that 
Ibn Rushd wants to denote by the expression ‘the existence of God’? Does he 
mean the question of whether God actually exists or not? Or does he mean 
something different by it?  
We are able to gain an idea of what Ibn Rushd means when we take into account 
that the discussion surrounding ‘the affirmation of the creator’ takes place in 
the very first section of the Kashf which is entitled ‘on the essence (fī’l-dhāt).’ 
For some reason, this fact receives no mention or attention whatsoever in the 
secondary literature. Ibn Rushd presents the knowledge gained about God 
divided in several sections, headed by a section dealing with God’s essence; then 
His attributes; His deeds and a number of other aspects. This approach is of 
course not uncharacteristic of other kalām works written before Ibn Rushd’s 
time, as we have seen.855 The section on God’s essence contains, besides the 
affirmation of the creator, one more subsection which deals with ‘God’s 
oneness,’ this being the first thing Ibn Rushd demonstrates after he has 
established a link between the produced world and God as its producer. The 
knowledge about God’s oneness, we must bear in mind, does in fact pertain to 
nothing else than God’s essence itself. This fact is emphasised by Ibn Rushd in 
the following section on God’s attributes which he begins with a discussion of 
how God’s attributes relate to God’s essence. There he points out that God’s 
attribute of being one, just like His being eternal, constitutes a so-called ṣifa 
nafsiyya or essential attribute as opposed to another class of attributes, the ṣifāt 
maʿnawiyya or hypostatic attributes. ‘By the essential attribute,’ Ibn Rushd 
explains, ‘I mean that with which the essence is described due to itself, not due 
                                                          
854 Compare Ibn Rushd’s criticism of those who deny the notion of agency for the shāhid, 
arguing that ‘they have no way to know God because they cannot acknowledge that every act 
has an agent’ (ibid., p. 193).  
855 To name only two examples, al-Ghazālī’s al-Iqtiṣād begins with a section ‘on God’s essence’, 
followed by one ‘on God’s attributes’ and one ‘on God’s acts.’ In al-Māturīdī’s Kitāb al-Tawḥīd, 
the section ‘on God’s attributes’ is preceded by remarks about His being one and the question of 
whether He is to be called a ‘body’ and a ‘thing,’ which all concern God’s essence, and finally 
there is a section on ‘God’s acts.’   
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to the subsistence of a hypostatic entity (maʿnā) in it, in addition to the essence, 
like when we say: one and eternal.’856 As for the other seven divine attributes of 
knowledge, power, will, life, speech, hearing and sight, it is interesting to 
observe that Ibn Rushd discusses them in a separate section entitled ‘on the 
attributes,’ thus in a way following the approach of the Ashʿarite mutakallimūn 
for whom these attributes are distinct from God’s essence. Ibn Rushd in fact 
presents their position that these seven attributes are to be regarded as ‘in 
addition to the essence,’ that is, as ṣifāt maʿnawiyya, yet in the Kashf Ibn Rushd 
hints at his own conviction, spelled out more clearly in the Tahāfut al-tahāfut, 
that this view is not correct.857 There, he speaks of the ‘absurdities which arise 
from the doctrine that the First Principle possesses attributes additional to His 
essence.’858 What this means is that, even though in the Kashf Ibn Rushd 
dedicates a separate section to the attributes, for him they truly belong to the 
consideration of God’s essence.859 Returning to God’s attribute of being one in 
particular, we need to keep in mind that this characteristic does not only say 
something about God’s essence, as Ibn Rushd made clear when counting it 
among the ṣifāt nafsiyya, but also about His existence. This is the case as for Ibn 
Rushd – and in this he actually agreed with his arch opponents, the Ashʿarites – 
a thing’s essence and its existence are one and the same. The same is true for 
God’s other essential attribute, His being eternal, which likewise describes – and 
classifies – His existence. As a matter of fact, we have already come across Ibn 
Rushd using the word ‘existence,’ not ‘essence’ in relation to the question of 
whether God is eternal or not when he criticised the Ashʿarites’ use of 
speculative proofs, saying: ‘But regarding the existence of this originator, doubt 
arises which the science of kalām cannot dispel: We cannot say that this 
                                                          
856 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 134. 
857 In the Kashf, Ibn Rushd criticises the view of the Ashʿarites on the divine attributes and 
points out its flaws, stating: ‘When these people said that He is an essence and attributes in 
addition to it, they more implied that He is a body than that they denied it’ (p. 139). Generally, 
however, he holds in the Kashf that the question of whether these attributes describe the 
essence itself or are hypostatic attributes is one that does not need to be discussed as it is not of 
interest for the masses. Revelation ‘acknowledges their existence without going into detail,’ and 
this has to suffice (p. 135). 
858 Ibn Rushd, Tahāfut (1964), p. 179. 
859 In the Tahāfut Ibn Rushd explains that God’s different attributes are in reality only aspects or 
ways of considering the one eternal essence: ‘The one identical entity, when considered insofar 
as something else proceeds from it, is called powerful and agent, and, when considered under 
the aspect of its particularising one of two opposite acts, it is called willing...’ (1964, p. 497).  
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originator is eternal or originated.’860 The equation of essence and existence is a 
tenet which is not expounded upon in the Kashf861 and once more we have to 
turn to the Tahāfut al-tahāfut where Ibn Rushd expounds on it. There he states 
in a number of instances that essence and existence are one and the same. With 
the subtle aim of criticising Ibn Sīnā,862 Ibn Rushd explains: ‘He believed that the 
thing’s existence refers to an attribute in addition to its essence... But all this is 
based on a mistake which is that the existence of a thing is one of its 
attributes.’863 For Ibn Rushd the correct view is that ‘existence is an attribute 
which is the essence itself, and whoever maintains something different is 
mistaken.’864 With regards to God, everything the examination of His essence 
pertains to, also concerns the examination of His existence – the kind of 
existence that is specific to Him – and vice versa. We shall hence submit that Ibn 
Rushd’s mentioning ‘God’s existence,’ about which knowledge is to be gained, 
does not refer to the question of whether there God actually exists or not. This 
might at first seem perplexing, in particular when the whole discussion is 
approached with the expectation that this expression cannot refer to anything 
else than the dichotomy between existence and non-existence as it is assumed 
in the traditional arguments for God’s existence. Yet, we should also keep in 
mind that in places Ibn Rushd speaks of ‘the knowledge of the existence of God’ 
alongside ‘the knowledge of God’ which certain methods are able or unable to 
establish. For instance, with regards to the Ashʿarites, he says that ‘they believe 
that the affirmation of the existence of God is only due to reason’865 and then 
ends his discussion about the validity of their proofs with the statement that ‘in 
the science of dialectics there is no solution to these doubts [i.e., doubts Ibn 
                                                          
860 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 103. 
861 Except for a concise remark in the discussion of the visibility of God where Ibn Rushd states: 
‘The senses perceive only the essence, and the essence is the existent itself (al-dhāt hiya nafs al-
mawjūd) shared by all existents’ (ibid., pp. 156-157). 
862 See Leaman 1988, pp. 104-106 for Ibn Rushd’s position on essence and existence and his 
critique of Ibn Sīnā in particular. See also Shehadi 1982, pp. 87-100 for a discussion of Ibn 
Rushd’s equation of essence and existence with regards to ontological questions (such as in the 
present discussion of God’s – or any other thing’s – essence and existence) and his acceptance 
that existence can be accidental when predicated of a thing in logical analyses (e.g., ‘X exists’) 
where the focus is, however, merely on propositions in the mind and not on real instances of 
things in this world.   
863 Ibn Rushd, Tahāfut (1964), pp. 597-598. Literally, the text has ‘one of its necessary 
concomitants (lāzim min lawāzimihi)’ which are a thing’s attributes. 
864 Ibid., p. 516. 
865 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 103. 
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Rushd expressed about their proofs], accordingly, it is necessary that this is not 
made the principle for the knowledge of God, in particular not for the 
masses.’866 Likewise, he states, still in the context of the question of which 
method leads to knowledge of the existence of God, that ‘from all this it becomes 
clear to you that the famous methods of the Ashʿarites to arrive at the 
knowledge of God are not…certain methods.’867 This indicates that, when Ibn 
Rushd speaks of methods which permit knowledge about ‘God’s existence,’ he 
does not refer to the question whether God does exist, but rather expresses 
nothing else than the more general ‘knowledge of God.’ Attaining knowledge of 
God pertains to establishing what His essence and existence are like, how they 
are described. And moreover, since Ibn Rushd rejects the idea that God is 
anything else than one simple essence, it is entirely plausible that he should 
speak of ‘God’s existence’ which the believer is required to know. We must 
therefore conclude that in this overarching quest to gain knowledge about God, 
the question asked by traditional proofs for God’s existence is not to be found in 
Ibn Rushd’s Kashf – in the same way they were absent from the writings of the 
theologians and philosophers before Ibn Rushd whom we considered 
previously. With regards to al-Ghazālī, who can be singled out, besides Ibn 
Rushd, for having made explicit mention of ‘the existence of God,’ we recall that 
he used the two words ‘existence’ and ‘essence’ interchangeably when he said 
about the purpose of the science of kalām that is makes known ‘the essence of 
God and His attributes’868 and ‘the existence of the Lord (Most-High!) and His 
attributes’869 respectively. Ibn Rushd’s use of these two terms seems to be 
entirely in line with that.  
Other Instances of ‘God’s Existence’ in the Kashf    
It should be pointed out that there are other instances in the Kashf which 
contain considerations about God’s existence. Yet, just as in the case of the 
consideration of God’s existence in the section on the affirmation of the creator, 
they do not pertain to the question of whether God exists; rather, they have to 
                                                          
866 Ibid., p. 107. 
867 Ibid., p. 116. 
868 Al-Ghazālī, al-Risāla, p. 54. 
869 Al-Ghazālī, al-Iqtiṣād, p. 8. 
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do with classifying the existence that is God’s, usually by distinguishing it from 
created existence, which is an important theme and objective in the Kashf as 
pointed out. It is interesting to note that in the Kashf Ibn Rushd does not make 
any contribution to the discussion whether God has to be counted among the 
entirety of existents or whether His being called an existent implies likening 
him to creation. We have come across this issue in a number of kalām works, 
among them al-Malāhimī’s al-Muʿtamad fī uṣūl al-dīn,870 ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s Sharḥ 
al-uṣūl al-khamsa871  and al-Nasafī’s Tabṣirat al-adilla 872  who related that 
numerous mutakallimūn dealt with the question of how God, who had 
previously been acknowledged as the world’s originator, can be shown to be an 
existent (mawjūd) rather than a non-existent (maʿdūm) or neither of the two. 
What their discussions made clear was that when these mutakallimūn asked 
whether God is (an) existent (hal Allāh mawjūd, as it were) they did not mean 
by it the same as when traditional arguments for God’s existence seek to answer 
the question of whether God exists. However, the issue that actually concerned 
Ibn Rushd is the question of whether God’s existence is different from that of 
created existence. Like a great many mutakallimūn preceding him, Ibn Rushd is 
eager to stress God’s otherness from creation, and he quotes the famous 
Qurʾānic declaration, we have come across before in the writings of such 
individuals as al-Ghazālī873 and al-Shahrastānī,874 that {There is nothing like 
Him (laysa ka-mithlihi shayʾ)}.’875 Ibn Rushd discusses the question of God’s 
incorporeality in particular with a view to what the common people should be 
told about it for whom ‘it is too difficult to establish proof for the existence of an 
existent (wujūd mawjūd) which is self-subsisting (but) not a body.’876 It would 
be too much to ask of them to think of God as an existent which is completely 
different from all existents they know, that is, the bodies of this world, insofar as 
He is supposed to be incorporeal and without extension in space. The common 
people rely on their knowledge of this world, the shāhid, which they make the 
                                                          
870 Ibid., p. 254: ‘The section on His being existent.’ 
871 Ibid., p. 177: ‘He is knowing and powerful, and the knowing and powerful one must be 
existent.’ 
872 Ibid., p. 195: ‘His description is that He is existent.’ 
873 Al-Ghazālī, al-Risāla, p. 332. 
874 Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya, p. 103 (of the Arabic text). 
875 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 139. This is Q. 42.11. 
876 Ibid., p. 141. 
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basis of their judgement about the ghāʾib,877 and they believe ‘that the existent 
is what is perceived, and that what is not perceived, is non-existence.’878 When 
they are told by the theologians that ‘there is such a thing as an existent 
(hāhunā mawjūdan) which is not a body,’ they are not able to comprehend it 
and to affirm God’s incorporality and otherness from created existence since 
‘the aspect of perception is taken away from them and it becomes the non-
existent for them.’879 Crucially, the point Ibn Rushd makes, when mentioning 
the non-existent, is not that the discussion of God’s incorporeality would lead 
the common people into atheism and the denial of God altogether. This point is 
never made. Rather, the point Ibn Rushd stresses is the difficulty that, if God is 
an existent (which He undoubtedly is), and if the existent is what is perceived 
and corporeal, then it must follow for the common people that God necessarily 
is perceptible and a body. The problem the mutakallimūn face is, hence, to 
maintain that God is an existent like all of created existence, but that His 
existence is different from created existence insofar as He is not a body and not 
observable by the senses.   
The Tahāfut al-tahāfut and the Terminology of Creation 
We have observed that in the Kashf Ibn Rushd makes use of the very same 
terminology as the mutakallimūn when describing God as the creator of the 
world. It is such terms as ṣāniʿ,880 bāriʾ,881 fāʿil,882 muḥdith883 as well as khāliq884 
that appear in relation with ‘the affirmation of the creator’ and Ibn Rushd’s dalīl 
al-ʿināya and dalīl al-ikhtirāʿ. At the same time, it is well-known that Ibn Rushd’s 
understanding of the mode of creation is quite different from that of the 
mutakallimūn – even though Ibn Rushd himself seems to want to stress, at least 
in his Faṣl al-maqāl, that the difference in views is in reality only minor and in 
fact ‘comes down to a disagreement about naming.’885 It is, however, not in the 
                                                          
877 Ibid., p. 147. 
878 Ibid., p. 139. 
879 Ibid., p. 139. 
880 Ibid., p. 101, p. 117 and p. 120. 
881 Ibid., p. 102, p. 103 and p. 118. 
882 Ibid., p. 118, p. 167 and p. 169. 
883 Ibid., p. 103. 
884 Ibid., p. 162. 
885 Ibn Rushd, Faṣl al-maqāl, pp. 40-41. 
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Kashf that Ibn Rushd expounds upon the difference in the way the 
mutakallimūn and philosophers understand the terminology of creation;886 
rather, one has to turn to the Tahāfut al-tahāfut. Like al-Ghazālī in his Tahāfut 
al-falāsifa, Ibn Rushd discusses the notion of God as agent who brought about 
the world in Chapter Three. This discussion makes clear how, from the 
mutakallimūn’s perspective, the philosophers – including Ibn Rushd – use the 
terminology of creation in a way that deprives it of its true meaning when they 
apply it to concepts which, for the mutakallimūn, have nothing to do with the 
true nature of God’s creation of the world. It also reveals, in turn, that from the 
perspective of the philosophers, the theologians claim to know the true 
meaning of these terms and concepts, while they in fact misunderstand 
Scripture’s teachings in these matters. Both camps essentially accuse each other 
of committing the same error.  
In both works, Chapter Three addresses the philosophers’ alleged ‘confusion in 
saying that God is the agent (fāʿil) and creator (ṣāniʿ) of the world and that the 
world is His creation and act.’ 887  Al-Ghazālī based his critique of the 
philosophers’ calling God an agent and creator – both of which denote the same 
concept in this context – on the definition of ‘agent’ as ‘someone from whom the 
act proceeds with the will to act, according to choice, and with the knowledge of 
the thing willed.’888 For the philosophers, he then argues, God causes the world 
necessarily (luzūman ḍarūriyyan) as they deny His attributes, in particular that 
of will, and therefore He cannot be called an agent.889 Ibn Rushd for his part 
now reverses the critique, arguing that the mutakallimūn’s definition of ‘agent’ 
is flawed as they exclude natural agents (al-fāʿil bi’l-ṭabʿ) from it, such are fire, 
wanting to affirm voluntary agents (bi-ruʾya wa-ikhtiyār) only. The real 
definition of ‘agent’ is ‘what causes another to pass from potentiality into 
                                                          
886 We have to bear in mind that the Kashf is essentially a basic exposition of religious doctrines 
for the common people, eschewing all sophisticated argumentation which could confuse the 
minds of laypeople. 
887 Ibn Rushd, Tahāfut (1964), p. 250. In al-Ghazālī’s Tahāfut al-falāsifa the heading appears as 
‘The illustration of their confusion in saying that God is the creator (ṣāniʿ) of the world and that 
the world is His creation’ (1927, p. 18). See Leaman 1988, the chapter entitled “Is God really an 
agent?” (p. 46 et seqq.) on this discussion.  
888 Ibid., p. 254.  
889 Ibn Rushd, Tahāfut (1954), p. 87 (In the 1964 Arabic edition, the passage containing al-
Ghazālī’s words is almost entirely missing, see p. 250).  
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actuality and from non-existence into existence.’890 Will is not part of this 
definition and the term therefore applies to both natural and voluntary agents. 
Al-Ghazālī is mistaken not only when it comes to the definition of ‘agent,’ but 
also when maintaining that the philosophers’ God acts out of necessity. Ibn 
Rushd clarifies that God is not like the agents in the shāhid, neither like humans 
who are a voluntary agents, nor like any agent acting necessarily. His 
knowledge, will and bounty from which the world proceeds are more prefect 
than in the agents of the shāhid.891 The mutakallimūn’s concept of the agent is, 
according to Ibn Rushd, too narrow, and God is in fact the most perfect of agents.  
The discussion of the terms ‘act (fiʿl)’ and ‘creation (ṣanʿ)’ to describe the world 
as God’s product concerns similar terminological disagreement. Al-Ghazālī 
defined ‘act’ and ‘creation’ as ‘that which truly proceeds from the will’892 – 
which is for Ibn Rushd, as we have seen, too narrow an understanding – and as 
that which is ‘an expression for temporal origination (iḥdāth)’893 – which Ibn 
Rushd denies as he acknowledges ‘everlasting origination (ḥudūth dāʾim)’894 
which has no first beginning. Contrary to al-Ghazālī’s claim that an eternal act is 
a contradiction in terms, Ibn Rushd maintains that the eternity of the world 
does not preclude it from being the act of an agent.  
Based on the above remarks, al-Ghazālī had accused the philosophers of using 
the terms agent and act only metaphorically (bi-ṭarīq al-majāz) and deprived of 
their real meaning.895 Ibn Rushd now reverses the charge and argues that, if at 
all, it is al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarites who call God an agent in a metaphorical 
sense.896 His argument is rather interesting as it comes close to an argument the 
Muʿtazilites had brought up against al-Ashʿarī at least a century before Ibn 
Rushd, as is reported by al-Juwaynī in his Kitāb al-Shāmil. As discussed in a 
                                                          
890 Ibn Rushd, Tahāfut (1964), p. 255. See Kogan 1985, p. 216 on the three kinds of non-
existence in Ibn Rushd and the one he singles out as the one God’s creative act pertains to. See 
also Ibn Rushd, Tahāfut (1964), p. 274: ‘The act of the agent is only connected with existence in 
a state of non-existence, that is, existence which is in potentiality, and it is not connected with 
actualised existence...nor with non-existence, in so far as it is non-existence.’ 
891 Ibid., pp. 255-257.  
892 Ibid., p. 270. 
893 Ibid., p. 271. 
894 Ibid., p. 271. 
895 Ibid., p. 268. 
896 Ibid., p. 267. 
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previous chapter, al-Juwaynī reports that the Muʿtazilites criticised al-Ashʿarī 
for his arguments relating to the question about ‘the need of origination for the 
originator’897 and in particular for his use of the famous kitāba-kātib and bināʾ-
bānin analogy to affirm the principle of causation for the realm of the 
unobservable. Since ‘the building does not occur, according to him [i.e., al-
Ashʿarī], as something the servants have power over,’ as al-Ashʿarī rejected real 
human causal efficacy,898 he has no basis to establish that God is indeed an 
agent and the creator of the world in the truest sense of the word, thus their 
argument.899 
When Ibn Rushd now attempts to reverse al-Ghazālī’s charge that the 
philosophers speak of God as agent only in a metaphorical sense, he focuses on 
the same analogy between the agent in the shāhid and the agent in the ghāʾib 
which posed the focal point of the Muʿtazilites’ critique of al-Ashʿarī’s argument. 
Al-Ghazālī maintained, Ibn Rushd argues, that the only kind of agent is the 
voluntary agent on the basis of which he rejected the philosophers’ notion of 
God as agent. Yet, it is precisely due to the analogy between the shāhid and the 
ghāʾib that the Ashʿarites render God’s being called a voluntary agent a 
metaphor as they ‘do not acknowledge a free will in man and a power to 
exercise an influence on reality.’900 It follows that ’if this is the case with the 
agent in the shāhid, how can it be said that the true agent in the ghāʾib is to be 
described as acting through knowledge and will?’901  
Even though Ibn Rushd seemed to have been of the opinion – or at least he 
argued so – that the philosophers’ understanding of what God’s creation of the 
world exactly means is not that different from that of the theologians, the above 
discussions show that disagreement about the correct use of terminology 
primarily stems from different views of the world and indeed reflects them: The 
concept of the agent, for instance, must vary depending on whether one 
believes that to acknowledge efficient causality outside God violates the notion 
                                                          
897 Al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil (1960-61), p. 154. 
898 In the Kitāb al-Lumaʿ, al-Ashʿarī explains that only God is ‘one who has power over (qādir 
ʿalayhi) [i.e., the act which is acquisition (al-fiʿl alladhī huwa kasb)-’ (p. 72). 
899 Al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil (1960-61), p. 157. 
900 Ibn Rushd, Tahāfut (1954), p. 94. Compare Ibn Rushd, Tahāfut (1964), p. 267. 
901 Ibn Rushd, Tahāfut (1964), p. 267. 
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of His omnipotence or whether one thinks that the very existence of the world 
can only be explained when maintaining causes other than God. 
The Tahāfut al-tahāfut and the Proof of the Creator 
It is rather surprising that the Tahāfut al-tahāfut is almost entirely excluded 
from considerations of Ibn Rushd’s arguments for God’s existence in secondary 
literature. This is even more astonishing since al-Ghazālī’s alleged proof that 
God exists in his Tahāfut al-falāsifa is a much discussed and often referred to 
matter and since Ibn Rushd deals with the exact same questions al-Ghazālī 
pored over. In al-Ghazālī’s Tahāfut, it is in particular Chapters Four and Ten in 
which his proof for God’s existence is presumably found, based on his charge 
against the philosophers that they are unable to show that the world has a 
creator and cause external to it.902 Similarly, Ibn Rushd speaks of – and 
ultimately denies – the philosophers’ alleged ‘inability to prove the existence of 
the creator of the world (wujūd ṣāniʿ al-ʿālam)’ or ‘to affirm (ithbāt) the creator 
of the world,’ as the heading of Chapter Four appears in different 
manuscripts,903 as well as ‘their incapacity to establish the proof that the world 
has a creator and cause (li’l-ʿālam ṣāniʿan wa-ʿilla)’ in Chapter Ten.904 Yet, it 
appears that all we find is a comment in Sulaymān Dunyā’s Arabic edition of the 
Tahāfut al-tahāfut that in Chapter Four ‘Ibn Rushd responds to al-Ghazālī and 
states that the philosophers are closer to reason in their affirmation of the 
existence of God (ithbāt wujūd Allāh) than the ahl al-sunna and the dahriyya’905 
as well as the remark by van den Bergh in the introduction to his translation of 
the same work that Ibn Rushd follows al-Ghazālī’s arrangement of his 
discussions among which there is also the question of the proof of God’s 
existence.906  
Far from pointing out the philosophers’ failure to prove that God really does 
exist, we recall, it was al-Ghazālī’s general aim in Chapter Four to show that 
                                                          
902 Chapter Four is entitled ‘On their inability to affirm the creator (ithbāt al-ṣāniʿ)’ and Chapter 
Ten ‘On the illustration that belief in al-dahr and in the denial of the creator (nafī al-ṣāniʿ) is 
necessary for them.’ 
903 Ibn Rushd, Tahāfut (1964), p. 427. 
904 Ibid., p. 630. 
905 Ibid., p. 983 (section nuṣūṣ wa-mawḍūʿāt). 
906 Ibn Rushd, Tahāfut (1954), p. xv. 
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they are unable to prove the world’s being due to another since they do not 
succeed in proving the impossibility of an infinite regress of causes. The 
philosophers, in consequence, come close to committing the grave sin to 
contradict Scripture which clearly states that the world is God’s work. To 
assume that an eternal world owes its existence to another seemed like a 
contradiction in terms and like a sheer absurdity to al-Ghazālī. Ibn Rushd deals 
with no other question. His argument focuses on stressing that it is not absurd 
at all that an eternal world should come from another since the most perfect 
agent (fāʿil) is the one on whom the act depends always and where this 
connection does not cease after the act has come to be (mind you, the world is 
regarded by the philosophers as God’s act, just as by the theologians). Therefore, 
when Ibn Rushd speaks of the philosophers’ endeavour to prove ‘the existence 
of the creator of the world,’ he uses this phrase in the Tahāfut al-tahāfut in the 
very same sense as in the Kashf: simply to denote the idea that the world is not 
a self-sufficient thing, but that its existence, despite having no beginning, is 
dependent on another. It is this very notion which al-Ghazālī attempted to 
attack; the question of whether the philosophers have grounds for their belief in 
God’s existence if they start from the assumption of an eternal world was not 
the point. 
Chapter Ten of al-Ghazālī’s Tahāfut al-falāsifa contains the famous statement 
that ‘the one who does not assume the originatedness of the bodies has no 
ground at all for his assumption of the creator.’907 The common interpretation 
in secondary literature of this remark was, we recall, that al-Ghazālī means to 
defend the cosmological argument as the only valid, and possible, proof that 
God exists.908 Yet, it became clear that this statement of his essentially expresses 
the same thought and reasoning as in Chapter Four: To assume that the world is 
the product of another, generally speaking, and of God, to be exact, when 
upholding its eternity, not its originatedness, is absurd. In particular, al-Ghazālī 
made the point that the philosophers should follow the dahriyya in their belief 
in the eternal and uncaused heavens – that is, a world without an (external) 
                                                          
907 Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut (1927), p. 209. 
908 See, for instance, Davidson 1987, p. 370 and Fakhry 2004, p. 231. 
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creator – as the former cannot prove that the heavens are not necessarily 
existent and therefore in need of a cause.  
Ibn Rushd attempts to defend the philosophers’ belief that the eternal world is 
God’s product by arguing that al-Ghazālī’s criticism is valid only for Ibn Sīnā’s – 
as Ibn Rushd thinks: flawed and innovative – arguments, but that it is of no 
concern for the ancient philosophers who were able to show that the heavens in 
their corporeality are necessary, but possible in their motion and must have a 
necessary, incorporeal mover.909 Again, it is important to bear in mind the 
                                                          
909 Ibn Rushd, Tahāfut (1964), pp. 637-642. Motion also plays an important role in Ibn Rushd’s 
commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Book Lām) where he states that ‘there is no way to 
demonstrate the existence of the separate substance (wujūd jawhar mufāriq) except for 
through motion, and all methods other than the method based on motion, which are believed to 
lead to the existence of the first mover (wujūd al-muḥarrik al-awwal), are only persuasive’ (Ibn 
Rushd, Tafsīr mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿat, commentary 5, p. 1423). This statement on the part of Ibn 
Rushd is yet another instance where he is understood to discuss the correct method of proving 
that God exists: Kukkonen speaks of ‘the proof from motion, touted in Averroes’ commentary 
works as the one and only scientific method of proving God’s existence’ (2002, p. 408). 
Davidson points out that ‘Averroes furthermore understands that the proof of the existence of 
God has to take its departure from a physical phenomenon,’ that is, motion (1987, p. 317). 
Evidently, it is when Ibn Rushd speaks of the aim to prove the existence of the first mover (as in 
the above statement) or when he concludes that ‘there is then something which imparts motion, 
but which is not moved’ (ibid., commentary 35, p. 1588) that this is taken to express his 
intention to show that God exists. The same is the case when he states that ‘there is necessarily 
a substance eternal and not moved’ (ibid., commentary 29, p. 1558). As in the case of the Kashf 
and the Tahāfut al-tahāfut, a different reading of what Ibn Rushd discusses can be suggested: 
Aristotle said about the enquiry in Book Lām that ‘it is about substance and what it seeks are the 
causes and principles of substance’ (ibid., text 1, p. 1406). It follows: To prove the existence of 
the first mover hence solely refers to the investigation of the causes of substance (as the first 
mover is the ultimate cause). A distinction has, therefore, to be made between the idea that God 
Himself (that is, His existence, in the sense of traditional arguments) is sought to be proven and 
the idea that it is God’s role as the final cause which is at stake (as part of the broader 
investigation of causation). In the cosmological argument for God’s existence, the proof of the 
creator indeed means nothing else than the proof that God really does exist – the existence of 
some entity, endowed with certain inferable attributes, has been established and this entity is 
then named ‘God’. In the arguments presented by classical Islamic theologians and philosophers, 
however, the proof of the creator (or related terms) is not the same as the proof that God really 
does exist, as we have seen many times. Likewise, Ibn Rushd’s conclusion (following Aristotle) 
that the proof from motion allows to establish ‘the existence of the separate substance’ is, firstly, 
only one aspect of the wider enquiry into substance in general and the three types of substance 
postulated in the Physics and, secondly, does not seek to establish that God exists, but that God, 
the first mover, is of a substance different from the substances of the heavens and the sublunary 
world (constituting the remaining two types of substance). It should also be added that the 
same kind of enquiry as that relating to God also applies to the heavens and the sublunary world 
respectively: With regards to God, His status as cause and His particular type substance is 
enquired into, and with regards to the heavens and the sublunary world, their being 
effects/causes and their type of substance is enquired into as well. No one would, however, 
suggest that when Aristotle (or Ibn Rushd) speaks of proving a substance which is movable, but 
eternal and not corruptible, as well as of establishing that the movable and corruptible 
substance (i.e., the sublunary world) has a cause, that he actually intends to prove that the 
heavens, to which all of this refers, exist. The proof that there is a particular type of substance 
(i.e., that of the heavens) is not a proof for the existence of the heavens – and this holds true as 
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actual context of this discussion to avoid the mistake of assuming that al-Ghazālī 
and Ibn Rushd’s concern is which method does or does not prove that God 
exists. Therefore, when van den Bergh translates al-Ghazālī’s charge against the 
philosophers that ‘al-qawl bi’l-dahr lāzim lahum’910 as ‘they are forced to admit 
atheism,’911 he reads a meaning into the term dahr as well as the debate as a 
whole which fails to appreciate the nuances inherent in the arguments of both 
al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd.     
Conclusions 
It seems almost obvious that we are dealing with a proof for God’s existence, a 
teleological argument, to be precise, in Ibn Rushd’s al-Kashf in view of the many 
instances where he speaks of methods proving the existence of the creator of 
the world as well as God’s existence. A careful analysis of the way Ibn Rushd 
uses the expression ‘the existence of the creator’ and related terms, however, 
illustrated a number of important points: Firstly, this expression denotes 
different things in different passages and, in particular, one would be too quick 
to assume that ‘the existence of the creator’ refers to nothing else in Ibn Rushd 
than the question about the existence versus non-existence of an entity, in the 
way this expression is used in the traditional arguments for God’s existence. 
Secondly, what Ibn Rushd in fact means to denote by it is nothing else than what 
all theologians and philosophers before him sought to demonstrate: that the 
world owes its existence to another, namely God, rather than existing due to 
itself or being the product of chance. This is the purpose of the proof for the 
existence of the creator as well as the affirmation of the creator and it has 
nothing to do with showing that another entity, God, exists besides the world. 
Ultimately, the proof of the existence of the creator, which establishes a link 
between God and the world, serves the purpose of gaining knowledge about 
God as Ibn Rushd is agreed with the majority of his predecessors that it is only 
through God’s role as creator that He can be known. Knowledge of God pertains, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
well for the proof that there is yet another type of substance (i.e., that of God), which is not a 
proof for God’s existence either.        
910 Ibid., p. 630. See also al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut (1927), p. 19: ‘al-qawl bi’l-dahr wa-nafī al-ṣāniʿ 
lāzim lahum.’ 
911 Ibn Rushd, Tahāfut (1954), p. 250. 
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for Ibn Rushd, to His essence and attributes (which in Ibn Rushd’s view refer to 
the very essence itself), besides a few other aspects. Knowledge of God’s 
essence is the same as knowledge of His existence: His essence is His existence, 
which is specific to Him, and the theologians’ and philosophers’ aim alike is to 
establish what His essence and existence are like. It is this aim which is 
expressed by Ibn Rushd in the words ‘the method which leads to knowledge of 
God’s existence’. With a view to terminology, Ibn Rushd follows such later 
theologians as al-Ghazālī and al-Nasafī who also speak of ‘existence’ with 
regards to the creator and God respectively. Subject matter-wise, however, Ibn 
Rushd follows in the exact same steps as all his predecessors for whom God’s 
existence was an unquestioned fact, while God’s nature and His relation to the 
world were seen as matters requiring rational investigation and justification. 
This is true for both Ibn Rushd’s al-Kashf as well as his Tahāfut al-tahāfut, 
where the issue at stake is not whether the philosophers succeed in proving 
that God actually exists, but whether they can show that the eternal world is 
God’s creation and act.        
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Chapter Eight: Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209) 
 
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī is considered an immensely significant and highly original 
Islamic theologian. Despite his Ashʿarite credentials, his writings reveal the 
profound influence philosophical thinking had on him. While arguing against 
certain doctrines associated with the philosophers of Islam, such as the belief in 
the eternity of the world, al-Rāzī nevertheless borrowed a number of their most 
characteristic methods and concepts, such as the notions of possibility (jawāz) 
and necessity (wujūb) with regards to the world and God, and incorporated 
them into the methods and concepts characteristic of the theologians. This is 
most evident in those discussions in al-Rāzī’s works which are concerned with 
what in secondary literature has always been seen as arguments for God’s 
existence. Like the many theologians and philosophers who preceded him, al-
Rāzī is believed to have devoted a considerable part of his theological works to 
the question of how the existence of God can be proven. The view proposed by a 
number of scholars devoted to the study of al-Rāzī912 is, as shall be seen in more 
detail, that, generally speaking, he can be seen as an adherent to ‘the standard 
Kalam procedure of proving the existence of God, which consisted in 
demonstrating the creation of the world and inferring the existence of God from 
creation,’913 as Herbert Davidson puts it. Contrary to this view, we shall argue 
that al-Rāzī’s works, just like the philosophical and theological works of his 
predecessors, contain no arguments which have the purpose of proving the 
existence of God in the traditional sense. We do find in his writings arguments 
for the affirmation of the creator, or similar expressions, and these are the ones 
associated with the endeavour of proving God’s existence, but they in fact serve 
an entirely different purpose, as shall be seen. In explaining what this purpose is 
and what al-Rāzī seeks to establish, if it is not the existence of God as 
understood in secondary literature, we shall consider four theological writings 
                                                          
912 It will be seen where we refer to relevant secondary sources that not much (comprehensive) 
research has been done on al-Rāzī’s role in the development of Islamic arguments for God’s 
existence.  
913 Davidson 1987, p. 75. See also Mahdi, p. 299 in Burrell and McGinn 1990: ‘His general 
argument is that creation proves the existence of God… This is of course the standard argument 
of kalām-theology.’ 
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of his in their chronological order:914 al-Ishāra fī ʿilm al-kalām which is one of al-
Rāzī’s earliest works of a distinctly Ashʿarite nature; al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn, 
another influential kalām work; al-Tafsīr al-kabīr or Mafātīḥ al-ghayb, al-Rāzī’s 
celebrated commentary on the Qurʾān; as well as al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya min al-ʿilm 
al-ilāhī, being the lengthiest and most detailed of al-Rāzī’s theological writings.        
The Ishāra fī ʿilm al-kalām – The Concern and Method of Theology 
The Ishāra opens with a chapter in which al-Rāzī explains why theology (ʿilm al-
kalām) is the noblest of all sciences. It has the noblest of all subject-matters, 
which makes it the most formidable science, and this is ‘the essence of the 
creator and His attributes, and what is necessary for Him and what is not 
permissible for Him.’915 Al-Rāzī’s characterisation of what theology is concerned 
with provides the very same line of arguments one encounters in the writings of 
his Ashʿarite predecessors such as al-Ghazālī who described theology’s 
endeavour as ‘the investigation of God’s essence and His attributes.’916  
Not everybody, al-Rāzī remarks, has shared this view of theology and there are 
people who consider engagement with it to be a baleful innovation (bidʿa). In 
relation to the aforementioned endeavour to attain knowledge about God’s 
essence and attributes, these people have pointed to the Prophetic saying 
‘ponder over creation, do not ponder over the creator’917 and expressed their 
view that certain discussions conducted in theology are forbidden. ‘Pondering 
over whether He is knowing by virtue of His essence or due to knowledge...all 
this is pondering over the creator,’ they have said, ‘and this is forbidden.’918 Al-
Rāzī responds to this criticism by pointing out that, admittedly, pondering over 
the creator is prohibited, however, he does not seek to defend speculation about 
God’s essence, that is, God Himself, but rather about ‘what is necessary for Him 
and what is permissible for Him and what is absurd for Him.’919 Therefore, the 
theologian is in fact ordered to ‘speculate about the created things insofar as 
                                                          
914 For a chronology of al-Rāzī’s works see Shihadeh 2006, pp. 7-11. 
915 Al-Rāzī, al-Ishāra, p. 29. 
916 Al-Ghazālī, al-Risāla, p. 85. 
917 Al-Rāzī, al-Ishāra, p. 38. 
918 Ibid., p. 38. 
919 Ibid., p. 38. This statement seems, of course, not entirely correct since al-Rāzī does deal with 
the question of whether certain attributes of God are essential or in addition to the essence, e.g. 
with regards to the attribute of endurance (ibid., pp. 244-253). 
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they are proofs for the existence of the creator (wujūd al-ṣāniʿ) and His 
attributes.’920 With this statement, al-Rāzī establishes that the method to gain 
knowledge about God, that is, His essence and attributes, cannot be by 
pondering over God Himself, but rather by considering Him in His role as 
creator. This method is of course the one all theologians before al-Rāzī 
advocated and it entails the idea that the characteristics of creation point to the 
characteristics of the one who is their creator. Yet, one cannot but wonder: If 
theology has God as its subject-matter and seeks nothing else than to make 
known His essence and attributes, does it then take God’s existence for granted 
and only enquires into what this entity is like? Or does al-Rāzī’s reference to the 
‘proofs for the existence of the creator’ point to that theology’s first task entails 
the proof that God exists, as secondary literature indeed has it? Once more, and 
as in the case of such scholars as al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd, we must ask the 
question of what al-Rāzī might mean when he states that the created things are 
proofs for ‘the existence of the creator’ and what this method is meant to 
establish.  
The Purpose of the Proof of the Existence of the Creator 
Some clarification about what the proof of the existence of the creator denotes 
can be gained from one of the last chapters of the Ishāra which deals with the 
issue of prophesy. There al-Rāzī refers to the prophet Noah and states:  
Do you not see that the first thing Noah said to his people was: {serve [uʿbudū] 
God, for He is your only god [ilāh]},921 so he pointed out to them the proof for the 
creator (al-dalīl ʿalā’l-ṣāniʿ)… The Qurʾān, which is the miracle of our master, 
begins with proofs of tawḥīd, and He says: {People, worship your Lord [rabb] 
who created you and those before you…+922 – what the verse denotes is a proof 
for the existence of the creator (dalīl ʿalā wujūd al-ṣāniʿ).923  
A look at the answer given to Noah by his people shows us that his mission was 
not to call them to acknowledge God’s existence and that his ‘proof for the 
creator’ did not denote an argument for God’s existence either. They replied: 
‘*He is merely a mortal like you, trying to gain some superiority over you. God 
would have sent down angels if He had wished; besides, we never heard of 
                                                          
920 Ibid., p. 38. 
921 This is Q. 23.23. All translations of the Qurʾān are from Abdel Haleem 2004.  
922 This is Q. 2.21. 
923 Al-Rāzī, al-Ishāra, pp. 324-325. 
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anything like this from our forefathers.+’924 Evidently, Noah’s people did believe 
in God’s existence, and his mission was nothing else than to call them to the 
worship of God alone and to promulgate God’s uniqueness and oneness 
(tawḥīd). We have explained in previous chapters that the Qurʾānic argument – 
which was later taken over by the theologians – for God’s sole worthiness of 
worship is based on His being the sole creator of the world.925 Al-Rāzī, too, 
establishes a connection between Noah’s attempt to convince his people to 
abandon shirk (associating partners with God) and his declaration that God is 
the only creator – expressed by the term ilāh. We shall come across the term 
ilāh repeatedly in al-Rāzī’s later writings, such as in his al-Tafsīr al-kabīr and al-
Maṭālib al-ʿāliya, where it takes up a prominent position. In the Ishāra, al-Rāzī 
links God’s being the only ilāh to His being the only creator when he writes: ‘If 
someone were to say: What is the specific characteristic of the godhead 
(khāṣṣiyya al-ilāh)? We would say: His specific characteristic is His ability to 
create (iqtidāruhu ʿalā’l-ikhtirāʿ).’926 Yet, it is in the Tafsīr kabīr that al-Rāzī 
provides a clear explanation of this term. There we read the following: ‘What is 
meant by…al-ilāh is: he who is our creator and maker of our essences and 
attributes’927 and ‘al-ilāh is an expression for the one who is able to create (al-
qādir ʿalā’l-khalq wa’l-ibdāʿ wa’l-ījād wa’l-ikhtirāʿ).’928 With special reference to 
God, al-Rāzī states: ‘God is the ilāh of the worlds insofar as He is the one who 
brought them about, from non-existence into existence.’929 It follows that, 
according to al-Rāzī, Noah explained to his people that only God is creator, 
which al-Rāzī phrases in the words: ‘he pointed out to them the proof for the 
creator.’ With reference to the Prophet of Islam, al-Rāzī describes the same idea 
as ‘denot,ing- a proof for the existence of the creator.’ We must infer from this, 
firstly, that al-Rāzī uses the expressions ‘proof for the creator’ and ‘proof for the 
existence of the creator’ interchangeably – something which shall be confirmed 
in his later works as well – and, secondly, that the proof for the (existence of the) 
creator has nothing to do with what the traditional arguments for God’s 
                                                          
924 This is Q. 23.24. Their reply does not appear in the Ishāra though. 
925 Compare, for example, Chapter One on al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm. 
926 Al-Rāzī, al-Ishāra, p. 272. 
927 Al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr, vol. 13, p. 56. Exegesis of Q. 6.74. 
928 Ibid., vol. 13, p. 102. Exegesis of Q. 6.74. 
929 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 234. Exegesis of Q. 1.2. 
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existence seek when they conclude that the world has a cause or creator. The 
proof of the creator in al-Rāzī’s al-Ishāra serves an entirely different purpose.930 
What Theology Seeks Through the Proof of the Existence of the 
Creator 
After it has hence become clear that ‘the proof for the (existence of the) creator’ 
refers to the proof that God is the one thanks to whom the world exists, we can 
return to the question of which purpose the method described by al-Rāzī as 
‘speculat(ion) about the created things insofar as they are proofs for the 
existence of the creator and His attributes’ serves. A passage in one of the latest 
sections can help us answer the question about the purpose of this method. 
There, al-Rāzī discusses whether the philosophers are right in maintaining that 
God’s ḥaqīqa cannot be known. The term ḥaqīqa denotes nothing else than 
God’s essence, and ḥaqīqa and the more common dhāt are used by al-Rāzī as 
                                                          
930 Note that, in this context, when al-Rāzī speaks of the creator, he does not use it as an 
equivalent of God; rather, he means to denote a certain role of God. That this is the case is 
evident when considering the following statement in al-Rāzī’s Maʿālim uṣūl al-dīn: ‘The non-
existence of the effect (ʿadam al-maʿlūl) must be due to the non-existence of the cause (ʿadam al-
ʿilla)’ (p. 56). Crucially, al-Rāzī utters these words in relation to God, the cause, and His creation 
of the world, the effect. In this particular context, it is obvious that by the non-existence of the 
cause al-Rāzī does not mean the non-existence of an entity, namely God: According to the 
theologians, there was initially a state of affairs where only God existed, but not the world. It 
would be absurd to assume that, then, the non-existence of the world was due to the non-
existence of its cause, that is God. Yet, it is correct to assume that the world did not exist, 
because God was not yet acting as its cause. The question of whether and in which way God 
could become a cause and whether this implied change in the divine essence was of course a 
hotly debated issue, but it shall suffice to note that the theologians generally made the point that 
God’s eternal will could decide on a particular moment from among equal moments to actualise 
His creative activity. On this question, see, for example, al-Ghazālī’s Tahāfut al-falāsifa who 
presents the philosophers’ objection to the theologians’ doctrine of a temporally created world 
as being: ‘”He did not will its ,i.e., the world’s- existence before this,” from which it follows that 
one must say: “Its existence occurred because He became a willer of its existence after not 
having been a willer,”… Thus, it is now ascertained…that the proceeding of the temporal from 
the Eternal without a change of state of affairs in the Eternal…is impossible.’ To which al-Ghazālī 
replies: ‘With what ,argument- would you deny one who says, “The world was temporally 
created by an eternal will that decreed its existence at the time in which it came to be.’ (al-
Ghazālī, Tahāfut (2000), pp. 14-15). Compare also al-Rāzī’s al-Arbaʿīn where he states: ‘This is 
the famous discussion which posits that the cause of non-existence is the non-existence of the 
cause (ʿilla al-ʿadam hiya ʿadam al-ʿilla)’ (vol. 1, p. 115). He says this with reference to the equal 
possibility of the world’s existence and non-existence. Existence takes precedence ‘due to the 
existence of what has an influence (yuʾaththiru) on existence’ and non-existence ‘due to the 
non-existence of what has an influence on existence’ (vol. 1, p. 115). The statement that ‘the 
cause of non-existence is the non-existence of the cause’ does obviously not imply that, before 
its creation, the world was in a state of non-existence because God did not exist. Rather, it was 
non-existent because God was not a cause giving it existence.    
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equivalents.931 Al-Rāzī holds against this view ascribed to the philosophers that 
revelation obligates humans to know God’s essence and that therefore there 
must be a way of attaining knowledge about it. Reason (al-ʿaql) discovers this 
method: ‘We know the necessity that the possible things (al-mumkināt) end in 
an existent which does not need another, and we have shown that its existence 
is its essence (ḥaqīqa) itself, and that it is not permissible that they are different. 
Hence, if we know its existence and its necessity, we know His essence.’932 As al-
Rāzī states here, in a previous section he defended the view that in God, essence 
and existence are one and the same thing.933 This is also al-Rāzī’s position when 
it comes to created existents, and he mentions the example of an atom where its 
particular essence and existence are the same thing and that existence is not an 
entity (maʿnā) subsisting in the divine essence.934 Yet, it is important to bear in 
mind the fundamental difference between God and creation when it comes to 
their kinds of existence: God is necessary in terms of His existence (wājib al-
wujūd li-dhātihi), while creation is possibly existent (mumkin al-wujūd li-
dhātihi). This is in fact what al-Rāzī establishes as the very first item of 
knowledge with regards to God’s essence. In the section entitled ‘On the 
affirmation of the attribute of existence’935 al-Rāzī writes:  
We explained that the world is possible, and every possible thing must have one 
who makes necessary (muqtaḍin). Therefore, either it is the case that the 
possible things end in one who makes necessary and who is necessarily existent 
by virtue of his essence, and this is the creator, the worshipped one (Most-High 
and Hallowed!) – or it is the case that they do not end in a cause (sabab) 
necessarily existent by virtue of his essence, but rather everyone who 
necessitates (from among them) needs another, without end, but this is 
absurd.936  
Al-Rāzī here establishes two things: Firstly, created existence insofar as it is 
possible in itself points to its need for a creator; creation did not simply pop into 
                                                          
931 See al-Rāzī, al-Ishāra, p. 76: ‘We say: It is not permissible to say that the existence of the 
creator is other than His ḥaqīqa’ and ibid., p. 83: ‘Existence is, according to us, the dhāt itself.’ 
932 Ibid., p. 270. 
933 See ibid., p. 76: ‘The necessity of existence must be inherent in (dākhil) the essence of the 
necessarily existent [i.e., God] because if it was not inherent in the essence, it would occur to 
it...but that which occurs to something is possible in itself.’ God’s existence would hence need a 
cause to render it necessary, and this cause would be His essence, which al-Rāzī rejects as an 
absurdity. 
934 Ibid., p. 83. 
935 Ibid., p. 74. 
936 Ibid., pp. 74-75. See also p. 75: ‘It has hence been established that the possible things depend 
in their entirety on an existent which is necessarily existent by virtue of its essence.’ 
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existence uncaused. Secondly, this creator is then identified with the only other 
existent besides the world, that is, God, ‘Most-High and Hollowed.’937 This is the 
very meaning of the statement that ‘the possibility in the world…points to the 
existence of the creator (al-imkān fī’l-ʿālam al-dāll ʿalā wujūd al-ṣāniʿ)’938 as well 
as of ‘the affirmation of the creator (ithbāt al-ṣāniʿ),’939 as explained above, 
which is also the heading of the chapter in which the present discussion appears. 
In the same section, al-Rāzī is then also able to conclude that God’s existence is 
necessary, precisely because it has been established previously that the world is 
of possible existence. To conclude, what is important for us is the following: al-
Rāzī establishes that, in order to gain knowledge about God’s essence – which is, 
as we remember, one aspect of what theology is concerned with – one simply 
needs to know about God’s existence, since both are the same. Knowledge about 
God’s existence, however, means knowing that His specific existence – which 
distinguishes Him from created existence – is necessary. This follows from the 
fact that the existence of created things is possible. Besides the necessity of 
God’s existence, knowledge of the divine essence also involves, according to al-
Rāzī, the question of whether God can be seen. This is so because, according to 
al-Rāzī, it is a thing’s existence which is the ground for the possibility that it can 
be seen. With this view, al-Rāzī opposes such groups as the Muʿtazilites who 
argued that visual perception of a thing depends on our senses, and since God is 
said to be neither atom, nor body, nor accident, He is removed from what 
humans can see.940 The question of God’s visibility is therefore related to certain 
assumptions about His essence and type of existence. These two aspects 
pertaining to knowledge of God’s essence are subsumed by al-Rāzī under the 
heading ‘what is necessary for Him regarding the essential attributes (al-ṣifāt 
al-nafsiyya).’941 Knowledge of God’s essence, however, also involves ‘what is 
impossible for God regarding the essential attributes.’ 942  These negative 
attributes referring to God’s essence again pertain to classifying God’s 
particular existence. Al-Rāzī firstly establishes that God is not a body or a 
                                                          
937 Ibid., p. 75. 
938 Ibid., p. 45. 
939 Ibid., p. 73. 
940 Ibid., pp. 79-80. 
941 Ibid., p. 73. 
942 Ibid., p. 93. 
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corporeal entity. This means that His existence, unlike the spatial existence of 
atoms and bodies, is not specified by place or extension in space. Al-Rāzī then 
shows that God is not an accident either. In this context, we need to keep in 
mind that, according to the Ashʿarite position, there are four types of essences 
or existents: The essences belonging to the created world are either atoms or 
bodies or accidents, and al-Rāzī seeks to establish God’s essence, and thereby 
His existence, as being of a different kind.  
These two sections on what is necessary for God and what is impossible for Him 
in terms of the essential attributes then establish everything that is there to 
know about the divine essence.943 This is achieved by analysing God’s particular 
existence which is known through contrasting it with the existence that is 
specific to created things. Following the admonition not to ponder over God 
Himself, al-Rāzī instead focuses on God in His role as creator since created 
things with their characteristics point to the characteristics of their creator – 
the traditional analogy between the shāhid and the ghāʾib.944 It should finally be 
noted that the entire aforementioned discussion, including the proof that the 
world has an origin in time and exists due to God as its creator, appears under 
the heading ‘On the affirmation of His essence.’945  
The second aspect al-Rāzī mentioned as the objective of theology at the 
beginning of the Ishāra, that is, attaining knowledge of God’s attributes, then 
completes the endeavour to know God.946 This involves the proofs that God 
                                                          
943 Note that what al-Rāzī establishes as knowledge of God’s essence is very much the same as 
his predecessor al-Ghazālī established with regards to the divine essence in his al-Iqtiṣād fī al-
iʿtiqād: Knowledge of God’s essence contains ten aspects: His existence is His essence; He is 
eternal; enduring; not an atom; not a body; not an accident; not extended in any of the six 
directions; not to be described as being placed upon the throne; visible; and finally one. 
944 It should be noted that this is also true for humans insofar as they are seen as agents of their 
deeds (the discussion about the reality of human causal efficiency left aside. For the discussion, 
see, for example, the Muʿtazilites’ criticism of al-Ashʿarī as reported by al-Juwaynī in his al-
Shāmil (1960-61), p. 157.)  
945 Al-Rāzī, al-Ishāra, p. 47. 
946 Davidson states with regards to al-Rāzī and a number of other mutakallimūn that they 
‘append to their proofs of the existence of God a teleological argument showing the creator to be 
“knowing,” and hence possessed of the attribute of knowledge’ (1987, p. 235). His 
characterisation of the proof of God’s being knowing as an appendix to what Davidson regards 
as a proof that God exists seems to go right against al-Rāzī’s own explanations. To show that 
God is knowing is not simply an appendix (and this holds true for all other divine attributes), 
but it part of what theology seeks to establish through the method which declares God the 
creator of the world. 
 
 
204 
 
indeed is powerful, living, knowing, willing, speaking, hearing and seeing, which 
are the seven hypostatic attributes commonly ascribed to God. Besides them, al-
Rāzī discusses God’s endurance and whether He is of perpetual existence by 
virtue of His essence or due to an attribute in addition to His essence. We have 
seen in previous chapters that this was in fact an issue of disagreement among 
the mutakallimūn, and al-Rāzī here opts for the second alternative. He then 
concludes the section on these hypostatic attributes by noting the impossibility 
of there being any other attributes for God besides the ones just proven. He 
presents the following reasoning: There cannot be unlimited other attributes 
which we may not know of ‘because we are obligated to know God’s uniqueness 
(waḥdāniyya Allāh): {bear in mind that there is no god [ilāh] but God}947 but the 
knowledge of a thing’s being unique is part of the knowledge of its essence. If, 
therefore, we do not know the thing, we do not know whether it is unique, and 
we only know the godhead if we know all His attributes. This is so because the 
godhead is the essence which is described with all attributes subsisting in Him. 
Therefore, if this is the case, there has to be a proof for them.’948 What al-Rāzī is 
arguing here is that ultimately, the believer has to acknowledge tawḥīd and 
‘that God is one and unique, without partner.’949 Yet, in order to do so he has to 
come to know that the essence which is God’s is a unique essence and that the 
essences of created things do not resemble His. The believer, therefore, also has 
to know the divine attributes as the knowledge of them is part of knowing God 
and His uniqueness.  
Conclusions 
Contrary to the assumption to be found in secondary literature, as mentioned 
before, that the proof of the existence of the creator has the same purpose as the 
traditional arguments for God’s existence, in al-Rāzī’s al-Ishāra the following 
picture emerges: ‘The proof of the creator’ or similar expressions refers to the 
endeavour to show that the world is God’s product and that God is its sole 
creator. For al-Rāzī, this is an important tenet to defend for two reasons: on the 
                                                          
947 This is Q. 47.19. 
948 Al-Rāzī, al-Ishāra, p. 269. 
949 Ibid., p. 256. 
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one hand, because he argues, in line with the Qurʾānic reasoning, that God’s sole 
worthiness of worship depends on knowing that He is the only creator. On the 
other hand, because al-Rāzī argues that human can only fulfil their order to 
acknowledge God’s uniqueness (tawḥīd) when they know that God’s essence, 
together with the divine attributes, is unique. The only way of attaining this 
knowledge, however, which is the concern of theology, is by pondering over the 
characteristics of creation since they reveal the characteristics of their creator, 
God.  
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The Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn – The Concern and Method of Theology 
Al-Rāzī’s al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn resembles the Ishāra in many respects – since 
it, too, is a book of theology – and this is also true of the sections on ‘the 
affirmation of the knowledge of the creator,’950 as al-Rāzī has it in the Arbaʿīn. 
Nevertheless, one fundamental difference between the Ishāra and the Arbaʿīn is 
that in the latter work a preface stating the concerns of theology and what it 
seeks to establish, as we find it in the Ishāra, is entirely missing. Al-Rāzī 
immediately begins the Arbaʿīn with the question of the eternity vs. 
originatedness of the world. Yet, despite the absence of a clear statement as to 
the subject-matter of theology, it seems justified to assume that in the Arbaʿīn 
al-Rāzī conceives of it as being nothing different than in the Ishāra. This can be 
inferred from the questions he discusses, but more importantly, this seems 
likely since in the works al-Rāzī wrote after the Arbaʿīn, such as the Tafsīr and 
the Maṭālib, he describes the concerns of theology in the very same words as in 
the Ishāra. Theology seeks ‘God’s essence and attributes and deeds,’951 as the 
Tafsīr has it, and investigates ‘God’s essence and attributes,’952 as stated in the 
Maṭālib. It therefore appears that we have to view the discussions in the Arbaʿīn 
against this background. 
Let us then turn to the question of what al-Rāzī has to say in the Arbaʿīn about 
the endeavour of gaining knowledge about God’s essence and His attributes. We 
recall that in the Ishāra, al-Rāzī argued that God’s essence and His existence are 
one and the same thing, and that by knowing God’s specific kind of existence – 
that is, its necessity, that it can be seen as well as its not being corporeal or an 
accident – we can know His essence. The method to attain this knowledge was 
to contrast God’s existence with created existence. In the Arbaʿīn, al-Rāzī takes a 
different stance with regards to the relation between God’s essence and His 
existence. He now rejects the view held by the founder of his school, al-Ashʿarī, 
that ‘the existence of every thing is the same as its essence (māhiyya)’953 and 
opts instead for the view which, as he says, many mutakallimūn and most 
                                                          
950 Al-Rāzī, al-Arbaʿīn, vol. 1, p. 101. 
951 Al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr, vol. 2, p. 96. 
952 Al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib, vol. 1, part 1, p. 37. 
953 Al-Rāzī, al-Arbaʿīn, vol. 1, p. 82. 
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philosophers subscribed to that ‘the existence of the thing is a description (waṣf) 
different (mughāyir) from its essence’954 or ‘existence is in addition (zāʾid) to 
the essence.’955 This is also the case with God, as al-Rāzī states: ‘Our view is that 
the existence of God is in addition to His essence.’956 This of course raises the 
question of what al-Rāzī now has to say about the statement made in the Ishāra 
that God’s essence can be known since it is the same as His existence.  
In the Arbaʿīn, al-Rāzī reveals his position that the method put forward in the 
Ishāra to attain complete knowledge of God, insofar as His essence and 
attributes are concerned, does no longer achieve this goal. Al-Rāzī grants, 
following the philosophers (al-ḥukamāʾ), that existence is something which can 
be grasped intuitively (badihī al-taṣawwur) and understood (maʿlūm al-
taṣawwur), but ‘the reality (kunh) of the essence (māhiyya) of the True One 
(Glorified!),’957 he points out, cannot be grasped by humans. ‘The essence 
(ḥaqīqa) of the True One (Glorified!) is different from the existence,’ al-Rāzī 
stresses, and as a consequence ‘the essence of the True One (Glorified and Most-
High!) cannot be grasped.’958 Elsewhere,959 al-Rāzī further elaborates on this 
and explains that many mutakallimūn held that God’s essence can be known – a 
view al-Rāzī himself obviously shared previously.960 Now, however, he intends 
to prove its falseness. In doing so, al-Rāzī argues that ‘what is known about Him 
is only the existence, the negative attributes and the positive attributes, but the 
knowledge of these things is different from the knowledge of the specific 
                                                          
954 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 82. 
955 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 85. In the Ishāra, al-Rāzī argued that essence and existence must be the same 
because ‘if the existence of the atom (jawhar) was different from its essence, then it would be 
the case that we know that its essence is described with extension and has directions even 
though it might not be existent. Both intelligibles would not be contradictory, and the 
knowledge of one of them would be possible without the other, but this is an absurdity’ (p. 83). 
In the Arbaʿīn, al-Rāzī argues, for instance, that while a body and an accident are different kinds 
of essences, they are the same in their being existent, hence existence must be something else 
than the particular essences (vol. 1, p. 83). 
956 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 86. 
957 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 145. 
958 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 145-146. 
959 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 308: ‘Exposition (of the question of whether) the reality (kunh) of the essence 
of God (Most-High!) is knowable for humans or not.’ 
960 In the Ishāra, al-Rāzī did not speak of God’s kunh in addition to His essence and existence 
though. 
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essence (al-dhāt al-makhṣūṣa wa’l-ḥaqīqa al-makhṣūṣa). Hence, the knowledge 
of the specific essence is not possible.’961  
In any case, even if humans can never grasp what God’s specific essence is like, 
al-Rāzī stresses that they can nevertheless know ‘the existence and the negative 
and positive attributes.’962 It is these very attributes which al-Rāzī seeks to 
make known following the affirmation of the creator for the originated world. 
Yet, what does al-Rāzī mean by the negative and positive divine attributes? The 
former are descriptions of God in terms of what He is not or what needs to be 
negated of Him. Al-Rāzī states: ‘We say: He is necessarily existent. This means: 
He is the existent which cannot receive non-existence. We say: He is eternal. 
This means: He was existent from pre-eternity until now. … We say: He is not a 
body or an atom or in a place… - all this is negation.’963 The divine attributes al-
Rāzī refers to as positive are the usual seven hypostatic attributes, that is, God’s 
being powerful, knowing, willing, alive, speaking, hearing and seeing. 
It is crucial to note that everything al-Rāzī mentions here as God’s negative 
attributes is established as a consequence of ‘the affirmation of the knowledge 
of the creator’ which constitutes the Third Question. It is also in the Third 
Question that God’s being necessarily existent is proven. The Fourth Question 
until the Tenth Question then establish the remaining negative attributes 
mentioned above. The positive attributes are established in the subsequent 
Questions. As in the case of the Ishāra, it seems plausible that in his quest to 
gain knowledge about God in terms of His essence and (hypostatic) attributes – 
even if al-Rāzī states that what God’s essence really is like cannot be known –, 
he follows the method which allows attaining this knowledge on the basis of 
God’s role as creator. Once more, God’s characteristics can be known when one 
considers the characteristics of created things. It therefore appears that ‘the 
affirmation of the knowledge of the creator’ in the Arbaʿīn is not intended by al-
Rāzī to prove that God exists; rather, it is where al-Rāzī establishes a connection 
between the world and God since the world is shown to be in need of another 
                                                          
961 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 308. See also p. 310: ‘We say: The essence (ḥaqīqa) of God and the reality 
(kunh) of His essence (māhiyya) cannot be grasped…and it follows that it cannot be understood 
by the minds.’ 
962 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 310. 
963 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 308. 
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for its existence. This means that the proof of the creator seeks to affirm a 
certain role for God, namely that of being creator. It does not, however, seek to 
establish the existence of an entity in addition to the world, as it were.  
Investigation of the Methods to Affirm the Creator 
Let us therefore have a closer look at the methods which are said to establish 
just this. In the Arbaʿīn, al-Rāzī presents four methods, making use of the 
concept of permissibility (imkān) associated with the philosophers as well as 
the notion of originatedness (ḥudūth) characteristic of the mutakallimūn. The 
first two methods al-Rāzī presents focus on the possibility of the essences of 
things in this world and their attributes respectively, and they lead to the 
affirmation of ‘the (existence of the) necessarily existent.’964 The remaining two 
methods focus on the originatedness of atoms and bodies as well as their 
attributes, and affirm ‘the knowledge of the creator.’965 Since all four methods 
appear in the Third Question under the heading ‘the affirmation of the 
knowledge of the creator,’ this indicates that whether al-Rāzī focuses on the 
affirmation of the necessarily existent or the creator, he pursues the same 
objective: The mutakallimūn who focused on the originatedness of the world 
argued that nothing originates by chance or emerges into existence without 
cause, and since an infinite regress of causes which are all originated is 
impossible, they were able to conclude that the world not just is, but exists due 
to an outside cause. Thus, they ascribed creation to God and proved Him to be 
creator. The philosophers, on the other hand, stressed the inherent possibility 
of the existents in this world, but likewise argued that the actualisation of 
something possible (mumkin) cannot occur due to chance or due to an infinite 
regress of possible causes or even due to circular causation where each member 
is possibly existent and the cause of another member. When they hence 
affirmed that the world exists due to an existent which is outside the aggregate 
of possible existents making up this world, they declared the world to be a 
created thing and God to be its creator. Be this as it may, the real focus of the 
Third Question is not so much an affirmation that the world exists due to a 
                                                          
964 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 103 (mentions wujūd) and p. 121. 
965 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 124 and p. 129. 
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cause and that this cause is no other than God;966 al-Rāzī’s main concern is to 
show that God is necessarily existent by virtue of His essence. With the only 
exception of the fourth method,967 all other methods involve the proof of God’s 
necessary existence, which al-Rāzī seems to consider an integral part of them. In 
the first method, which is the one focusing on the possibility of the essences, al-
Rāzī reaches this conclusion, firstly, by showing that something from among the 
entirety of existents is necessarily existent by virtue of its essence968 and, 
secondly, by showing that whatever is, however, possibly existent – which is the 
world – depends on the necessarily existent.969 In the second method, which 
focuses on the possibility of the attributes of creation, al-Rāzī first establishes 
the dependence of all bodies on God,970 then argues that the creator of these 
                                                          
966 However, not in the sense that since it has a cause, God must exist; rather, in the sense of 
answering the question: Who is the cause due to which the world exists? 
967 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 129-131: The fourth method consists of the dalāʾil al-anfus and the dalāʾil al-
āfāq. The former is reasoning on the basis of the formation of humans from a drop of sperm, 
which al-Rāzī ascribes to the Qurʾān (e.g., Q. 40.67). Sperm is a body whose parts are equal, yet 
different body-parts are formed from it. The assumption that the planets could be sufficient in 
explaining the influence on sperm and humans’ development is rejected. This makes it 
necessary, al-Rāzī says, that ‘the one who influences (muʾaththir) the formation of (the different 
parts) is not nature or the power of the planets, but a wise creator, an arranger through power 
and choice’ (p. 130). He then moves on to the dalāʾil al-āfāq which focus on reasoning on the 
basis of the states of animals, plants, metals, planets and others. Al-Rāzī concludes this method 
by stating that this sort of reasoning stems from the Qurʾān.  
968 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 103: ‘There is no doubt that the essences (al-ḥaqāʾiq wa’l-māhiyyat) are 
existents, and it is true of every existent either that its essence is receptive to non-existence or 
that it is not. If its essence, insofar as it is an essence, is not receptive to non-existence, then this 
existent is necessarily existent by virtue of its essence, and this is what is sought (wa-huwa al-
maṭlūb).’ 
969 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 103: ‘but if its essence is receptive to non-existence, we say: …its existence has 
no precedence over its non-existence, if it was not for one who gives precedence (murajjiḥ). 
Then (we say): If this murajjiḥ was possible, we would have to repeat ourselves, and either 
circular causation (al-dawr) or an infinite regress (al-tasalsul) would be necessary, but they are 
absurd. Therefore, their ending in the necessarily existent by virtue of its essence is 
unavoidable.’ Note that in the Maṭālib, al-Rāzī stresses that this method, which he ascribes to 
Ibn Sīnā, does not establish that the world is not the necessarily existent, unless a further proof 
is presented that it is possibly existent. This does not seem to be too much of a concern for al-
Rāzī, however, since he starts from the assumption that the observable word is possibly existent, 
as established in the First Question (‘On the originatedness of the world’, vol. 1, p. 19). This is 
also indicated by the fact that al-Rāzī presents this method as being ‘reasoning…on the basis of 
the possibility of the essences.’  
970 The argument runs like this: Bodies are equal in terms of their essences and different in 
terms of their attributes, but bodies could have different attributes as well. Their having specific 
attributes is therefore due to one who decides on the specification (mukhaṣṣiṣ) and who gives 
preponderance to one of two equal alternatives (murajjiḥ). This applies therefore to all bodies 
(ibid., pp. 121-124).   
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bodies cannot Himself be corporeal971 in order to state finally: ‘If we want to 
make clear that this existent is necessarily existent by virtue of its essence, we 
return to some parts of what we mentioned in the first proof.’972 Likewise, the 
third method first establishes that all bodies, which have previously been 
proven to be originated, exist due to an originator. Al-Rāzī explains their need 
for an originator only indirectly with the fact of their being originated, and 
names their inherent possibility, which requires one who exerts influence 
(muʾaththir), as the true ground. He then has an imaginary opponent pose the 
question of whether this originator who has just been affirmed for the world 
could not Himself be possibly existent, to which al-Rāzī replies: ‘Now in order to 
explain His (Most-High!) being necessarily existent by virtue of His essence we 
need to return to what we said in the first proof.’973  
We can therefore conclude that in the Arbaʿīn, al-Rāzī seems to be pursuing the 
very same objective as in the Ishāra, which is to attain knowledge of God in 
terms of His essence and (hypostatic) attributes, and this is achieved through 
the method which affirms God as the creator of the world since this role allows 
the inference of certain characteristics for God. Yet, one important point 
remains to be made: We recall that when al-Rāzī discussed the question of what 
knowledge of God humans are able to attain, he maintained that ‘what is known 
about Him is only the existence, the negative attributes and the positive 
attributes.’974 We have explained what al-Rāzī means by the negative and 
positive divine attributes and have shown how their affirmation follows from 
the proof that the world is God’s product. What, however, does al-Rāzī mean 
when he states that God’s existence is known? Firstly, it should be noted that 
when al-Rāzī here mentions our knowledge of ‘the existence,’ he does not mean 
by it the characterisation of God’s existence as being necessary or eternal or 
incorporeal or anything like that; rather, he really does mean by it the mere fact 
                                                          
971 Namely: If this murajjiḥ was himself a body, his specification with possible attributes would 
also require a murajjiḥ, which would lead to the absurdity of an infinite regress (al-tasalsul). He 
can therefore not be a body and not corporeal (ibid., p. 124). 
972 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 124. 
973 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 128. Al-Rāzī mentions another way of proving the same point: Bodies are 
originated, and every originated thing needs an originator. After stating this, al-Rāzī 
immediately turns to the question of whether this originator is possible or necessary (ibid., pp. 
128-129). 
974 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 308. 
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of God’s being an existent thing. This is most evident in al-Rāzī’s Maʿālim uṣūl al-
dīn where he states, discussing the same question of whether humans can attain 
knowledge of God’s essence: ‘What humans know is: the existence; the qualities 
(kayfiyyāt) of the existence, that is, (His) pre-eternity, eternity and necessity; 
the negations, that is, He is not a body nor an atom nor an accident…’975 In the 
Maṭālib, for instance, al-Rāzī refers to God’s being an existent thing in the same 
context as ‘the absolute/pure existence (al-wujūd al-muṭlaq)’ 976  and 
distinguishes it from the negative and positive attributes. It therefore appears 
that what al-Rāzī maintains is that we know of God’s being existent thanks to 
the method we have discussed above. Does this then not involve a contradiction 
since we argued that the affirmation of the creator never serves the purpose to 
prove God’s existence as the traditional arguments for God’s existence do? This 
question can be negated. We need to keep in mind that the task of theology is to 
make God known in His entirety, that is, to establish everything that is to be 
known about God’s essence and (hypostatic) attributes. One aspect this 
involves is to state that God is an existent thing. To provide an analogy to this, it 
would be the same as when someone said to another about a third person: ‘Tell 
me everything that is to be known about person X!’ In order to provide 
complete knowledge of this third person, the person asked would have to 
mention person X’s being an existent thing, in addition to a great number of 
other descriptions pertaining to her essence and attributes. Yet, it is evident 
that this complete description of person X, and in particular the mention of her 
being an existent, is different from the proof that there really is an instance, so 
to say, of this assumed person X in reality – which is precisely what arguments 
for God’s existence seek to establish.977 The importance of making the point that 
God belongs to the existent things in the context of discussions between 
Ashʿarite and Muʿtazilite theologians about the relation between essence and 
existence should also not be forgotten. We recall that such theologians as al-
Juwaynī launched a vigorous attack against Muʿtazilite theologians for 
                                                          
975 Al-Rāzī, Maʿālim uṣūl al-dīn, p. 79. 
976 Al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib, vol. 1, part 2, p. 82. 
977 It should also be kept in mind that, according to the mutakallimūn, these descriptions of God 
cannot be used as an analogue for describing humans. God cannot be perceived as other humans 
can, and the only way of justifying one’s descriptions of God is by reference to His acts, as these 
acts allow inferences as to the characteristics of their agent. 
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maintaining that there are non-existent essences. This belief, he argued, leads to 
the absurdity that God who is an essence described with certain attributes 
could be non-existent but nevertheless is able to act as the creator and sustainer 
of this world. The Muʿtazilites, he maintained, therefore need to present further 
proof that God is in fact an existent essence.978 This debate also shows that the 
assumption of God’s being non-existent, as discussed by the theologians, is not 
the same as the assumption of God’s non-existence in the traditional arguments 
for God’s existence (this being what they seek to prove false).    
Conclusions 
Unlike in the case of the Ishāra where al-Rāzī’s reference to Noah’s mission 
provided particularly clear evidence as to the meaning and purpose of the proof 
of the creator, in the Arbaʿīn we did not come across such unequivocal 
statements. Yet, in analogy to al-Rāzī’s explanation in the Ishāra of what 
theology seeks and the methods it employs to accomplish it, we showed that 
arguments for God’s existence (in the traditional sense) are absent from the 
Arbaʿīn as well. This finding is further supported when we take into account 
what al-Rāzī has to say in the Mafātīḥ al-ghayb, his commentary on the Qurʾān.  
  
                                                          
978 Al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil (1969), p. 617 et seqq. 
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Al-Tafsīr al-kabīr 
Nominally, al-Rāzī’s al-Tafsīr belongs to a different category of writings and 
discipline than the works of kalām and falsafa which we made the object of our 
enquiry. Yet, it shall be included among al-Rāzī’ works taken into consideration 
in this chapter for the following reason: Despite the fact that we are dealing 
with a tafsīr work, the Mafātīḥ al-ghayb is an abundant source of inherently 
philosophico-theological discussions. The affirmation and proof of the creator, 
too, plays a major role in al-Rāzī’s commentary and it is therefore an important 
source for our enquiry whether arguments for God’s existence have a place in 
al-Rāzī’s thought. Furthermore, the Tafsīr provides us with an understanding of 
certain terms, concepts and methods which are explained in less detail in al-
Rāzī’s proper kalām works. 
The Purpose of the Proof of the Existence of the Creator 
One such instance allowing us to establish what al-Rāzī means by the 
affirmation of the creator is his commentary on the story of Pharaoh and Moses 
told in Sūra al-Qaṣas. In Q. 28.38 Pharaoh says to his people, after Moses has 
called them to submit to God’s guidance: *you have no other [ilāh]979 that I 
know of except me.} Al-Rāzī comments on this verse that Pharaoh’s statement 
comprises two aspects: firstly, the denial of an ilāh other than him and, secondly, 
the affirmation of ilāhiyya for himself.980 We have explained above that in the 
Tafsīr al-Rāzī defines the term ilāh as denoting him ‘who is creator (khāliq).’981 
Yet, he also explains the term as referring to ‘the one who is the object of 
worship (al-maʿbūd).’982 With this in mind, al-Rāzī then turns to the first aspect 
and states that Pharaoh thought that the celestial bodies (al-kawākib wa’l-aflāk) 
are sufficient to explain the different states the sublunar world exhibits and that 
therefore ‘there is no need to affirm a creator (ithbāt ṣāniʿ).’983 Pharaoh 
                                                          
979 Abdel Haleem’s translation of the verse has ‘god’ for ilāh. I choose not to adopt this 
translation as al-Rāzī’s commentary makes clear that the English term ‘god’ does not seem to do 
justice to the subtleties of how he understands Pharaoh’s statement, as will be seen. 
980 Al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr, vol. 24, p. 252. 
981 Ibid., vol. 13, p. 56. 
982 Ibid., vol. 13, p. 43. Note how this destinction reflects the old dichotomy between tawḥīd al-
rubūbiyya, referring to God’s oneness as creator, and tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya, His sole worthiness of 
worship, we have came across numerous times. 
983 Ibid., vol. 24, p. 252. 
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followed the principle that ‘that for which there is no proof cannot be 
affirmed,’ 984  also known as the argument from ignorance. 985  Al-Rāzī, 
unsurprisingly, rejects this position attributed to Pharaoh and argues that there 
is in fact ‘proof for the existence of the creator:’986 When we know of the 
originatedness of the bodies in general, we know that the celestial bodies, too, 
must be originated, and since every originated thing is in need of an originator, 
it follows that the whole world has a creator. Regarding the second aspect 
mentioned above, that is, Pharaoh’s claiming ilāhiyya for himself, al-Rāzī 
comments that he certainly did not claim to be ‘creator of the heavens and the 
earth and the seas and the mountains as well as creator of the essences and 
attributes of humans,’987 this being one of the meanings of the term. Rather, 
Pharaoh’s claim to be al-ilāh refers to his demand to be al-maʿbūd.988 Here, the 
latter term appears in a slightly different meaning than usual where it denoted 
‘the one who deserves worship’ as becomes clear when al-Rāzī states about 
Pharaoh: ‘The man denied the creator (kāna yanfī al-ṣāniʿ) and said: There is no 
obligation (taklīf) for the people except for that they have to obey their king and 
comply with his order.’989 Lastly, and crucially for our endeavour to understand 
what the affirmation of the creator refers to, al-Rāzī points out the following: 
Pharaoh’s question addressed to Moses in Sūra Ṭa Ha {Moses, who is this Lord 
of yours?}990 shows clearly that ‘he had knowledge of God (Most-High!) (kāna 
ʿārifan bi’llāh) and that he only said this so it would spread among the simple-
minded people (al-aghmār min al-nās).’991  
This whole passage is most enlightening. It is clear that in al-Rāzī’s view 
Pharaoh was not an atheist who denied the existence of God (Allāh); after all, 
‘he had knowledge of God (Most-High!).’992 At the same time, however, Pharaoh 
‘denied the creator’ and thought that there is no evidence making it necessary 
                                                          
984 Ibid., vol. 24, p. 252. 
985 See also Shihadeh 2013 in which he focuses on al-Rāzī’s Nihāyat al-ʿuqūl. 
986 Al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr, vol. 24, p. 252. 
987 Ibid., vol. 24, p. 252. 
988 Ibid., vol. 24, p. 252. 
989 Ibid., vol. 24, p. 252. 
990 This is Q. 20.49. 
991 Al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr, vol. 24, p. 252. 
992 Consider also ibid., vol. 24, p. 254: ‘As for His saying {they thought that they would not be 
brought back to Us} (i.e., Q. 28.39), this proves that they had knowledge of God (kānū ʿārifīna bi-
llāh), but denied the resurrection.’  
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to ‘affirm a creator.’ All this is clear evidence that the denial of the creator does 
not refer to the denial of God’s existence.993 Rather, Pharaoh’s opposition to 
affirming the creator must be understood as that he saw no need to postulate 
God as the one who brings about all events in this world, arguing that these can 
be explained otherwise. The passage also indicates that Pharaoh’s denial of an 
ilāh other than himself does not denote his denial of God’s existence; rather, 
following the Qurʾānic reasoning that God’s deserving worship, gratefulness and 
obedience is based on His being the only ilāh which in turn is based on His being 
the only creator,994 Pharaoh’s sin consisted in demanding exclusive obedience 
to himself and in denying God what only He deserves.995 This passage is finally 
also relevant insofar as the context of Pharaoh’s error shows that al-Rāzī’s 
mentioning the proof for ‘the existence of the creator’ and that ‘the world has a 
creator’ based on the originatedness of the bodies does not have the purpose of 
proving that God exists – despite the claim to the contrary we encounter in 
secondary literature. Its real purpose in the present discussion is to show that 
the whole world, including the celestial bodies, is part of creation and that this 
points to God’s being their creator.  
At this point, it might be worth adding that, even if it appears curious to speak 
of ‘the proof of the existence of the creator’ when intending to prove that this 
world came about through God’s fiat, that is, when assigning the role of creator 
to God, this is nevertheless the language al-Rāzī – and other theologians, as we 
                                                          
993 An example of how this distinction has been overlooked in secondary literature is Kholeif 
1969. He has a section (pp. 74-78) explaining al-Rāzī’s proofs for God’s existence (wujūd Allāh). 
Kholeif correctly reproduces al-Rāzī’s methods based on the concepts of originatedness and 
permissibility with regards to essences and attributes, but it becomes evident that he interprets 
them as having the same purpose as classical arguments for God’s existence. For instance, he 
uses the expressions ‘God’s existence (wujūd Allāh),’ ‘the existence of the necessarily existent 
(wujūd wājib al-wujūd)’ and ‘the existence of the creator (wujūd al-ṣāniʿ)’ entirely 
interchangeably, without pointing out the nuances we have stressed. 
994 See, for example: ‘There is no way to declare false the worship of the idols except for through 
declaring false that the sun, the moon and the other celestial bodies are āliha and arrangers 
(mudabirra) for this world’ (ibid., vol. 13, p. 39) and ‘al-ilāhiyya is based upon the faculty of 
creation (al-khāliqiyya) and it has been established that he who does not create is not an ilāh’ 
(ibid., vol. 32, p. 15). 
995 Compare ibid., vol. 22, p. 64 (exegesis of Sūra Ṭaha): ‘As for his ,i.e., Pharaoh’s- claim to al-
rubūbiyya, it means that he declared it an obligation for them to obey him and to subjugate to 
him and not to be obedient to anybody else.’ Note that al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm (Kitāb al-Dalīl al-
kabīr, p. 86), al-Kindī (Fī al-falsafa al-ūlā, p. 104), al-Baqillānī (al-Inṣāf, p. 21) and al-Māturīdī 
(al-Tawḥīd, p. 21) used the term al-rubūbiyya in the context of the proof that God is the sole 
creator of everything, not so much with reference to God’s role as the one who can demand 
obedience from humans. 
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have seen in previous chapters – uses. Another instance where al-Rāzī opts for 
this kind of expression is when he speaks of certain things in this world proving 
‘the existence of the prophet (wujūd al-nabī).’996 This statement appears in the 
context of his commentary on Q. 14.9-10 which al-Rāzī interprets as mentioning 
individuals who doubted that God really would make certain humans His 
messengers. Al-Rāzī’s mention of proofs for ‘the existence of the prophet’ 
therefore refers to proofs that allow ascribing a particular role to certain 
individuals.    
There is a further instance in al-Rāzī’s al-Tafsīr which sheds light on the 
meaning and purpose of the proof for the existence of the creator. This is his 
commentary on Q. 2.164 which reads: {In the creation of the heavens and the 
earth; in the alternation of night and day; in the ships that sail the seas with 
goods for people; in the water which God sends down from the sky to give life to 
the earth…; in the changing of the winds and clouds…: there are signs in all 
these for those who use their minds.} Ayman Shihadeh refers to this very verse 
as an example of how al-Rāzī makes use of a teleological argument for God’s 
existence inspired by the Qurʾān.997 A different picture, however, emerges with 
regards to al-Rāzī’s understanding of what this verse is meant to prove. 
Referring to ‘the ships that sail the seas,’ al-Rāzī explains that they represent the 
‘reasoning…for the existence of the creator.’998 Yet, unlike the objective of 
traditional arguments for God’s existence, al-Rāzī identifies the objective in this 
verse as the following: ‘Even if the ships have been assembled by humans, it is 
nevertheless He (Most-High!) who created the devices through which the 
assembly of the ships is possible, and if it was not for His creation of them, this 
would not be possible.’999 As argued before, the proof of ‘the existence of the 
creator’ evidently denotes the proof that God is creator. In the case of this 
particular verse, an allusion seems to be made by al-Rāzī, even if this is not 
spelled out, to the contentious notion of human efficient causality which, some 
theologians felt, was in conflict with the notion of God’s absolute efficacy of, and 
                                                          
996 Ibid., vol. 19, p. 93. 
997 Shihadeh 2008, p. 201. He refers to al-Rāzī’s al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya though where al-Rāzī 
mentions the very same verse as an argument from design (tadbīr). 
998 Al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr, vol. 4, p. 218. 
999 Ibid., vol. 4, p. 218. 
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power over, everything.1000 In the same manner, God’s sending down rain from 
the sky to give life to the earth, which the same verse mentions, is referred to by 
al-Rāzī as among ‘His proofs for the creator’1001 and he clearly seeks to make the 
point that God is to be identified as the agent responsible for this. Rain, al-Rāzī 
states, belongs to what ‘no one can create except for God (Most-High!).’1002 The 
colours, tastes and smells caused by rain falling on the earth all equally belong 
to ‘what no one is capable of except for God.’1003  
Since the purpose of the proof for the existence of the creator has hence been 
clarified, based on al-Rāzī’s exegesis of Q. 28.38 as well as Q. 2.164, it should be 
noted that he uses the following expressions in one breath and entirely 
interchangeably: He speaks of ‘the proofs…for the affirmation of the creator (al-
dalāʾil…ʿalā ithbāt al-ṣāniʿ)’1004  alongside the proof ‘which points to the 
existence of the creator (al-dāll ʿalā wujūd al-ṣāniʿ),’ 1005  while likewise 
mentioning certain things in this world which are ‘in need…of the creator 
(muftaqira…ilā’l-ṣāniʿ)’1006 and speaking of ‘their need…for a wise and eternal 
arranger (Praised and Most-High!).’1007 
Theological Methodologies and Objectives 
Following the contours of the Ishāra, in his al-Tafsīr al-Rāzī also reveals that he 
considers reasoning on the basis of creation for the creator the one and only 
method to gain knowledge about God’s nature. In his commentary on Q. 2.21, al-
Rāzī restates his view that theology (ʿilm al-uṣūl) is the noblest of all sciences. 
This is so, on the one hand, because all other sciences depend on it and are 
subsequent to it1008 and, on the other hand, because theology’s subject-matter is 
                                                          
1000 See, for instance, Burrell’s chapter on “Creation” in The Cambridge Companion to Classical 
Islamic Theology (Edited by Tim Winter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 
141-160).  
1001 Al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr, vol. 4, p. 219. 
1002 Ibid., vol. 4, p. 219. 
1003 Ibid., vol. 4, p. 219. 
1004 Ibid., vol. 4, p. 209. 
1005 Ibid., vol. 4, p. 209. 
1006 Ibid., vol. 4, p. 209. 
1007 Ibid., vol. 4, p. 209. 
1008 The discipline of Qurʾānic exegesis (tafsīr) depends on the affirmation of ‘the existence of 
the creator who is choosing and speaking’ (ibid., vol. 2, p. 95) since the Qurʾān is considered 
God’s speech (kalām Allāh).  The investigation of the Prophetic traditions (kalām rasūl Allāh) 
depends on the affirmation of his prophethood. Jurisprudence (fiqh), which investigates God’s 
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the noblest of all. ‘As for theology,’ al-Rāzī states, ‘what it seeks is God’s essence 
and His attributes and His deeds, and (it seeks) all classes of things known, 
whether non-existent or existent.’1009 The definition given in the Tafsīr of what 
theology is concerned with is hence the same al-Rāzī gave in the Ishāra and 
shall proffer in the Maṭālib. Equally in line with his previous works, and indeed 
with the works of all theologians before him, al-Rāzī notes that knowledge of 
God can only be attained through speculation and reasoning (al-naẓar wa’l-
istidlāl). Speculation leads to the intuition that this world, which is originated, 
must depend on one who exerts influence on it (muʾaththir) and that this ‘can 
only be God (Most-High!).’1010 Knowledge of God, which means, to be precise, 
knowledge about His essence and attributes, is therefore once more described 
as being dependent on showing that God has to be credited with having brought 
about the world.  
The same is affirmed elsewhere in al-Rāzī’s al-Tafsīr: In his exegesis of Q. 43.9 
which reads *If you ,Prophet- ask them, ‘Who created the heavens and the 
earth?’ they are sure to say, ‘They were created by the Almighty, the All 
Knowing.’+, al-Rāzī states that according to the mutakallimūn ‘the first 
knowledge about God is the knowledge of His being [i.e., that He is!] originator 
for the world and its maker (al-ʿilm bi-kawnihi muḥdithan li’l-ʿālam fāʿilan 
lahu).’1011  
That the knowledge of God’s agency is declared the basis of, and method leading 
to, the knowledge about His essence, attributes and acts, which are the subject-
matter of theology, becomes even more evident in al-Rāzī’s commentary on Q. 
26.23. In this verse, Pharaoh poses the question to Moses *What is this “Lord of 
the Worlds”?+. Al-Rāzī explains that the question about the ‘what’ demands that 
‘the essence of the thing should be made known (taʿrīf ḥaqīqa al-shayʾ).’1012 A 
thing’s essence may be known through a number of ways,1013 but ‘making 
                                                                                                                                                                    
laws (aḥkām Allāh), follows the affirmation of God’s oneness and uniqueness (tawḥīd) as well 
as prophethood, which are both established by theology. 
1009 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 96. 
1010 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 104. 
1011 Ibid., vol. 27, p. 197. 
1012 Ibid., vol. 24, p. 128. 
1013 They are: ‘either through that essence itself; or through a part of it; or through something 
outside it; or through something combined from inside and outside it’ (ibid., vol. 24, p. 128). 
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known the essence (māhiyya) of the necessarily existent is only possible 
through His necessary concomitants and His traces (bi-lawāzimihi wa-āthārihi),’ 
among which al-Rāzī names ‘this observable world, that is, the heavens and the 
earth and what is between them’1014 as the most evident one. In particular, this 
means, al-Rāzī notes, that, once humans have grasped that the things observed 
in this world end in the necessarily existent by virtue of its essence, they 
understand that God is ‘absolutely unique (farad muṭlaq).’1015 Returning to 
Pharaoh’s question to Moses, al-Rāzī then states that Pharaoh dismisses Moses’ 
reply {the Lord of the heavens and the earth and everything between them} 
because the latter referred to God’s role as creator – al-fāʿiliyya wa’l-
muʾaththiriyya –, without actually speaking about what makes God’s essence 
specific (khuṣūṣiyya al-ḥaqīqa). Al-Rāzī finally comments, in line with the 
Arbaʿīn, that knowing about a thing’s necessary concomitants or traces – such 
as the world in the case of God – does not result in knowing the essence itself. 
For our enquiry, however, it is important to note that here the world’s being 
God’s product is presented as serving the purpose to allow humans to gain 
knowledge about God’s essential and hypostatic attributes, even if complete 
knowledge of God’s specific essence can never be attained. The world with its 
characteristics points to God, its creator, in terms of His essence, attributes and 
deeds – it is, however, not used to prove that God exists, as the traditional 
proofs of God’s existence aspire to do.    
The Proof for God’s Existence – Methods and Meaning 
Considering these findings, it must now seem somewhat astonishing that, still in 
his commentary on Q. 2.21-22,1016 al-Rāzī utters the following words:  
Note that He (Praised!) decreed that He be worshipped, and the order to worship 
Him depends on knowledge of His existence (maʿrifa wujūdihi). Since the 
knowledge of His existence is not necessary, rather it is based on reasoning, He 
reports here what proves His existence. Note that we explained in the reason-
based books (al-kutub al-ʿaqliyya) [i.e., kalām works] that the method to affirm 
                                                          
1014 Ibid., vol. 24, p. 128. 
1015 Ibid., vol. 24, p. 128. 
1016 Which reads: {People, worship your Lord, who created you and those before you, so that 
you may be mindful [of Him] who spread out the earth for you and built the sky; who sent water 
down from it and with that water produced things for your sustenance. Do not, knowing this, set 
up rivals to God.} 
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Him (Praised and Most-High!) (ithbātihi) is either possibility or originatedness 
or both together, and all this with regards to atoms and accidents.1017  
As opposed to all aforementioned instances where al-Rāzī spoke of the 
affirmation of the existence of the creator and the like, he now speaks of God’s 
existence and that the knowledge of it depends on speculation. The methods 
which are said to prove this are four, and they are the very same methods al-
Rāzī already discussed in his al-Arbaʿīn where they served to prove that God is 
creator: reasoning based on the possibility of the essences, followed by the 
possibility of the attributes, then the originatedness of the essences and finally 
the originatedness of the attributes.1018 In this part of his commentary, al-Rāzī 
does not provide much detailed explanation of these methods associated with 
the theologians and philosophers as he had done in the Arbaʿīn. He does, 
however, mention a number of Qurʾānic verses which, according to Him, contain 
and represent the same reasoning.1019  
Let us now have a closer look at the verse al-Rāzī adduces as an example of the 
reasoning on the basis of the originatedness of the bodies as his commentary of 
this verse sheds some light on the question of what these four methods are 
meant to establish. The verse in question is Q. 6.76 in which Abraham says {I do 
not like things that set} when he sees the star set about which he previously 
said that it is his Lord (rabb).1020 Al-Rāzī explains the context of the verse as 
that Abraham’s people were worshippers of the heavenly bodies and called 
them āliha and arbāb.1021 They believed that the stars are part of God’s creation, 
                                                          
1017 Al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr, vol. 2, p. 106. Note that Mahdi (in D. Burrell and B. McGinn 1990), 
referring to al-Rāzī’s enumeration of these methods where he speaks of his reason-based books 
in the Tafsīr, sees them in the light of proving ‘God’s existence’ (p. 301). 
1018 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 107. 
1019 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 107: For example, for the reasoning based on the possibility of the essences, 
he mentions Q. 47.38 {God is the source of wealth [al-ghanī] and you are the needy ones [al-
fuqarāʾ]}. For the reasoning based on the possibility of the attributes, he mentions {who created 
the heavens and the earth} which can be found in Q. 6.1 and Q. 11.7. 
1020 Ibid., vol. 13, p. 52. Al-Rāzī is eager to stress that Abraham did not utter these words in 
affirmation of al-rubūbiyya for the star, rather he might have reflected about what his people 
believed concerning them. This appears clearly in defence of the doctrine of the prophets’ 
immunity to sin (compare Ibn Taymiyya, al-Fatāwā (37 vols., al-Malik Fahd li-Ṭabāʿa al-Muṣḥaf 
al-Sharīf, 2004), vol. 4, p. 319: ‘The belief that prophets are free (maʿṣūmūna) from all major 
sins, but not the minor ones is what the majority of Muslim scholars hold and all sects and even 
the majority of theologians…and most exegetes and Ḥadīth scholars and jurists.’).  
1021 Note that al-Rāzī explains the term rabb in the same way as the term ilāh: ‘What is meant by 
al-rabb and al-ilāh is: he who is creator for us and maker of our essences and attributes’ (ibid., 
vol. 13, p. 43). See also this explanation: ‘God is the ilāh of the worlds insofar as He is the one 
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whom they considered to be the supreme ilāh (al-ilāh al-akbar),1022 but that 
these celestial bodies are responsible for the creation (takhluqu) of plants and 
animals in this lower world.1023 Al-Rāzī rejects this belief as absurd arguing that 
the setting of the stars indicates their originatedness and their need for another 
to give them existence, yet that which is in need of another does not deserve to 
be called rabb and ilāh.1024 This, according to al-Rāzī, is the reasoning contained 
in Abraham’s utterance *I do not like things that set+ in Q. 6.76. Al-Rāzī then 
proceeds to explain that Abraham ‘called (his people) away from the worship of 
the stars and to tawḥīd.’ 1025  Concretely, this means that al-Rāzī views 
Abraham’s mission was to convince his people to give up their worship of any 
entity besides God, whom they already acknowledged as the main creator, and 
by abandoning to associate any partners with God (nafī al-sharīk) to affirm His 
uniqueness (ithbāth al-tawḥīd). 1026  Al-Rāzī’s commentary on this verse 
therefore clarifies two things: Firstly, he adduces this verse as an example of 
reasoning on the basis of the originatedness of the bodies since the corollary of 
the setting of the stars is that they are originated and hence depend for their 
existence on a creator. Secondly, following al-Rāzī’s own account, Abraham does 
not make use of this insight in order to achieve what traditional arguments for 
God’s existence seek to show; rather, the realisation that all bodies in this world, 
including the stars, are originated makes it necessary to acknowledge that only 
God is rabb and ilāh – He is not the ilāh al-āliha, but the only ilāh – and that He 
alone is therefore worthy of worship. We can thus conclude that the reasoning 
on the basis of the originatedness of the world, which al-Rāzī sees exemplified 
in Q. 6.67, has no other purpose than to establish what al-Rāzī elsewhere 
referred to as ‘the first knowledge about God is the knowledge about His being 
originator for the world and its maker.’1027  
                                                                                                                                                                    
who brought them about from non-existence into existence, and He is the rabb of the worlds 
insofar as He keeps them in existence’ (ibid., vol. 1, p. 234). 
1022 See also ibid., vol. 2, p. 52: ‘He (Most-High!) is the ilāh al-āliha in their opinion.’ 
1023 Ibid., vol. 13, p. 56. 
1024 Ibid., vol. 13, p. 56. 
1025 Ibid., vol. 13, p. 58. 
1026 Ibid., vol. 13, p. 61.  
1027 Ibid., vol. 27, p. 197. 
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If this is the case, it follows that this must also hold true for the other three 
methods al-Rāzī enumerated alongside the one just discussed.1028 This finding is 
further confirmed by the fact that al-Rāzī characterises the fourth method 
which is based upon the originatedness of accidents as ‘establishing the 
knowledge about the existence of the creator,’1029 the meaning of which was 
previously discussed. Furthermore, al-Rāzī states that the pious ancestors (al-
salaf) knew of other methods to prove the same point, and he mentions among 
them a conversation between the Prophet and ʿImrān b. Ḥuṣayn, one of his 
companions: ‘The Prophet said to him: How many āliha1030 do you have? He said: 
ten. The Prophet said: but what when a calamity and difficult times hit you? He 
said: God (Allāh). The Prophet said: so which ilāh do you have besides God?’1031 
This episode is a further confirmation that al-Rāzī views the aforementioned 
four methods in the light of establishing that God alone deserves to be called the 
creator of the world and to be obeyed.  
Having clarified this, we now need to return to our initial question what al-Rāzī 
has in mind when he states that it is ‘God’s existence’ which needs to be known 
before worship of Him can become obligatory, and that it is the aforementioned 
four methods which prove just this. On the face of it, it seems to be 
contradictory that, on the one hand, al-Rāzī presents these methods as having 
the purpose to prove God’s role as creator and, conversely, as serving to prove 
His existence. An answer to our question may be found when considering the 
following: Towards the very end of his commentary on Q. 2.21-22 – which is 
precisely where al-Rāzī introduced the aforementioned four methods – al-Rāzī 
gives an explanation of God’s saying *,He- who sent water down from it and 
with that water produced things for your sustenance}. He points out that God 
mentions rain and provisions from Him so that human ‘may ponder about 
themselves and about the states of what is above them and what is beneath 
                                                          
1028 McAuliffe (in D. Burrell and B. McGinn 1990) speaks of the five kinds of creation mentioned 
in Q. 2.21-22, which al-Rāzī makes the basis of his explanation of the four methods, as 
containing ‘evidence for God’s existence’ (p. 283). Shihadeh (2008, p. 198) presents al-Rāzī’s 
four methods as different types of arguments for God’s existence, and so does Ceylan (1996, pp. 
81-85).   
1029 Al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr, vol. 2, p. 108. 
1030 Literally singular: kam ilāh.  
1031 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 108. 
 
 
224 
 
them, and they shall know that nothing from among these things can bring them 
,i.e., the provisions- about…except for one who is different from them in terms 
of the essence and the attributes, and this is the wise creator (Praised and Most-
High!).’1032 The idea al-Rāzī puts forward is that by considering what the 
essences and attributes of created things are like, one reaches the conclusion 
that their creator must be one who is completely different from them. This 
reasoning is spelled out where al-Rāzī focuses on the method based on the 
originatedness of the accidents: Everyone necessarily knows, he argues, that he 
was once non-existent and that he therefore depends on one who brought him 
about (mūjid). This entity is not a human being pondering over this question, 
nor is it his parents, nor any other human. This entity is not one of the planets 
or stars either as they are subject to change – a sign of their own originatedness. 
It must be something (amr) which is not a body or corporeal like the created 
bodies and it must have choice (mukhtār) in what it brings about as well as 
power over it (qādir).1033 Al-Rāzī’s mentioning the aspect of incorporeality with 
regards to the being who deserves to be called the creator of humans and the 
world as a whole is telling. We recall from al-Rāzī’s account in the Arbaʿīn, for 
instance, that corporeality is what characterises one type of essence/existence, 
namely atoms/bodies. Accidents are a different type of essence/existence, and 
God in His incorporeality (as well as His non-subsistence in a substrate, unlike 
the accident) is yet another type of essence/existence.  Furthermore, it is due to 
the classification of the existence of created things as originated that God’s 
existence can be classified as eternal. If God was not of eternal existence, it 
would not be justified to call Him creator and to distinguish Him from creation 
(as He Himself would need a cause); yet, the originated existence of everything 
other than God is the very basis for the justification of His exclusive worthiness 
of worship, as discussed previously. The same is obviously true of those two 
methods which focus on the classification of created existence as being possible 
and the classification of God’s existence as being necessary. Existence which is 
necessary by virtue of the essence is nothing else than eternal existence (i.e., 
beginningless and uncaused), and the fact that God is the necessarily existent 
                                                          
1032 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 120. 
1033 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 107. 
 
 
225 
 
goes hand in hand with His being the creator of the world. We can therefore 
conclude: The reason why al-Rāzī maintains that worship of God depends on 
knowing His existence is that, only when humans know that God is of eternal, 
necessary and incorporeal existence which does not subsist in a substrate, they 
appreciate God’s uniqueness and difference from creation and that God Himself 
is without cause. All this, however, can only be established on the basis of 
speculation about God’s traces, as al-Rāzī has it elsewhere,1034 which are the 
very four methods introduced above. Contrary to the common understanding in 
secondary literature, it appears that al-Rāzī does not have in mind a proof of 
God’s existence in the traditional sense when he states: ‘Every existent other 
than God points to the existence of God.’1035 It is, in this context, important to 
bear in mind that, when al-Rāzī speaks of the existence of a thing, he might refer 
to more than the mere fact that this thing is not non-existent. This is confirmed 
by the following statement of his, made elsewhere: ‘We have mentioned in this 
book [i.e., the Tafsīr] how the existence of the heavens and the earth proves 
their need for the choosing creator.’1036 It is evident that it is not the mere fact 
that the heavens and the earth are existents which indicates their createdness; 
the fact that something exists says nothing about whether it exists due to 
another or uncaused. What al-Rāzī means is that the kind of existence specific to 
the heavens and the earth insofar as they are originated and possible points to 
their dependence on God as their creator. Let us therefore repeat once more, 
this is what al-Rāzī means when he says: ‘Everything besides God proves God’s 
existence.’1037 It should be noted that this reading of al-Rāzī’s statement, which 
emerged from all the forgoing considerations, proffers a different 
understanding of his objectives than encountered in the works of certain 
academics. This is evident when Shihadeh, for example, poses and answers the 
                                                          
1034 Ibid., vol. 24, p. 128. 
1035 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 223. Compare ibid., vol. 1, p. 180: ‘The proof for His existence is the existence 
of His creation, and His saying {Lord of the Worlds} (i.e., Q. 1.2) alludes to that there is no way 
to know His existence except for on the basis of His being the Lord (rabb) of the worlds.’ Note 
that al-Rāzī explains the term rabb as ‘the one who keeps them ,i.e. the worlds- in existence’ 
(ibid. vol. 1, p. 234) and equates it with ilāh: ‘What is meant by al-rabb and al-ilāh is: he who is 
creator for us and maker of our essences and attributes’ (ibid., vol. 13, p. 43). 
1036 Ibid., vol. 19, p. 93. 
1037 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 223. This account in the Tafsīr clearly ties in with the discussion in the Ishāra 
where al-Rāzī made the point that knowledge of God’s oneness and uniqueness (waḥdāniyya 
Allāh) is directly linked to knowing that His essence – and thereby existence – has no 
comparison.   
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question: ‘How does he ,i.e., al-Rāzī- then view the relation between the subject-
matter of theology and its objectives? … Knowing the natures of created things 
has no soteriological value, except in their being signs for the existence of 
God.’1038 Since Shihadeh utters these words against the background of the 
assumption that al-Rāzī’s concern is exactly the same as that of traditional 
arguments for God’s existence, it is clear that he views the method and idea 
expressed by al-Rāzī in the above statement in an entirely different light than 
proposed by us.   
Conclusions 
In line with al-Rāzī’s two earlier works, the Ishāra and the Arbaʿīn, it became 
clear that the traditional proof for God’s existence seems to be entirely absent 
from the Tafsīr, and that the purpose which the proof of the existence of the 
creator (or similar expressions) serves has been misunderstood in some of 
secondary literature. We have shown that al-Rāzī means by the proof for the 
existence of the creator the proof that it is God who brought about the entire 
world.1039 Al-Rāzī then makes this insight the foundation of God’s exclusive 
right to be worshipped as well as declares it the single method which allows 
                                                          
1038 Shihadeh 2005, pp. 174-175. 
1039 Al-Rāzī’s Tafsīr contains an argument which, at first glance, seems to resemble Pascal’s 
famous wager about God’s existence. In his Pensées (Blaise Pascal’s Pensees, English translation 
by W. F. Trotter, Blacksburg, VA: Virginia Tech, 2001, pp. 45-46), Pascal (d. 1623-1662) writes: 
‘If there is a God, He is infinitely incomprehensible… We are then uncapable of knowing either 
what He is or if He is. … Let us then examine this point, and say, “God is, or He is not.” But to 
which side shall we incline? … Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is.’ Al-
Rāzī states: ‘Acknowledging the existence of the ilāh who chooses and who obligates…is very 
wise (aḥūṭ), hence it must be done. … Affirming the existence of the ilāh is very wise because, if 
he was not existent, there would be no harm in the affirmation of his existence. But if he is 
existent, then the greatest harm lies in his denial’ (vol. 19, p. 94 (exegesis of Q. 14.10)). Al-Rāzī 
and Pascal’s arguments have one thing in common: They stress the benefit weighed against the 
harm of affirming the existence of the creator (al-Rāzī) and the existence of God (Pascal) 
respectively. However, the fundamental difference between them is: Firstly, al-Rāzī deals with 
the question of whether one should affirm that this world is something that came about due to 
another who is its creator, and that this creator is none but God who must be obeyed (this being 
what the phrase ‘affirmation of the (existence of the) creator’ refers to, as argued in this 
chapter). Pascal, on the other hands, deals with the question of whether in a situation where 
neither God’s existence nor His non-existence are conclusive, one has good reason to wager for 
His existence. These are fundamentally different questions. Also, while Pascal maintains that 
there is no conclusive evidence for what his wager is concerned with – that is, God’s existence –, 
al-Rāzī stresses that there is conclusive proof for what he enquires into (see, for example ibid., 
vol. 24, p. 252 (exegesis of Q. 28.38) where al-Rāzī rejects Pharaoh’s position which he presents 
as that the affirmation of an ilāh other than himself cannot be undertaken since ‘that for which 
there is no proof cannot be affirmed.’ Al-Rāzī counters: ‘We do not concede that there is no 
proof for the existence of the creator.’).  
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humans to gain knowledge about God in terms of His essence and attributes, 
which is what theology seeks. 
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Al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya – Theological Methodologies and Objectives 
The final work written by al-Rāzī we shall take into consideration is his 
celebrated al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya. It is in most respects very similar to his three 
previous works in respect of those passages that are relevant for our enquiry. 
As in the Ishāra, the opening chapter of the Maṭālib contains an explanation of 
why the science of theology (al-ʿilm al-ilāhī) is the noblest of all sciences. This is 
the case because the object of its investigation is ‘the essence (dhāt) of God 
(Most-High!) and His attributes’1040 and because He is the noblest of all 
existents. ‘God’s (Most-High!) essence and the attributes of His lordliness’1041 
belong to the greatest and holiest things known. In the Maṭālib, al-Rāzī then also 
restates his view that, even if theology is concerned with attaining knowledge of 
God in terms of His essence and attributes, the human mind falls short of really 
knowing God. Its ability to conceive of a thing in terms of its essence is confined 
to four ways,1042 yet since God’s essence is unlike everything humans have ever 
known, it cannot be conceived in the same way as the observable existents 
around us.1043 The only method available to humans to know God is therefore 
‘reasoning on the basis of the effect (al-maʿlūl) to the cause (al-ʿilla)…which is 
moving from the created thing (al-makhlūq) to the creator (al-khāliq).’1044  
So far, al-Rāzī’s description of the subject-matter of theology and of what it 
seeks as well as of the method it employs to achieve this is entirely in line with 
his previous works. The similarity between the method presented in the 
Maṭālib and the methods introduced in al-Rāzī’s earlier works is even more 
evident in one of the subsequent chapters where he explains ‘the method of the 
theological philosophers (al-ḥukamāʾ al-ilāhiyyīna)’ this way:  
It is reasoning on the basis of the states of the possible things for the affirmation 
of an existent which is necessarily existent by virtue of its essence. This is so 
because, when it has been established that these observable existents are 
possible and originated, and that the possible thing needs the one who gives 
                                                          
1040 Al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib, vol. 1, part 1, p. 37. 
1041 Ibid., p. 48. 
1042 These are: conceiving (taṣawwur) of essences through the five senses; physical perception 
as in the case of pain or hunger; conceiving of ‘inborn ideas’ (bi-ḥukm fiṭra ʿuqūlinā) like the 
meaning of existence and non-existence; conceiving of ideas which have no actualisation in 
reality like an associate (sharīk) for God (ibid., pp. 49-50). 
1043 Ibid., pp. 50-51. 
1044 Ibid., p. 51. 
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preference (to one of two possible alternatives) (al-murajjiḥ), and that the 
originated thing needs the originator, and that the infinite regress (of causes) (al-
tasalsul) and circularity (al-dawr) are absurd, then it is necessary that these 
existents end in an existent which is eternal and necessarily existent by virtue its 
essence.1045  
Once more, knowledge of God is attained on the basis of the classification of the 
existence which belongs to observable things in this world as being possible 
and originated since this points to the characterisation of God’s existence, and 
thereby essence, as eternal and necessary. It is also important to note that al-
Rāzī’s detailed discussion of all the different methods leading to this knowledge 
appears as part of the overarching section entitled ‘On the proofs for the 
affirmation of the creator (al-ilāh) for this observable world and the affirmation 
of His being necessarily existent by virtue of His essence.’1046 This confirms 
what has become evident numerous times before, namely that the proof of 
God’s being creator of the world serves the immediate purpose of establishing 
His essential and hypostatic attributes. Like in the Tafsīr, al-Rāzī describes this 
method as being ‘reasoning on the basis of the existence of what is other than 
God to the existence of God (Most-High!),’1047 which, as we have stressed, has 
nothing to do with the aims of traditional arguments for God’s existence.  
Investigation of the Methods and Purpose of the Proof of the Creator 
Al-Rāzī’s detailed account of the methods on the basis of which knowledge of 
God’s essence and attributes can be attained reveals that they are the very same 
methods he mentioned, and explained, in the Arbaʿīn and the Tafsīr. In the 
Maṭālib, al-Rāzī lists ‘the affirmation of the creator (al-ilāh) of the world based 
upon the possibility of the attributes,’1048 followed by ‘the affirmation of the 
knowledge of the existence of the creator (al-ilāh) based upon the 
originatedness of the essences,’1049 and finally ‘the affirmation of the knowledge 
of the creator (al-ṣāniʿ) based upon the originatedness of the attributes.’1050 
                                                          
1045 Ibid., p. 53. 
1046 Ibid., p. 65. 
1047 Ibid., p. 54. 
1048 In three chapters, ibid., pp. 177-199. 
1049 Ibid., p. 200. 
1050 In three chapters, ibid., pp. 215-232. It should be noted that in the Maṭālib, the term ilāh 
appears simply as an equivalent of the term ṣāniʿ and denotes nothing else than the creator, as 
evident from the chapter headings. The aspect of worship, contained in the term al-maʿbūd, 
which al-Rāzī associated with al-ilāh in the Tafsīr, alongside the aforementioned aspect of 
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Exactly like in the Arbaʿīn, the method focusing on the inherent possibility of the 
attributes of things in this observable world involves that all bodies are equal in 
terms of their ‘body-ness’ or corporeality (al-jismiyya), but different when it 
comes to their specification with certain attributes. The attributes must hence 
be possible. This specification must be due to a cause (sabab), since otherwise 
one would admit that something possible can occur without one who makes it 
preponderate over the alternative, which al-Rāzī has already proven wrong. 
Turning to the cause, al-Rāzī then establishes that it must be ‘a separate existent 
which is neither a body nor corporeal.’1051 Following the reasoning that ‘the 
existence of what is other than God (points) to the existence of God,’ al-Rāzī has 
established that God’s existence is different from created existence insofar as 
the former is incorporeal. It should once more be kept in mind that corporeality 
and incorporeality are what distinguishes different types of essences from each 
other, according to the theologians. As for the knowledge that God is of 
necessary existence, al-Rāzī notes that this is only established once it has been 
ruled out that He is possibly existent through reference to the impossibility of 
an infinite regress of causes or their circularity.1052  
The next proof for ‘the affirmation of the knowledge of the existence of the 
creator (al-ilāh) (Most-High!)’1053 al-Rāzī presents is the one based upon the 
originatedness of the essences. Its reasoning is the very same as in the Arbaʿīn, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
creation, is now missing. (This is not to say, however, that the reasoning that only the creator is 
deserving of worship does not hold any longer.) It can therefore be questioned whether the 
common translation of ilāh as ‘god’ (e.g., in the all-important profession of faith, for instance in 
Q. 2.255: ‘God ,Allāh]: there is no god [ilāh] but Him’ or when Davidson, referring to the so-
called dalīl al-tamānuʿ (the proof for God’s oneness based on the notion of mutual hindrance, 
derived from Q. 21.22: {If there had been in the heavens and the earth any gods [āliha] but Him, 
both heavens and earth would be in ruins}), states: ‘in the most popular proof for unity, the 
pivotal thought is that the hypothesis of two deities cannot be squared with what is meant by 
‘God’ (1987, p. 165).) is adequate for the Maṭālib, while it may work for certain discussions in 
the Tafsīr (that is, if one argues that the English term ‘god’ means nothing else than ‘the creator’ 
and ‘the one who is worthy of worship.’ Al-Rāzī’s approach to Pharaoh’s claim to be the only ilāh, 
however, revealed the further difficulty that in this particular context, al-Rāzī did not 
understand this term as to denote ‘the creator’ or ‘the one worthy of worship,’ but rather as ‘the 
one who must be obeyed.’ This is another instance where the English term ‘god’ does not seem 
to do justice to how al-Rāzī understands the term ilāh.). One could also wonder whether the 
frequent occurrence of the term ilāh (and in particular of ‘the existence of the ilāh’) in the 
Maṭālib taken together with the common translation of it as ‘god’ or ‘godhead’ might further 
have contributed to the conviction expressed in secondary literature that al-Rāzī indeed is 
concerned with the proof of God’s existence in the traditional sense.  
1051 Ibid., p. 185. 
1052 Ibid., pp. 186-187. 
1053 Ibid., p. 200. 
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and al-Rāzī describes this method as that preferred by the majority of 
mutakallimūn who argued that all bodies are originated and that everything 
originated is in need of a creator.1054 The proof is complete (al-dalīl innamā 
yatimmu), al-Rāzī carries on, once it has been shown that this creator is eternal 
– since his being originated would lead to the absurdity of an infinite regress – 
and thereby necessarily existent by virtue of his essence. ‘This is what is 
sought,’1055 al-Rāzī concludes, pointing to the purpose of this method which 
consists in establishing the kind of existence that is God’s.  
Thirdly, al-Rāzī turns to ‘the affirmation of the knowledge of the creator (al-
ṣāniʿ)’ based on the originatedness of the attributes.’1056 In al-Rāzī’s view, this 
method is somewhat more straightforward than the two previous ones since 
‘before the knowledge of the possibility of the essences of the bodies and before 
the knowledge of their originatedness, we witness the origintedness of states 
(aḥwāl) and attributes over which humans have no power.’1057 In line with his 
account in the Arbaʿīn, this argument focuses on such observable events in the 
upper world as the movements of the planets as well as the alternation of night 
and day, alongside changes in plants and animals in the lower world. A special 
status and separate chapter is once more assigned to the reasoning based on 
‘how humans develop from sperm’1058 where al-Rāzī notes: ‘This kind of proof is 
closest to the heart and has the greatest impact on the minds.’1059 Like in his 
account of the previous two methods, al-Rāzī then concludes this chapter by 
pointing out that the creator to whom all existents can be traced must be 
necessarily existent by virtue of his essence, and this is what God Himself 
intended when He said in the Qurʾān {that the final goal [al-muntahī] is your 
Lord}.1060   
                                                          
1054 Ibid., p. 200. Like in the Arbaʿīn, the need of the originated for an originator is explained on 
the basis that the originated thing is possibly existent by virtue of its essence. 
1055 Ibid., p. 200. 
1056 Ibid., p. 215. 
1057 Ibid., p. 215. 
1058 Ibid., p. 216. Note that this is an argument with a long tradition which al-Ashʿarī already 
used in his proof of the creator: ‘What is the proof that creation has a creator? … The proof for 
this is that humans…were a drop of sperm, then a clinging clot, then flesh, then blood, and we 
know that they cannot transform themselves from state to state…’ (al-Lumaʿ, pp. 17-18).  
1059 Ibid., p. 216. 
1060 Ibid., p. 227.  This is Q. 53.42. 
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According to al-Rāzī, the early philosophers (qudamāʾ al-falāsifa) employed a 
different reasoning which, however, also takes into consideration the 
originatedness of the attributes found in creation. They focused on the endless 
rotations (adwār) this world goes through, concluding from them ‘the 
affirmation of the creator (al-ilāh),’1061 following the Qurʾānic statement that 
{The creation of the heavens and the earth is greater by far than the creation of 
mankind}.1062 They arrived at the conclusion that the agent who brings about 
these rotations ‘cannot be a body or corporeal, therefore one needs to 
acknowledge an existent which is not a body nor corporeal and who is the 
mover (al-muḥarriq) of…the spheres. This existent is God (Most-High!).’1063 
This account makes evident the purpose attributed to the reasoning in question, 
which is on the one hand to identify none but God as the sole creator and on the 
other hand to show that He is of a kind of existence which is different from the 
corporeal existence characteristic of creation. 
In the Maṭālib, al-Rāzī finally introduces yet another method to ‘affirm the 
creator (al-ilāh) (Most-High!) for this creation’ 1064  which Shihadeh has 
identified as an ‘argument from design’ or ‘teleological argument.’1065 Al-Rāzī 
states:  
Note that whoever reflects about the various parts in the higher and lower world 
will understand that this world is built in the most advantageous and best way 
and according to the most excellent and perfect arrangement (tartīb). The sound 
mind hence bears witness that things can only occur in this way through the 
arrangement of one who is wise and knowing. This method therefore points to 
the existence of the creator (al-ilāh) for this world.1066  
In al-Rāzī’s discussion of this proof we find one unequivocal indication that 
Shihadeh, even though rightly characterising this reasoning as an argument 
from design, is nevertheless mistaken in describing it as an argument for God’s 
existence: No book, al-Rāzī states, provides a better explanation of this kind of 
proof than the Qurʾān, and this is most evident in God’s words in Q. 2.164.1067 
                                                          
1061 Ibid., p. 228. 
1062 This is Q. 40.57. 
1063 Ibid., p. 228. 
1064 Ibid., p. 233. 
1065 Shihadeh 2008, p. 201. 
1066 Al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib, vol. 1, part 1, p. 233. 
1067 Ibid., p. 235. 
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We have come across this very verse, which speaks of signs contained in the 
heavens and the earth, in the alternation of night and day and so forth, in the 
Tafsīr, and it became clear that al-Rāzī understands it as being concerned with 
the proof that God, none other, is the one who brought about the world. It 
therefore follows that al-Rāzī’s invocation of the notion of arrangement (tadbīr) 
in this world is indeed an argument from design – yet, not for the existence of 
God, but rather for God’s being sole creator.      
Further Indication of the Purpose of the Proof of the Creator and 
Reference to the Existence of God 
What al-Rāzī’s detailed account of these four methods reveals is also confirmed 
by a subsequent chapter with the title ‘On the words spoken by the greatest of 
all people regarding this issue.’1068 This chapter appears as part of a section of 
the Maṭālib which deals with ‘the proofs, contained in the higher and lower 
world, which point to the existence of the eternal creator (al-ilāh).’1069 In this 
chapter, al-Rāzī mentions the tradition we have already come across in his al-
Tafsīr according to which the Prophet asked ʿImran b. al-Huṣayn how many 
āliha he has besides God (Allāh).1070 We recall that this tradition is evidently 
concerned with stressing that only God is the true creator, from which it follows 
that only He deserves worship. These two aspects are contained in the term ilāh. 
Al-Rāzī then mentions a tradition about certain heretics (zanādiqa) who ‘denied 
the creator’1071 and whom the sixth Shiite Imām Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad al-Ṣādiq (d. 
148/765) tried to convince that ‘your ilāh is the one you turn to’1072 in times of 
hardship. Al-Rāzī comments on this tradition that it contains the same 
reasoning as Q. 29.65 where God speaks: {Whenever they go on board a ship 
they call on God, and dedicate their faith to Him alone}.1073 Once more, it 
becomes clear that the denial of the creator mentioned in the tradition has 
nothing to do with the denial of God’s existence; the heretics’ belief in God’s 
existence is out of question, but they are neglectful when it comes to their 
                                                          
1068 Ibid., p. 240. 
1069 Ibid., p. 237. 
1070 Ibid., p. 240. 
1071 Ibid., p. 240. 
1072 Ibid., p. 240. 
1073 Ibid., p. 241. 
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acknowledging God as their ilāh to whom they should be grateful as He brings 
about everything. Furthermore, al-Rāzī mentions that al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820) 
was once asked about ‘the proof for the creator.’1074 He replied by mentioning 
the existence of certain things in this world which are beneficial for humans and 
concluded: ‘So the one who arranges all these bodies according to this 
marvellous system is God (Praised!).’1075 The proof of the creator here clearly 
denotes the proof that God is the one who brings into existence and arranges all 
things. The same chapter on the proof of the creator contains yet another 
argument brought forward by al-Rāzī which appears in the form of a poem by 
Abū Nuwās (d. ca. 199/813). It reads: ‘ponder over the plants of the earth and 
look / at the traces of what the Sovereign produced / …which bear witness / 
that God has no associate (sharīk).’1076 Al-Rāzī does not comment on this poem 
at all, but the content of the poem as well as the fact that he mentions it in the 
context of the proof of the creator shows in the clearest way that the existence 
of God is not at stake at all, but rather the defence of God’s unique role as 
creator. Finally, one account al-Rāzī mentions in the same section is worth 
further consideration as al-Rāzī begins it with the words: ‘Doubt about the 
existence of God (Most-High!) (shakk fī wujūd Allāh) occurred to the heart of a 
certain king.’1077 It is not the (existence of the) creator which is denied or 
doubted in this account, but God’s existence. What does al-Rāzī mean by it and 
how does it fit in with the overarching theme of this chapter? The story itself 
told by al-Rāzī seems to tie in with all the previous accounts seeking to prove 
that the world exists due to another and that this other is none but God. The 
story runs that this doubting king had a wise vizier who, at the honour of his 
king, transformed ruins into beautiful cities. Upon the king’s question how these 
splendid cities came about, the vizier replied: ‘We found these things had come 
about (ḥadathat) spontaneously due to themselves without a builder.’1078 The 
king realised the obvious absurdity of this, to which the vizier replied: ‘If the 
occurrence (ḥudūth) of these buildings is impossible without an architect…, 
                                                          
1074 Ibid., p. 241. 
1075 Ibid., p. 241. 
1076 Ibid., p. 242. 
1077 Ibid., p. 246. 
1078 Ibid., p. 246. 
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then the originatedness (ḥudūth) of the lower and higher world with all the 
wondrous and strange things in them without one who brings them about and 
an arranger is even more impossible.’1079 Thereupon, the king returned to ‘the 
true religion.’1080 Why is it then that al-Rāzī speaks of God’s existence which the 
king doubted, not the existence of the creator? An indication of what he means 
by it can be found when we return to al-Rāzī’s al-Tafsīr. In Q. 14.9-10, God 
speaks of previous nations who rejected the messengers sent to them saying: 
{We do not believe the message with which you were sent. We have serious 
doubts about what you are asking us to do}. The messengers are said to have 
replied: {Can there be any doubt about God, the Creator of the heavens and the 
earth?} It is important to note that al-Rāzī describes the conflict between these 
nations and their messengers as being about the veracity of their prophethood 
which the former doubted, yet it is evident that the existence of God itself was 
not at stake: ‘*We do not believe the message with which you were sent} – its 
meaning is: We disbelieve in what you claim that God sent you with, (and this is) 
because they did not acknowledge that they were (indeed) sent (by God).’1081 
The doubt expressed by these people solely refers to the messengers’ call to 
tawḥīd, but not to belief in God’s existence, as becomes clear when al-Rāzī states: 
‘When those unbelievers said to the messengers: {We have serious doubts 
about what you are asking us to do}, their messengers said: Are you doubting 
God…while all we call you to is worship of this ilāh, the Benefactor, and all we 
forbid you is worship of another than Him?’1082 Having hence identified the 
nature of the conflict taking place, we must then read the following statement 
made by al-Rāzī against this very background:  
The author of the Kashshāf [i.e., al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1143)- said: the hamza 
of negation (hamza al-inkār) was introduced [i.e., in {a-fī’llāh shakk}] because the 
speech does not focus on the doubt, rather it focuses on that the existence of God 
(Most-High!) does not include doubt (wujūd Allāh taʿālā lā yaḥtamilu al-shakk). I 
[i.e., al-Rāzī- say: There are people who say that before the arrival of clear proofs, 
human nature (fiṭra) bears witness to the existence of the choosing creator.1083  
                                                          
1079 Ibid., p. 246. 
1080 Ibid., p. 246. 
1081 Al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr, vol. 19, p. 92. 
1082 Ibid., pp. 92-93. 
1083 Ibid., p. 93. 
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We can infer from the aforementioned that expressing doubts about God is not 
intended by al-Rāzī as referring to doubts that God, the object of worship, 
actually exists and is real, so to say, as the context provided by al-Rāzī himself 
clarifies. The same must be true for the expression ‘doubt about God’s existence.’ 
It is noteworthy that al-Rāzī sees al-Zamakhsharī’s statement that ‘the existence 
of God (Most-High!) does not include doubt’ as being related to the almost self-
evident nature of the knowledge that the world is God’s creation. ‘Doubting God’ 
and ‘doubt about God’s existence,’ it hence appears, has to do with expressing 
doubt about what cannot reasonably be declared untrue of God: that He alone is 
creator, that He sends messengers and that none but He is worthy of worship. 
Returning to the account of the king whose heart felt ‘doubt about the existence 
of God,’ we may now draw a parallel to al-Rāzī’s explanation in the Tafsīr: The 
king doubted that the world is God’s creation as is evident from the 
conversation between him and his vizier, and it is because of this theme that al-
Rāzī mentions it in the section dealing with proofs for the creator. The story of 
the doubting king is not concerned with the question of whether God actually 
exists or how His existence can be proven, and just as in the account in the 
Tafsīr, the mention of doubt about God’s existence means doubting God in what 
should be evident about Him. 
The chapter entitled ‘On the words spoken by the greatest of all people 
regarding this issue’ where the story of the doubting king appears is, however, 
not the only chapter where al-Rāzī’s mentioning God’s existence makes us sit up 
and take notice. It is followed by a chapter with the title ‘On the enumeration of 
the proofs which the different classes of people in this world mentioned.’1084 It 
begins with al-Rāzī noting that throughout history different people followed 
different methods ‘to affirm the knowledge of God (Most-High!).’1085 They can 
be divided in three classes: those who enquire into the beliefs of nations long 
gone;1086 those associated with Sufi practices;1087 and finally the ordinary 
people in this world.1088 
                                                          
1084 Al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib, vol. 1, part 1, p. 249. 
1085 Ibid., p. 249. 
1086 ‘al-ʿulamāʾ al-bāḥithūna ʿan tawārīkh ahl al-dunyā wa-maʿrifa al-aḥwāl al-māḍiya min aḥwāl 
hādhā al-ʿālam’ (p. 249). 
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In their endeavour to ‘affirm the creator (al-ilāh) for this world,’1089 the first 
group holds that ‘enquiry into the history of the people of this world shows that 
there was never a group worth mentioning who denied the existence of God 
(Most-High!) (yankirūna wujūd Allāh) and all their disagreement concerned 
was the ,divine- attributes.’1090 All people, al-Rāzī carries on, acknowledged an 
arranger (shayʾ yudabbiru) for this world. This is true for Muslims, Christians 
and Jews who obviously ‘acknowledge (muʿtarifūna) the existence of God 
(Most-High!),’1091 but also for the Zoroastrians (al-majūs).1092  All these groups, 
who have in common that they affirm prophecy, agree upon ‘the affirmation of 
the existence of God (Most-High!).’1093 Those people, on the other hand, who did 
not believe that God sends messengers, nevertheless were unanimous about 
‘the affirmation of the existence of the creator’1094 as well. Al-Rāzī mentions the 
Arabs who lived before the arrival of Islam (ahl al-jāhiliyya) and explains that 
their affirmation of it is evident from the Qurʾānic verses *If you ,Prophet- ask 
them who created the heavens and the earth, they are sure to answer, ‘God,’+1095 
and {Can there be any doubt about God, the Creator of the heavens and the 
earth?}1096 which is the very same verse we discussed previously in connection 
with al-Rāzī’s account of the doubting king. Al-Rāzī furthermore mentions the 
Indians among those who ‘affirm the existence of the creator’1097 as well as 
Negros (al-zanūj), the Turks, the Chinese, the Byzantines, the Berbers and the 
Greeks.1098 This investigation leads al-Rāzī to conclude that, ‘if one human 
should have a suspicion or doubt about the existence of the creator, then it has 
                                                                                                                                                                    
1087 ‘aṣḥāb al-riyāḍāt wa-arbāb al-mukāshafāt’ (p. 254). 
1088 ‘ṭawāʾif ahl al-ʿālam al-ladhīna ḥaṣalat lahum ʿuqūl kāmila…illā annahum lam yashtaghilū bi-
ṭalb al-ʿulūm al-daqīqa’ (p. 272). 
1089 Ibid., p. 249. 
1090 Ibid., p. 249. 
1091 Ibid., pp. 249-250. 
1092 Ibid., pp. 250-251. 
1093 Ibid., p. 251. 
1094 Ibid., p. 251. 
1095 This is Q. 39.38. 
1096 This is Q. 14.10. 
1097 Ibid., p. 251. 
1098 Ibid., pp. 251-252. 
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to be that this doubt and suspicion occur due to the insufficiency of his reason 
and understanding, but not due to the non-existence of what is sought.’1099  
With regards the second class of people, those who are associated with Sufism, 
as well as the third class, the ordinary people who have sound minds but do not 
engage with sciences, it shall suffice to point out that al-Rāzī solely mentions 
their ways of affirming the creator, but leaves the existence of God entirely 
unmentioned.1100  
If we now want to answer the question of which role al-Rāzī’s mentioning ‘the 
existence of God’ plays in this context, we need to bear a few points in mind: 
Firstly, it is notable that al-Rāzī introduces the whole passage as being 
concerned with the methods of each of the three groups to gain ‘knowledge of 
God.’ We have come across this phrase multiple times and have seen that in 
every single instance, it referred to attaining knowledge about God’s essence, 
attributes and acts. It is safe to assume that here al-Rāzī does not mean anything 
else. Secondly, it should be kept in mind that the chapter appears as part of the 
main section entitled ‘On detailing the proofs for the existence of the eternal 
creator’1101 and must hence be concerned with precisely this question. Except 
for the three instances in the section on the first class of people, and among 
them those who affirm prophecy, al-Rāzī nowhere mentions ‘the existence of 
God.’ And in the instance he mentions ‘the existence of God,’ this appears under 
the heading, so to speak, of their approach to ‘affirming the creator for this 
world.’ Thirdly, as for the instances where he mentions God’s existence, they 
                                                          
1099 Ibid., p. 252. Note that al-Rāzī ends the whole section by concluding: ‘So this is what points 
to the proofs, derived from the knowledge about history, for the existence of the creator for this 
world’ (p. 254). 
1100 With regards to the second group, al-Rāzī once more refers to Q. 29.65 which reads: 
{Whenever they go on board a ship they call on God, and dedicate their faith to Him alone, but 
once He has delivered them safely back to land, see how they ascribe partners to Him.} We have 
seen before how al-Rāzī associates this verse in his Tafsīr with people’s failure to acknowledge 
only God as creator and to offer gratitude to Him alone. In the Maṭālib, al-Rāzī now mentions 
this very verse in connection with the second group who maintain that some people are 
persistent in their ‘denial of the creator, the arranger (nafī al-ilāh al-mudabbir),’ yet in times of 
hardship they become aware of their ‘subordination to the creator of the world,’ only to 
eventually return to their doubts (p. 271). As for the third group, al-Rāzī states that their 
affirmation of the choosing creator comes close to being a precaution (aqrab ilā al-iḥtiyāṭ) 
against denying him. Affirming the creator is wiser than not to. Al-Rāzī thereby restates his 
‘wager’ which we have discussed (in a footnote) at the end of the section on the Tafsīr (p. 272). 
1101 Ibid., p. 237. 
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pertain to the general remark attributed by al-Rāzī to the historians that all 
people throughout history affirmed God’s existence and that this is particularly 
and obviously true of those groups who affirmed prophecy. It now appears that 
what al-Rāzī here means by ‘the existence of God’ is really nothing else than the 
belief that God exists. He seems to want to stress that all nations believed in 
divinity, their disagreement as to God’s nature (i.e., attributes) left aside. A 
reading of al-Rāzī’s mentioning ‘God’s existence’ in this context in analogy to the 
way he used it in the Tafsīr – where ‘God’s existence does not comprise doubt’ 
meant that God cannot be doubted in what He reveals or what the messengers 
say about Him – does not seem convincing here: It would be contradictory if al-
Rāzī counted those who deny prophecy among those who affirm God’s existence 
in the sense that they do not doubt Him and His words. In general, however, we 
have to keep in mind that al-Rāzī is concerned with the enquiry into different 
methods to gain knowledge of God. The method according to all three groups 
appears as reasoning which establishes God as creator. Therefore, even if it 
should be true that in this chapter al-Rāzī for the first time mentions the issue of 
God’s existence, it still has to be distinguished from what the proof of the 
creator seeks to establish and the proof of God’s existence (in the traditional 
sense) remains absent from al-Rāzī’s endeavour. Very much in line with the 
mutakallimūn’s own approach in their theological works, al-Rāzī here presents 
God’s existence as a fact undisputed among all people and nations, and solely 
focuses on how different groups throughout history sought to gain knowledge 
about God in terms of His attributes.  
God the Creator – An Agent or Necessary Cause? 
Our examination of al-Rāzī’s discussions pertaining to the affirmation of the 
creator in four of his works shed light on the essential role the proof of God’s 
being originator of the entire world played in his thought. In this respect, al-
Rāzī’s works are not distinct from the kalām works of his predecessors; yet, we 
recall that many mutakallimūn, with a view to the philosophers’ conception of 
God, were eager to stress that God is cause of the world in a specific way. The 
major part of al-Juwaynī’s affirmation of the creator in his al-Irshād, for example, 
is not so much concerned with establishing the link between the world and God 
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as its mukhaṣṣiṣ as with clarifying the nature of this mukhaṣṣiṣ. Al-Juwaynī 
presented the three alternatives that God could be ‘one who necessitates (mūjib) 
the realisation of the origination in the same manner as the ʿilla which 
necessitates (mūjiba) its effect’ or ‘a nature (ṭabīʿa) as the naturalists 
(ṭabāʾiʿiyyūn) assume’ or finally ‘a choosing agent (fāʿil mukhtār).’1102 Other 
mutakallimūn, such as al-Malāḥimī in his al-Muʿtamad fī uṣūl al-dīn1103 and al-
Ghazālī in his Tahāfut al-falāsifa,1104 likewise made choice and will an essential 
part of their notion of God as creator. How, then, does al-Rāzī approach this 
aspect of the proof of the creator? Unlike in the case of al-Juwaynī, to clearly 
define the concept of the creator, and in particular to distinguish it from the 
philosophers’ notion (as viewed by the theologians) of God as necessitating 
cause bereft of will, does not seem to play a major role for al-Rāzī in his proof of 
the creator. In the section on the affirmation of the creator in the Ishāra, al-Rāzī 
uses the terms ṣāniʿ, sabab and muqtaḍin1105 interchangeably without further 
defining them or stating in which way God is a cause. The first time the 
distinction made by al-Juwaynī between a willing agent and a necessitating 
cause seems to come into play is where al-Rāzī begins his discussion of the 
hypostatic divine attributes. There, the idea of God being a necessary, essential 
cause is rejected and made the basis of the affirmation of the attribute of 
power.1106 The same discussion also contains a much later section entitled ‘On 
the impossibility that He (Most-High!) causes essentially (mūjib bi’l-dhāt)’1107 
which constitutes a proper refutation of the philosophers. In the Arbaʿīn, al-Rāzī 
also employs a host of terms to describe God in His role as creator, such as 
ṣāniʿ,1108 muʾaththir,1109 mukhaṣṣiṣ,1110 murajjiḥ1111 and muḥdith,1112 but only 
                                                          
1102 Al-Juwaynī, al-Irshād, p. 28. 
1103 Al-Malāḥimī, al-Muʿtamad, p. 83: ‘(Firstly,) the influence coming from an influencer 
according to choice, and this is the act (fiʿl), (and secondly,) an influence coming from a 
necessitating influencer, which is the ḥukm of the ʿilla or the musabbab of the sabab. We will 
now clarify that His essence is not one that necessitates, like an ʿilla or sabab.’ 
1104 See Chapter Three which deals with the philosophers and theologians’ respective notions of 
the terms fāʿil/agent and ṣāniʿ/creator. Al-Ghazālī maintains: ‘The agent is not called fāʿil and 
ṣāniʿ because he is a cause (sabab), only, rather because he is a cause in a specific way, namely 
due to will and choice’ (Tahāfut 1927, p. 97). 
1105 Al-Rāzī, al-Ishāra, p. 75. 
1106 Ibid., p. 108 and p. 110: ‘lam takun mūjidiyyatuhu li-dhātihi’. 
1107 Ibid., p. 161. 
1108 Al-Rāzī, al-Arbaʿīn, vol. 1, p. 101. 
1109 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 101. 
1110 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 121. 
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deals with the concepts of a necessary cause (al-ʿilla al-mūjiba1113 and mūjib 
bi’l-dhāt1114) and a powerful, choosing agent (qādir fāʿil mukhtar)1115 in his 
discussion of the first of God’s hypostatic attributes, His being powerful. The 
many chapters in the Maṭālib concerned with the proof of the creator are no 
real exception from this rule. Whether al-Rāzī makes use of the term ilāh or fāʿil 
or ṣāniʿ, he does not engage in defining them – except for in two instances, as it 
appears: One of them is where he presents the reasoning on the basis of the 
possibility of the attributes.1116 There he states, after having affirmed a 
muʾaththir for the world, that the mutakallimūn would continue asking whether 
this muʾaththir is one who causes necessarily due to the nature of his essence 
(mūjib bi’l-dhāt) or an agent endowed with choice (fāʿil bi’l-ikhtiyār). Ruling out 
the first option, al-Rāzī is led to conclude ‘that the creator (ilāh) of the world 
is…a choosing agent and not a necessitating cause.’1117 The other instance is in 
the section discussed above where al-Rāzī divides those who seek knowledge 
about God into three classes.1118 There, he presents the ‘wager’ we already 
encountered in the Tafsīr which states: ‘Either this world has a creator (ilāh) or 
not… Then we say: Either the creator of this world is a choosing agent (fāʿilan 
mukhtāran) or not…’1119 Other than these two instances, it is once more only in 
his discussion of the hypostatic divine attributes, and the attribute of power in 
particular, that al-Rāzī objects to the notion of God being a necessary cause 
(mūjib bi’l-dhāt)1120 and defends His being a choosing agent (fāʿil mukhtār).1121 
It would surely be wrong to conclude that to specify the way in which God is the 
world’s cause is not of importance to al-Rāzī since it does not play an essential 
role in the sections on the affirmation of the creator. After all, in all of his works 
                                                                                                                                                                    
1111 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 121. 
1112 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 124. 
1113 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 180. 
1114 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 182. 
1115 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 183. 
1116 Al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib, vol. 1, part 1, p. 184. 
1117 Ibid., p. 186.     
1118 Ibid., p. 249 et seqq.: ‘On the enumeration of the proofs mentioned by different classes of 
people.’ 
1119 Ibid., p. 272. Compare the ‘wager’ in the Tafsīr: ‘Firstly, the affirmation of the existence of 
the creator (al-ilāh) is very wise… Secondly, the affirmation of his being a choosing agent 
(fāʿilan mukhtār) (is very wise) because if he was a necessary cause (mūjiban)…’ (vol. 19, p. 75). 
1120 Al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib, vol. 2, part 3, p. 86. 
1121 Ibid., p. 89. 
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he does make the point elsewhere that God is an agent endowed with will, 
power and choice. Nevertheless, it seems justified to conclude that the focus of 
al-Rāzī’s proof for the creator has shifted – away from what was al-Juwaynī’s 
major concern, that is, God’s nature as cause, to the more underlying proof that 
the world actually depends on another, namely God, for its existence.  
Conclusions 
It is evident from the four works written by al-Rāzī we considered in this 
chapter that he understands the message of Islam and the Qurʾān as being 
addressed to people who were very much embedded in a world where divinity 
had its established place, yet who failed when it comes to the correct way of 
approaching the divine. It is in this very context that al-Rāzī introduces his 
discussions of the proofs for the (existence of the) creator, which in secondary 
literature is portrayed as being concerned with proving that God exists. Al-
Rāzī’s many references to the prophets sent by God revealed that he links the 
proof of the creator to the endeavour to show that only Allah (God) is creator 
and that only He is therefore deserving of worship. Neither the celestial bodies 
worshipped by Abraham’s people nor the many associates ascribed to Allah by 
the people of Muḥammad’s time are creators and hence are not deserving of 
worship. In this context, the proof of the creator has the function of a proof for 
tawḥīd, not however for the existence of God. The endeavour of theology is 
presented by al-Rāzī in essentially the same light and with the same purpose: It 
seeks to make God know in terms of His essence and attributes, yet it does so 
because the knowledge of God’s uniqueness is a prerequisite for worship of Him. 
Only once humans know that God’s essence is unique – and this means that 
God’s essence is completely different from the essences that belong to created 
things – they know that only God is worthy of worship, obedience and gratitude. 
Al-Rāzī also made the point that a number of other disciplines, such as 
jurisprudence and Qurʾānic exegesis, rest and depend on the knowledge of 
God’s being creator. In order to achieve this, the theologian makes use of the 
very same method already employed by the prophets referred to in the Qurʾān, 
which al-Rāzī refers to as the proof of the creator: Knowledge of God’s essence 
and attributes is attained on the basis of His role as creator of the world, since 
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the characteristics of creation point to the characteristics of the entity which is 
its creator. Theology seeks nothing else than what all prophets sought, and in 
this particular quest, the proof of God’s existence in its traditional form is 
simply of no concern.  
Since it became evident that al-Rāzī’s concerns resemble those of the very first 
theologians, such as al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm, and philosophers, such as al-Kindī, as 
well as of those who came after them, we must therefore conclude the following: 
The philosophico-theological discourse which is concerned with the proof of 
God’s being sole creator and a unique entity did not change in essence, even if it 
is the case, as we have seen, that the terminology as well as arguments and 
methods employed changed and were developed over time.1122 
  
                                                          
1122 Hassan Wassouf (2005, p. 123) has also pointed out, with reference to the Arbaʿīn, how al-
Rāzī makes use of philosophical terminology in his proofs of the originatedness of the world and 
his discussion of God’s nature (by Wassouf understood as al-Rāzī’s proof of the existence of God 
(‘Gottesbeweis’, p. 120): ‘Er ist schließlich aber auch der Versuch einer Harmonisierung zweier 
eigentlich inkompatibler Weltkonzepte: Das Konzept der islamischen Philosophen von einem 
Gott, der reiner wuǧūd ist…und das Konzept des kalām, in dem ein personaler Schöpfergott 
,angenommen wird-… Er zeigt somit, wie verlockend das philosophische Vokabular für einen 
mutakallim des 12. Jahrhunders war’.  
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Conclusion 
At the beginning of this thesis, we posed the question of whether it really is the 
case, as often argued in the secondary academic literature, that medieval 
Islamic theologians and philosophers sought to prove God’s existence. Having 
investigated a number of important mutakallimūn and philosophers of the 
classical era, we have alluded to certain indications that suggest that the 
discourse these scholars participated in has indeed been misconstrued: Their 
discussions surrounding the originatedness versus eternity of the world and the 
affirmation of the creator were not concerned, as it has been argued, with the 
proof and provability of God’s existence, in the sense traditionally associated 
with arguments for God’s existence. The proof of God’s existence, in this sense, 
is in fact absent from their works. Rather, the discourse these scholars 
participated in was a discourse on the question of in which way the world is 
creation and God its creator, inspired by the manifold Qurʾānic verses stating 
{God is the Creator of all things}1123 and the like. Their main concern was, 
therefore, to defend the truth of Scripture. This pursuit did not only involve the 
refutation of those who assumed that the world simply is, independent of 
another, or came about by chance, thus clearly contradicting the Qurʾān. It also 
meant that each group would defend their particular understanding of what 
Scripture meant when it states that God created everything. This latter aspect 
became most apparent in the different accounts mutakallimūn and 
philosophers presented of the mode of God’s creation of the world: The 
mutakallimūn understood the Qurʾānic account of creation as denoting that the 
world was created ex nihilo (rather than formed from pre-eternal prime matter) 
and after a state of affairs where only God existed, but not the world. The 
philosophers interpreted the Qurʾānic pronouncements as indicating that 
creation itself has no first beginning and that the world existed eternally with 
and through God.  
Medieval Islamic scholars sought to prove that God really is the one who 
brought the world into existence not only in order to confirm Scripture’s 
position in this regard, but also because they argued, following the Qurʾānic 
                                                          
1123 This is Q. 39.62. 
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reasoning, that it is through God’s role as creator that His sole worthiness of 
worship is explained. They sometimes expressed this as tawḥīd al-rubūbiyya 
(God’s oneness as creator) and tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya (God’s uniqueness in being 
deserving of worship). The affirmation of God’s oneness and uniqueness 
(tawḥīd), so central to the Qurʾānic message, also includes, in the eyes of the 
mutakallimūn and philosophers, God’s nature. As in the case of their discussion 
of the mode of creation, their investigation of God’s nature was precipitated by 
certain Qurʾānic pronouncements, in particular the declaration that *There is 
nothing like Him (laysa ka-mithlihi shayʾ)}.1124 To the exclusion of Ibn Sīnā, all 
scholars we discussed held that the only method of gaining knowledge of God’s 
nature (so as to confirm what the Qurʾān says about Him) is through His role as 
creator. The characteristics of creation, they argued, are indicative of the 
characteristics of its agent – this being the so-called analogy between the shāhid, 
the observable realm, and the ghāʾib, the unobservable realm. Ibn Sīnā for his 
part argued that true knowledge of God’s nature is attained by considering God 
alone (i.e., insofar as He is pure existence and the necessarily existent due to 
essence). This is where the later theologians and philosophers – Ibn Sīnā, al-
Juwaynī, al-Ghazālī, Ibn Rushd and al-Rāzī – began to speak of affirming or 
proving ‘God’s existence’; the difference between God and creation became now 
expressed in terms of the difference between His type of existence and their 
existence, clearly under the influence of Ibn Sīnā’s identification of metaphysics’ 
subject matter as existence qua existence and its consequences. We showed that 
they did not mean by this phrase what is meant by it when speaking about 
classical cosmological, teleological or ontological arguments for God’s existence , 
despite the claim to the contrary in much of the secondary academic literature; 
rather, their proof and affirmation of God’s existence always referred to the 
classification of God’s particular kind of existence, a sense in which it does not 
appear primarily in the aforementioned classical arguments. If God is unlike 
creation, as the Qurʾān states, He must be transcendent and incorporeal, these 
scholars argued, even if the anthropomorphists (mujassima) maintained the 
opposite. Yet, is God to be considered an existent at all, if He does not resemble 
created existents in any way, certain philosophers and the bāṭiniyya demanded. 
                                                          
1124 This is Q. 42.11. 
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And how does existence in God relate to His essence, especially in comparison 
to the other divine attributes?              
Our discussion of the earliest Islamic theologians and philosophers, such as al-
Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm and al-Kindī, as well as of their successors of later generations, 
up until Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, showed that it is these aspects and questions 
which inexorably characterise the discourse in which they participated. The all-
important aspect of confirming Scripture was most evident in al-Qāsim whose 
Kitāb al-dalīl al-kabīr is almost entirely based on Qurʾānic verses speaking 
about God’s role as creator. Al-Qāsim already employed the Qurʾānic reasoning 
that creation points to God’s being creator and allows the inference of the divine 
attributes and characteristics from the attributes and characteristics of creation. 
Al-Kindī, Islam’s first philosopher, shared these concerns, but he very much 
drew on methods and ideas associated with Greek philosophy. For example, his 
proof of God’s being creator did not require the premise of the world’s origin in 
time, so characteristic of the mutakallimūn; instead he interpreted God’s role as 
creator in terms of His being the bestower of oneness. Certain notions, which 
should come to underlie the arguments used by later theologians and 
philosophers in this discourse, can already be found in al-Qāsim and his fellow 
Muʿtazilites. This includes the notions of particularisation (ikhtiṣāṣ, takhṣīṣ) and 
change (taghayyur) (this forming the basis of the atomistic worldview of the 
Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite mutakallimūn), which all have a Qurʾānic origin. The 
treatment of these very same questions on the part of later mutakallimūn, 
starting with al-Māturīdī, appeared in a much more systematised way, so 
characteristic of kalām. Unlike in al-Qāsim, their discussions are mainly based 
on rational argumentation without much direct reference to the Qurʾān. Yet, the 
spirit of the Qurʾān is still discernable, for example, in the arrangement of 
chapters, later having become the standard, where the originatedness of the 
world is made the premise for the inference that God is its creator. These later 
scholars, such as Ibn Rushd and al-Rāzī, would present a synthesis of 
speculative arguments, often based on atomism and employing the 
aforementioned notions of particularisation as well as permissibility (imkān, 
jawāz) and necessity (wujūb), and the Qurʾānic arguments pointing to God’s 
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role as creator, such as the argument from the development of humans from 
sperm.  
Already in al-Māturīdī and in al-Bāqillānī it became apparent that the 
confirmation of Scripture meant more than just the proof that God brought 
about the world at all. It also meant to disprove the validity of beliefs 
considered contrary to the way each scholar understood the mode of creation. 
Al-Māturīdī represents one of the earliest instances of a theologian discussing 
the issue of the notion of God as cause. He was eager to refute the view that God 
is a necessary cause due to His nature, often ascribed to the philosophers, which 
should become a standard element in the theologians’ defence of the notion of 
the creator who brings into existence due to will and choice. In al-Juwaynī, the 
affirmation of the way in which God is the cause of the world took precedence 
over the all-important affirmation of the principle of causation itself. Under the 
influence of philosophy, al-Ghazālī and al-Rāzī later adopted certain 
terminology, originally rejected by the mutakallimūn as not apt to describe God 
in His role as creator. Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd exemplified how the philosophers 
employed the very same terminology used by the theologians, which was of 
course oftentimes of a Qurʾānic origin, but how they associated their very own 
interpretation of the mode of creation and God’s being creator with these terms. 
Ibn Sīnā criticised the mutakallimūn for their method of inferring God’s 
attribute of being creator from the premise that the world has a first beginning 
for its existence. Had they considered God Himself, rather than creation, they 
would have been able to grasp the true meaning of Scripture’s account of 
creation, which is eternal emanation. Interestingly, al-Juwaynī has to be singled 
out among the mutakallimūn as he, too, presented an argument establishing the 
way in which the world is creation (i.e., temporally originated) based on the 
consideration of God’s nature as a willing, choosing agent.  
Why is it then that the proof of God’s existence, in the traditional sense, is 
absent from the works of medieval Islamic theologians and philosophers? As 
noted in the Introduction, the answer to this question is a difficult one, and one 
needs to be careful not to slip into assumptions. From the textual evidence we 
can infer two things: firstly, not only are proofs for God’s existence not to be 
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found in the works we examined, but their authors do not provide us with any 
explicit statement either, explaining why, or acknowledging that, these 
arguments are not part of their discourses. They are simply silent on this point. 
Secondly, from the issues they actually do discuss we can infer what questions 
concerned them and why. We have seen how all theologians and philosophers 
alike, whom we included in our survey, shared the primary concern of proving 
one of the key tenets of the Qurʾān: it is God who has created everything. This 
point, as well as all other related discussion, do therefore have their starting 
point in the Qurʾān, something both theologians and philosophers variously 
noted. This tells us that they did not conceive of the Qurʾān itself as being 
concerned with the proof of God’s existence, nor that their discussions of the 
proof of the creator and the like actually deviated from what they identified as 
the Qurʾān’s concern in this respect. Furthermore, we have pointed out that the 
way in which these scholars perceived the audiences for whom they wrote 
indicates that the question of the provability and proof of God’s existence was 
not considered in need of discussion. This statement, however, already seems to 
assume too much: the textual evidence does in fact not even allow us the 
conclusion that they thought there was no need to discuss this question; this 
seems to imply that they were aware of it in the first place. Yet, how can this be 
established if the texts we examined are completely silent on this issue?! All we 
can say, based on the textual evidence considered, is that classical Islamic 
theology and metaphysics do no include the proof and provability of God’s 
existence.     
Let us then conclude with the following remark: It is in fact not that astonishing 
that the purpose of the arguments employed by the aforementioned theologians 
and philosophers has been misunderstood, as it seems, in the secondary 
academic literature. After all, not only the reasoning these arguments follow, 
but also the terminology employed seems to clearly indicate that their concern 
is the proof of God’s existence – God’s existence in the sense in which it is used 
in classical cosmological or other arguments for God’s existence. Who would 
deny that such phrases as ‘the proof that the world has a creator,’ ‘the 
affirmation of the creator for creation’ or ‘the proof of the existence of the 
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creator’ immediately bring to mind a cosmological argument for God’s existence? 
This impression is even more reinforced when we read about the endeavour on 
the part of theologians and philosophers to prove ‘God’s existence’ or when al-
Rāzī speaks of ‘the affirmation of the knowledge of the ilāh (Most-High!),’ 
considering that the term ilāh is commonly taken to denote the deity. Moreover, 
if one does not take into account the broader context in which these discussions 
take place and if one is not careful to investigate the sense in which certain 
terminology was used, it is easy to be misled and to fail to see the purpose of 
these discussions. This became most evident in the use and meaning of the two 
phrases ‘the proof for the creator’ and ‘the proof for God’s existence’, which 
turned out to denote entirely different things depending on whether they are 
used in the context of a traditional proof of God’s existence (in particular 
cosmological arguments) or whether they were part of a discourse about God’s 
role as creator and His nature. In particular when approaching these Islamic 
arguments with the workings of traditional cosmological arguments for God’s 
existence in mind, it is difficult not to be lead somewhat astray. In cosmological 
arguments, as is known, the proof that God exists is the proof that there is a 
cause or creator for this world. In Kukkonen’s words: ‘that we have 
a…maker…means that we have a God.’1125 Yet, in the Islamic arguments this is 
not the case, as we have shown, and it is definitely not intended by their 
proponents. We recall al-Rāzī, to name only one example, who stated that ‘the 
non-existence of the effect must be due to the non-existence of the cause’.1126 
We noted that al-Rāzī uttered these words in reference to the non-existent 
world before God brought it about, and we explained that, in this context, ‘the 
non-existence of the cause’ does, of course, not mean God’s non-existence but 
His not being a cause. Therefore, unlike in traditional cosmological arguments, 
our theologians and philosophers did not extend the question of whether the 
created world exists due to a creator to the question of whether this does or 
could prove that God really does exist. They had a different concern, as we have 
shown. 
                                                          
1125 Kukkonen 2002, pp. 406-407.   
1126 Al-Rāzī, Maʿālim uṣūl al-dīn, p. 56. 
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It should lastly be noted that all the arguments we have encountered in the 
works of medieval Islamic theologians and philosophers, spanning from the 
range of constructs in al-Qāsim to al-Rāzī, could, of course, be utilised by 
someone seeking to prove God’s existence. It has become clear on multiple 
occasions that these classical Islamic arguments resemble traditional 
arguments for God’s existence in many ways in terms of their structure. Also, as 
stressed in the Introduction, one and the same argument can be used to prove 
two separate things: on the one hand, that God has the attribute of being creator, 
as our theologians and philosophers intended to show, when they used a 
particular effect (the created world) so as to be pointed to the one entity that is 
identified as its cause (God); on the other hand, that God must exist since the 
world has a cause, as argued in the traditional arguments for God’s existence, 
where the existence of the cause is inferred from the existence of the effect and 
its need for a cause. It would surely be worth dedicating further research to the 
question at what point Islamic theologians and philosophers entered into a new 
discourse, this being the discourse on arguments for the existence of God. It 
would particularly be interesting to investigate the reasons for a possible 
change of discourse, whether they lie within the Muslim tradition itself or 
whether any influences from the outside, that is, Muslim scholars’ engagement 
with other faiths, for instance, can be pointed to. Moreover, our findings have 
further implications for the way academic scholarship has viewed arguments 
for God’s existence in western philosophy. For example, our suggestion that 
neither al-Kindī, nor Ibn Sīnā, nor Ibn Rushd attempted to formulate a proof for 
God’s existence, in the sense used in traditional arguments for God’s existence, 
but that they at the same time saw themselves, to some extent, in the tradition 
of Greek philosophy raises questions about the role of these proofs in Greek 
philosophy itself. If our findings are accepted, one may ask: does al-Kindī, Ibn 
Sīnā and Ibn Rushd’s understanding of philosophers such as Aristotle indicate 
to us how their arguments should be read? Or does their understanding simply 
represent how classical Islamic scholars adopted certain aspects from Greek 
philosophy for their own purposes, while neglecting others – for instance, the 
endeavour to prove on rational grounds that God exists.         
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1 
Ibn Sīnā’s own example of the dalīl: 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Davidson’s own version of the dalīl: 
 
  
This tree  
(Major term) 
is burnt.  
Everything burnt 
(Middle term) 
was touched by fire. 
(Minor term) 
This tree was touched by fire. 
Possibly existent 
beings 
(Major term) 
are traceable to a being 
necessarily existent by 
virtue of itself.  
Something exists 
(Middle term) 
which is possibly existent 
by virtue of itself. 
(Minor term)  
Something exists which is traceable to a 
being necessarily 
existent by virtue of 
itself.  
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Major premise 
Minor premise Cause 
Conclusion 
Effect 
Figure 3 
Davidson’s dalīl rearranged according to Ibn Sīnā’s structure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
The ten points of the investigation of God’s essence in al-Ghazālī’s Iqtiṣād, the 
first one being His existence: 
 
Something exists 
(Major term) 
which is possibly existent 
by virtue of itself. 
Possibly existent 
beings (Middle term) 
are traceable to a being 
necessarily existent by 
virtue of itself.   
(Minor term)  
Something exists which is traceable to a 
being necessarily 
existent by virtue of 
itself.  
